Loops often come to my mind when thinking about reality. Self-awareness is like a camera pointing at it's monitor and creates a visual feedback loop of a "infinite" corridor. Natural selection is basically environmental feedback - the environment shaping itself. — Harry Hindu

I agree. And on one hand this points to an aporia, an M.C. Escher 'impossible' vision of reality. On the other hand we have some kind of Hegelianism.

Constituted as it is, this process cannot belong to the subject; but when that point of support is fixed to start with, this process cannot be otherwise constituted, it can only be external. The anticipation that the Absolute is subject is therefore not merely not the realisation of this conception; it even makes this realisation impossible. For it makes out the notion to be a static point, while its actual reality is self-movement, self-activity.

...Everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as well. At the same time we must note that concrete substantiality implicates and involves the universal or the immediacy of knowledge itself, as well as that immediacy which is being, or immediacy qua object for knowledge. — Hegel

We have something like the entanglement of language in non-language. The real is intelligible. It includes this very discourse about itself. But intelligibility is not a matter of the 'private' subject. To be in language is to participate in a group subject. What the community takes for real is just the real, inasmuch as the real is intelligible.

But this especially includes worldly objects. Indeed, we tend to collapse objectivity (unbiasedness) into these objects, forgetting intuitions of logic that don't depend directly on sense organs. From one perspective objects and concepts are two ways of saying the same thing. The chair is grasped as a chair. As Husserl has shown, objects already transcend our perspectival viewing of them. If we walk around the chair or close our eyes and open them again, it is the same chair. The chair is never completely devoured by the eyes. So this 'involuntary' concept is just the object as object as the 'kernel' of sensation. But we can of course take meanings as 'objects' in a shared 'mental' space, and we call them 'concepts.'And concepts-objects exist in a network, getting their determination from one another. At the level of reason (conversations like this), we have something like the real's determination of itself. To the degree that what I am saying in these public signs is rational, 'I' do not speak as some isolated subject. We co-determine the real ---as that which is co-determined through a distributed rationality with a variety of bodily perspectives on the world.

Ah yes, the gap between us and the absolute is taken as the absolute itself! And of course such thinkers don't acknowledge the intelligibility of their own discourse which establishes the absolute impossibility of the absolute. It occurs to me that rejections of absolute knowledge just make our finite knowledge in its plurality absolute. It is all the absolute we can hope for and therefore the functioning absolute. — sign

This observation may or not be helpful but neither Aristotle nor Plato dismissed or declared victory over Cratylus and his arguments. They, in their various fashions, were holding out for it not being the last word.

A point of comparison would be the times both of those writers excluded some points of view as matters they hoped would never come up again.

Weird. That's such a basic thing to know. Objective sounds are sounds occurring external to your body. — Terrapin Station

"Sound" refers to a sensation. How could a sensation be external to a sensing body?

I explained a number of times what I'm referring to with "matter." — Terrapin Station

I don't recall any such explanation, only a confused bit of nonsense.

Locke builds his case on an ability to abstract ideas from general terms and on primary and secondary qualities. Locke continues on from Descartes by offering indirect realism and by saying that it is ok to doubt, with the little knowledge we have we can still get by and build working scientific theories. — Jamesk

It's been quite a while since I read Locke. But I remember that I think his division between primary and secondary qualities is unsound, and somewhat arbitrary. I think that if this distinction falls through, Locke's ontology is pretty much lost Berkeley provides a much more sound argument, though he really does not provide principles for an ontology. Maybe Berkeley disproves Locke's ontology without providing an acceptable alternative. That's what I remember about Berkeley, he provides a lot of good arguments against some ontological principles, without providing an alternative to those refuted principles. I'll reread yours and wayfarer's posts above, and see if I can recall why I was unimpressed by Locke's ontology, and quite incline to accept Berkeley's points. Maybe I can contribute something worthwhile to the thread.

