Just thought I'd mention the difference.

§53

As I said in my comments on §51 (way back now!), the next few sections basically iterate through a variety of ways in which which roles are established and changed, along with all the various effects that follow from these establishments and changes. §53 makes this clear off the bat, even though the opening statement can be a little ambiguous when read on its own:

§53: “Our language game (48) has various possibilities”.

Possibilities of what? Of dealing with the question raised in §51 regarding the correspondence between signs and things, hence:

§53: "There is a variety of cases in which we would say that a sign in the game was the name of a square of such-and-such a colour”.

§53 iterates through three such possibilities:

(1) Where people are simply taught that such and such a sign corresponds to such and such a square.
(2) Where the correspondence were ‘laid down somewhere’, much like, say, a pantone color chart:



And finally, (3) Where the chart is a ‘tool in the use of language’, in which a description of a complex refers to the chart each time a simple is referred to. As @“Luke” mentioned, this is the same kind of use of a chart that was mentioned back in §1. However, the puzzle for §53 - at least an immediate puzzle that jumps out at me - is the difference between (2) and (3). In both cases a chart is referred to establish correspondence, so why does Witty distinguish (2) and (3) with a ‘however, also…”?

The key difference seems to be this: in (3), the chart is used ‘every time’, as it were, one wants to make a description. This contrasts with (2) in which the chart simply serves as a kind of fall-back, where, although it is ‘laid down somewhere’, it is not always the case that we must refer to it. Perhaps in (2), we know the chart exists out there somewhere (maybe on an internet site), and we only look it up when say, a dispute arises. In (3), by contrast, the chart is immediately a 'tool in the use of language’: a tool without which the language would not ‘work’.

It is this distinction between (2) and (3) that allows Witty to begin to establish the fact that rules can be employed differently in a language-game. Hence the conclusion of §53, which moves in this direction:

§53: "If we call such a chart the expression of a rule of the language-game, it can be said that what we call a rule of a language-game may have very different roles in the game”.

In other words, rules don’t always play the same role in a language-game. They can play different roles, just as they do in (2) and (3). Finally, with respect to the meter rule discussion in §50, it can be said that that particular discussion hinges upon treating the meter rule like possibility (3), where the Paris meter, in its capacity as a 'tool in the use of language’, cannot be said to be either a meter nor not a meter long. Were the Paris meter be treated in a discussion according the possibility (2) however, one might be able to say that it is a meter long (or not).

In both cases a chart is referred to establish correspondence, so why does Witty distinguish (2) and (3) with a ‘however, also…”? — StreetlightX

Very nice. I overlooked the important distinction between uses (2) and (3) in my reading. This gives a lot more sense to the final sentence. Thanks.

(1) Where people are simply thought that such and such a sign corresponds to such and such a square. — StreetlightX

Just a small correction: I think you mean "taught".

Nice exposition, thank you. One point I disagree with though. You say;

Possibilities of what? Of dealing with the question raised in §51 regarding the correspondence between signs and things, hence: — StreetlightX

Unless I'm mistaken, you seem to be suggesting that 53 (and I suppose 54) are somehow answering the question raised at 51. I think rather they are contributing to Wittgenstein's overall argument that there is no more general answer to be had than a description. The difference is maybe small, but I think significant. It's like asking someone what colours cars come in and one answers "oh, all sorts, there's red, blue, green...", and another answers "there's red, blue and green.". The difference is only in the ellipses, but the implication of the former is that you'll get no better an answer than such a full list of colours as might, for all practical purposes, be endless. The latter, however, whilst being open to error still, is claiming some complete list might be drawn up.

I think this, together with many other such sets of aphorisms, don't make much sense unless viewed in the former sense.

To paraphrase 51(end of) to 54 the way I interpret it;

In order to see more clearly we must look close up. (51)
But what prevents us from looking close up in philosophy? (52)
Well, rules play a different role in different games, there's no generalisable rule for us to find beyond simply describing it. (53)
And sometimes, the only way we know these rules is by observing the other players in each and every game. (54)
So that is what prevent us from looking close up in philosophy, the desire to find some generalisable rule rather than to describe.

Just a small correction: I think you mean "taught". — Luke

:up: - corrected.

Unless I'm mistaken, you seem to be suggesting that 53 (and I suppose 54) are somehow answering the question raised at 51. I think rather they are contributing to Wittgenstein's overall argument that there is no more general answer to be had than a description. The difference is maybe small, but I think significant. It's like asking someone what colours cars come in and one answers "oh, all sorts, there's red, blue, green...", and another answers "there's red, blue and green.". The difference is only in the ellipses, but the implication of the former is that you'll get no better an answer than such a full list of colours as might, for all practical purposes, be endless. The latter, however, whilst being open to error still, is claiming some complete list might be drawn up. — Isaac

Yeah, that's fair. A big part of what I'm trying to do here is establish the 'flow' of the PI, to show the threads that weave from one part to the next, and sometimes it does mean I obscure global implications for local connections, so I appreciate the corrective.

