Loops often come to my mind when thinking about reality. Self-awareness is like a camera pointing at it's monitor and creates a visual feedback loop of a "infinite" corridor. Natural selection is basically environmental feedback - the environment shaping itself. — Harry Hindu
Constituted as it is, this process cannot belong to the subject; but when that point of support is fixed to start with, this process cannot be otherwise constituted, it can only be external. The anticipation that the Absolute is subject is therefore not merely not the realisation of this conception; it even makes this realisation impossible. For it makes out the notion to be a static point, while its actual reality is self-movement, self-activity.
...Everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as well. At the same time we must note that concrete substantiality implicates and involves the universal or the immediacy of knowledge itself, as well as that immediacy which is being, or immediacy qua object for knowledge. — Hegel
Ah yes, the gap between us and the absolute is taken as the absolute itself! And of course such thinkers don't acknowledge the intelligibility of their own discourse which establishes the absolute impossibility of the absolute. It occurs to me that rejections of absolute knowledge just make our finite knowledge in its plurality absolute. It is all the absolute we can hope for and therefore the functioning absolute. — sign
Weird. That's such a basic thing to know. Objective sounds are sounds occurring external to your body. — Terrapin Station
I explained a number of times what I'm referring to with "matter." — Terrapin Station
Locke builds his case on an ability to abstract ideas from general terms and on primary and secondary qualities. Locke continues on from Descartes by offering indirect realism and by saying that it is ok to doubt, with the little knowledge we have we can still get by and build working scientific theories. — Jamesk
↪Terrapin Station You say that the 'objective world' exists irrespective of whether anyone is around to observe it. I say not. Why? Because the very image of the 'objective world' that you're referring to, contains an implicit reference from the human perspective. You can picture the vast empty cosmos, planets coursing in their orbits, the formation of stars, and so on. But that is a picture that exists from a perspective, and containing a time-scale and distance-scale within which it is meaningful. Absent those elements of a framework within which that judgement is made, what can be said 'to exist' at all? That 'empty universe' is still something that is dependent on there being an observing mind.
Furthermore, something like this has been shown by physics itself. [...] — Wayfarer
Just as we look at an object from a specific perspective (yet the object exists independent of our looking), so we describe the universe from a specific perspective (yet the universe exists independent of our describing). — Andrew M
. Maybe Berkeley disproves Locke's ontology without providing an acceptable alternative. That's what I remember about Berkeley, he provides a lot of good arguments against some ontological principles, without providing an alternative to those refuted principles. — Metaphysician Undercover
But the point is, the manner in which either 'the universe' or 'the object' exists 'independent of our describing' is never known to us (as per Kant). — Wayfarer
Things can only be "in a manner" for a percipient; so unless there is an all-seeing infinite intelligence that thinks and perceives the ding an sich in all its infinite possible "manners"; things in themselves simply exist. — Janus
But the other point is, this allows Kant to be both an empirical realist, and a transcendental idealist. He can accept (as I do) the empirical reality of the age of the Universe etc, but at the same time, insist on the fact that the 'intuitions of time and space' are still intrinsic to the observer and not to the so-called objective world. — Wayfarer
But the point is, the manner in which either 'the universe' or 'the object' exists 'independent of our describing' is never known to us (as per Kant). So the object is not simply 'in the mind', but the reference frame, which the observer brings to the picture, is intrinsic to any description or knowledge of the world. We can't know of it outside of or apart from any such frame. The 'assumed independence of the object' is just what Kant refers to as 'transcendental realism'. (CPR, A369. — Wayfarer
And that is also the main point at issue in the debate between Bohr and Einstein.) — Wayfarer
But the other point is, this allows Kant to be both an empirical realist, and a transcendental idealist. He can accept (as I do) the empirical reality of the age of the Universe etc, but at the same time, insist on the fact that the 'intuitions of time and space' are still intrinsic to the observer and not to the so-called objective world. It is being able to grasp that kind of 'double perspective' that is important here. (On that note, have to log out for at least a few days, duty calls.) — Wayfarer
Berkeley says that we cannot form abstract ideas of colour without shape, or of bodies without a background, motion without something moving. It is this separation that Locke uses to describe primary and secondary qualities that Berkeley calls abstract ideas. Berkeley says he cannot abstract in that way, can you think of an abstract man, of no particular size, body type, colour, hair etc?