↪Terrapin Station You say that the 'objective world' exists irrespective of whether anyone is around to observe it. I say not. Why? Because the very image of the 'objective world' that you're referring to, contains an implicit reference from the human perspective. You can picture the vast empty cosmos, planets coursing in their orbits, the formation of stars, and so on. But that is a picture that exists from a perspective, and containing a time-scale and distance-scale within which it is meaningful. Absent those elements of a framework within which that judgement is made, what can be said 'to exist' at all? That 'empty universe' is still something that is dependent on there being an observing mind.

Furthermore, something like this has been shown by physics itself. [...] — Wayfarer

I commented on this a while back. One way to think of it is not that the universe didn't exist prior to sentient observers, but that its dynamics presuppose a frame of reference (which an observer can provide).

Just as we look at an object from a specific perspective (yet the object exists independent of our looking), so we describe the universe from a specific perspective (yet the universe exists independent of our describing).

Just as we look at an object from a specific perspective (yet the object exists independent of our looking), so we describe the universe from a specific perspective (yet the universe exists independent of our describing). — Andrew M

But the point is, the manner in which either 'the universe' or 'the object' exists 'independent of our describing' is never known to us (as per Kant). So the object is not simply 'in the mind', but the reference frame, which the observer brings to the picture, is intrinsic to any description or knowledge of the world. We can't know of it outside of or apart from any such frame. The 'assumed independence of the object' is just what Kant refers to as 'transcendental realism'. (CPR, A369. And that is also the main point at issue in the debate between Bohr and Einstein.)

But the other point is, this allows Kant to be both an empirical realist, and a transcendental idealist. He can accept (as I do) the empirical reality of the age of the Universe etc, but at the same time, insist on the fact that the 'intuitions of time and space' are still intrinsic to the observer and not to the so-called objective world. It is being able to grasp that kind of 'double perspective' that is important here. (On that note, have to log out for at least a few days, duty calls.)

Great post, keep them coming.

. Maybe Berkeley disproves Locke's ontology without providing an acceptable alternative. That's what I remember about Berkeley, he provides a lot of good arguments against some ontological principles, without providing an alternative to those refuted principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is right in line with my question. He does actually provide a lot of support for his theory however a lot of that support is almost identical to the support Locke had used and Berkeley had refuted. Kind of like saying you can't use that reason to support matter but I can use it to support spiritual substance.

If we can expose this tactic it would seriously undermine immateriality as an alternative to Locke.

But the point is, the manner in which either 'the universe' or 'the object' exists 'independent of our describing' is never known to us (as per Kant). — Wayfarer

I would say the point is that "the universe" or "the object" (or to be precise what appears to us as such)-- the ding an sich--- doesn't exist in any "manner" independent of our perceptions and conceptions; it simply exists.

Things can only be "in a manner" for a percipient; so unless there is an all-seeing infinite intelligence that thinks and perceives the ding an sich in all its infinite possible "manners"; things in themselves simply exist.

Also, things exist in "manners" for other perceptive beings (animals); manners which we can never know because of the differences between their body/brain/nervous systems and ours.

Things can only be "in a manner" for a percipient; so unless there is an all-seeing infinite intelligence that thinks and perceives the ding an sich in all its infinite possible "manners"; things in themselves simply exist. — Janus

I think that for Berkeley the ding an sich is God. There is no veil of perception to be overcome, just God, his ideas of objects and us and our minds, it is all clear and very direct.

But the other point is, this allows Kant to be both an empirical realist, and a transcendental idealist. He can accept (as I do) the empirical reality of the age of the Universe etc, but at the same time, insist on the fact that the 'intuitions of time and space' are still intrinsic to the observer and not to the so-called objective world. — Wayfarer

What could maybe be added here is inter-subjectivity. Or rather I think 'inter-subjectivity' is still too theoretical but points to what I have in mind. Science is a community effort. Objectivity is (and I think you'd agree) not about stuff out there but precisely about separating science from non-science. An statement is objective/rational or not. Objective reality is science's (or philosophy's) determination (ascertainment not construction) of reality. Objectivity is about the social and not the physical. The physical does indeed offer intense objectivity, but collapsing objectivity into objects creates a mess I think we both agree on. I could summarize by saying that it's impossible for an isolated subject to be rational or scientific. (This doesn't mean that I can't run off to the woods having been raised/educated and do science. But I'm still in a world that knows my language.)