Also, nice to have you on board!

§54

§54 serves to illustrate the point arrived at at the end of §53: that rules can themselves have different roles in a (language) game. Hence the reference to "kinds of cases where a game is played according to particular rule" - not just 'cases', mind you, but kinds of cases. The rest of §54 iterates though different kinds of roles that rules can play - as an aid in teaching the game; as a tool of the game itself (as with possibility (3) in §53); as what is observed from watching play.

In each case, the idea is that rules play a different role in the game; with the implication that there is no uniform role that rules play across different language games: one must get 'close up' (§51) to figure out exactly which role (or roles?) rules play.

A big part of what I'm trying to do here is establish the 'flow' of the PI, to show the threads that weave from one part to the next, and sometimes it does mean I obscure global implications for local connections, so I appreciate the corrective. — StreetlightX

Yes, I see what you're doing now. It's a tricky balance to strike I think, so I hope you'll take any future such wide-focus comments I may make as additions, rather than corrections.

Also, nice to have you on board! — StreetlightX

Thank you, it's a pleasure to be here.

Unless I'm mistaken, you seem to be suggesting that 53 (and I suppose 54) are somehow answering the question raised at 51. — Isaac

I wouldn't say that Streetlight is suggesting that this question is being answered. "Dealing with the question" does not necessarily imply answering it. Witty says that we must look at it in detail, from "close to". Putting something under a microscope is a way of dealing with it, but it doesn't necessarily answer the questions we have about it. What is often the case is that we have to compare the up close view with the far back view, and often reciprocate back and forth with our attention, to establish a relationship between the aspects observed from up close and the aspects observed from far back.

Consider the (2) example, where the chart is as Streetlight calls a "fall-back". If we were looking only up close, we might not even observe the existence of the chart, because we might not see any of the instances of referring to it. And such instances, if observed, might be obscured and taken as irrelevant because they are few and far between and the chart may not be recognizable as such. Therefore we wouldn't even know that such a chart existed until we compare the far back look and see a pattern of reference. Then we could turn back to an even closer close-up to focus directly on the chart, and see exactly what the chart consists of.

Here's something I think we ought to take note of. At 51 he says we must look at the detail, the up-close. Then at 52 he says:

"But first we must learn to understand what it is that opposes such an examination of details in philosophy."

So the expose which follows in the next section may be an explanation of this opposition to examining detail, rather than an actual examination of the detail. Think of the "particular rule", as the thing to be examined in detail. Are we examining this thing in detail, or are we examining the opposition to examining it?

§54

For me, the most important aspect of Wittgenstein's rule-following analysis, is not only the idea of the complexity of rule-following within language-games, but the necessary connection of rule-following with actions. Hence, the importance of "[learning] the game by watching how others play." So the rule, for e.g., thats bishops move diagonally, isn't a rule apart from the actions associated with the rule. And of course it's those actions that determine what's correct and incorrect, i.e., "[the] characteristic signs of it [correct and incorrect] in the player's behaviour." And obviously it can't just be any behavior, but the behavior of the social group in relation to the game.

It's also interesting that Wittgenstein points out how that same behavior can be recognized in languages we're not familiar with, which he mentions in connection with a slip of the tongue. It's almost as if there are bedrock behaviors that are associated with all acting, i.e., acting that transcends language in some respect.

§55

The first quote of 55, it seems to me, is referring to his ideas in the Tractatus (not exclusively of course), i.e., his picture theory of language. So true propositions, in the Tractatus, refer to the idea that the proposition (the names - primitive signs) match up with facts (objects - the primitives that make up facts). Hence, the name corresponds to the object, which then gives meaning to the sign.

So part of what Wittgenstein is talking about in terms of the primitive language-game given at the beginning of the PI, is in direct opposition to his thinking in the Tractatus. He demonstrates in the PI using various analogies and examples how the idea of meaning is not, for the most part, connected up with a sign associated with an object. That meaning still has sense even if the object that corresponds to the sign doesn't exist, or is destroyed. Where does that sense reside? It resides in the complexity of the language-game, grammar, rules, and actions (correct and incorrect) within social contexts, all of these work together to establish meaning.

My interpretation is not necessarily exegetical, but seen from a broader perspective.

Where does that sense reside? It resides in the complexity of the language-game, grammar, rules, and actions (correct and incorrect) within social contexts, all of these work together to establish meaning. — Sam26

—An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game. — Wittgenstein 55

As per my discussion with Luke, the paradigm referred to here cannot be an object, because the word still has meaning when the object is destroyed. How do you think it is, that something so general, and abstract, as "grammar, rules, and actions (correct and incorrect) within social contexts", is "a paradigm", as "paradigm" is used above? Remember, at this point in the text Wittgenstein is considering a specific problem which is an attitude of opposition by philosophers, toward looking up close, at details, and our example is the "particular rule".