It is this abstraction that allows Locke to claim the general term of matter. For Berkeley this is incoherent, because he cannot imagine a secondary quality in absence of a primary one and so Locke is abusing language by only using it as symbols of denotation. I am still not 100% on how this works, but I hve limited language understanding. — Jamesk
This is right in line with my question. He does actually provide a lot of support for his theory however a lot of that support is almost identical to the support Locke had used and Berkeley had refuted. Kind of like saying you can't use that reason to support matter but I can use it to support spiritual substance.
If we can expose this tactic it would seriously undermine immateriality as an alternative to Locke. — Jamesk
I would say that the manner in which a thing exists is known to us. The apple is red, etc. That is the thing in itself, as described in human terms. — Andrew M
The fact that, at least indirectly, one can actually see a single elementary particle—in a cloud chamber, say, or a bubble chamber—supports the view that the smallest units of matter are real physical objects, existing in the same sense that stones or flowers do.
But the inherent difficulties of the materialist theory of the atom, which had become apparent even in the ancient discussions about smallest particles, have also appeared very clearly in the development of physics during the present century.
This difficulty relates to the question whether the smallest units are ordinary physical objects, whether they exist in the same way as stones or flowers. Here, the development of quantum theory some forty years ago has created a complete change in the situation. The mathematically formulated laws of quantum theory show clearly that our ordinary intuitive concepts cannot be unambiguously applied to the smallest particles. All the words or concepts we use to describe ordinary physical objects, such as "position", "velocity", "color", "size", and so on, become indefinite and problematic if we try to use then of elementary particles....it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on.
During the coming years, the high-energy accelerators will bring to light many further interesting details about the behavior of elementary particles 1 . But I am inclined to think that the answer just considered to the old philosophical problem [i.e. of idealism vs materialism] will turn out to be final. If this is so, does this answer confirm the views of Democritus or Plato?
I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or—in Plato's sense—Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics. — Werner Heisenberg, The Debate between Plato and Democritus
I'm not clear what transcendental idealism is adding here. — Andrew M
What could maybe be added here is inter-subjectivity. Or rather I think 'inter-subjectivity' is still too theoretical but points to what I have in mind. Science is a community effort. Objectivity is (and I think you'd agree) not about stuff out there but precisely about separating science from non-science. An statement is objective/rational or not. Objective reality is science's (or philosophy's) determination (ascertainment not construction) of reality. Objectivity is about the social and not the physical. — sign
What we have with modern scientific method is a way of distilling the kinds of facts that are generalisable for all observers, and also quantifiable through mathematics. — Wayfarer
A lot rests on the way that science was interpolated into the position that had previously been assigned to religion, as a 'guide to how educated folks ought to think'. Of course, when it comes to technê that is quite appropriate, but not necessarily when it comes to practical wisdom, aesthetics or ethics. It doesn't allow any space for the sense of the unknowable and the mysterious, which hems in and bounds human knowledge. — Wayfarer
The space for the unknowable and the mysterious is the privatized conscience — sign
I'm under the impression that you believe in some kind of non-scientific non-subjective truth. — sign
So objectivity is applicable across an enormous range of phenomena, but it's not absolute.
— Wayfarer
What could it possibly mean for objectivity to be "absolute"? Is that even a coherent notion? — Janus
Due mainly to Protestantism, which 'internalised' the entire vast salvific machinery of medieval religion. — Wayfarer
And really part of that is the aspiration to arrive at an understanding of the absolute, an answer to the question of 'what is behind it all?' It's not unprecedented in philosophy and religion, after all: God, in the Christian doctrine, is the 'alpha and omega', source and end of everything. — Wayfarer
Certainly the objects of common experience exist in a common-sense way - which is the attitude of empirical realism. But when you really examine the nature of those objects, and indeed the nature of experience itself, at bottom it is actually quite mysterious - even unreal. — Wayfarer
I'm not clear what transcendental idealism is adding here.
— Andrew M
It's a subtle but important point, but it undermines the entire notion of 'mind-independence', albeit on different grounds to Berkeley. Kant points out that empirical knowledge is dependent on attributes and powers which already exist in the mind - so 'things conform to thoughts', rather than vice versa. — Wayfarer
People at one time thought that the movements of the stars and planets were mysterious. But that turned out to be a statement about people's knowledge and understanding, not about the phenomena themselves. — Andrew M
Was Kant claiming that the existence of dinosaurs in the ancient past depended on human thought? — Andrew M
'Everyone knows that the earth, and a fortiori the universe, existed for a long time before there were any living beings, and therefore any perceiving subjects. But according to Kant ... that is impossible.'
Schopenhauer's defence of Kant on this score was ...that the objector has not understood to the very bottom the Kantian demonstration that time is one of the forms of [human] sensibility. The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room.
The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper.
