why is it easier to predict the mind of God than it is to predict the mind of another human being? — Harry Hindu
So, why do idealists complain that science can't explain the mind - the human mind - like it can explain gravity or chemical reactions when gravity and chemical reactions are ideas of God? — Harry Hindu
When someone says something is real I take it to mean absolute (as opposed to being dependent or relative) in being, so particulars are absolute in being wheres universals are not so absolute but rather dependently being on something absolutely being. Such as music dependently being on absolute instruments for creation and absolute people to listen to. Trees dependently being on particular configurations of absolute matter and absolute people naming these configurations such. — Happenstance
His key arguments are as plausible as materialism and just as well supported. That is the problem, he cannot provide better support that materialism has, he basically uses the same support that he demolished in materialism.
Please take some time and actually read his theory and dialogues before engaging in a meaningful discussion about them. — Jamesk
Berkeley says that we don't have ideas of other spirits or of God, because an idea can only resemble an idea. We do have 'notions' of other minds and of God because of our intuitive knowledge that we have ourselves minds. The notion theory is a bit more complex than I make it out and it is one of the weakest parts of his theory. — Jamesk
"Emergent" might be the wrong word. It's a result from our size relative to the size of other things. We seem to be right in the middle with everything extending away in both space, size and time. Our minds compartmentalize space - into atoms, molecules, on up to things on our size-scale and past it to planets, solar systems, galaxies and universes. These larger things seem to "emerge" from the interactions of smaller processes if you think from "bottom to top". In order to try to get a more objective understanding of it, we'd need to think of ourselves as not having a size relative to other things. That seems difficult - maybe something we just can't grasp because having a size relative to other things fixes our subjective size-relation perception of the world and we can't escape that view of the worldFor me this bottom-up approach is not the way to go. We can't atomize the mind and reconstruct it. Of course you mention emergent properties, so you see the problem. But I'd say that our atomizing theories themselves emerge from this same 'emergent property.'
Another way we might approach this is to 'confess' that meaning (in all its embarrassing and suspicious mysteriousness) is fundamental. The world or what exists is clearly not only 'meaning' (whatever this meaning is), of course. But existence is always already meaningfully structured. Of course we can theorize about the origin of meaning as an act of meaning. — sign
This seems like how I keep saying that the mind, including it's misperceptions, illusions and delusions, are real because they are part of reality as much as everything else. Galaxies and illusions should be part of the same substratum.For me we still have the problem here that 'sensory impressions' and 'quarks' are signs that point to meanings that themselves point beyond themselves. The world, in my view, is composed of (among other things) acts of meaning. The world is composed of (among other things) attempts to say what the world is composed of. I know this may sound strange. But what does it mean when a metaphysics excludes itself from the real it tries to grasp? If acts of meaning are 'unreal,' then any theory of the real is itself unreal. It's odd that a theory of the real would be satisfied with building up itself from quarks or sensory impressions that themselves function within this theory. — sign
As for the basic building blocks of the mind, it seems to me that it would be sensory impressions. All of our ideas, imaginings, beliefs and knowledge are composed of sensory impressions. The smallest unit I can think about is a sensory impression. For instance, I can think of just the color red, or a tactile sensation, or a sound with no meaning. Anything else I can think of, would be composed of these things. Coffee is composed of visual (black vs. w/ cream), tactile (warm liquid or iced), auditory (the sound of the coffee dripping), olfactory and gustatory units.Fascinating theory. I must confess that I'm still somewhat opposed to the project being framed in terms of finding fundamental units. IMV, any description of what is has to acknowledge what makes such a description possible and intelligible. I'm not saying yours doesn't, but it doesn't go into much detail about its own presence. Let's say we have a theory about what is fundamental that does not include language. Maybe it theorizes the origin of language. Yet language is also the origin of this theory of the origin. This doesn't make the theory worthless. But perhaps it calls for an enriched account. — sign
These larger things seem to "emerge" from the interactions of smaller processes if you think from "bottom to top". In order to try to get a more objective understanding of it, we'd need to think of ourselves as not having a size relative to other things. That seems difficult - maybe something we just can't grasp because having a size relative to other things fixes our subjective size-relation perception of the world and we can't escape that view of the world — Harry Hindu
I agree with your explanation of meaning. I consider meaning and information the same thing and the relationship between causes and their effects. Effects carry information about their causes. Effects mean their causes. I like to use Steven Pinker's tree rings example. Tree rings (the effect) are the result of how the tree grows throughout the year (the cause). The tree rings mean, or carry information about, the cause, which is why you can get the age of the tree by the number of rings it has. — Harry Hindu
This seems like how I keep saying that the mind, including it's misperceptions, illusions and delusions, are real because they are part of reality as much as everything else. Galaxies and illusions should be part of the same substratum. — Harry Hindu
All of our ideas, imaginings, beliefs and knowledge are composed of sensory impressions. The smallest unit I can think about is a sensory impression. — Harry Hindu
https://philosophynow.org/issues/32/Towards_the_Definition_of_Philosophy_by_Martin_Heidegger
Heidegger takes the path of repudiating the primacy of the theoretical attitude. For him, we are never in the position of experiencing the sensedata of the Anglo-Saxon tradition.