§55

§55 deepens, ever so slightly, the distinction made in §53 between a sample being a 'tool in the use of language' - one being used immediately in a language-game (like a color from a chart each time a description is given), and a name where no such sample is invoked.

(A distinction that roughly corresponds to what I referred to as possibility (3) and possibilities (1) and (2) in my commentary of §53).

Again at stake here is something of a conditional: if a sample - or what Witty here also calls a paradigm, like the vault-locked Sepia sample or paradigmatic Paris meter - is used 'in conjunction with a name in a language-game', then it must actually exist in order to be spoken of sensically (if 'exist' is too fraught a word, one can say instead something like: there must really be a sample without which a language which invokes it could not get off the ground). Contrapositively, if no such sample is involved in a particular language game, then there is no need for it to actually exist in order for me to speak sensically.

This discussion actually hearkens back to §40-§45, where the question of whether words need 'bearers' in order to have meaning was raised. There, Witty concluded that no, they do not. This, however, is something of an exception: they don't ... unless a sample is involved in the use of words.

One might think of it this way: there are games in which the point is to check if something measures up to the sample; in the absence of such a sample, there would be no point to the game - there would be no meaning to our words. But not every game is like this. When I say "Nothung has a sharp blade" (§44), there is no need that Nothung actually be around, and in one piece, for this sentence to have meaning; but something like "is it the same length as Nothung?" would require there to be Nothung around to measure it against (notwithstanding a question like 'is it the same length as Nothung was?).*

*Note: I suspect older translations have Nothung rendered as 'Excalibur', though I could be wrong about this.

And of course it's those actions that determine what's correct and incorrect, i.e., "[the] characteristic signs of it [correct and incorrect] in the player's behaviour. — Sam26

I know you're going beyond the text somewhat, but there are some ambiguities with this reading, I think. First, I'm not clear on what it means to say that actions 'determine' what is correct and incorrect: is it not the case that actions are correct or incorrect? (i.e. you seem to introduce a temporal logic - actions > in/correctness - where I'm not sure there is one; But perhaps you don't quite mean this and I'm over-reading). Second, the "it" in the "the characteristic signs of it" seems to refer to 'distinguishing between mistakes and correct play' and not instances of correct and incorrect play - the act of distinction, and not the objects of the distinction, as in, not:

(1) "[the] characteristic signs of it [correct and incorrect] in the player's behaviour"; But:
(2) "[the] characteristic signs of it [distinguishing correct and incorrect play] in the player's behaviour";

This insofar as the immidiately preceeding sentence is:

"But how does the observer distinguish in this case between players’ mistakes and correct play? - There are characteristic signs of it in the players’ behaviour": the 'it' seems to refer to the verb - the act of distinguishing in/correct play by players in the game, and not individual correct and incorrect play in themselves.

Anyway, just a pair of observations that seemed to stand out to me.

I know you're going beyond the text somewhat, but there are some ambiguities with this reading, I think. First, I'm not clear on what it means to say that actions 'determine' what is correct and incorrect: is it not the case that actions are correct or incorrect? (i.e. you seem to introduce a temporal logic - actions > in/correctness - where I'm not sure there is one; But perhaps you don't quite mean this and I'm over-reading). Second, the "it" in the "the characteristic signs of it" seems to refer to 'distinguishing between mistakes and correct play' and not correct and incorrect play itself - the act of distinction, and not the objects of the distinction, as in, not:

(1) "[the] characteristic signs of it [correct and incorrect] in the player's behaviour"; But:
(2) "[the] characteristic signs of it [distinguishing correct and incorrect play] in the player's behaviour";

This insofar as the immidiately preceeding sentence is:

"But how does the observer distinguish in this case between players’ mistakes and correct play? - There are characteristic signs of it in the players’ behaviour": the 'it' seems to refer to the verb - the act of distinguishing in/correct play by players in the game, and not individual correct and incorrect play in themselves. — StreetlightX

What I mean by "...the actions determine what's correct or incorrect" is that the actions within the social context is the means by which we distinguish what's correct or incorrect. No action, as I understand it, is intrinsically correct or incorrect, except as it is seen within the game, or as seen within a social context. No more than an arrow is intrinsically pointing, it points within the context of the actions associated with the arrow.

