But I do not know whether to say that the figure described by our
sentence consists of four or of nine elements! Well, does the sentence
consist of four letters or of nine?—And which are its elements, the
types of letter, or the letters? Does it matter which we say, so long as
we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case?
Reiterating his message from §47, whether these primary elements are 'simple' or 'complex' depends on how we agree to use those terms; what we mean by 'simple' and 'complex'. As he states lastly: "Does it matter which we say, so long as we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case?" — Luke
Perhaps some of what you say could be deduced from what he says, but you're largely missing the point about meaning being undetermined outside a language-game. — Luke
Here the sentence is a complex of names, to which corresponds a complex of elements. The primary elements are the coloured squares. "But are these simple?"—I do not know what else you would have me call "the simples", what would be more natural in this language-game. But under other circumstances I should call a monochrome square "composite", consisting perhaps of two rectangles, or of the elements colour and shape.
But I do not know whether to say that the figure described by our sentence consists of four or of nine elements! Well, does the sentence consist of four letters or of nine?—And which are its elements, the types of letter, or the letters?
I tend to agree with Conant/Diamond here insofar as I take it that this is what Witty understands therapy to consist in and why the notion is so central to his meta-philosophy. You can't shout Terrapin into understanding this point, as you seem to be doing in your post. Nor can you force him to engage in the sort of philosophical therapy he needs to understand it so long as he refuses to work with L.W. qua therapist in order to fully realize the point through a sort of anerkennen (i.e. if he reads Wittgenstein as his buddy rather than as a philosophical diagnostician who needs to be allowed some pathos of distance in order to show the reader what he wants him to see). — John Doe
I also didn't really understand your reference to primary elements being "self-refuting". — Luke
think Conant and Diamond are incorrect in the way they interpret parts of Wittgenstein — Sam26
I guess it's possible some here might come to see what is going on in the PI, although I'm not too hopeful. — Banno
I think what you're doing here - slowly refining your views as L.W. forces them out of you - "It's experience...wait no, that's too broad, it's ways of seeing and acting, what no..." is what the book is aiming to get us to do as readers. — John Doe
I don't mean to derail the reading group, but having read the thread so far, I'd really like to know what people think Wittgenstein was trying to do by writing PI. It seems that a lot of posters are drawing conclusions as if they knew without first establishing why they've reached that conclusion. — Ciaran
I don't know why you would characterize my reply to Terrapin as shouting, maybe because of the force of the comment, I'm not sure. In fact, I tried to inject a bit of humor into the comment. — Sam26
Here is where I think things actually get super interesting, from an epistemological point of view: if grammar is a condition of sense, and there are innumerable ways in which we can employ grammar(s), what exactly is the status of grammar (hence language and sense) itself? For it’s clear that grammar cannot be ‘read off’ the ‘thing itself’: the chess-board in all its black and white glory provides no definitive answer - cannot provide any definitive answer - as to how to parse what is simple and what is composite about it. The grammar of our languages(s) do not 'naturally mirror' the structure of the world (if it even makes sense to speak of a 'structure' of the world). — StreetlightX
Streetlight you are correct to point out the relationship between all of this and epistemology. I think grammar should be seen as having the role of governing the moves within language-games, as opposed to the actual moves. An actual move may or may not conform to the rules of grammar. It follows from this that a correct move is in conformity with the grammatical rules. If we extend this analogy to epistemology, epistemology is simply a move in a language-game governed by the grammar in social contexts. — Sam26
I'm not sure I can agree with your analysis here. I understand entirely how the bigger question of Wittgenstein's intention cannot be deduced from the text until at least after §89, but I don't think there is much merit in the exegetical work prior to that.
The early points about the role of ostension, for example, seem to hinge entirely on an assumption that Wittgenstein was solely attempting to knock down some kind of straw man version of Augustine's argument which later sections make it clear (to me anyway) that he was not. — Ciaran
A good interpretation of the text involves understanding Wittgenstein from the Notebooks (around 1914), which is his early thinking on meaning, all the way through to On Certainty. — Sam26
Obviously there are going to be different interpretations, but that doesn't mean we can't get the gist of his thinking. — Sam26
That's just the way it is. I'm not going to pretend that I'm good at basketball when I'm not, and if I do pretend, it will be obvious to those who know how to play, that I'm don't know what I'm doing. — Sam26
Grammar involves rules, and we have not gotten to the point where he discusses what learning a rule consists of. — Metaphysician Undercover
Streetlight has done a pretty good job for not having much of a background in Wittgenstein (if I understood his earlier comment correctly), but this is probably due to his philosophical background. — Sam26
StreetlightX is doing a bloody fantastic job delving into the material with a sharp intellect at a great pace — John Doe
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