As I pointed out way back, if by "learning" we don't mean that odd notion that has it that one is given something wholesale where the person receiving it is entirely passive in the process--and Augustine surely isn't using "learning" that way, and neither am I, then I don't agree with Wittgenstein that learning a language can not be done via ostension. — Terrapin Station

Some aspects of language use are learned via ostension, that is not the issue. But since some aspects of language use are required, as already known, for ostensive learning to proceed, then learning language is not done entirely through ostension.

I don't see where you disagree. You agree that the student must already know how to do something, in order for ostension to be successful. So this cannot be learned through ostension. And ifsome necessary parts of language are learned through ostension, then this, what the student needs to know in order for ostension to be successful, is a necessary part of language. Now, if this, what the student needs to know in order for ostension to be successful, cannot be learned through ostension, and it is a necessary part of language, then language cannot be learned solely through ostension. What part do you disagree with?

That's not what I'm referring to. I'm referring to the fact that conventionally, "learning" doesn't connote being given something wholesale where the person receiving it was entirely passive in the process. It rather connotes something where the learner was an active participant, where learning necessarily involved them thinking about what they're hearing, etc. — Terrapin Station

I know that's what you are saying, but it's irrelevant. Suppose that the activity A is required to learn X. Also, the activity B is required for the activity A. It would be false to claim that reference to activity A provides a complete description of learning X, because we must also refer to activity B as well. The fact that referring to "activity A" necessarily implies, or "connotes" activity B is irrelevant because activity B has not been included in the description, therefore the description is incomplete. A description is explicit, not implicit. In order for the description to be complete, activity B must be described.

But since some aspects of language use are required, as already known, for ostensive learning to proceed — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree with that claim.

You agree that the student must already know how to do something, in order for ostension to be successful. — Metaphysician Undercover

They have to be able to observe and they have to be able to make a mental association between things like the sound the demonstrator is making and what the demonstrator is pointing to. That doesn't require that the person has a language already.

Just where do you believe that a language prerequisite is entering the scenario, and why do you believe that?

I disagree with that claim — Terrapin Station

We already agreed on this, that the student must already know how to do some different things, for ostension to be successful. I believe you called it mental activity. This aspect of language use, which you called mental activity is not learned through ostension because it is required for ostension. Why disagree now?

They have to be able to observe and they have to be able to make a mental association between things like the sound the demonstrator is making and what the demonstrator is pointing to. That doesn't require that the person has a language already.

Just where do you believe that a language prerequisite is entering the scenario, and why do you believe that? — Terrapin Station

I find it hard to believe that an intelligent person like yourself, has such a hard time to understand this. It's like you have a mental block. My claim is not that it is necessary that "the person has a language already". My claim is that in order for a person to use a language, it is necessary that the person know something which cannot be taught through ostension. Therefore we cannot provide an adequate description of what it means to learn a language simply by referring to ostension, because we need to describe how the person knows how to do this other thing which is not taught by ostension, but is required for ostension.

Can I get a quick vote on whether we should proceed with or without a companion, like say PMS Hacker or have a short read on Cavell’s paper “The Availability of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy”?

If you want to bring up any commentators, then feel free, as far as I'm concerned. But I am not the leader of this group.

If I recall correctly, @I like sushi, is still the leader.

We already agreed on this, that the student must already know how to do some different things, for ostension to be successful. I believe you called it mental activity. This aspect of language use, which you called mental activity is not learned through ostension because it is required for ostension. Why disagree now? — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't agree that they have to know anything about any language.

My claim is that in order for a person to use a language, it is necessary that the person know something which cannot be taught through ostension. — Metaphysician Undercover

Teaching/learning refers to the activities of both the teacher and the student. To say that the activities of the student are something additional to learning/being taught is to not undertand the terms teaching/learning.

