I should have noted this earlier:

Another category I mentioned was that of certainty. Whatever
certainty is, it's clearly not obviously the case that everything
which is necessary is certain. Certainty is another
epistemological notion. Something can be known, or at least
rationally believed, a priori, without being quite certain.
You've read a proofin the math book ; and, though you think
it's correct, maybe you've made a mistake. You often do make
mistakes of this kind. You've made a computation, perhaps
with an error.

Certainty is a type of belief, not a type of knowledge.

And the conclusion: that S is 1 metre long is an a priori, contingent truth. — Banno

I didn't start rereading Naming and Necessity yet, or even read the vast majority of this thread, but that, surprisingly, is something I agree with. I was assuming I wasn't going to agree with anything Kripke said in this book. (Because for one, I think the whole idea of a "rigid designator" is just complete nonsense, at least aside from an individual simply stipulating that they're going to use a term rigidly.)

And,

Those who have argued that to make sense of the notion of rigid designator, we must antecedently make sense of 'criteria of transworld identity' have precisely reversed the cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identi­fications' are unproblematic in such cases.

p.49. — Banno

If we're just saying that in counterfactual (or "possible worlds") talk, we can refer to things so that they're "the same x" as they are in the actual world, barring counterfactual modifications we make to them, and to some extent that's necessary to make sense of counterfactual talk at all, that shouldn't take a whole book/series of lectures to note.

SO, are there any problems with transworld identification? Can we move on, accepting it as simple stipulation? — Banno

When we think of Nixon losing an election, we must be thinking of a Nixon who ran in the first place, as opposed to a NIxon who left the US to become a Tibetan monk when he was 17. This possible world must also be one in which the sun didn't go supernova 10,000 years ago.

The list of things that had to be just so for there to be a Nixon who ran for president of the USA would appear to be massive and extending backward to the beginning of the universe. Therefore, I agree it's a simple stipulation. I don't agree that any of the profound philosophical questions associated with the stipulation have been answered by Kripke.

Agree?

I've noticed a mention of essentialism in reading Naming and Necessity. Is that what instantiates identity?

Let's see how Kripke teases out the consequences of that simple suggestion.

I don't agree that any of the profound philosophical questions associated with the stipulation have been answered by Kripke. — frank

What profound philosophical questions?

We just stipulate, then work out the consequences as needed. Generally, we don't draw attention to the sun not going supernova 10,000 years ago when ordering coffee; why bother when discussing what would have been the case had Nixon become a monk?

The take home is that possible worlds are stipulated, and not found. And that does dissolve a icture of modality that was fraught with philosophical difficulties.

I've no idea what you are asking.

I'm asking a question about the process of identification or the criteria of identification according to Kripke. Here is a snippet from the text:

In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names
are rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) might not
have been the President, it is not the case that he might not
have been Nixon (though he might not have been called
'Nixon'). Those who have argued that to make sense of the
notion of rigid designator, we must antecedently make sense
of 'criteria of transworld identity' have precisely reversed the
cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon,
and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened
to him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identifications'
are unproblematic in such cases. — Kripke pg. 49

He adds this as a footnote to the above:

Of course I don't imply that language contains a name for every object.
Demonstratives can be used as rigid designators, and free variables can be used
as rigid designators of unspecified objects. Of course when we specify a
counterfactual situation, we do not describe the whole possible world, but
only the portion which interests us. — Kripke footnote (16) on page 49

He goes on:

Does the 'problem' of ' transworld identification' make any sense? Is it simply a pseudo-problem?
[...]
Similarly, given certain counterfactual vicissitudes in the history of the molecules of a table, T, one may ask whether T would exist, in that situation, or whether a certain bunch of molecules, which in that situation would constitute a table, constitute the very same table T. In each case, we seek criteria of identity across possible worlds for certain particulars in terms of those for other, more 'basic', particulars. If statements about nations (or tribes) are not reducible to those about other more 'basic' constituents, if there is some 'open texture' in the relationship between them, we can hardly expect to give hard and fast identity criteria;
[...] — Kripke, pg.50