I do think there is a kind of temporal logic to it, i.e., there is an action, then there is the determination if that action is correct or incorrect. How does one separate the action from the act of distinguishing right and wrong, correct and incorrect? There would be no temporal logic if the act itself was intrinsically right or wrong, correct or incorrect. The acts are only deemed correct or incorrect as the social group determines. When I use the word determine, I'm saying that the social groups decisions to say the bishop moves diagonally is not determined by any move in itself, but is determined within the social context of distinguishing correct and incorrect moves.

As to your last point, I agree that the "it" in the characteristic signs of it refers to the distinguishing between mistakes and correct play. However, the acts of distinction cannot be separated from the objects of distinction. Don't they go hand-in-hand?

I'm not sure I've understood your points, because in the first paragraph you seem to suggest that it's the actions that are correct or incorrect. However, in the last paragraph you do distinguish between the act of distinguishing correct and incorrect, from the acts within the game. However, the acts within the game are what determine correct or incorrect, but only as we determine that they are correct or incorrect. The two seem to be logically connected.

I've repeated myself, but only in an effort to clarify. I've probably misunderstood your points.

To paraphrase 51(end of) to 54 the way I interpret it;

In order to see more clearly we must look close up. (51)
But what prevents us from looking close up in philosophy? (52)
Well, rules play a different role in different games, there's no generalisable rule for us to find beyond simply describing it. (53)
And sometimes, the only way we know these rules is by observing the other players in each and every game. (54)
So that is what prevent us from looking close up in philosophy, the desire to find some generalisable rule rather than to describe. — Isaac

Not that I disagree, but it's also worth noting that at §51, immediately before W counsels the reader to "look at what really happens in detail", he asks whether the signification of the colour by the sign consists in a mental correspondence between sign and colour, such that the colour always comes before our minds when using the sign. I think that what Wittgenstein is also doing here is continuing his sustained attack on the idea that meaning is mental (or spiritual or occult). At §52, he says that an empirical investigation is superfluous if one presupposes an explanation and disregards empirical facts, which strikes me (at least in part) as a criticism directed at those who presuppose the explanation just described, i.e. the mental account of correspondence/meaning.

I wouldn't say that Streetlight is suggesting that this question is being answered. "Dealing with the question" does not necessarily imply answering it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fair point.

I think that what Wittgenstein is also doing here is continuing his sustained attack on the idea that meaning is mental (or spiritual or occult). At §52, he says that an empirical investigation is superfluous if one presupposes an explanation and disregards empirical facts, which strikes me as (at least in part) a criticism directed at those who presuppose the explanation just described, i.e. the mental account of correspondence/meaning. — Luke

It's an interesting take on it. I'd be inclined to agree insofar as I'm allowed to emphasise your use of the word 'also'.



My reading of 55 is roughly in accord with @StreetlightX so I won't repeat it, but I would like to add (or rather draw further attention to) the theme which StreetlightX hints at;

The three stage aphorism groups have thus far been of a similar sort and I think 55 belongs to the group expressed in 46-64 (so we haven't finished it yet) in which Wittgenstein is examining views about names signifying primary elements. So, Wittgenstein is making his usual attack on generalisation here. "isn't this the way things are?", the interlocutor asks, "Well, sometimes it is and sometimes it isn't", Wittgenstein answers.

It's broadly speaking taking apart, piece by piece, any attempt to analyse names into something else, something 'hidden' behind their every day use.

But not every game is like this. When I say "Nothung has a sharp blade" (§44), there is no need that Nothung actually be around, and in one piece, for this sentence to have meaning; but something like "is it the same length as Nothung?" would require there to be Nothung around to measure it against (notwithstanding a question like 'is it the same length as Nothung was?).* — StreetlightX

I think that there is really no such difference between these two examples. The only real difference is that one is in the form of a question. "Is it the same length as Nothung" really has the same sort of meaning as "Does Nothung have a sharp blade", when Nothung has been destroyed. In each case, "sharp blade" and "length" refer to properties of an object which once existed but does not exist anymore. There may be a distinction of primary and secondary properties here, but I don't think that's what Wittgenstein intends. So talking about the properties of non-existent objects, whether it be "length", or "sharp blade", in each case has some sense, but he hasn't really examined in what kind of way it has sense.

What I mean by "...the actions determine what's correct or incorrect" is that the actions within the social context is the means by which we distinguish what's correct or incorrect. No action, as I understand it, is intrinsically correct or incorrect, except as it is seen within the game, or as seen within a social context. No more than an arrow is intrinsically pointing, it points within the context of the actions associated with the arrow. — Sam26

This would require the assumption that the game, or "social context" has inherent within it, rules, by the means of which, such a judgement of correct or incorrect could be made. But we have not yet found, in the close-up examination of the details, the existence of any such rules. We haven't even gotten beyond the problem which is that philosophers are commonly opposed to making such a close-up examination. Why do you simply assume that there are rules inherent within "social context"?

