This post begins working through the idea that we successfully refer in one of six different ways. We can do this by 1.)using naming practices without using descriptive practices, 2.)using descriptive practices without using naming practices, 3.)naming that which had been only previously described, 4.)naming that which had been both previously named and described, 5.)describing that which had been only previously named, and 6.)describing that which had been both previously named and described.

The first group above is existentially dependent upon naming practices. The second group above is existentially dependent upon descriptive practices. The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth group above are existentially dependent upon both naming practices and descriptive practices.

The term "both" applies only to a quantity of two. There are four combinations.

What this shows us is that there are four possible ways to combine naming and descriptive practices and asserts that there are six different ways to successfully refer. Successful reference can be the result of any one of these 'methods'.

Or at least...

That is exactly what I'm attempting to take proper account of, and hopefully by doing so will be able to determine whether or not all six suggested methods are capable of successful reference.

If my current musings are relevant to Kripke's examples has yet to have been determined. It is relevant to successful reference. By default alone, it ought be at least partially applicable, for Kripke's lectures directly involve what counts as successful reference.

Yes, do you know in which lectures he proceeds to talk about empty names and fictional entities like Santa Claus.

As far as I can understand, Kripke either brilliantly states that content or semantic value is mental and not always empirical or that because of this then the descriptivist might be right about semantic value of a counterfactual with no reference.

...counterfactual with no reference... — Wallows

That's a brilliant phrase.

Using naming practices without using descriptive practices... — creativesoul

Do we actually do this?

Yes, we do.

Does it successfully pick out an individual to the exclusion of all others?

Yes. It does.

Can it be done?

It is, therefore... not only can it be done, it has already been done!

Conclusion:Descriptive practices are not necessary for all cases of successful reference.

There's an 'intuitive' use of the term "necessary"...

...

Using descriptive practices without using naming practices... — creativesoul

Do we actually do this?

Yes, we do.

Does it successfully pick out an individual to the exclusion of all others?

Yes. It does.

Can it be done?

It is, therefore... not only can it be done, it already has been done!

Conclusion:Naming practices are not necessary for all cases of successful reference.

There's an 'intuitive' use of the term "necessary".

Hmmm... Seems to be equal thus far...

Can either 1.) or 2.) be done by a language user that has never used the other?

In other words, can someone who has never used descriptive practices point and name?

Surely they can. They do!

Can someone who has never used naming practices employ descriptive practices?

Surely they cannot!

We look at this world and see whether X identifies a unique individual in it. But that tells us nothing to do with whether X would pick out a unique individual, no individuals, or multiple individuals, in an alternate world. — andrewk

The point is that it successfully refers in this world. It only follows then that either it is capable of successfully referring in some possible world or this world is not possible.

Take your pick.

The larger point, by my lights, is that we start out our endeavor by virtue of establishing what sorts of expressions are used in actual cases of successful reference...

We go from there.

That seems to me to be exactly what Kripke wants to do.

Yes, do you know in which lectures he proceeds to talk about empty names and fictional entities like Santa Claus — Wallows

Santa Claus is mentioned on pages 93 and 97. But it's just a hit-and-run reference. Nothing of any depth is said about what connotations 'Santa Claus' has and how it works given its emptiness.

While on p93, I was reminded of this bit, which proponents of the view that Kripke proved descriptivism 'wrong' would do well to read and consider:

Haven't I been very unfair to the description theory? Here I have stated it very precisely - more precisely, perhaps, than it has been stated by any of its advocates. So then it's easy to refute. Maybe if I tried to state mine with sufficient precision in the form of six or seven or eight theses, it would also turn out that when you examine the theses one by one, they will all be false. — N&N p93

Kripke goes on from there to try to justify this unfairness (lack of charity, as I pointed out on about page 1), but all he can offer is that descriptivism 'seems to be wrong' and Kripke's approach 'seems to' be 'better'. Seems to whom? To Kripke of course.