Hence the whole tangent about Augustine not referring to only one side of that by his comments about learning, and hence my comments saying that if Wittgenstein is arguing that "learning" refers to only one side of it, and not what the student is doing, too, then Wittgenstein doesn't understand the conventional sense of the term "learning." It would be rather comical if that's all this is amounting to--that Wittgenstein doesn't understand the conventional sense of a term. But to say that learning doesn't include the student thinking about the material, etc., is to not understand what learning refers to. When we talk about learning something ostensively, we're not imagining that the student is mindless. That's not what that term refers to.

I’d say more of a “pace setter” if anything? If you wish to refer to a companion go ahead. The thing is I don’t have a copy of one and even if I had the pdf I am not willing to read one atm. Others maybe so any input you have give it.

I’ll try and ask some questions about the “ostensive” soon enough.

In the meantime perhaps we ca move the reading on to 30. Most people seem to be ploughing ahead so may as well keep it up.

I said 1-7 to start so people could find their feet if they needed to. From now on I reckon looking at around 20 sections oer week is a good enough pace (pauses if needed.)

TO ALL

It would be very, very helpful if people could note the part of the text in each reply/question/musing. This way anyone new to the topic can easily see what you’re referring to and add to the discussion.

Note: At the moment the discussion going on above is engaging the text around the 20 mark?

Perhaps you ought to simply participate and contribute rather than proliferating reading groups and readings which you don't commit yourself to.

I didn't agree that they have to know anything about any language. — Terrapin Station

It's not a matter of knowing anything about any language. That's not what we've been discussing, you're changing the subject. A person can know how to use language without knowing anything about any language.

Teaching/learning refers to the activities of both the teacher and the student. To say that the activities of the student are something additional to learning/being taught is to not undertand the terms teaching/learning. — Terrapin Station

The point is that the activities carried out by the student, which are necessary for the student's ostensive learning, are not learnt through the ostensive learning. Therefore they are "something additional" to what is learnt by the ostensive procedure. If you can't understand this then so be it.

I think it was a polite suggestion; and a welcome one.

I’m certainly no authority on Wittgenstein, but I do like trying to take on tasks where I can facilitate discussions.

I think I already stated that it helps to make explicit what W means when he talks about “language.”

It is clear enough from the outset that W is referring to “language” as the medium of communication we’re using to talk here. He is not saying “language” and referring to mental processes; he does however mention lingual thought as using language.

In this sense one, or both of you, seem to be using the term “language” as suits your position and not how W presented it. That could be a huge problem for others reading if you don’t make your use explicit.

For reference I believe W says (12-16) that we don’t need to know the word for “hammer” to understand the use of a hammer. Language doesn’t equip us with knowledge of an object simply by naming something. He thrn goes on to remark about announced words in given settings with “Slab!” having more meaing intent to it than a singular object because it is an exclaimation - here there is the difference of written and spoken language AND social context (maybe it is worth noting that in German if a word is Capitalized then it is regarded as a noun; which means when Germans read they use a marker to resolve some problems of misinterpretation by the reader.)

It can be quite hard to sift through the dramatic play of words, colloquialisms and use of rhetorical speech. I believe it is in this W is laying out some of the problems of mannerisms in language and how certain we confuse speaking with thinking - that is debatable though; nevertheless it is something that made me pause when I first read this text and thought about sketchy nature of language and how words are infinitely tightly bound sentences/phrases/paragraphs which can be reduced in this way or that completely dependent upon the contextual terminological use (eg. If I say “This is bad!”, yet in another exchange say, “This is bad!”, there is no reason for you to understand what my intent is without knowing my attitudes to some degree; “bad” can mean “good”, as in “badass.”)

W then goes on to mention something of symbolism and categories (yet I don’t think he explicitly says “categories”?) when talking of colour, shape and number (23 - ref. to language/words as “tools”, 28, 29 to 35 - talk about numbers, colours and shapes). Here he mentions that pointing out a group of items and annoucing something doesn’t make explicit what the word annouced means (could be “group,” could be “five,” could be “circular,” could be “yellow,” etc.,.) it is from here that categories are formed by cross referencing what is said in reference to what items. With numbers we do not cmoe up with the term “number” prior to the words “one, two, three, four, ...” because it is impossible to do so (or is it?) because we must first have the word items at hand order to talk about them and then categorise them as a group of “numbers.” Also, we don’t need a term for “number” to “count.” Words in this sense can be seen as nascent measurements of experience.