No action, as I understand it, is intrinsically correct or incorrect, except as it is seen within the game, or as seen within a social context. No more than an arrow is intrinsically pointing, it points within the context of the actions associated with the arrow.

I do think there is a kind of temporal logic to it, i.e., there is an action, then there is the determination if that action is correct or incorrect. How does one separate the action from the act of distinguishing right and wrong, correct and incorrect? There would be no temporal logic if the act itself was intrinsically right or wrong, correct or incorrect. — Sam26

I pretty much agree on all these points - it is only within the context of a game that one can speak of correct and incorrect actions, and that those actions themselves are not 'intrinsically' correct or incorrect. But we can argue this and still say that it is actions that are themselves correct or not with the qualification, that correctness must be understood within the context of a game. In fact, to be perfectly frank, it should be the case that such a qualification isn't even necessary - for if Witty is right, it wouldn't even make sense to speak of correctness outside of a game. It's in that sense that I'm happy to say that actions can or cannot be correct. Long story short - we agree, with a small difference on terminological emphasis.

As to your last point, I agree that the "it" in the characteristic signs of it refers to the distinguishing between mistakes and correct play. However, the acts of distinction cannot be separated from the objects of distinction. Don't they go hand-in-hand? — Sam26

Not necessarily. Recall that the context of all this is in a discussion about the variety of roles that rules can have in a language-game. And this part in particular is about reading rules 'off the way the game is played' - that is, reading rules off behaviour. And Witty's point here seems to me to be something like: one can recognise that rules are at work, even if one is ignorant of the 'content' of those rules: "It would be possible to recognise that someone was doing so [correcting a slip of the tongue] even without knowing his language." Presumably, without knowing the language - without knowing what mistake was made - one can still recognise that a mistake was made. But this is a minor point.

We are in agreement StreetlightX, even where you expanded the point a bit in the first paragraph, and clarified the second paragraph. Excellent work!

This would require the assumption that the game, or "social context" has inherent within it, rules, by the means of which, such a judgement of correct or incorrect could be made. But we have not yet found, in the close-up examination of the details, the existence of any such rules. We haven't even gotten beyond the problem which is that philosophers are commonly opposed to making such a close-up examination. Why do you simply assume that there are rules inherent within "social context"? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't understand how it is that you do not agree with this, namely, that any language-game, which by definition is social, necessarily has rules (implicit and/or explicit). The rules are observed in the actions of those who participate, either correctly or incorrectly. So, if the call is made for a slab, and someone brings the correct stone, they, by definition, are following the correct rule. What is the rule? The rule (known or unknown) is in the bringing of the correct stone in response to the call. If there is no rule, how can we say that they followed the correct action? Keep in mind that even if there is no concept of a rule, as in primitive man, the act of retrieving the correct stone is the act by which we can attribute the concept rule as we know it.

Any language-game by definition is a rule-following activity, if not, then there would be no consistency of actions that would make it work. If there were no rules there would be no agreement in how to proceed, and thus no game of any sort, language or not. What is the rule that dictates that I should go left or right when I see an arrow? There surely isn't something intrinsic to the arrow. It has to be consistency of action within the group as they respond in various contexts to the pointing of the arrow, and that's what the rule consists in, necessarily.

I'm not assuming anything, I'm basing my conclusion on the evidence, as just presented in the previous paragraphs, and as presented by others as they too have interpreted these ideas. I'm not just pulling this out of the air randomly.

Afterthought:
This is not connected to my response to MU.

Kripke's paradox, by the way, is dependent on an interpretation of a rule, which is not what correct rule-following is about (not something in me, as if my understanding determines what's correct or not). It's not my interpretation of some rule that determines what it means to follow a rule correctly, it's in the agreement of the acts within the social group that determines what's correct or not.

I think Kripke has gone wrong in attributing one's interpretation of the rule with correct rule-following. So, the answer to Kripke's paradox is in the dissolving of the problem, which is done when one see's correct rule-following in the right light.

This would require the assumption that the game, or "social context" has inherent within it, rules, by the means of which, such a judgement of correct or incorrect could be made. But we have not yet found, in the close-up examination of the details, the existence of any such rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

I may be misunderstanding what you're saying here, so correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems this (and similar objections you've raised) are of the form;

"Presume that some hidden generalisable rule hides behind what we see in these examples - Wittgenstein has failed to establish what it is"

Whereas what Wittgenstein is showing by these examples is that there is no generalisable rule hidden behind what we see.

So in essence you're right, from your premise. Wittgenstein has failed to show us the generalisable rule behind what we see in the examples, but that's because his examples are meant to show that there isn't one.