But the point is, the manner in which either 'the universe' or 'the object' exists 'independent of our describing' is never known to us (as per Kant). So the object is not simply 'in the mind', but the reference frame, which the observer brings to the picture, is intrinsic to any description or knowledge of the world. We can't know of it outside of or apart from any such frame. The 'assumed independence of the object' is just what Kant refers to as 'transcendental realism'. (CPR, A369. — Wayfarer

I would say that the manner in which a thing exists is known to us. The apple is red, etc. That is the thing in itself, as described in human terms.

Looking at the apple is the basis for our language about it. Nonetheless the apple exists independently of human experience and representation.

And that is also the main point at issue in the debate between Bohr and Einstein.) — Wayfarer

The moon still exists when no-one is looking...

But the other point is, this allows Kant to be both an empirical realist, and a transcendental idealist. He can accept (as I do) the empirical reality of the age of the Universe etc, but at the same time, insist on the fact that the 'intuitions of time and space' are still intrinsic to the observer and not to the so-called objective world. It is being able to grasp that kind of 'double perspective' that is important here. (On that note, have to log out for at least a few days, duty calls.) — Wayfarer

I'm not clear what transcendental idealism is adding here. All that seems required is that empirical explanations take into account the nature of the observer.

Berkeley says that we cannot form abstract ideas of colour without shape, or of bodies without a background, motion without something moving. It is this separation that Locke uses to describe primary and secondary qualities that Berkeley calls abstract ideas. Berkeley says he cannot abstract in that way, can you think of an abstract man, of no particular size, body type, colour, hair etc?

It is this abstraction that allows Locke to claim the general term of matter. For Berkeley this is incoherent, because he cannot imagine a secondary quality in absence of a primary one and so Locke is abusing language by only using it as symbols of denotation. I am still not 100% on how this works, but I hve limited language understanding. — Jamesk

I think we ought to recognize the difference between an abstract concept (universal), and an imagination, an image of a particular within the mind. The former, for example mathematical concepts, geometrical figures, etc., exist by definition. A "square" is such and such, a "circle" is such, and so on. The very existence of these concepts in the realm of the human mind, relies on their respective definitions. On the other hand, we can imagine a particular, by producing an image in the mind without knowing a definition. We can however make a judgement as to how the image corresponds to sensations. Is the image produced from sense experience, or is it completely imaginary?

So, "an abstract man" would not be an image of a particular man, rather a definition of what it means to be a man. We can consider the distinction between primary and secondary qualities in this way as well. Locke looks at qualities, and realizes that some qualities we do not directly sense, or imagine, we deduce their existence through definitions. The question for Berkeley might be described as how would we validate abstract concepts as referring to anything independent from the mind. So he uses "matter" as an example to demonstrate that we can just as easily conceive of the world without matter. It all becomes much more complex than either Locke or Berkeley represents it as, and this is just like a lead up to Kant's a priori/a posteriori, and analytic/synthetic distinctions.

This is right in line with my question. He does actually provide a lot of support for his theory however a lot of that support is almost identical to the support Locke had used and Berkeley had refuted. Kind of like saying you can't use that reason to support matter but I can use it to support spiritual substance.

If we can expose this tactic it would seriously undermine immateriality as an alternative to Locke. — Jamesk

This just takes us back to Descartes' argument. We can validate the existence of our own ideas because they are immediately present to us, but that there is substance (substance or matter, being an abstract idea) independent from this requires building up a system of correspondence, and correspondence is based in fundamental assumptions which cannot be proven. So the arguments Berkeley uses against Locke cannot really be applied back against Berkeley as you suggest. But Berkeley is basically just an extension of Descartes' naivety which is fine for grasping the reality of ideas, but gives us nothing to base an understanding of the physical world on. And the objections which one might use against Berkeley are quite distinct from the ones Berkeley uses against Locke. This would be that his strictly monist reality can provide no principles for correspondence.