This, incidentally, illustrates a difficulty in the way of understanding which transcendental idealism has permanently to contend with: the assumptions of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect' enter unawares into the way in which the statements of transcendental idealism are understood.
Such realistic assumptions so pervade our normal use of concepts that the claims of transcendental idealism disclose their own non-absurdity only after difficult consideration, whereas criticisms of them at first appear cogent which on examination are seen to rest on confusion. We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them.
The fundamental absurdity of materialism is that it starts from the objective, and takes as the ultimate ground of explanation something objective, whether it be matter in the abstract, simply as it is thought, or after it has taken form, as empirically given — that is to say, substance, the chemical element with its primary relations. Some such thing it takes, as existing absolutely and in itself, in order that it may evolve organic nature and finally the knowing subject from it, and explain them adequately by means of it ; whereas in truth all that is objective is already determined as such in manifold ways by the knowing subject through its forms of knowing, and presupposes them; and consequently it entirely disappears if we think the subject away.
Everything objective, extended, active, and hence everything material, is regarded by materialism as so solid a basis for its explanations that a reduction to this ...can leave nothing to be desired. [But] all this is something that is given only very indirectly and conditionally, and is therefore only relatively present, for it has passed through the machinery and fabrication of the brain, and hence has entered the forms of time, space, and causality, by virtue of which it is first of all presented as extended in space and operating in time.
If we can use feelings as explanations for peoples' behaviors, then aren't feelings objective? Anytime that you talk about the way things are, which includes peoples' emotional state, you are speaking objectively.I don't know what Berkeley would say to that; according to the logic of his thinking (based on what I recall) I think there would still be a real difference and hence a valid distinction between what is, what is experienced by us and the subjective feelings that arise on account of what we experience, with the former two being objective and the latter subjective. — Janus
And doesn't that make the claim that it is possible, in principle, to arrive at an objective understanding of the absolute? — Wayfarer
If we can use feelings as explanations for peoples' behaviors, then aren't feelings objective? Anytime that you talk about the way things are, which includes peoples' emotional state, you are speaking objectively. — Harry Hindu
Anyway, so you're basically using "absolute" to refer to "what's behind it all." I wouldn't say that an understanding of that is necessarily achievable only by science, at least not with the assumptions that are currently made by the sciences, and scientists are just as prone to endorsing nonsense as anyone else, but the answer to "what's behind it all" is certainly not going to be religious, and is certainly not going to be arrived at by anything like religious "inquiry." — Terrapin Station
The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding ... [Magee]
I interpret the underlined phrase to mean that realism smuggles a human perspective in, without recognising that it has done so. The pre-history of the Earth (for instance) is understood in terms of preceding epochs - that is, to all of us, an objective fact or set of observations, and I am not taking issue with that. But what this doesn't recognise is that, these observations are still oriented around an implicitly human perspective in terms of time and space. And that spatio-temporal framework is what is 'the creation of the understanding'. That is what would not be real, in the absence of any observers. So the picture we have, of the serene early Earth, silently orbiting the Sun, still contains an implicit observer, who forgets that she is still part of the picture. Absent that organising principle supplied by the mind, what can be said to exist? — Wayfarer
The problem with this perspective is that the religious traditions give us a much more comprehensive and realistic understanding of the nature of time, and the relationship between time and space, than the assumptions employed in modern science do. All of the unanswerable problems of modern physics, and cosmology, mentioned by wayfarer above, along with the issues of spatial expansion, dark matter, dark energy etc., are all incomprehensible aspects of reality under the paradigm of the scientific representation of time. It is my opinion that the problems in understanding these aspects of reality, will never be resolved until we release the scientific representation of time, and return to the religious ideology for guidance. — Metaphysician Undercover
"Sound" refers to a sensation. How could a sensation be external to a sensing body? — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't recall any such explanation, only a confused bit of nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover
How would it make any sense to say that subjective/subjectivity refers to or necessarily implies "not the way things are"?
I've said this a ton of times, but when I use the terms subjectve/objective, I'm using them as simple synonyms for "mental" versus "extramental," and ultimately, I'm using those as terms for two different sorts of locations (brains versus everything else). Applying one term versus another to various things is like asking whether something goes in a cabinet or not. "Peanut butter?" "Yeah in the cabinet." "The couch?" "No, not in the cabinet." Etc.
Why does the location matter? Simply because if something is only a mental phenomenon, then it's not something that one can get right or wrong in the sense that one can get right or wrong what the chemical composition of, say, a volume of seawater is, It's simply a fact that people have the mental content that they do. — Terrapin Station
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