Another category I mentioned was that of certainty. Whatever
certainty is, it's clearly not obviously the case that everything
which is necessary is certain. Certainty is another
epistemological notion. Something can be known, or at least
rationally believed, a priori, without being quite certain.
You've read a proofin the math book ; and, though you think
it's correct, maybe you've made a mistake. You often do make
mistakes of this kind. You've made a computation, perhaps
with an error.
And the conclusion: that S is 1 metre long is an a priori, contingent truth. — Banno
And,
Those who have argued that to make sense of the notion of rigid designator, we must antecedently make sense of 'criteria of transworld identity' have precisely reversed the cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identifications' are unproblematic in such cases.
p.49. — Banno
SO, are there any problems with transworld identification? Can we move on, accepting it as simple stipulation? — Banno
I don't agree that any of the profound philosophical questions associated with the stipulation have been answered by Kripke. — frank
In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names
are rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) might not
have been the President, it is not the case that he might not
have been Nixon (though he might not have been called
'Nixon'). Those who have argued that to make sense of the
notion of rigid designator, we must antecedently make sense
of 'criteria of transworld identity' have precisely reversed the
cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon,
and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened
to him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identifications'
are unproblematic in such cases. — Kripke pg. 49
Of course I don't imply that language contains a name for every object.
Demonstratives can be used as rigid designators, and free variables can be used
as rigid designators of unspecified objects. Of course when we specify a
counterfactual situation, we do not describe the whole possible world, but
only the portion which interests us. — Kripke footnote (16) on page 49
Does the 'problem' of ' transworld identification' make any sense? Is it simply a pseudo-problem?
[...]
Similarly, given certain counterfactual vicissitudes in the history of the molecules of a table, T, one may ask whether T would exist, in that situation, or whether a certain bunch of molecules, which in that situation would constitute a table, constitute the very same table T. In each case, we seek criteria of identity across possible worlds for certain particulars in terms of those for other, more 'basic', particulars. If statements about nations (or tribes) are not reducible to those about other more 'basic' constituents, if there is some 'open texture' in the relationship between them, we can hardly expect to give hard and fast identity criteria;
[...] — Kripke, pg.50
I'm asking a question about the process of identification or the criteria of identification according to Kripke. Here is a snippet from the text:
In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names
are rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) might not
have been the President, it is not the case that he might not
have been Nixon (though he might not have been called
'Nixon'). Those who have argued that to make sense of the
notion of rigid designator, we must antecedently make sense
of 'criteria of transworld identity' have precisely reversed the
cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon,
and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened
to him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identifications'
are unproblematic in such cases. — Kripke pg. 49 — Wallows
What profound philosophical questions? — Banno
We just stipulate, then work out the consequences as needed. Generally, we don't draw attention to the sun not going supernova 10,000 years ago when ordering coffee; why bother when discussing what would have been the case had Nixon become a monk? — Banno
The take home is that possible worlds are stipulated, and not found. And that does dissolve a picture of modality that was fraught with philosophical difficulties. — Banno
Does the 'problem' of ' transworld identification' make any sense? Is it simply a pseudo-problem?
[...]
Similarly, given certain counterfactual vicissitudes in the history of the molecules of a table, T, one may ask whether T would exist, in that situation, or whether a certain bunch of molecules, which in that situation would constitute a table, constitute the very same table T. In each case, we seek criteria of identity across possible worlds for certain particulars in terms of those for other, more 'basic', particulars. If statements about nations (or tribes) are not reducible to those about other more 'basic' constituents, if there is some 'open texture' in the relationship between them, we can hardly expect to give hard and fast identity criteria;
[...] — Kripke, pg.50
What profound philosophical questions?
— Banno
Heraclitus type questions like those Wallows has mentioned. — frank
The take home is that we can stipulate possible worlds as things that are stipulated. If we want to think about possible worlds that are found, we are free to do that as well, unless you know of some reason we shouldn't. — frank
Sittin' here puzzlin' over how you managed to get things so wrong, again. — Banno
I read Kripke as setting up a grammar that allows coherent discourse on modal issues. Hence it is especially important to recognise the way he seperate names from descriptions, necessity from the a priory and the analytic, and so on. — Banno
SO, are there any problems with transworld identification? Can we move on, accepting it as simple stipulation? — Banno
A much worse thing, something creating great additional problems, is whether we can say of any particular that it has necessary or contingent properties, even make the distinction between necessary and contingent properties. Look, it's only a statement or a state of affairs that can be either necessary or contingent ! Whether a particular necessarily or contingently has a certain property depends on the way it's described. This is perhaps closely related to the view that the way we refer to particular things is by a description...
I hope the idea of fixing the reference as opposed to actually defining one term as meaning the other is somewhat clear.
So : the question of transworld identification makes some sense, in terms of asking about the identity of an object via questions about its component parts. But these parts are not qualities, and it is not an object resembling the given one which is in question. Theorists have often said that we identify objects across possible worlds as objects resembling the given one in the most important respects. On the contrary, Nixon, had he decided to act otherwise, might have avoided politics like the plague, though privately harboring radical opinions. Most important, even when we can replace questions about an object by questions about its parts, we need not do so. We can refer to the object and ask what might have happened to it. So, we do not begin with worlds (which are supposed somehow to be real, and whose qualities, but not whose objects, are perceptible to us), and then ask about criteria of transworld identification; on the contrary, we begin with the objects, which we have, and can identify, in the actual world. We can then ask whether certain things might have been true of the objects. — Kripke pg. 53
...the question of transworld identification makes some sense, in terms of asking about the identity of an object via questions about its component parts. But these parts are not qualities... — Kripke pg. 53
Most important, even when we can replace questions about an object by questions about its parts, we need not do so... — Kripke pg. 53
But these parts are not qualities, and it is not an object resembling the given one which is in question... — Kripke pg. 53
If Nixon lost the election, how could that be the same universe as this one? — frank
I disagree. His view does exactly that. At least for the sort of questions posited so far.As cool as this essay is, it does not resolve problems of that type. It does not make them go away. — frank
If we want to think about possible worlds that are found, we are free to do that as well, unless you know of some reason we shouldn't. — frank
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