Responsibility is a social convention simply because people believe in free will, not because it is metaphysically true.

I don't think this quite cuts it. If responsibility were an arbitrary convention, how can it play a dynamic role in our personal and social life? Again, what would motivate anyone to give an arbitrary convention a central role in social interaction? Wouldn't such centrality be completely irrational and long-since recognized as such? — Dfpolis

I'd be careful how you're using "arbitrary" there. Something being conventional or subjective doesn't imply that it's "arbitrary" in the sense of "random" or "per (fleeting) whim," Neither implies that the thing in question is irrational either.

As for how something that's only a convention, or only a way we think can play a dynamic role in our personal and social life, it's hard to believe that you're even asking that question, because why would you think that something that's just a way that we think or just a convention wouldn't be able to play a dynamic role in our personal and social life? You might as well wonder how love can play a dynamic role in our personal and social life. If someone wondered that, we'd have to wonder why in the world they'd think there would be something difficult to explain there.

if A is a necessary cause of B, then B could not happen without A. If A is also a sufficient cause of B, then A is also not possible without B. How does necessity not enter here?

Furthermore, no one in their right mind would claim that behavior supervenes on the planets. Where did you get that from?

If it's not subjective, then it obtains independently of what anyone thinks about it. What would be the evidence of that? — Terrapin Station

I am not saying that responsibility has no subjective element, but that it is not entirely subjective. Responsibility is a relation between a subject and a forseeable, objective state of affairs that would not be, had the subject not acted as he or she did.

This relation exists whether or not it is known to exist. Suppose I bully a person online and as a result that person decides to commit suicide. I may never know that happened, still, I'm partly responsible for it.

I am not saying that responsibility has no subjective element, but that it is not entirely subjective. Responsibility is a relation between a subject and a forseeable, objective state of affairs that would not be, had the subject not acted as he or she did. — Dfpolis

I'd agree that there's an objective fact a la x only happened because of y, where y is the result of a decision that some subject made, and information, ability to understand it, etc. was available to the subject so they could have had knowledge that x would obtain, but if you're using the term "responsibility" for that objective fact, you'd have to be careful to remove all normative/evaluative connotation from the term . . . which would be difficult to do outside of a specialized academic context,

At any rate, I wish you the best of luck with your book on free will. I give up on this pissing match. God bless you.

I do not believe that mental phenomena cause changes in the brain as you do. If mental phenomena were causally efficacious, then wouldn’t it be possible for telekinesis to occur? It is much more likely that mental phenomena supervenes on the physical brain. This is knowable a fortiori. It is consistent and coherent with neuroscience. Your claim is not. — Noah Te Stroete

Clearly, mental phenomena have physical effects. In the placebo effect, telling the patient that a drug is efficacious makes it more efficacious. This is a proven fact. In the UCLA study I mentioned earlier, cognitive therapy of OCD patients resulted in substantial rewiring of their brains as shown by before and after MRIs.

As for telekinesis, Dean Radin and Roger Nelson (1989) reviewed 832 experiments by 68 investigators in which subjects were asked to control random number generators, typically driven by radioactive decay. They subjected the results to meta-analysis, a method for combining data from many experiments. While control runs showed no significant effect, the mean effect of subjects trying to influence the outcome was 3.2 x 10^-4 with Stouffer’s z = 4.1. In other words, subjects controlled an average of 32 of every 100,000 random numbers, and this effect is 4.1 standard deviations from pure chance. The odds against this are about 24,000 to 1.

Radin and Diane C. Ferrari (1991) analyzed 148 studies of dice throwing by 52 investigators involving 2,592,817 throws, found an effect size (weighted by methodological quality ) of 0.00723 ± 0.00071 with z = 18.2 (1.94 x 10^73 to 1). Radin and Nelson (2003) updated their 1989 work by adding 84 studies missed earlier and 92 studies published from 1987 to mid-2000. This gave 515 experiments by 91 different principal investigators with a total of 1.4 billion random numbers. They calculated an average effect size of 0.007 with z = 16.1 (3.92 x 10^57 to 1).