I think I already stated that it helps to make explicit what W means when he talks about “language.” — I like sushi

Sure, but in this case, it's not clear to me what difference that would make in either my argument or Metaphysician Undercover's argument.

I don't agree that having some of "what Wittgenstein means by 'language'" is necessary prior to learning language via ostension.

I suppose we could load "what Wittgenstein means by 'language'" in a way that it might matter, although the contortions needed for that might make it so that we might as well say "what Wittgenstein means by 'language being a necessary prerequisite'" in a manner that, if carried through wholesale for everyone, for everything they say, would disable ever taking issue with anyone about anything.

"Oh, well what Charles Manson meant by 'curing society' . . ." and so on.

It's not a matter of knowing anything about any language. That's not what we've been discussing, you're changing the subject. A person can know how to use language without knowing anything about any language. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here's the question you asked:

Does anyone disagree with what Wittgenstein is arguing, that it is impossible to learn language solely through ostension? — Metaphysician Undercover

The answer is yes, I disagree that it's impossible to learn language solely through ostension.

That the student knows or does something that's not itself language, prior to learning language via ostension, is irrelevant to the question. The question isn't whether it's impossible to learn or do any arbitrary thing that one might know/do only via learning language through ostension.

W then goes on to mention something of symbolism and categories (yet I don’t think he explicitly says “categories”?) when talking of colour, shape and number (23 - ref. to language/words as “tools”, 28, 29 to 35 - talk about numbers, colours and shapes). — I like sushi

I don't think he mentions "categories" explicitly, but he is continually referring to types, and kinds of usage, as well as senses. So if we can divide language into different ways of using words, as per #23 quoted earlier, ( https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/230433 ) then an identified way of using words, as an identified activity, is implicitly a category. Consider what is then said at #24:

24. If you do not keep the multiplicity of language-games in view
you will perhaps be inclined to ask questions like: "What is a question?"

Keep in mind what is implied in the analogy at #2 #3, that a game is a type of activity which consists of sub-classifications, different types of games such as board games, etc.. Language is a type of activity which is sub-classed into activities such as those mentioned at #23. The act of "questioning" therefore is to proceed with a type of activity which is a sub-class of the overall classification of a type of activity called "language". Thus it is a particular type of language-game within the category of "language-game", like a board game is a particular type of game within the category of "game".

I don't agree that having some of "what Wittgenstein means by 'language'" is necessary prior to learning language via ostension.

I suppose we could load "what Wittgenstein means by 'language'" in a way that it might matter, although the contortions needed for that might make it so that we might as well say "what Wittgenstein means by 'language being a necessary prerequisite'" in a manner that, if carried through wholesale for everyone, for everything they say, would disable ever taking issue with anyone about anything.

"Oh, well what Charles Manson meant by 'curing society' . . ." and so on. — Terrapin Station

In order to understand what Wittgenstein is presenting, you need to understand how he is using "language". The word "language" for Wittgenstein does not refer to a thing which you can point to and say "that is language". It refers to a type of thing, and that type of thing is an activity, just like a game is an activity. So we cannot divide language into parts as if it is a physical thing, it gets sub-divided into different types, just like one subdivision of "animal" is "mammal", and a subdivision of "mammal" is "human being". These are types. Refer to the analogy at #2 #3. "Board game" refers to a type of game. Describing what a board game consists of does not provide a description of the broader category of "game".

What Wittgenstein demonstrates is that there is at least one type of activity, which exists within the broader classification of activities, called "language", that cannot be learned by ostensive definition. He identifies this type of activity as distinguishing types.

The answer is yes, I disagree that it's impossible to learn language solely through ostension.