I would agree except I would say the things are objectively real insofar as God makes them to be by thinking them. Obviously things are not static they are all more or less dynamic and hence constantly changing.

Could we say that for Berkeley the objective and the subjective are basically the same thing?

I don't know what Berkeley would say to that; according to the logic of his thinking (based on what I recall) I think there would still be a real difference and hence a valid distinction between what is, what is experienced by us and the subjective feelings that arise on account of what we experience, with the former two being objective and the latter subjective.

I would say that the manner in which a thing exists is known to us. The apple is red, etc. That is the thing in itself, as described in human terms. — Andrew M

Certainly the objects of common experience exist in a common-sense way - which is the attitude of empirical realism. But when you really examine the nature of those objects, and indeed the nature of experience itself, at bottom it is actually quite mysterious - even unreal. The statement that 'the moon exists when not being looked at' is, of course, almost exactly the kind of point that Berkeley made his case on. And that exact question, as you know, was asked, exasperatedly, by Einstein himself, during the debates with Bohr and Heisenberg over the meaning of quantum physics. Why did he feel compelled to ask it?

The fact that, at least indirectly, one can actually see a single elementary particle—in a cloud chamber, say, or a bubble chamber—supports the view that the smallest units of matter are real physical objects, existing in the same sense that stones or flowers do.

But the inherent difficulties of the materialist theory of the atom, which had become apparent even in the ancient discussions about smallest particles, have also appeared very clearly in the development of physics during the present century.

This difficulty relates to the question whether the smallest units are ordinary physical objects, whether they exist in the same way as stones or flowers. Here, the development of quantum theory some forty years ago has created a complete change in the situation. The mathematically formulated laws of quantum theory show clearly that our ordinary intuitive concepts cannot be unambiguously applied to the smallest particles. All the words or concepts we use to describe ordinary physical objects, such as "position", "velocity", "color", "size", and so on, become indefinite and problematic if we try to use then of elementary particles....it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on.

During the coming years, the high-energy accelerators will bring to light many further interesting details about the behavior of elementary particles ¹ . But I am inclined to think that the answer just considered to the old philosophical problem [i.e. of idealism vs materialism] will turn out to be final. If this is so, does this answer confirm the views of Democritus or Plato?

I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or—in Plato's sense—Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics. — Werner Heisenberg, The Debate between Plato and Democritus

1. Although the LHC has by no means resolved this question, arguably it has only amplified it.

I'm not clear what transcendental idealism is adding here. — Andrew M

It's a subtle but important point, but it undermines the entire notion of 'mind-independence', albeit on different grounds to Berkeley. Kant points out that empirical knowledge is dependent on attributes and powers which already exist in the mind - so 'things conform to thoughts', rather than vice versa.

What could maybe be added here is inter-subjectivity. Or rather I think 'inter-subjectivity' is still too theoretical but points to what I have in mind. Science is a community effort. Objectivity is (and I think you'd agree) not about stuff out there but precisely about separating science from non-science. An statement is objective/rational or not. Objective reality is science's (or philosophy's) determination (ascertainment not construction) of reality. Objectivity is about the social and not the physical. — sign

What we have with modern scientific method is a way of distilling the kinds of facts that are generalisable for all observers, and also quantifiable through mathematics. So objectivity is applicable across an enormous range of phenomena, but it's not absolute. That is why, at the end of the day, we have only the shifting sands of falsifiable hypothesis.

A lot rests on the way that science was interpolated into the position that had previously been assigned to religion, as a 'guide to how educated folks ought to think'. Of course, when it comes to technê that is quite appropriate, but not necessarily when it comes to practical wisdom, aesthetics or ethics. It doesn't allow any space for the sense of the unknowable and the mysterious, which hems in and bounds human knowledge.

So objectivity is applicable across an enormous range of phenomena, but it's not absolute. — Wayfarer

What could it possibly mean for objectivity to be "absolute"? Is that even a coherent notion?

What we have with modern scientific method is a way of distilling the kinds of facts that are generalisable for all observers, and also quantifiable through mathematics. — Wayfarer

I agree. The scientific subject is an ideal, unbiased subject. It is ideal both as an idea and a goal.