Bösch, Steinkamp, and Boller (2006) did a meta-analysis of 380 studies in an article placing experiments in the context spoon bending and séances. They excluded two-thirds of the studies considered. Nonetheless, they found high methodological quality, and a small, but statistically significant effect. Unsatisfied, they attacked the data for lacking a predictive theory, and suggested that workers find a stronger effect. Such demands are not scientific. General relativity was confirmed by minuscule effects, e.g. a 43 arc second per century anomaly in perihelion of Mercury discovered in 1859, but unexplained until 1916. Further, no objective effect can be adjusted to meet skeptics’ demands.

In sum, for anyone committed to the scientific method, and willing to follow the data where it leads, there can be no doubt that mental states can modify physical states.

I have no doubt that most mental states supervene on physical states as well as on planetary positions. More importantly, I think that neural and glial processing play an essential role in human thought. Just because intentionality is not reducible to physicality does not mean that the two exist independently. The sphericity of a ball is not reducible to its material, but that does not mean that the sphericity and rubberiness are separate substances.

Descartes drew his line in the wrong place. The mind has an essential physical subsystem. This was recognized by Aristotle, Aquinas and most other pre-Cartesian thinkers. The problem is that we have no reason to believe that intentional operations are reducible to physical operations, and very good reason to think that they are not.

Nothing actually known to neuroscience contradicts anything I have said. If you think otherwise, please be specific.

No, you're not getting the idea. If there's a supervenience relation, one can't obtain without the other. Planets could still exist if we didn't. — Terrapin Station

Your "can't" is about physical, not logical or metaphysical, necessity. Your "could" has the force of an imagined state, not physical possibility. We know, for example, that the Moon plays a protective role with respect to asteroid collisions. On the other hand, we do not know that the earth could have formed outside of an environment that also led to the formation of the other planets. Our specific evolution depended on the solar system being as it is, with asteroid collisions occurring when and how they did, and with the laws of nature, physical constants, and initial state of the universe being as they are.

Your ability to imagine something physically unrealizable does not make the imagined state physically possible.

People, or the entire Earth, could disappear. That's not just imaginary in the sense of fantastical, it could easily happen for a number of different reasons.

The (other) planets would not be affected (if we disappear, and if the Earth does, they're future states would in no way depend on people per se)

Hence, there's no supervenience relation.

A supervenience relation there doesn't exclude either the notion that mental, aesthetic properties are physical or nonphysical. — Terrapin Station

Agreed. So what philosophic value does the supervenience relation have? How does it help us develop a consistent understanding of human experience?

Agreed. So what philosophic value does the supervenience relation have? How does it help us develop a consistent understanding of human experience? — Dfpolis

Well, first, not everything is developed as a tool for some other purpose.

Supervenience is handy as a way of talking about a certain kind of dependence relation, without restricting the relation to situations where we're claiming either a substantial identity or a causal relationship.

Hive society animals have a completely different form than our own so I feel your comparison is unfair. You use hive insects as the example for all social animals and that is a mistake, at the very best we could be compared to other primates but not insects. — Jamesk

Of course we are much different than hive insects, but that does not undermine my point. The thesis was that responsibility is explained by us being social animals. If this were true, then a responsibility relation would be a feature of all social animal groups. That is not the case, so, the concept requires more than us being social animals to explain it.

Unless you think that morals are a natural feature of the world, which i do not, I also don't think comparing us to other species is helpful either, — Jamesk

I always find such statements puzzling. Aren't we, with all of our intellectual and social complexity, part of the natural world? Isn't intentionality as natural as physicality -- even if they are not reducible, one to the other? Of course we are very different than other species and ignoring our differences can invalidate conclusions, especially when thought is involved.

I think there is a natural basis for morality, but that it's elaboration is social, cultural and historical, if that is what you mean.

Responsibility is a social convention simply because people believe in free will, not because it is metaphysically true. — Noah Te Stroete

OK. Responsibility came up because I was asked what free will would explain. It seems to me that if there is no free will, then there would be no reason to believe there is, because no one would feel responsible. That brings us back to asking how the feeling of responsibility could evolve, given that it can serve no purpose if people are physically compelled to act as they do?

Also, if intentions can have no physical effect, how can we talk about them, for surely talking about them is a physical process that necessarily depends on operation of the intentions we discuss? But, if intentions did have no physical effect how could the intentional state of feeling responsible change what we do in the future?

The thesis was that responsibility is explained by us being social animals. If this were true, then a responsibility relation would be a feature of all social animal groups. — Dfpolis

Humans are social animals
Humans have developed the concept of morality and responsibility
Therefore all social animals will develop the same concept.