That the student knows or does something that's not itself language, prior to learning language via ostension, is irrelevant to the question. The question isn't whether it's impossible to learn or do any arbitrary thing that one might know/do only via learning language through ostension. — Terrapin Station

This is demonstrably false. Consider this true proposition: "one must first count to five before counting to ten". Now consider that a person learns how to count to ten. Counting to five is "not itself" counting to ten, but it is clearly not irrelevant to counting to ten. Counting to five is "necessary" for counting to ten.

So when you dismiss what is necessary for ostensive learning, as irrelevant to ostensive learning, you are making the same mistake as one who would dismiss counting to five as irrelevant to learning how to count to ten.

So when you dismiss what is necessary for ostensive learning, as irrelevant to ostensive learning, — Metaphysician Undercover

It's irrelevant to whether we can ostensively learn language.

Re the counting analogy, it's the same as saying that the student can learn to count to ten without already knowing how to count to ten.

If you wanted to ask, "Is it possible to learn how to count to ten without knowing how to count to five first," you'd need to actually ask that.

You asked if it's possible to ostensively learn language. The answer is that yes, it is.

If you want to argue that it's not possible to ostensively learn language, you'd have to say what one can't learn ostensively that is language.

Your comments in the following section are an incoherent mess, but I'm trying to avoid some other big tangent:

The word "language" for Wittgenstein does not refer to a thing which you can point to and say "that is language". It refers to a type of thing, — Metaphysician Undercover

Keep in mind, by the way, that we can't go back to pretending that "(ostensive) learning" is positing a student who is a blank slate, who is just passive, etc., because then we're simply saying that Wittgenstein is forwarding an argument based on a ridiculous misunderstanding of what people are referring to with the term "(ostensive) learning."

It's irrelevant to learning language. — Terrapin Station

As necessary for ostensive definition, it is necessary for learning language. Therefore it is not irrelevant. Likewise, counting to five is necessary for counting to ten, therefore it is not irrelevant to counting to ten.

Re the counting analogy, it's the same as saying that the student can learn to count to ten without already knowing how to count to ten. — Terrapin Station

That's false, counting to five is something other than counting to ten.

If you wanted to ask, "Is it possible to learn how to count to ten without knowing how to count to five first," you'd need to actually ask that. — Terrapin Station

Can you not read? I stated that as a true proposition: "one must first count to five before counting to ten". If you doubt the truth of this proposition, and want to ask if it's possible to learn how to count to ten without first learning how to count to five, and challenge the soundness of my argument, then be my guest. Perhaps you might make a case.

If you want to argue that it's not possible to ostensively learn language, you'd have to say what one can't learn ostensively that is language. — Terrapin Station

This has already been stated, we've been through this countless times. There are specific mental activities which are required to be performed by the student in order that the student may learn by ostensive learning. These cannot be learned by ostension. But they are a part of language, just like counting to five is a part of counting to ten.

No one is claiming "that is language". You clearly misunderstand what Wittgenstein means by "language". It is not a thing you can point to and say "that is language". "Language" is a word which refers to a certain type of human activity, with a multitude of sub-types, just like "game" is such a word.

Your comments in the following section are an incoherent mess, but I'm trying to avoid some other big tangent: — Terrapin Station

Right, you're trying to avoid the point which Wittgenstein is making, so that you may carry on with your nonsensical misunderstanding. Either pay attention to the book, or excuse yourself from the discussion. But to dismiss the theme of the book as a "big tangent" is unacceptable behaviour. If it all appears like an incoherent mess to you, then perhaps you ought to forget about it.

As necessary for ostensive definition, it is necessary for learning language. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it's irrelevant to the question of whether you can learn language ostensively that the student is doing non-linguistic things mentally, because "learning language ostensively" doesn't imply that the student is NOT doing non-linguistic things mentally.

That's false, counting to five is something other than counting to ten. — Metaphysician Undercover

Saying that they can't learn a language ostensively without already knowing something linguistic is the same as that.