According to this view, all perceptual experience involves awareness of an appearance, regardless of whether it is an experience of a physical object. Moreover, all our knowledge of the external world is said to be based upon our beliefs concerning the sense-data that we experience. For Heidegger, in contrast, the theoretical attitude is secondary, being predicated on the existence of a preconceptual understanding that is the basis on which we conduct our day-to-day life. We do not see sense-data, what we see – at least as students and lecturers – are, for example, chairs, desks, windows. There is no problem of the external world because we are always already in that world.
He gives the example of the lectern from which he is speaking. He doesn’t see brown surfaces, arranged in such and such a way, from which he infers the existence of a lectern; what he sees is the lectern ‘in one fell swoop’ as either too high or too low, as convenient to his purpose or not. He sees it as already something meaningful... For the young Heidegger and his audience it is simply part of the environment (Umwelt) in which they live, it has the character of a world (Welt). Further, in a neologism which is to become characteristic of his manner, he turns the noun into a verb – ‘es weltet’ – that is, ‘it worlds.’ — link
This is the most incoherent reply you've had yet. If an idea can only resemble an idea, then an idea is a resemblance of itself? Or, it would be that resemblances are the fundamental aspect of reality - not ideas!
"Notions" is a synonym for "ideas", so you've contradicted yourself. — Harry Hindu
Yes, and eventually realize that it may even be presumptuous to call this state-of-affairs a "view" where one is "seeing" brown surfaces. What the f*** is this state-of-affairs that is going on?!He can learn to see the lectern as brown surfaces. — sign
Coffee is composed of visual (black vs. w/ cream), tactile (warm liquid or iced), auditory (the sound of the coffee dripping), olfactory and gustatory units. — Harry Hindu
Yes, and eventually realize that it may even be presumptuous to call this state-of-affairs a "view" where one is "seeing" brown surfaces. What the f*** is this state-of-affairs that is going on?! — Harry Hindu
And put together into completely new configurations (imagination). This is another reason to think of sensory impressions as fundamental units.The lifeworld can be deconstructed, examined by reason, and put back together (if possible) to test our understanding of the pieces and the way they fit together. — sign
And put together into completely new configurations (imagination). This is another reason to think of sensory impressions as fundamental units. — Harry Hindu
fundamental units. — Harry Hindu
That's not really how I see it. I see explanations (both right and wrong ones) as part of that causal substratum I talked about. They are just new arrangements resulting from interactions of input (sensory data) and our built-in software (genetic and life history). Explanations would be the output, no different than any output a computer produces (processed information). Explanations are causes themselves and produce effects. Everything is a process of causation (information/meaning). In essence, what is real is what has causal power.I am clarifying for myself that I don't object to the atomistic project. Analysis is good. I would just balance it out with a further clarification of what is already there. If we are going to explain reality (including what is called mind or reason) in terms of building blocks, then we also have to really look into the nature of reason. Otherwise we have something like an un-opened box at the heart of our explanation. We We explain 'mind' (which includes our own ability to do) without having clarified its nature. Our attempts to explain reality add to reality and in that sense oppose themselves. — sign
That's not really how I see it. I see explanations (both right and wrong ones) as part of that causal substratum I talked about. They are just new arrangements resulting from interactions of input (sensory data) and our built-in software (genetic and life history). Explanations would be the output, no different than any output a computer produces (processed information). Explanations are causes themselves and produce effects. Everything is a process of causation (information/meaning). — Harry Hindu
When you think of "democracy" what fills your mind? What form does "democracy" take in your mind other than just the scribbles on the screen? How do you know that you're thinking of "democracy"? It requires an awareness of some visualization of maybe politicians vying for your vote, or citizens voting. Our minds cross-reference these visual or auditory impressions with other sensory impressions. "Warmth" refers to some tactile sensation. "Green eggs and ham" refer to a visual of eggs and ham that are colored green with maybe even an imagined smell or taste. — Harry Hindu
How do you understand explanation? — sign
So Berkeley on one hand accepts physical objects as material things but because he doesn't accept that physical things can be mind independent . So the physical side of matter presents no conflict, only the quality matter has to exist independently stops materiel being a synonym physical. — Jamesk
if I observed an oar in the water and it is bent then according to Berkeley, the oar does not appear to be bent, it's actually bent. But if I put my hand in the water, I feel the oar is straight! Does this mean that there are two actual oars I am perceiving? — Happenstance