A lot rests on the way that science was interpolated into the position that had previously been assigned to religion, as a 'guide to how educated folks ought to think'. Of course, when it comes to technê that is quite appropriate, but not necessarily when it comes to practical wisdom, aesthetics or ethics. It doesn't allow any space for the sense of the unknowable and the mysterious, which hems in and bounds human knowledge. — Wayfarer

Indeed. What occurs to me is that this is precisely the ground of pluralism. If objectivity is understood in terms of the scientific object or object of common sense, then everything else can only be subjective. The space for the unknowable and the mysterious is the privatized conscience. From this perspective we maintain a 'priesthood' and 'theology' of the objective (the scientific subject) but reduce its realm. In practice, I think we recognize quasi-objectivity in a wider realm. It is 'not just my opinion' that hurting children is wrong. Or rather that's arguably a superstitious way of looking at which pretends that worldly objects are perfectly established. The fantasy is that there is stuff out there which is 'perfectly' there. Somehow 'hurting children is wrong' is subjective despite the consensus while what is 'perfectly' there is not consensus, despite its mediation by a scientific consensus. In short, some 'stuff in itself' is a dead 'god' or ground of objectivity.

I'm under the impression that you believe in some kind of non-scientific non-subjective truth. I'm suggesting that 'objective' is a good word for this. Indeed, the dominant definition is still 'of a person or their judgment' that is 'not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts.'

The space for the unknowable and the mysterious is the privatized conscience — sign

Due mainly to Protestantism, which 'internalised' the entire vast salvific machinery of medieval religion.

I'm under the impression that you believe in some kind of non-scientific non-subjective truth. — sign

Indeed - embedded in the Great Chain of Being. All of the world's wisdom traditions were 'topographies' of that conception. (Actually I bought Arthur Lovejoy's book of that title, which regrettably doesn't read very well as it's poorly edited and written in rather turgid academic prose comprising very long paragraphs. But the overall idea is still sound in my view. I'll reply further in that other thread.)

So objectivity is applicable across an enormous range of phenomena, but it's not absolute.
— Wayfarer

What could it possibly mean for objectivity to be "absolute"? Is that even a coherent notion? — Janus

I believe that overall, a very important motivation of Enlightenment philosophy - exemplified by the French 'philosophes', Auguste Comte, the Scottish Enlightenment (including Hume), and Kant himself - was the attempt to shift the foundations of knowledge from the generally metaphysical and religious outlook of the foregoing culture, to one provided by the natural sciences.

And really part of that is the aspiration to arrive at an understanding of the absolute, an answer to the question of 'what is behind it all?' It's not unprecedented in philosophy and religion, after all: God, in the Christian doctrine, is the 'alpha and omega', source and end of everything. Later Greek philosophy was likewise animated by the idea of the One (ta hen) which was the source of all (and which Christian theology borrowed heavily from). Hegel himself sought to understand and explain how the Absolute manifested in history. More recently, 'in a 1980 lecture, “Is the End in Sight for Theoretical Physics?”, Stephen Hawkings expressed “cautious optimism” that within 20 years physicists would discover a “complete theory” that would solve the riddle of existence. It would tell us what reality is made of, where it came from and why it takes the form we observe. He expanded on these ideas in Brief History of Time, published in 1988' (quoted by John Horgan). So I think it's quite reasonable to portray science as 'the quest for the absolute'. And I think that scientific realism still generally maintains that aspiration. And doesn't that make the claim that it is possible, in principle, to arrive at an objective understanding of the absolute? Isn't the 'search for the grand unified theory' that Hawkings refers to, trying to do that?

Due mainly to Protestantism, which 'internalised' the entire vast salvific machinery of medieval religion. — Wayfarer

I agree, and internalizing it differentiated it. We are all 'still Protestants' inasmuch as we believe in freedom, one might say. The meta-belief (the functioning absolute) is that the 'absolute' is a private matter. I intend neither praise nor blame. 'I' in my noisy idiosyncrasy who strive nevertheless to determine the real-for-us am of course made possible as 'myself' by this freedom. So the private conscience in fact strives outward for public recognition, via persuasion which is not forbidden. We can also note the gap between words and deeds here. The freedom of speech is 'Protestant.'