This discussion actually hearkens back to §40-§45, where the question of whether words need 'bearers' in order to have meaning was raised. There, Witty concluded that no, they do not. This, however, is something of an exception: they don't ... unless a sample is involved in the use of words. — StreetlightX

I question whether this is not more of a rule than an exception. Firstly, note that Wittgenstein is specifically discussing names at §55 and not simply words. Thus, are there any examples of names which are used without the involvement of a sample or paradigm, i.e. without a standard of comparison?

One might think of it this way: there are games in which the point is to check if something measures up to the sample; in the absence of such a sample, there would be no point to the game - there would be no meaning to our words. But not every game is like this. When I say "Nothung has a sharp blade" (§44), there is no need that Nothung actually be around, and in one piece, for this sentence to have meaning; but something like "is it the same length as Nothung?" would require there to be Nothung around to measure it against (notwithstanding a question like 'is it the same length as Nothung was?).* — StreetlightX

I find it interesting that Wittgenstein chooses an example here that is most likely fictional. Even if it is not, there are certainly other meaningful names in our language which are more clearly fictional. We needn't say that these names of fiction lack samples, because the public works of fiction which give meaning to these names can equally be used as independent standards of comparison to teach the meanings of the names and to help settle disputes.

don't understand how it is that you do not agree with this, namely, that any language-game, which by definition is social, necessarily has rules (implicit and/or explicit). — Sam26

We went through this at the beginning of the book. In Wittgenstein's use of "game" it is neither implicit nor explicit that rules are necessary for games. It may be the case, as StreetlightX suggests above, that "rules" implies "game", but "game" does not necessarily imply "rules". But I don't think that we've even progressed far enough in the close-up examination of rules to even be able to make this conclusion, that rules cannot exist outside the context of a game.

Any language-game by definition is a rule-following activity, if not, then there would be no consistency of actions that would make it work. — Sam26

Allow me to paraphrase the problem. If it requires that one knows a language in order for that person to learn a rule (I.e. if we can only learn a rule through language) then it is impossible that all language-games are rule following activities. At this point in the book, we haven't had the close-up examination required to determine the nature of "a rule", Therefore we cannot say whether it is the case that we must know rules in order to play a language-game, as you claim, or is it the case that we must be playing language-games in order to learn a rule.

So in essence you're right, from your premise. Wittgenstein has failed to show us the generalisable rule behind what we see in the examples, but that's because his examples are meant to show that there isn't one. — Isaac

I think the issue is that a rule only seems to exist in a general form. Look at the three examples which StreetlightX very aptly laid out. What appears as if it were one rule, may manifest in these three different ways. So Wittgenstein asks, what does it mean to play a game according to a "particular rule". He wants to look beyond this general sort of form, to determine the form of the specific (particular) rule.

So what you call "the generalizable rule", is what is referred to as the "particular rule". His examples so far show three possible ways that the particular rule could exist. We haven't determined which one is the actual particular rule, so we haven't yet found the existence of the particular rule. However, I wouldn't say yet, that he intends to show that there isn't one, because we need to read further ahead.

If it requires that one knows a language in order for that person to learn a rule (I.e. if we can only learn a rule through language) then it is impossible that all language-games are rule following activities. — Metaphysician Undercover

[my emphasis]

Here's where you seem to go wrong. Where did anyone say this? Language would never get anywhere if this was the case. In fact, I've said the opposite, "[t]he rule (known or unknown) is in the bringing of the correct stone in response to the call." Moreover, what do you think learning a rule is all about? When one learns to act in accord with a command, one is learning to follow a rule. It doesn't require that you know a language, or that you know what a rule is. Animals can even participate in rule-governed activities. Think of learning to follow simple commands. The learning of language, and the learning of following rules are things that happen at the same time, viz., if you learn a language, then you are learning to follow rules (implicit or explicit, known or unknown).

Don't confuse the concept of rule-following (or the concept rule), which involves a certain understanding, with learning to follow a rule. The two are quite different. As the animal or primitive man, or even modern man learns to respond to a language, say commands, they are both learning a language and learning to follow rules (it's a simultaneous act). In fact, knowing is not involved at all, one simply acts in accord with, or acts along with others, and as one does, one learns. The learning gets more and more involved until the animal is left behind in its ability to learn or participate in more complicated linguistic forms. However, the human excels at using concepts, until the human learns what the concepts mean, and how to use the concepts in more sophisticated ways.

The only thing that is required beforehand, is that you have the ability to learn a language, whether primitive or not. It's not required that you know anything, in fact, you don't know anything. The language-game of knowing is much more advanced, and requires an advanced understanding of the use of the concepts involved.

I'm not yelling when I use the bold letters, I'm just using it as a very strong emphasis.

I'm afraid you've lost me, so this may be a bit piecemeal, I'm just trying to understand where you're coming from.