Can you not read? I stated that as a true proposition: "one must first count to five before counting to ten". If you doubt the truth of this proposition, and want to ask if it's possible to learn how to count to ten without first learning how to count to five, and challenge the soundness of my argument, then be my guest. Perhaps you might make a case. — Metaphysician Undercover

How ridiculously ironic that you're asking that. In other words, if you want to know something more speciific, such as, "Is it impossible to learn a language ostensively without first blah blah blah" then you'd need to ask that. (Though note that the "blah blah blah" might be something that we're referring to by "learning language ostensively"--you'd need to make sure that it isn't.)

There are specific mental activities which are required to be performed by the student in order that the student may learn by ostensive learning. These cannot be learned by ostension. But they are a part of language, just like counting to five is a part of counting to ten. — Metaphysician Undercover

What part of language are we talking about?

No one is claiming "that is language". You clearly misunderstand what Wittgenstein means by "language". It is not a thing you can point to and say "that is language". "Language" is a word which refers to a certain type of human activity, with a multitude of sub-types, just like "game" is such a word. — Metaphysician Undercover

We're not saying something so stupid as, say, "One has to be conscious to use language. Therefore consciousness is part of language, and one doesn't learn how to be conscious ostensively. Thus, language can't be learned ostensively," are we? Because as I noted, that would be really, really stupid.

Right, you're trying to avoid the point which Wittgenstein is making, — Metaphysician Undercover

When Wittgenstein makes an incoherent mess rather than you--and he will often enough, I'll comment on that as I go through the book. I don't want to get into some other big tangent that's your doing. If you were quoting Wittgenstein, then fine, I'll get into that tangent.



Just as an aside, by the way, I should again note that I'm not arguing that language necessarily is learned ostensively (again, though, it would depend on just how broadly we're defining ostension). I'm simply arguing that it's possible to learn language ostensively.

No, it's irrelevant to the question of whether you can learn language ostensively that the student is doing non-linguistic things mentally, because "learning language ostensively" doesn't imply that the student is NOT doing non-linguistic things mentally. — Terrapin Station

That's nonsense, as a necessary part of language this cannot be said to be "non-linguistic".

We're not saying something so stupid as, say, "One has to be conscious to use language. Therefore consciousness is part of language, and one doesn't learn how to be conscious ostensively. Thus, language can't be learned ostensively," are we? Because as I noted, that would be really, really stupid. — Terrapin Station

Why is that stupid? If one must be conscious to learn language, then consciousness is a necessary part of language. It may be a matter of stating the obvious, but stating the obvious is not being stupid. People sometimes ignore the obvious, or even, for some reason insist that the obvious is irrelevant, perhaps because it is obvious. Therefore it is sometimes necessary to state the obvious, and insist on its relevance by demonstrating this logically.

It is that other type of behaviour, (your type of behaviour), of dismissing the obvious as irrelevant, which may be described as stupidity. If we were discussing what a human being is, and someone said, it's a living being, this is not stating anything stupid. It is stating the obvious. But if you were to insist that being alive is irrelevant to being human, that is really really stupid. So it really looks like you are a splendid display of stupidity. Why don't you shut up and get with the program?

Moving on with the book:

21
One can think about language, not just meaning, but grammar, etc., in different ways, where tone of voice, context, etc. make a difference. No obvious disagreement there.

22
Every assertion is (or "contains") an assumption? No.

"But 'that such-and-such is the case' is not a sentence in our language"
What? What language is he talking about? That's definitely a sentence in English. Is he talking about the limited "Slab" language he was setting up? Not sure what the idea is there.

"And if I write, not 'It is asserted that . . . .', but 'It is asserted: such-and-such is the case', the words 'It is asserted' simply become superfluous."
No idea what big difference the "that" is making to Wittgenstein there.

"Would this shew that every statement contained a question?"
No.

I'm not sure I understand much of the following passage, especially not the part that follows the first parenthetical:

It is only a mistake if one thinks that the assertion consists of two actions, entertaining and asserting (assigning the truth-value, or something of the kind), and that in
performing these actions we follow the prepositional sign roughly as we sing from the musical score. Reading the written sentence loud or soft is indeed comparable with singing from a musical score, but 'meaning (thinking) the sentence that is read is not.