And really part of that is the aspiration to arrive at an understanding of the absolute, an answer to the question of 'what is behind it all?' It's not unprecedented in philosophy and religion, after all: God, in the Christian doctrine, is the 'alpha and omega', source and end of everything. — Wayfarer

Indeed, I read science in its most expansive and romantic conception of itself as a 'theology' of the real understand in terms of publicly available objects (to be redundant). The feeling-tone justifies the metaphor. Nature is a goddess to see in her nudity. So perhaps the focus is simply on the sensually public (already 'conceptualized' in the ordinary sense that makes the arranging the experiments possible.) This is a 'theology' of the real that methodologically excludes its own substance (meaning). This meaning is like the optic nerve, the condition for the possibility of science and also its instituting blind-spot. The 'primordial' problem of interpreting the other (the problem of reading non-mathematical language) is simply dodged, with impressive results.

To be clear, I think one can cherish science without collapsing it into philosophy, and I ultimately don't think 'scientism' is the name of the 'problem.' The 'problem' (if we must have one) is perhaps our own individual freedom, but as it exists in others. On the other hand, we need such frustrating freedom to enjoy being recognized as freedom by freedom. But this is also as reason by reason, and 'scientism' would be one of many claims in a plurality of privatized consciences sharing a world in which they are bodily interdependent.

Certainly the objects of common experience exist in a common-sense way - which is the attitude of empirical realism. But when you really examine the nature of those objects, and indeed the nature of experience itself, at bottom it is actually quite mysterious - even unreal. — Wayfarer

People at one time thought that the movements of the stars and planets were mysterious. But that turned out to be a statement about people's knowledge and understanding, not about the phenomena themselves.

I'm not clear what transcendental idealism is adding here.
— Andrew M

It's a subtle but important point, but it undermines the entire notion of 'mind-independence', albeit on different grounds to Berkeley. Kant points out that empirical knowledge is dependent on attributes and powers which already exist in the mind - so 'things conform to thoughts', rather than vice versa. — Wayfarer

I don't understand that conclusion. Was Kant claiming that the existence of dinosaurs in the ancient past depended on human thought?

People at one time thought that the movements of the stars and planets were mysterious. But that turned out to be a statement about people's knowledge and understanding, not about the phenomena themselves. — Andrew M

Of course we know vastly more about physical cosmology than did the ancients, but mysteries have a way of re-appearing in new guises. We have discussed at length the problems of the interpretation of the meaning of quantum mechanics. Meanwhile controversy rages about the scientific status, or lack thereof, of strings, super-symmetry and multiverses. They are all mysteries that don't look like being resolved anytime soon.

Was Kant claiming that the existence of dinosaurs in the ancient past depended on human thought? — Andrew M

I have quoted this before:

'Everyone knows that the earth, and a fortiori the universe, existed for a long time before there were any living beings, and therefore any perceiving subjects. But according to Kant ... that is impossible.'

Schopenhauer's defence of Kant on this score was ...that the objector has not understood to the very bottom the Kantian demonstration that time is one of the forms of [human] sensibility. The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room.

The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper.

This, incidentally, illustrates a difficulty in the way of understanding which transcendental idealism has permanently to contend with: the assumptions of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect' enter unawares into the way in which the statements of transcendental idealism are understood.

Such realistic assumptions so pervade our normal use of concepts that the claims of transcendental idealism disclose their own non-absurdity only after difficult consideration, whereas criticisms of them at first appear cogent which on examination are seen to rest on confusion. We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them.