Say we see an oar in water, Hylas says, and it appears bent to us. We then lift it out and see that it is really straight; the bent appearance was an illusion caused by the water's refraction. On Philonous' view, though, we cannot say that we were wrong about the initial judgement; if we perceived the stick as bent then the stick had to have been bent. ... Philonous has an answer to this worry. While we cannot be wrong about the particular idea, he explains, we can still be wrong in our judgement. Ideas occur in regular patterns, and it is these coherent and regular sensations that make up real things, not just the independent ideas of each isolated sensation. The bent stick can be called an illusion, therefore, because that sensation is not coherently and regularly connected to the others. If we pull the stick out of the water, or we reach down and touch the stick, we will get a sensation of a straight stick. It is this coherent pattern of sensations that makes the stick. If we judge that the stick is bent, therefore, then we have made the wrong judgement, because we have judged incorrectly about what sensation we will have when we touch the stick or when we remove it from the water. 1
the sense of seeking an unconditional truth - understanding this one thing, all things are understood. Explanation was finding the reason for everything. — Wayfarer
I agree with Berkeley in that regard. He reminds us that it’s a conceit to believe we can see the world as if from no perspective whatever, as if sense-knowledge is absolute. In so doing we attribute to sense-knowledge a kind of absoluteness which is not warranted. This is his principle point. — Wayfarer
Say we see an oar in water, Hylas says, and it appears bent to us. We then lift it out and see that it is really straight; the bent appearance was an illusion caused by the water's refraction. On Philonous' view, though, we cannot say that we were wrong about the initial judgement; if we perceived the stick as bent then the stick had to have been bent. ... Philonous has an answer to this worry. While we cannot be wrong about the particular idea, he explains, we can still be wrong in our judgement. Ideas occur in regular patterns, and it is these coherent and regular sensations that make up real things, not just the independent ideas of each isolated sensation. The bent stick can be called an illusion, therefore, because that sensation is not coherently and regularly connected to the others. If we pull the stick out of the water, or we reach down and touch the stick, we will get a sensation of a straight stick. It is this coherent pattern of sensations that makes the stick. If we judge that the stick is bent, therefore, then we have made the wrong judgement, because we have judged incorrectly about what sensation we will have when we touch the stick or when we remove it from the water.
What was confusing about it? I may be wrong about it but I thought what I typed was pretty clear! Relationships do exist, there is no denying this, as do illusions, so what is your definition of real?To me, what you have said here appears very confused. Why does something have to be absolute to be real? Are relations not real? — Metaphysician Undercover
I see explanation as just a use of language, and language is just composed of visual and/or auditory impressions. When we explain things to others, we use our cultural language (those specific visual and auditory symbols) to communicate an explanation.How do you understand explanation? For me it's the postulation of necessary relationships. It's a grid thrown over experience. If you see this, then expect that (or project 'that' back on the past.) To get this, do that. Entities in relationship. I like this project/understanding of explanation. Clarifying/installing the causal nexus is what it looks like to me. — sign
Going back to being skeptical of this state-of-affairs being a "view", I have to ask, "why does it appear like a "view""? What I mean is, why is there depth, not just in vision, but in our auditory, tactile, gustatory and olfactory symbols? That may be the one thing that they all share in common because if not for that, we could have good reason to be skeptical of our sensations being about a external world. Each sense supplies very different symbols. The fact that I can see coffee and feel coffee at the same time, isn't as good as being able to see them and feel them in the same location as well.A little more on my understanding of Heidegger that might add this issue. Our pre-theoretical experience of the world is largely in terms of objects that we can just grab and use. We as the subject aren't present to ourselves much of the time. Instead we just 'are' grabbing and using. From this perspective, pure mind as opposed to pure object is a theoretical postulation. When we switch to the theoretical mode we gaze on the objects dispassionately (or of value only in the construction of generalizations.) And we are also highly conscious of the subject as we scan our own ideas for coherence. So the theoretical mode only reinforces its founding assumptions, in some sense --maybe trapping us in problems or at least trapping us in a reduced set of approaches to these problems. — sign
This is a question to both of you, are illusions, even though they exist, real? — Happenstance
I didn't bypass it. I replied and I said that it is only coherent if they mean something, or else it's just scribbles. That isn't subjective. — Harry Hindu
"The song Kashmir" refers to a particular, and so does "music" refer to a particular (particular idea or whatever) — Metaphysician Undercover
Thanks for that Wayfarer, but what does God, the arbiter of actuality, see? — Happenstance
we use our cultural language (those specific visual and auditory symbols) to communicate an explanation. — Harry Hindu
but those scribbles and sounds still need to refer to something to mean something other than just being visual scribbles and sounds — Harry Hindu
Relationships do exist, there is no denying this, as do illusions, so what is your definition of real? — Happenstance
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