No. I was responding to someone who seemed to think that matter referred to something only microscopic. — Terrapin Station

So then, if matter isn't about a microscopic vs macroscopic distinction, how are you defining matter exactly?

...even though b is comprised of a. — Terrapin Station

So can the macroscopic stuff "comprise" the microscopic stuff just as well as the other way round?

Are you arguing for a top-down relationship as well as a bottom-up one in your understanding of materiality?

What I'm telling you is that I cannot look at the chair and tell you that it is made of wood, or that it is made of plastic without having some idea of what wood and what plastic are. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not asking you to tell me what the chair is composed of. I'm merely asking if you can make a distinction between different materials visually - without having to convert those distinctions into language to tell me what it is composed of. The difference isn't in the idea, but in how it actually appears and feels, and our words merely pointy to those distinctions.

Matter is an idea, but not all ideas are matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

what are ideas composed of if not matter or mind? Ideas can be about matter or about other things, but all ideas are composed of matter is what a realist would say.

Again, there's a standard definition a few posts up. Or you can just google "matter definition."

Why would it have anything to do with a microscopic/macroscopic divide? Where is that idea coming from?

just as well as the other way round? — apokrisis

How would "the other way around" make any sense? Smaller bits comprised of larger bits??

I'm neither saying anything like "bottom up" nor "top down." Matter simply occurs on both microscopic and macroscopic levels.

Again, there's a standard definition a few posts up. — Terrapin Station

But I asked if you could supply your own. Interesting that you won't.

Chairs and tables are matter. — Terrapin Station

This is an example of the confusion I was hoping you would clarify.

Is it true that chairs ARE matter? Or that chairs are comprised of matter? Or indeed that a chair is an idea we impose on matter?

If you are arguing for an Aristotelian position on substantial being, then all three of these statements work as different aspects of the same metaphysical package.

But I doubt you have any desire to endorse hylomorphic thinking. So how can a chair BE matter, as you state?

but all ideas are composed of matter is what a realist would say. — Harry Hindu

A naive realist.

But I asked if you could supply your own. Interesting that you won't. — apokrisis

I'm not using the term in an unusual way.

Is it true that chairs ARE matter? — apokrisis

Yes, of course.

Or that chairs are comprised of matter? — apokrisis

That too. Why would they be matter but not be compromised of matter, or be compromised of matter but wind up as something other than matter?

Or indeed that a chair is an idea we impose on matter? — apokrisis

We have ideas of chairs (and since we're talking about an artifact in this case we make them as we do because of the ideas we have), but the chair itself isn't an idea.

Re hylomorphism, matter necessarily has form. Form isn't something separate.

A naive realist. — apokrisis

Naive realism is a view re philosophy of perception. "all ideas are composed of matter is what a realist would say" doesn't have anything to do with philosophy of perception.

But I doubt you have any desire to endorse hylomorphic thinking. So how can a chair BE matter, as you state? — apokrisis

As you pay for it's disposal per kg. A bottle can easily be just glass... :)

I'm not asking you to tell me what the chair is composed of. I'm merely asking if you can make a distinction between different materials visually - without having to convert those distinctions into language to tell me what it is composed of. The difference isn't in the idea, but in how it actually appears and feels, and our words merely pointy to those distinctions. — Harry Hindu

Right, that's what I've been trying to explain to those people who have been suggesting that we could sense what the chair is made of, matter. We can't do that, we have to take our sensations, and put them into words through the means of ideas. We cannot sense what the chair is made of, be it wood, plastic, matter, or whatever. We sense differences, as you say, not what a thing is made of.

what are ideas composed of if not matter or mind? Ideas can be about matter or about other things, but all ideas are composed of matter is what a realist would say. — Harry Hindu

I really don't know what an idea is made of, but that is irrelevant. I'm just arguing against those who claim that we observe the existence of matter through sensation.

A bottle can easily be just glass... — Heiko

I don't think you are really thinking about what you are saying. If it is "just glass" then how is it "a bottle"?

You can separate the formal and material causes of substantial being. So you can point to the form - the bottle - and you can point to the matter - the glass. But then you are losing sight of the thing you thought you were talking about - substantial being - in saying the form "just is" the matter. Hey presto!

I don't think you are really thinking about what you are saying. If it is "just glass" then how is it "a bottle"? — apokrisis

I don't think you are talking about the actual thing. You know to put bottles into a glass-container, no?

Too much

I'm not using the term in an unusual way. — Terrapin Station

Too true. That is the problem. You are content with the usual folk metaphysics.

Re hylomorphism, matter necessarily has form. Form isn't something separate. — Terrapin Station

So if matter can never lack form, then ontically, what is matter in contrast to form? What could define it as fundamental?

I ask the question even though I know you will only talk past it.

You know to put bottles into a glass-container, no? — Heiko

I can't make sense of this.

How do you point to glass OR the "bottle" in a case of a glass bottle?

Too true. That is the problem. You are content with the usual folk metaphysics. — apokrisis

If It's "the usual folk metaphysics" and there's supposedly a problem with it, there would need to be a good argument for whatever the problem is supposed to be.

So if matter can never lack form, then ontically, what is matter in contrast to form? What could define it as fundamental? — apokrisis

Why would you be trying to contrast them or say that one is more fundamental? They're inseparable and incoherent without the other.

And I ask that knowing that you won't even attempt to answer.

Why wouldn't an indirect realist be able to say the same thing? Matter may not actually be as it appears to us.

Easy. You show that "bottle" is an idea that can be imposed on other materials, like plastic or metal. And you can show that "glass" is what you are left with once you melt your bottle to a liquid puddle.