I'm asking a question about the process of identification or the criteria of identification according to Kripke. Here is a snippet from the text:

In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names
are rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) might not
have been the President, it is not the case that he might not
have been Nixon (though he might not have been called
'Nixon'). Those who have argued that to make sense of the
notion of rigid designator, we must antecedently make sense
of 'criteria of transworld identity' have precisely reversed the
cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon,
and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened
to him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identifications'
are unproblematic in such cases. — Kripke pg. 49 — Wallows

What I get from that with respect to your question is that the "criteria of transworld identity," which isn't something we need to figure out first (that's putting the cart before the horse as Kripke says) is gained by (a) the fact that we're going to stipulate some things as rigid designators, and (b) for some things, like Nixon, it wouldn't really make sense to entertain a counterfactual to the effect of "What if Nixon wasn't Nixon," regardless of whether we actually call him "Nixon" or not. (He's "that same guy" in counterfactuals, whatever we call him.) That tells us our criteria of transworld identity. It tails along from how we talk about counterfactuals.

Whether all of that is something that Kripke would agree with, I don't know, but that's what I get from the passage you quoted at any rate.

Well, he does mention a sort of Sorities paradox in regards to identity along with the problem of maintaining that same identity over time. Logic doesn't deal with such vageness as he mentions in a footnote to the above passages.

What profound philosophical questions? — Banno

Heraclitus type questions like those Wallows has mentioned.

We just stipulate, then work out the consequences as needed. Generally, we don't draw attention to the sun not going supernova 10,000 years ago when ordering coffee; why bother when discussing what would have been the case had Nixon become a monk? — Banno

Every little thing seems to be related to every other little thing in the universe. If Nixon lost the election, how could that be the same universe as this one? How could that be the same Nixon as ours? As cool as this essay is, it does not resolve problems of that type. It does not make them go away. We don't do science by examining language use. We don't solve philosophical problems that way either. I'm sure this is obvious to you.

The take home is that possible worlds are stipulated, and not found. And that does dissolve a picture of modality that was fraught with philosophical difficulties. — Banno

The take home is that we can stipulate possible worlds as things that are stipulated. If we want to think about possible worlds that are found, we are free to do that as well, unless you know of some reason we shouldn't.

Does the 'problem' of ' transworld identification' make any sense? Is it simply a pseudo-problem?
[...]
Similarly, given certain counterfactual vicissitudes in the history of the molecules of a table, T, one may ask whether T would exist, in that situation, or whether a certain bunch of molecules, which in that situation would constitute a table, constitute the very same table T. In each case, we seek criteria of identity across possible worlds for certain particulars in terms of those for other, more 'basic', particulars. If statements about nations (or tribes) are not reducible to those about other more 'basic' constituents, if there is some 'open texture' in the relationship between them, we can hardly expect to give hard and fast identity criteria;
[...] — Kripke, pg.50

Emphasis mine

Yup.

That's what I'm talking about Banno. What if they are??? Those are unaddressed issues.

In support of Kripke... his point - if I read him correctly - is that there are times(anytime???) when we do not need to talk about the fundamental elemental constituents of something in order to sensibly discuss the thing(object) we're discussing. I would agree that most often we do not.

What profound philosophical questions?
— Banno

Heraclitus type questions like those Wallows has mentioned. — frank

Yeah, I think Kripke takes care of Heraclitus' 'same river' pseudo-problem. It's untenable... utterly untenable.

The take home is that we can stipulate possible worlds as things that are stipulated. If we want to think about possible worlds that are found, we are free to do that as well, unless you know of some reason we shouldn't. — frank

Nah. Possible worlds are a metacognitive endeavor. There are no possible worlds without extremely complex language.

All you'll find is language use.

Sittin' here puzzlin' over how you managed to get things so wrong, again. — Banno

Hmmm...

"So wrong"

"again"

Puzzlin' indeed.