I think the issue is that a rule only seems to exist in a general form. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you saying that it seems to you that this is how a rule exists, or that you understand Wittgenstein to be implying this is the case? Because if the latter, I get the exact opposite impression and I'm not sure what line of interpretation has lead you to that conclusion.

Look at the three examples which StreetlightX very aptly laid out. What appears as if it were one rule, may manifest in these three different ways. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think it does appear as if it were one rule. Wittgenstein is pointing out three different roles rules can play in games. He's simply saying that rules do not play the same role in every game. This applies to any rule, it's not that one rule plays three different roles, it's that any rule could play any number of roles, there is no generalisable statement we could make about the roles rules play in games beyond a description of the roles rules play in games. That is what our close-to examination has shown.

He wants to look beyond this general sort of form, to determine the form of the specific (particular) rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, I'm unsure where you've got this impression from. If Wittgenstein was concerned to determine the form of the specific rule then he's going about doing so in a very obscure manner. He'd surely lay out as many language games as he could think of, and go through them one by one to arrive at some kind of Universal Rule Book. But we already have the first draft of such a book, the dictionary.

So what you call "the generalizable rule", is what is referred to as the "particular rule". — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein is claiming that the generalisable rule doesn't exist, so I don't see how it could be what is referred to as the particular rule. You may have to explain this a bit more clearly for me.

We haven't determined which one is the actual particular rule, so we haven't yet found the existence of the particular rule. However, I wouldn't say yet, that he intends to show that there isn't one, because we need to read further ahead. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK. I'm not sure, if you haven't got the message I'm getting from this section, that further reading is going to make it any more clear, but let's push on and see what happens.

I question whether this is not more of a rule than an exception. Firstly, note that Wittgenstein is specifically discussing names at §55 and not simply words. Thus, are there any examples of names which are used without the involvement of a sample or paradigm, i.e. without a standard of comparison? — Luke

True, but §40-45 is also largely about names, and I was not being specific when I said it was about 'words'. As for the question - sure - Nothing, N.N. - these are citied explicitly as names which have meaning even when their 'bearers' no longer exist.

I find it interesting that Wittgenstein chooses an example here that is most likely fictional. Even if it is not, there are certainly other meaningful names in our language which are more clearly fictional. We needn't say that these names of fiction lack samples, because the public works of fiction which give meaning to these names can equally be used as independent standards of comparison to teach the meanings of the names and to help settle disputes. — Luke

Fiction works well to bear out Witty's point: names generally don't have to be names of existing things to have meaning. I'm not sure what it means to speak of a fictional name being a sample though - part of Witty's point in §55 is if the bearer of a name serves to be a sample or paradigm in a language game, then if that bearer doesn't exist ('is destroyed'), then that name 'would have no meaning'.

As for the question - sure - Nothing, N.N. - these are citied explicitly as names which have meaning even when their 'bearers' no longer exist. — StreetlightX

So you're saying that a person's name is an example of a name that is used without the involvement of a sample or paradigm?

What about Buddha or Genghis Khan or Hitler? I'm not doubting that these names have meaning - of course they do - but isn't there also some standard associated with using these names, whereby we can go wrong in their use, or which allows us to make true or false statements about their bearers? Do standards/paradigms only exist for things such as metres? Why can't the names of people or fictional objects also have standards/paradigms/samples/exemplars?

I'm not sure what it means to speak of a fictional name being a sample though — StreetlightX

I never said that a fictional name was a sample; I suggested that fictional names had samples/standards. E.g. if I wanted to find out details about Harry Potter then I could read one of the books. Likewise, if I wanted to find out information about Hitler, then I could read a history book.

So you're saying that a person's name is an example of a name that is used without the involvement of a sample or paradigm? — Luke

No, only that it can be - if that's it role in a particular language game.

I suggested that fictional names had samples/standards. — Luke

Again, the Wittgensteinian response, I think, would be: they can have samples/standards, but only if they are used that way. Just like I can say that the Paris meter is or is not a meter long if it's not playing the role of a standard, I can similarly speak of Harry Potter without invoking Rowling's specific Potter - I write Harry Potter fan fic, say.

It's all in the roles.

Here's where you seem to go wrong. Where did anyone say this? Language would never get anywhere if this was the case. In fact, I've said the opposite, "[t]he rule (known or unknown) is in the bringing of the correct stone in response to the call." Moreover, what do you think learning a rule is all about? When one learns to act in accord with a command, one is learning to follow a rule. It doesn't require that you know a language, or that you know what a rule is. Animals can even participate in rule-governed activities. Think of learning to follow simple commands. The learning of language, and the learning of following rules are things that happen at the same time, viz., if you learn a language, then you are learning to follow rules (implicit or explicit, known or unknown). — Sam26

I know that you've said the exact opposite to this, that's the point. Wittgenstien, has not yet established the relationship between language and rules, to make the conclusion which you have made. So I suggested the very opposite to your conclusion, as still a possibility from what Wittgenstein has so far exposed. Whether a person needs to understand language to learn a rule, or whether a person needs to understand rules to learn a language has not yet been determined. So as much as you might assert that a person cannot learn language without learning rules, these assertions are irrelevant to the text we're reading.