All humans are social animals
If humans develop morality because they are social animals then
All social animals would do the same.

How do your premises lead to that conclusion? Your argument is neither sound nor valid.

My claim is that mental phenomena supervene on the physical brain. Some difference in the brain is necessary for a change in the mental processes. Also the brain supervenes on mental processes. Any change in mental processes necessitate changes in the brain. Hence, my assertion that there is supervenience BETWEEN mental processes and the brain. — Noah Te Stroete

Some difference in the brain is necessary for a change in the mental processes and Any change in mental processes necessitate changes in the brain mean exactly the same thing: that mental processes supervene on brain processes. Not the other way around.

Anyway, I just wanted to draw your attention to your basic misunderstanding of supervenience in general.

You’re correct! However, it has no bearing on my overall argument. Thanks. God bless you!

I have a question. Have these experiments been replicated with the same results? It seems they would have to be replicated a few times with the same results to be cogent.

Also, the placebo effect can be explained by brain states. Is placebo treatment sustainable?

It seems to me that a person can be said to have an absolutely free will only if that person is in some mysterious sense self-created; that is, only if that person, in some way, was able to choose who they are (their character).
For, ultimately, it is the person's character which determines the motives to which he/she responds, or does not respond, and it is their character for which he/she feels responsible.
This I learned from Arthur Schopenhauer!

"I am still waiting for an account of responsibility that works if we have no free will and all acts are determined. "
Here's two compatibilist accounts of responsibility:

1.The natural reaction to hearing about the drunk driver killing the bicyclist is a reactive attitude that the driver is guilty. In most cases, a perpetrator has a feeling of guilt after recognizing a consequence of a bad choice (e.g. the girl expressed this to friends, and it was these friends who reported the crime).These morally reactive attitudes are the basis of our moral responsibility practices. They are natural responses, not mere social convention.They are an aspect of interpersonal relations and expectations, and of our internal feelings. It is inconceivable that we would stop holding such people morally accountable, or stop feeling guilty, even if it were somehow proven that determinism is true. Indeed, the fact that we have these attitudes contributes to our behavior, because we generally prefer to avoid guilt and social approbation, and enjoy pride and respect.

2. Could the drunk driver have done differently? Yes she could have, if she had held the strong belief that the risk of driving drunk was so great that it outweighed her impulse to do so. This could only have occurred had there been something different about the past (formation of that belief), but that's reasonable. If our choices aren't the result of our personal beliefs, dispositions, and impulses - what are they? Random?

When she is released from prison, let’s hope she will actually have learned this, and doesn’t repeat the risky behavior. Our beliefs and dispositions are part of what we are - we own the results, and this makes us accountable. We can learn new beliefs, and these will influence our behavior.

#1 and #2 are more or less independent, but in tandem they provide not only a coherent account of moral responsibility, they also explain why normal functioning people strive for generally moral behavior. We want to avoid guilt, fit in, and we want to avoid approbation by others. We CAN always do better, but it requires learning things. Social consequences (positive and negative) and internal guilt/pride provide incentives to learn what is needed to behave morally. Calvinists believe our lives are fully determined and we can't really change what we are destined to do. However, each Calvinist strives to prove to everyone, including themselves, that they are among the saved - they prove this by their behavior.

I am going to post this in a new thread, to solicit input from more than the one or two that will read this buried in the current thread.

The drunk driver could have behaved differently only if the drunk driver had possessed a different character; viz., a character which was able to respond positively, rather than negatively or not at all, to the cognitive realization (motive) that the risk of driving drunk was so great that it outweighed the impulse to do so. Over a lifetime, we all become better acquainted gradually with who we are (our character) by experiencing what we actually do or omit doing, how we actually behave or do not behave, when presented with different motives and circumstances. It is not the person's deeds, per se, which we praise or condemn. They are merely indicators of the person's moral character. And, in the final analysis, it is the person's moral character which bears the responsibility, guilt, praise, or blame for what was done or left undone. It is our character for which we feel responsible. And this responsibility makes sense and has meaning only if we were absolutely free to choose who we are. And when did this choice occur??? Now it gets metaphysical!