Part of my not being sure of that is that it seems like maybe Wittgenstein is suggesting that he has a pretty superficial approach to music, if performing a score is that different from "meaning" a sentence to him . . . at any rate, I'm not worrying about this passage at the moment unless it turns out to be important for something else later.

This part of the book is seeming like a lot of rambling to me, by the way.

23
Definitely agree with the first paragraph there.

. . . There's that "form of life" metaphor again. Not fond of that. But otherwise still no problem with anything in this section or 24

25
Some other animals pretty clearly have types of languages, and probably many others do, too, where it's just not clear to us that the phenomena in question are functioning like languages. So I don't agree with this section, but it's probably not going to matter.

26 - 27
"One thinks that learning language consists in giving names to objects"
Which one thinks that? <rimshot>
Seriously, though, who would think that's all it is?
Wittgenstein wasn't under the mistaken impression that ostensively learning language was just this, was he? If so, why?

28
Sure, ostensive demonstration can be interpreted in various ways, which is why multiple examples are necessary for someone to figure out things like "two." The student makes associations, formulates concepts, performs abstractions, makes deductions, etc. That's all part of what we're referring to by learning in general, including ostensive learning. Those things are not themselves language, by the way..

29
The way you ostensively demonstrate something like "two" is by showing two of different sorts of things and saying "two" with them. So two people, two donuts, two trees, two shoes, etc. Sesame Street does this sort of thing all the time. The person observing this figures out what's in common in all of the examples, and thus they arrive at the abstraction "two."

"For the word 'number' here shews what place in language, in grammar, we assign to the word."I think that's much harder to do, and I'd say that's one of the last things that "number' there would do.

"That is to say: misunderstandings are sometimes averted in this way."
Sure, sometimes they are, but that's not the only way you can do that.

But is there only one way of taking the word "colour" or "length"?
Of course, not, and re meaning per se, there are more meanings for any term than there are people. (Meaning is different than definitions.) There are going to be misunderstandings, different definitions, etc. no matter what we do, by the way. Again, the way you demonstrate this sort of stuff ostensively is not by additional words (that haven't been demonstrated), but by examples that the observer formulates concepts, abstractions, etc. in response to.

30
"So one might say: the ostensive definition explains the use—the meaning—of the word when the overall role of the word in language is clear."
That's certainly one thing that ostensive demonstrations can do, but it's not the only thing they can do.

. . . oops, the pdf version of the book has something missing here, probably not much though . . .

"Could one define the word "red" by pointing to something that was not red?"
You can help someone understand a term by negation like that, but if there's no positive demonstration they're unlikely to get any word (unless there are some unique examples that are escaping my imagination at the moment).

"But it might well be asked: are we still to call this "definition"?"
I wouldn't normally call it a definition, but I don't think it matters that much if we do call it that. It has some features of definitions, especially limiting what the term refers to.

"One has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to be capable of asking a thing's name."
Sure, and if we literally mean asking then one definitely has to know language in order to be able to do that. BUT, one does not have to ask or be capable of asking a thing's name in order to learn language.

That's nonsense, as a necessary part of language this cannot be said to be "non-linguistic". — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, only in the trollish way that consciousness is "linguistic."

Why is that stupid? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because for one, no one is saying that consciousness is learned ostensively, even though they might say that one can learn language ostensively. So arguing against "language is learned ostensively" by arguing that consciousness isn't learned ostensively is the worst, most trollish sort of straw man.

Again, only in the trollish way that consciousness is "linguistic." — Terrapin Station

You're trying to change the subject again. We were discussing specific mental activities required for ostensive learning, not consciousness in general. Obviously you've reversed who the troll is here, just like you reversed where the stupidity lies by claiming that the one who states the obvious is stupid for stating the obvious, rather than recognizing that the stupidity belongs to the one who claims that what is obviously relevant is actually irrelevant simply because it's relevance is obvious.