Are you saying that it seems to you that this is how a rule exists, or that you understand Wittgenstein to be implying this is the case? Because if the latter, I get the exact opposite impression and I'm not sure what line of interpretation has lead you to that conclusion. — Isaac

Yes, I am saying that this is what Wittgenstein is saying about rules. Look at #53 and the three ways which StreetlightX has elucidated. This is how "the rule" appears to us, as something general, vague and ill-defined, as "various possibilities". Here's the statement which concludes 53:

"If we call such a table the expression of a rule of the language-game, it can be said that what we call a rule of a language-game may have very different roles in the game."

The table is "the expression of a rule", so I interpret this as the table is the means of representing the rule. Remember back to 50, the object plays a role in the language-game, which is the means of representation of the name. Now the table is the means of representing a rule. in 50, what is represented by the object is "the name", in this case what is represented by the object (the table) is "a rule". Consider that we have switched "the name" for "the rule", such that the object, which is the table, is a means of representation of "the rule".

Now the name itself, is used to signify a type of object "slab" for example signifies a type of object. And, the rule itself, is used to signify a type of action. Both are signifying "a type", so in each case what is signified is something general, as types are. However, we can point to the name, as something particular, "slab" etc., now let's move along and point to the particular rule.

I don't think it does appear as if it were one rule. Wittgenstein is pointing out three different roles rules can play in games. He's simply saying that rules do not play the same role in every game. This applies to any rule, it's not that one rule plays three different roles, it's that any rule could play any number of roles, there is no generalisable statement we could make about the roles rules play in games beyond a description of the roles rules play in games. That is what our close-to examination has shown. — Isaac

It has to be one and the same rule which is referred to at 53. The rule dictates a correspondence between the sign and the square. But how the rule does this is what appears to us in the form of various possibilities. This is what stymies our attempts to isolate the particular rule. We see the chart and we see the action of the people following the rule, but if we go to describe how the rule acts, we can describe it in a variety of different ways, despite the fact that it is one and the same rule which may be acting in a variety of different ways. How can we isolate the particular rule when it appears to exist in a variety of different ways at the same time?

Again, I'm unsure where you've got this impression from. If Wittgenstein was concerned to determine the form of the specific rule then he's going about doing so in a very obscure manner. He'd surely lay out as many language games as he could think of, and go through them one by one to arrive at some kind of Universal Rule Book. But we already have the first draft of such a book, the dictionary. — Isaac

But he makes a very succinct reference to playing games according to a "particular rule" at the beginning of 54. Yes, he is approaching the idea of a particular rule in a very obscure way, but that is because this is the way that the rules of language-games appear to us, in very obscure ways. The problem I see is that people like Sam26 simply assume that rules exist, they conclude that must exist in order for language to be successful, so they assume "rules" in some extremely general way as inherent within the social fabric. But Wittgenstein is saying at 52, that we must get over this biased, or prejudiced way of looking at this subject, and look right up close, in detail, and find these rules, and describe them, instead of just assuming that they must be there.

It's like assuming that the mouse came into existence from spontaneous generation. "Spontaneous generation out of grey rags and dust" is the bias, like "laws intrinsic within social fabric" is the bias. Now we need to look right up close, analyzing the details of that fabric, to find these rules. But there's an opposition to this up close, detailed analysis. Why? You seem to say that there is no such thing as the particular rule, while Sam26 seems to say that particular rules are necessary. Sam26 is saying that spontaneous generation is the necessary conclusion, while you are saying that there is no such thing.

Wittgenstein is claiming that the generalisable rule doesn't exist, so I don't see how it could be what is referred to as the particular rule. You may have to explain this a bit more clearly for me. — Isaac

I suppose I do not know what you mean by 'generalizable rule". So I don't know what you mean when you say that Wittgenstein is claiming that the generalisable rule does not exist. I haven't yet seen him claim that any sort of rule does not exist.

I know that you've said the exact opposite to this, that's the point. Wittgenstien, has not yet established the relationship between language and rules, to make the conclusion which you have made. So I suggested the very opposite to your conclusion, as still a possibility from what Wittgenstein has so far exposed. Whether a person needs to understand language to learn a rule, or whether a person needs to understand rules to learn a language has not yet been determined. So as much as you might assert that a person cannot learn language without learning rules, these assertions are irrelevant to the text we're reading. — Metaphysician Undercover

If your only argument is that I'm going beyond what the text is saying at this point, I say, of course I am, and I've said as much.