if people aren't interested, that's fine. They don't have to pay attention to me. — Terrapin Station
Rule-following is an activity, and it's one of the activities that takes place in a game. It doesn't necessarily mean that you have learned rules or that rules have been stipulated in some way prior to the learning of the game. The same is true when you teach a child what the word cup means, the child doesn't need to know anything about a rule in order to learn how to use the word. The child observes, and probably already has some background of what it means to associate a word with an object. This is similar to the person in Wittgenstein's example (PI 31), where there is no learning of the rules explicitly or implicitly. Note though that the person has a background with learning other games, and as a result it makes it easier for them to figure out how the game is played. — Sam26
However, one thing that might be missed - because people have been anticipating alot - is that §31 is actually the first time in the PI that Wittgenstein actually begins to discuss 'rules' explicitly at all. So far, rules were mentioned only back in §3, where, interestingly, Witty actually objects to characterizing games in terms of rules, and says that such a characterization is a 'restricted' one that doesn't capture the generality of games. To recall:
§3: "It is as if someone were to say, “Playing a game consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules . . .” - and we replied: You seem to be thinking of board games, but they are not all the games there are. You can rectify your explanation by expressly restricting it to those games." — StreetlightX
That ought to put us on alert to the fact that rules are not - so far at least - crucial elements in Wittgenstein's conception of games, and hence, language. This is something that will be developed here in §31 even more. §31 beings by characterizing a situation in which in order to understand a specific ostensive act ("This is the king”), one must know the rules before hand. What is being illustrated here is again, the need for prior knowledge before ostensive explanation can 'work': — StreetlightX
As with §3, Witty is here circumscribing (limiting) the role or importance of rules as necessary elements in the understanding of ostensive explanations. While acknowledging their necessity in some circumstances, the appeal to rules does not exhaust all of them. The rest of §31, which doesn't discuss rules at all, simply goes over some of the same ground as before: the need to have a certain kind of knowledge before ostensive explanations can work. — StreetlightX
In this phrase, “Playing a game consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules . . .”, the reference to board games is "on a surface", not "according to certain rules". — Metaphysician Undercover
So it's a real stretch of creative interpretation to claim that Wittgenstein might be implying here that a game could be played without rules. In common usage, "game" implies "play according to rules", — Metaphysician Undercover
There is no textual evidence to support arbitrarily cleaving the phrase in two. Speaking of 'stretchs of creative interpretation'. Nothing in the rest of the post refers to the PI either, so is entirely neglectable. — StreetlightX
Games are going to keep on cropping up here, so I think it's worth mentioning some games without rules: sandcastles, cowboys and indians, trains, bricks, dollies, ... not that we cannot make some rules for any of them if we want to play making rules, indeed making the rules is often a large part of playing dollies, but there is no essential need, such that if it is not rule bound it is not a game. — unenlightened
7. In the practice of the use of language (2) one party calls out the
words, the other acts on them. In instruction in the language the
following process will occur: the learner names the objects; that is,
he utters the word when the teacher points to the stone.—And there
will be this still simpler exercise: the pupil repeats the words after the
teacher——both of these being processes resembling language.
We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) as
one of those games by means of which children learn their native
language. I will call these games "language-games" and will sometimes
speak of a primitive language as a language-game.
And the processes of naming the stones and of repeating words after
someone might also be called language-games. Think of much of the
use of words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses.
I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into
which it is woven, the "language-game".
The central idea throughout the PI is the idea of the language-game, and under this rubric is the idea of rules of use (or logic of use), and also Wittgenstein's idea of grammar which falls under the role of the rules. Although the role of rules is probably more expansive than just the rules of grammar.
Whether we are referring to Wittgenstein's grammatical rules (which are important), or the more general idea of rule-following, as seen in the application of rules across a wider swath of language usage, rule-following is central.
Grammar is what makes the moves in language possible, just like the rules of chess make the game of chess possible. And just as the rules of chess permit some moves and disallow others, so also does grammar permit and disallow certain linguistic moves. This should be seen under the logic of use, but again keep in mind that the logic of use is broader than just grammar. It includes the various acts that occur in a language-game. For instance, the act of bringing the slab in Wittgenstein's primitive language-game, is also seen as part of the logic of use. Just as the rules of chess bring about the various moves in chess as part of the logic within the game.
It's also part of the nature of the rules of grammar to adjudicate certain moves as correct or incorrect. Again the parallel with chess rules. One can think of the rules of grammar and the rules of chess as more akin to commands to follow in order to play the game correctly. The rules are conventions, but they necessitate certain moves, i.e., if you want to play the game correctly within the social structure. — Sam26
It assumed there are rules. We can certainly “play a game” without knowing the rules; which maybe where some confusion lies in your exchanges above (on one or both sides?). — I like sushi
I would hold off, for now, of getting too deep into a discussion of the nature of games and their relation to rules. There's alot of that to come, and as it stands, the thrust of the sections we are discussing have to do with the relation between ostension and rules (that just happen to be in the context of a game). — StreetlightX
the thrust of the sections we've been discussing has to do with the relation between ostension and games, not the relation between ostension and rules. — Metaphysician Undercover
In relation to "rules", I agree that it is too early for a discussion of Wittgenstein's position, but in relation to "games", I do not agree. "Language-games" have been extensively mentioned, beginning with the explicit definition at #7 — Metaphysician Undercover
- but, these definitions are simply stipulative and (so far) shed little light on the specificity of why Wittgenstein calls them 'games' (and not, say, 'language-excercises' or 'language-activities'). Without an explicit discussion of games - which has not happened, but soon will - it's still the syntagm 'language-games' - taken as a whole - that is the matter for discussion, and not 'games' as such. — StreetlightX
So I believe #23 to be quite important because we have an approach presented here, toward the division of human activity. He asks "how many kinds of sentences are there?" And each different kind of sentence (a seemingly endless number), is itself a different language-game...
...The principle by which the activity, language, is divided here, is according to the kinds of sentences. And you will see that each different kind of sentence serves a different purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover
So at 23 Witty proposes "countless" different "kinds of sentence", and each kind is described as a distinct language-game, such that new kinds come into existence and others become obsolete. — Metaphysician Undercover
Witty does indeed begin by saying that there indeed countless kinds of sentence. But importantly, he then goes on to say that there are "countless different kinds of use of all the things we call 'signs', 'words', 'sentences'". What is 'countless' in the second part of the sentence are neither 'signs', 'words', or 'sentences', but the kinds of use of them. In other words, the bolded 'this diversity' refers to the kinds of use, and not individual 'signs', 'words', and 'sentences'. And it is the kinds of use that correspond to 'new types of language' and 'new language-games'. — StreetlightX
And this makes far, far more sense that equating language-games with sentences. Not only because Witty is explicit that language-games consist of "language and the activities into which it is woven" (of which a 'sentence' cannot be), but also because it is consistent with Witty's previous description of a language-game as "the whole process of using words" (§7), where again, use is foregrounded, and not as it were, units of meaning. Finally, the fact that the primacy of the 'sentence' gives way to being simply one element in a set (list) of consisting of 'signs', 'words', and 'sentences' means that even if Witty did mean to say language 'were' sentences, they would also have to be 'signs', and 'words'. Which itself would be an incredibly strange thing to say. — StreetlightX
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.