I’m losing the will to live ... anyone else care to comment or put forward a question?

Perhaps you ought to simply participate and contribute rather than proliferating reading groups and readings which you don't commit yourself to. — StreetlightX

I've committed myself to the reading groups that I started, which are the Naming and Necessity one by Kripke, and The World as Will and Representation Vol. I by Schopenhauer. I just progress slowly on reading those books as I tend to analyze things in a slow and laborious fashion. I don't like how we are progressing with this current reading group. My preference would be to have a companion, such as Marie McGinn's, The Routledge Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and have that supplement whatever questions may arise.

I don't have much to contribute to this discussion, and since I'm not the leader of this reading group I don't feel compelled to post anything or direct how we go about addressing each part of the book.

That's my take.

I included a the simple The Routledge Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations by Marie McGinn and a more technical Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations by Arif Ahmed. I hope others might benefit from any of these two supplementary texts.

Cheers.

I also added Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigation by David G. Stern...

I've committed myself to the reading groups that I started, which are the Naming and Necessity one by Kripke, and The World as Will and Representation Vol. I by Schopenhauer. I just progress slowly on reading those books as I tend to analyze things in a slow and laborious fashion. I don't like how we are progressing with this current reading group. My preference would be to have a companion, such as Marie McGinn's, The Routledge Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and have that supplement whatever questions may arise.

I don't have much to contribute to this discussion, and since I'm not the leader of this reading group I don't feel compelled to post anything or direct how we go about addressing each part of the book. — Wallows

I plan on participating in those, too, and I'll be doing the same thing there that I'm doing here. The only direction that I think would be handy would be if we're all reading and commenting on the same passages at the same time--more or less how album listening threads go, where folks comment on each tune as the thread-starter brings it up and makes his/her own comments.

No one really seems to be taking the initiative to do that, though. It's not necessarily something easy to find a good balance for. You don't want to do too much at a time, because then it starts to feel like homework to folks, they get behind, and they abandon the thread. But if it's too slow, folks lose interest that way, too.

Probably a couple pages per day is a good pace for a discussion thread. Three pages per day might be too much, especially if people are trying to participate in multiple threads simultaneously. One is probably too slow.

Attachments
Wittgenstein's Philosophical In - Arif Ahmed
(1M)
Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgens - Marie McGinn
(678K)
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigation - David G. Stern
(910K) — Wallows

Thanks for these links, by the way.

This thread is like the blind leading the blind. There are so many misunderstandings going on that it pains me to read this. If you listen to MU you'll all be screwed in the head. He doesn't have a clue. He sounds like he knows what he's talking about to someone who doesn't know the material, but he is lost in a fog.

First, I think you people are going to fast. Some of this material takes a lot of thought, and if you don't think it takes a lot of thought, then you definitely don't understand it. You really need someone who knows the material well to guide you through it. Otherwise, you'll end up with a bunch of cliches that will distort Wittgenstein's thinking. I've spent years studying the 90 pages of OC, and only then can I say I have a decent understanding of Wittgenstein's thinking in terms of knowing. I only say this because I've compared my thoughts to what other philosophers have written on the subject, and it lines up well.

If you don't have a philosophical background, and you start with Wittgenstein, that's like trying to learn calculus without learning the math leading up to the study of calculus. Wittgenstein's works are some of the most difficult to understand in all of philosophy. Even people who have a good background in philosophy get confused about his ideas. In fact, many of them are confused.

My summary of the PI in my thread on Wittgenstein is very simplistic. It doesn't come close to doing justice to his writings in the PI. My comments on OC are much better, but still need work.

Anyway, those are my thoughts for what they're worth.

:up:

Can you show us the way?

Believe me Wallows, I would loathe leading this thread. One of the reasons is that like other forums, people think their opinions have the same force, without studying, as those who have studied the material. Studying it doesn't make you right, but it sure gives you a leg up on those who haven't studied the material. Besides I'm working on my book, along with a theory of epistemology related to OC.