Conclusion:Naming practices are not necessary for all cases of successful reference.

Conclusion:Descriptive practices are not necessary for all cases of successful reference. — creativesoul

Hmmm... Seems to be equal thus far...

Can either 1.) or 2.) be done by a language user that has never used the other?

In other words, can someone who has never used descriptive practices point and name?

Surely they can. They do!

Can someone who has never used naming practices employ descriptive practices?

Surely they cannot! — creativesoul

They are not equal here. Let's compare this bit to the last and see what comes of it...

Descriptive practices are not necessary for all cases of successful reference. Can someone who has never used descriptive practices point and name? Yes! Pointing to an individual thing and saying it's name aloud is more than adequate for successful reference. Successful reference is prior to descriptive practice!

Naming practices are used prior to descriptive practices. That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else in any way whatsoever. Some successful reference(the first group) is in no way existentially dependent upon descriptive practices.

That's well worth noting!



What about the other? Let's see.

Naming practices are not necessary for all cases of successful reference. Can someone who has never used naming practices employ descriptive practices? No!

One could argue:But toddlers can and do point to a blue ball and say "blue" prior to saying "ball". "Blue" is a descriptive term!

I would say "blue" is a descriptive term. It does not follow that the toddler is using descriptive practices as a means for successful reference unless she is talking about the color of the ball.

We are talking about successful reference. In that light, If she says "blue" as a means for referring to the color of the ball, she is using the term "blue" correctly. If she says "blue" while thinking about the shape of the ball, she is not.

Remember, we're talking about whether or not it is possible to use descriptive practices as a means of successful reference prior to ever using naming practices or descriptive practices.

The only way to use the term "blue" as a means for successful reference, is to use the name of the color to talk about the color.

Remember the above group 'cases' in question...

There are no members in group 2. It's sheer logical possibility alone. Logical possibility alone does not warrant belief. There are no actual cases of a creature using descriptive practices as a means for successful reference doing so prior to their already being involved in naming practices.

Descriptive practices are not necessary for the members of the first group. The first group are cases of successful reference. All successful reference is existentially dependent upon fixing the referent. Descriptive practices are not necessary for fixing the referent.

See what I mean about just taking what he claims at face value and putting it to use?

What sense can then be made of the broad brushed claim that successfully picking a unique individual out of this world to the exclusion of all others depends upon description of any kind, definitive or otherwise?

It's simply not true.

Naming practices identify referents. Not all identification depends upon description. Description is not necessary for naming, identification, successful reference, and fixing the referent, because all of those happen prior to descriptive practices.

Using descriptive practices without using naming practices...
— creativesoul

Do we actually do this?

Yes, we do.

Does it successfully pick out an individual to the exclusion of all others?

Yes. It does.

Can it be done?

It is, therefore... not only can it be done, it already has been done!

Conclusion:Naming practices are not necessary for all cases of successful reference.

There's an 'intuitive' use of the term "necessary" — creativesoul

Let's revisit this in light of earlier revelations...

Some cases of successful reference include descriptive practices without using names. "The man who killed my husband" picks the unique individual out of this world that the speaker believes killed her husband. No proper name included in the example. Naming practices have already had long since begun however.

Yeah, I don't know how to proceed with this factoid in mind. It seems like a glaring example, that is brushed aside, of not being able to specify a referent that obtains to the same "entity" (however you define that metaphysically or ontologically, as Kripke seems to be inclined to state that entities exist in only an empirical manner) in (any) possible world, apart from the actual one.

This is sort of a roundabout way of stating that the "sense" of a name, under Kripkean semantics, is only restricted to the domain of the actual world. Or it could also mean that the sense of a name is conflated with the reference. What do you think about addressing this idea here?