Bryan Magee Schopenhauer's Philosophy, Pp 106-107

I interpret the underlined phrase to mean that realism smuggles a human perspective in, without recognising that it has done so. The pre-history of the Earth (for instance) is understood in terms of preceding epochs - that is, to all of us, an objective fact or set of observations, and I am not taking issue with that. But what this doesn't recognise is that, these observations are still oriented around an implicitly human perspective in terms of time and space. And that spatio-temporal framework is what is 'the creation of the understanding'. That is what would not be real, in the absence of any observers. So the picture we have, of the serene early Earth, silently orbiting the Sun, still contains an implicit observer, who forgets that she is still part of the picture. Absent that organising principle supplied by the mind, what can be said to exist?

Schopenhauer, again:

The fundamental absurdity of materialism is that it starts from the objective, and takes as the ultimate ground of explanation something objective, whether it be matter in the abstract, simply as it is thought, or after it has taken form, as empirically given — that is to say, substance, the chemical element with its primary relations. Some such thing it takes, as existing absolutely and in itself, in order that it may evolve organic nature and finally the knowing subject from it, and explain them adequately by means of it ; whereas in truth all that is objective is already determined as such in manifold ways by the knowing subject through its forms of knowing, and presupposes them; and consequently it entirely disappears if we think the subject away.

Everything objective, extended, active, and hence everything material, is regarded by materialism as so solid a basis for its explanations that a reduction to this ...can leave nothing to be desired. [But] all this is something that is given only very indirectly and conditionally, and is therefore only relatively present, for it has passed through the machinery and fabrication of the brain, and hence has entered the forms of time, space, and causality, by virtue of which it is first of all presented as extended in space and operating in time.

WWR vol. 1, sect. 7

I don't know what Berkeley would say to that; according to the logic of his thinking (based on what I recall) I think there would still be a real difference and hence a valid distinction between what is, what is experienced by us and the subjective feelings that arise on account of what we experience, with the former two being objective and the latter subjective. — Janus

If we can use feelings as explanations for peoples' behaviors, then aren't feelings objective? Anytime that you talk about the way things are, which includes peoples' emotional state, you are speaking objectively.

The subjective is a subset of the objective. Your feelings are part of reality as much as the waves of the ocean are. They are effects and causes.

And doesn't that make the claim that it is possible, in principle, to arrive at an objective understanding of the absolute? — Wayfarer

I'd phrase that as "an understanding of the objective absolute," not as "an objective understanding," since understanding itself doesn't have the property of being objective. Understanding is a mental phenomenon, not an extramental phenomenon.

Anyway, so you're basically using "absolute" to refer to "what's behind it all." I wouldn't say that an understanding of that is necessarily achievable only by science, at least not with the assumptions that are currently made by the sciences, and scientists are just as prone to endorsing nonsense as anyone else, but the answer to "what's behind it all" is certainly not going to be religious, and is certainly not going to be arrived at by anything like religious "inquiry."

If we can use feelings as explanations for peoples' behaviors, then aren't feelings objective? Anytime that you talk about the way things are, which includes peoples' emotional state, you are speaking objectively. — Harry Hindu

How would it make any sense to say that subjective/subjectivity refers to or necessarily implies "not the way things are"?

I've said this a ton of times, but when I use the terms subjectve/objective, I'm using them as simple synonyms for "mental" versus "extramental," and ultimately, I'm using those as terms for two different sorts of locations (brains versus everything else). Applying one term versus another to various things is like asking whether something goes in a cabinet or not. "Peanut butter?" "Yeah in the cabinet." "The couch?" "No, not in the cabinet." Etc.

Why does the location matter? Simply because if something is only a mental phenomenon, then it's not something that one can get right or wrong in the sense that one can get right or wrong what the chemical composition of, say, a volume of seawater is, It's simply a fact that people have the mental content that they do.

Anyway, so you're basically using "absolute" to refer to "what's behind it all." I wouldn't say that an understanding of that is necessarily achievable only by science, at least not with the assumptions that are currently made by the sciences, and scientists are just as prone to endorsing nonsense as anyone else, but the answer to "what's behind it all" is certainly not going to be religious, and is certainly not going to be arrived at by anything like religious "inquiry." — Terrapin Station

The problem with this perspective is that the religious traditions give us a much more comprehensive and realistic understanding of the nature of time, and the relationship between time and space, than the assumptions employed in modern science do. All of the unanswerable problems of modern physics, and cosmology, mentioned by wayfarer above, along with the issues of spatial expansion, dark matter, dark energy etc., are all incomprehensible aspects of reality under the paradigm of the scientific representation of time. It is my opinion that the problems in understanding these aspects of reality, will never be resolved until we release the scientific representation of time, and return to the religious ideology for guidance.