Matter may not actually be as it appears to us. — Harry Hindu

Sure. If we redefine matter as idea, I guess problem solved?

What are you talking about?

You show that "bottle" is an idea that can be imposed on other materials, like plastic or metal. And you can show that "glass" is what you are left with once you melt your bottle to a liquid puddle. — apokrisis

In other words you cannot. Saying a concrete thing was a bottle is just as aspectual as saying it is glass.

If It's "the usual folk metaphysics" and there's supposedly a problem with it, there would need to be a good argument for whatever the problem is supposed to be. — Terrapin Station

Correct.

Why would you be trying to contrast them or say that one is more fundamental? They're inseparable and incoherent without the other. — Terrapin Station

Again correct.

So the problem remains that you don't see the contradiction between the two statements.

Substantial being can't be just matter, or just form. And yet the folk position is that matter just IS substance and form ISN'T substantial. :chin:

In other words you cannot. Saying a concrete thing was a bottle is just as aspectual as saying it is glass. — Heiko

Hence hylomorphism. Sure.

The thing is - the bit that actually interests me - is that we can talk very clearly about the formal aspect of substantial being, but it all goes very shifty as we try to drill down into the material aspect of substantial being.

Glass is just informed substance. Bottles are one of those possible forms. The silca molecules composing the glass are just another deeper level of informed substance. Silicon and oxygen can compose other possible forms. Particle physics tells us that the electrons and quarks composing the silicon and oxygen atoms are yet again just informed substance - localised excitations in a quantum field or frustrations in a vacuum condensate.

So for the materialist, it is turtles all the way down. Yet materialists don't seem to think they have a problem.

Your argument is simply that ‘naive realism is obviously correct’.
— Wayfarer

Citation? — Terrapin Station

Well, here are two:

I first discovered Berkeley/idealism in general, as well as Descartes' obsession with certainty, etc. I thought that stuff was pretty interesting (even though I didn't agree with it (well, idealism at least) and thought it was bizarre when I first encountered it) and presented something of a challenge when I was about 16-17 years old. But then I advanced. That was about 40 years ago now. — Terrapin Station

And another:

I can still remember the first time I ran into someone who took Berkeley's idealism seriously. I couldn't believe it. — Terrapin Station

No doubt there would be many more, but life’s too short for me to waste time reading back to you what you actually say.

Again - you show not the least comprehension of Berkeley’s arguments, beyond asserting that they’re simply not credible. Which is not, as far as I’m concerned, a philosophical argument.

Substantial being can't be just matter, or just form. — apokrisis

So then my view isn't "the folk position." I couldn't care less if it is or isn't "the folk position," assuming that even clearly refers to some single stance, which is mind of dubious.

If It's "the usual folk metaphysics" and there's supposedly a problem with it, there would need to be a good argument for whatever the problem is supposed to be. — Terrapin Station

One good argument runs along the lines of: Because awareness matters … to all of us … except maybe when we've got our head in the clouds philosophizing about what is real. But matter as substance doesn’t explain the presence of awareness or any of its charms, things like its happiness and suffering, and its ability to cause these same attributes in other instantiations of awareness. The best a physicalist can do is do that faith thing which they often detest theist for: someday it will somehow magically be explained. Thus presenting a good reason to question that “everything is matter”.

I doubt that anyone here in their daily lives can’t colloquially/intuitively differentiate between that which is physical and that which is thoughts—regardless of their philosophies. Yet the affirmation that “all thoughts are composed of matter” has the equally justifiable—and also not perfect—alternative that “all matter is composed of thoughts”. Just that the latter can explain awareness, agency, and the like—especially when adopting a view such as Peirce’s objective idealism—whereas the former can’t.

(Besides which, there’s always the dual-aspect neutral-monism position wherein all stuff is, roughly speaking, basically just information that causally interacts, hence neither matter nor thought but that from which both manifest in their respective forms. Thought I’d trough this one in since it’s my view.)

Well, here are two: — Wayfarer

Where do those saying anything like "Here's my argument," or in any way suggest that I'm presenting an argument, or say anything resembling "naive realism is (simply) obviously correct"?

you show not the least comprehension of Berkeley’s arguments — Wayfarer

Where am i commenting on Berkeley's arguments to even say one way or another anything about what my understanding would be?

Your comments here suggest rather that you have zero reading comprehension ability.

So then my view isn't "the folk position. — Terrapin Station

Yep. Your position is that you back two contradictory positions without apparently realising it.

One good argument runs along the lines of: Because awareness matters … to all of us … except maybe when we've got our head in the clouds philosophizing about what is real. But matter as substance doesn’t explain the presence of awareness or any of its charms, things like its happiness and suffering, and its ability to cause these same attributes in other instantiations of awareness. The best a physicalist can do is do that faith thing which they often detest theist for: someday it will somehow magically be explained. Thus presenting a good reason to question that “everything is matter”. — javra

Wait a minute--let's clarify this first: "the usual folk metaphysics" is physicalism re the mind-body issue?

And the contradictory positions are?

Wait a minute--let's clarify this first: "the usual folk metaphysics" is physicalism re the mind-body issue? — Terrapin Station

I'm not going to get into an argument about what the "usual folk metaphysics" is ... other than to say that most folks take matter to be substantial.

Personally, I don't believe that "the usual folk" could give a rats ass about metaphysics (pardon my English) ... they just care that things work out better for them in their immediate lives. Which does entail the presence of awareness.

As I said, I'm skeptical that "the usual folk metaphysics" would clearly refer to a single view, rather than many different views. I was simply asking because that's what you quoted a comment about before launching into a mind-body discussion contra physicalism.