It seems to me that a person can be said to have an absolutely free will only if that person is in some mysterious sense self-created; that is, only if that person, in some way, was able to choose who they are (their character).
For, ultimately, it is the person's character which determines the motives to which he/she responds, or does not respond, and it is their character for which he/she feels responsible.
This I learned from Arthur Schopenhauer! — charles ferraro

This is also what Strawson Jr. is arguing. But my question is - so what? If that's how you define "absolutely free will," then, obviously, that's how it is. But how is this "absolutely free will" - a made-up thing that cannot possibly exist - relevant to any human concerns?

This is also what Strawson Jr. is arguing. But my question is - so what? If that's how you define "absolutely free will," then, obviously, that's how it is. But how is this "absolutely free will" - a made-up thing that cannot possibly exist - relevant to any human concerns? — SophistiCat

You could say this with almost any "problem" of philosophy. That's why the average person couldn't care less about philosophy.

If anyone wishes to demonstrate that "mental phenomena have physical effects," one needn't appeal to such arcana as experiments purporting to demonstrate telekinesis: anyone who has had a desire for some peanuts and gotten up to kitchen to get some has ably demonstrated that mental states can have physical effects.

This is also what Strawson Jr. is arguing. But my question is - so what? ... [H]ow is this "absolutely free will" ... relevant to any human concerns? — SophistiCat

You could say this with almost any "problem" of philosophy. That's why the average person couldn't care less about philosophy. — Noah Te Stroete

I disagree. Good philosophical analysis should be relevant to its subject. This is why I think Galen Strawson's analysis fails: ostensibly, it is about something that is very relevant to us: moral responsibility, free will. But in actuality, the artificial construct around which Strawson builds his argument has rather little to do with those subjects. This, by the way, characterizes many discussions related to free will.

But it doesn't have to be so. And indeed, if you look around for philosophical literature on these subjects, you will find better examples. (Earlier in the thread I cited what I consider to be a better example from Peter Strawson, Galen's father.)

H]ow is this "absolutely free will" ... relevant to any human concerns? — SophistiCat

Wasn't Strawson saying that we are not ultimately responsible for our actions? This seems to be a radical claim, and it has huge implications for human concerns. At least I think so.

If anyone wishes to demonstrate that "mental phenomena have physical effects," one needn't appeal to such arcana as experiments purporting to demonstrate telekinesis: anyone who has had a desire for some peanuts and gotten up to kitchen to get some has ably demonstrated that mental states can have physical effects. — Arkady

One problem with your theory is proving that mental states exist at all. Most recent research shows that on average our sub-conscious sends the message the body to get up and get peanuts about half a second before you think you have decided to do it.

The mental state to get the peanuts has been caused by something else, hunger, boredom, habit etc. As has is your choice for peanuts rather than something less salty. The fact you have where to sit and a kitchen to go to that has peanuts in it is also dependent on many things that have affected your life until then and will continue to after.

We don't need to defend compatibilism against hard determinism such as Strawson's. The libertarian argument needs to justify why freewill makes us morally responsible and why not having it should free us from any responsibility. Why is there a necessary connection between the two?

One problem with your theory is proving that mental states exist at all. Most recent research shows that on average our sub-conscious sends the message the body to get up and get peanuts about half a second before you think you have decided to do it. — Jamesk

If we think that mental states might not exist, then what the heck are we even talking about in the "before you think you have decided to do it" part?

If we think that mental states might not exist, then what the heck are we even talking about in the "before you think you have decided to do it" part? — Terrapin Station

We still cannot accurately prove which brain processes relate to which mental states so even if we accept mental states we don't really understand them either biologically or psychologically.

Let's accept that they exist, that still doesn't really tell us anything about what they do. That was the point of my example. No one is saying that our thoughts do not cause us to act, the question is what caused our minds to cause an act?
There seem to be only two choices, one, that it was determined and the other that it was random or spontaneous. Can you think of any other options? I can't.

There seem to be only two choices, one, that it was determined and the other that it was random or spontaneous. — Jamesk

Yeah, I'd agree those seem to be the only two options, but if randomness is involved, it could be that we can bias the outcomes, so that there's a 10% chance of x, a 15% chance of y, etc.

Re this: "We still cannot accurately prove . . ." We can't prove empirical claims period. However, proof aside, we have lots of evidence just how the third-person observable aspects of brains correlate to the first-person, mental aspects.