The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding ... [Magee]

I interpret the underlined phrase to mean that realism smuggles a human perspective in, without recognising that it has done so. The pre-history of the Earth (for instance) is understood in terms of preceding epochs - that is, to all of us, an objective fact or set of observations, and I am not taking issue with that. But what this doesn't recognise is that, these observations are still oriented around an implicitly human perspective in terms of time and space. And that spatio-temporal framework is what is 'the creation of the understanding'. That is what would not be real, in the absence of any observers. So the picture we have, of the serene early Earth, silently orbiting the Sun, still contains an implicit observer, who forgets that she is still part of the picture. Absent that organising principle supplied by the mind, what can be said to exist? — Wayfarer

Thanks for your explanation, that was helpful.

As I read it, Kant is reifying the way things appear to us into a world of appearances and making that the domain where dinosaurs, along with space and time, exist. A world of appearances does imply an observer.

Whereas the empirical realist says there is no world of appearances (nor a noumenal world), only a unitary world that appears in a particular way to observers and is described in human terms. So while our descriptions or pictures of the early Earth imply an observer, the early Earth itself does not.

The problem with this perspective is that the religious traditions give us a much more comprehensive and realistic understanding of the nature of time, and the relationship between time and space, than the assumptions employed in modern science do. All of the unanswerable problems of modern physics, and cosmology, mentioned by wayfarer above, along with the issues of spatial expansion, dark matter, dark energy etc., are all incomprehensible aspects of reality under the paradigm of the scientific representation of time. It is my opinion that the problems in understanding these aspects of reality, will never be resolved until we release the scientific representation of time, and return to the religious ideology for guidance. — Metaphysician Undercover

And what is the religious theory of time?

"Sound" refers to a sensation. How could a sensation be external to a sensing body? — Metaphysician Undercover

How ignorant would you have to be to not be familiar with definitions of "sound" not as a sensation?

"Sound is defined as "(a) Oscillation in pressure, stress, particle displacement, particle velocity, etc., propagated in a medium with internal forces (e.g., elastic or viscous), or the superposition of such propagated oscillation" for example

I don't recall any such explanation, only a confused bit of nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your evaluation of it is independent of the fact that I explained it.

How would it make any sense to say that subjective/subjectivity refers to or necessarily implies "not the way things are"?

I've said this a ton of times, but when I use the terms subjectve/objective, I'm using them as simple synonyms for "mental" versus "extramental," and ultimately, I'm using those as terms for two different sorts of locations (brains versus everything else). Applying one term versus another to various things is like asking whether something goes in a cabinet or not. "Peanut butter?" "Yeah in the cabinet." "The couch?" "No, not in the cabinet." Etc.

Why does the location matter? Simply because if something is only a mental phenomenon, then it's not something that one can get right or wrong in the sense that one can get right or wrong what the chemical composition of, say, a volume of seawater is, It's simply a fact that people have the mental content that they do. — Terrapin Station

Typical TS - responding to something I never said because they didn't take the time to read the whole post.

I never said, nor implied, that subjectivity is the opposite of objectivity. I said it is a subset of objectivity.

I think I actually said something like what you said. Illusions exist and are real. What they are interpreted to be about, doesn't exist and isn't real (that's what an illusion is - a misinterpretation of sensory data). That would be the subjective part that you are referring to - the way it appears, but isn't the way it is.

When I say that subjectivity is a subset, I'm saying that it is just a unique area in space/time, just like most areas of space/time. That rock is just as unique as this rock and your view is to my view. Views exist and are real. A view is located where you are located, and where I am located, and where every sensory-processing system is located. Rocks don't have a sensory-processing system, so there is no view located at the rock.