I read Kripke as setting up a grammar that allows coherent discourse on modal issues. Hence it is especially important to recognise the way he seperate names from descriptions, necessity from the a priory and the analytic, and so on. — Banno

Yes.

SO, are there any problems with transworld identification? Can we move on, accepting it as simple stipulation? — Banno

There are still some problems with transworld identifications, but I do not think that Kripke's language use grasps them. He has addressed some though...

For the sake of the read, and to understand his critique, those(remaining unaddressed issues) can be set aside...

A much worse thing, something creating great additional problems, is whether we can say of any particular that it has necessary or contingent properties, even make the distinction between necessary and contingent properties. Look, it's only a statement or a state of affairs that can be either necessary or contingent ! Whether a particular necessarily or contingently has a certain property depends on the way it's described. This is perhaps closely related to the view that the way we refer to particular things is by a description...

I think that this bit above underwrites quite a bit of these lectures. I do not concur. However, it is important to understand what Kripke is getting at...

What do you mean?

I hope the idea of fixing the reference as opposed to actually defining one term as meaning the other is somewhat clear.

This seems pivotal as well...

What do you mean? — Wallows

I need a quote of me from you to me.

Then, I may answer...

So : the question of transworld identification makes some sense, in terms of asking about the identity of an object via questions about its component parts. But these parts are not qualities, and it is not an object resembling the given one which is in question. Theorists have often said that we identify objects across possible worlds as objects resembling the given one in the most important respects. On the contrary, Nixon, had he decided to act otherwise, might have avoided politics like the plague, though privately harboring radical opinions. Most important, even when we can replace questions about an object by questions about its parts, we need not do so. We can refer to the object and ask what might have happened to it. So, we do not begin with worlds (which are supposed somehow to be real, and whose qualities, but not whose objects, are perceptible to us), and then ask about criteria of transworld identification; on the contrary, we begin with the objects, which we have, and can identify, in the actual world. We can then ask whether certain things might have been true of the objects. — Kripke pg. 53

Yes. I agree with that. It seems that if we do not do that, then possible world semantics lose coherency...

...the question of transworld identification makes some sense, in terms of asking about the identity of an object via questions about its component parts. But these parts are not qualities... — Kripke pg. 53

My side issue with this concerns certain situations where the object in question is existentially dependent upon it's parts(emergent things/objects). Kripke's scheme cannot take account of those situations. Earlier, I mentioned an apple pie and apples. Kripke stated of such situations...

Most important, even when we can replace questions about an object by questions about its parts, we need not do so... — Kripke pg. 53

I would think that the value we place upon possible world semantics(imaginary counterfactuals) ought be established, in some strong sense of the word, by virtue of correctly identifying the object(by our knowledge about the object in question when it is in fact an existentially dependent composite of other parts). If there can be no A without B, then a possible world scenario positing an A without B would be saying something like that we could imagine a world in which there were apple pies without apples, and that such an endeavor would be somehow useful for attaining/acquiring knowledge and/or understanding of apple pies.

:yikes:

But these parts are not qualities, and it is not an object resembling the given one which is in question... — Kripke pg. 53

"Resembling"...

Why ought an apple pie resemble all of it's parts as a pre-requisite to insisting that there are no sensible possible world scenarios that imagine apple pies without apples?

So what's the problem?

Here's how I read it. Some folk say that there is a problem in identifying individuals in other possible worlds. Kripke points out that other possible worlds are specified by our musings... and hence that there is no problem with such a grand title as "transworld identification".

If Nixon lost the election, how could that be the same universe as this one? — frank

As cool as this essay is, it does not resolve problems of that type. It does not make them go away. — frank

I disagree. His view does exactly that. At least for the sort of questions posited so far.

If we want to think about possible worlds that are found, we are free to do that as well, unless you know of some reason we shouldn't. — frank

Go for it. A the cost, as you yourself point out, of coherence.

Go for it. A the cost, as you yourself point out, of coherence. — Banno

Yet we do it all the time. That's the problem with the argument from The Way We Speak. We have contradictory customs.