Descriptive practices are not necessary for all cases of successful reference. Can someone who has never used descriptive practices point and name? Yes! Pointing to an individual thing and saying it's name aloud is more than adequate for successful reference. — creativesoul

This is in accordance with what seems to be the usual way to characterise things, which is that ostension is different from DD. But recently I've been wondering whether ostension is just a subcategory of DD.

Could it be that the act of pointing when naming something is a non-verbal way of communicating the words:

. . 'The first object that is intercepted by the line indicated by my finger is named.....'

That seems reasonable to me, and works for cases where the object is Tarzan, Jane or a dog, in which cases the only verbal output is 'Tarzan', 'Jane' or 'dog'. [my memory suddenly decides to inform me it is 'Me Tarzan' and 'You Jane', but let's ignore the Me and You for now]

If we accept this account, then the speech act contains the DD

'The first object that is intercepted by the line indicated by my finger'

and so it involves use of a descriptive practice and it becomes hard to think of a naming practice that does not rely on a descriptive practice.

Yeah, I don't know how to proceed with this factoid in mind. It seems like a glaring example, that is brushed aside, of not being able to specify a referent that obtains to the same "entity" (however you define that metaphysically or ontologically, as Kripke seems to be inclined to state that entities exist in only an empirical manner) in (any) possible world. — Wallows

The referent is the entity.

The referent is the entity. — creativesoul

For empty names, yes.
For proper names, no.

This is in accordance with what seems to be the usual way to characterise things, which is that ostension is different from DD. But recently I've been wondering whether ostension is just a subcategory of DD. — andrewk

Personally, and I think that Kripke would agree, there is no reason to believe that pointing and/or showing another something is capable of successful reference unless it is or has been already accompanied by language use...

There's an issue with incompatibility in my musings.

No one pointed it out. It's an old problem regarding the ambiguity of "necessary" as it relates to existential dependency.

For empty names, yes.
For proper names, no. — Wallows

Well, it depends upon one's terminological framework.

I see no reason to hold otherwise. The referent is the thing picked out to the exclusion of all others. It is the thing being talked about.

How is that not the case? I mean, what framework draws and maintains the distinction you've invoked? Can you show me?

Could it be that the act of pointing when naming something is a non-verbal way of communicating the words:

. . 'The first object that is intercepted by the line indicated by my finger is named.....' — andrewk

If we're talking about a toddler who is first learning how to do things with and/or use words, that quote above could not possibly be the content of such rudimentary thought and/or belief.

Just think about it. An empty name only has meaning with respect to its descriptive content because there is no referent.

Proper names also (not a feature exclusive to empty names only) hold descriptive semantic content. However, their meaning obtains in the actual world, given through their referent.

Does that help?

Just think about it. An empty name only has meaning with respect to its descriptive content because there is no referent. — Wallows

Example?

Ok, I guess you can assert that Santa Clause is a plump, elderly man with a white beard who lives in the North Pole and delivers candy, presents, or coal depending on how nice you have been for the past year. All of the "a, who, how's" stand in as the descriptions of the person and what "he" does on Christmas, of giving out presents that time of year.

I would caution against such inventions(the notion of an empty name) being used as justificatory ground for much anything at all.

Proper names also (not a feature exclusive to empty names only) hold descriptive semantic content. However, their meaning obtains in the actual world, given through their referent. — Wallows

Set this out.

Ok, I guess you can assert that Santa Clause is a plump, elderly man with a white beard who lives in the North Pole and delivers candy, presents, or coal depending on how nice you have been for the past year. All of the "a, who, how's" stand in as the descriptions of the person and what "he" does on Christmas, of giving out presents that time of year. — Wallows

This is an example of an empty name?

Empty of what?

It's an example of how the meaning and semantic content rests wholly within the descriptions ascribed to a fictitious entity that is Santa Claus.

Are you actually claiming that "Santa Claus" has no referent?

I'm asking you to explain to me what is meant by "empty name"...

I'm asking you to given an example.

Is that your example?

Are you actually claiming that "Santa Claus" has no referent? — creativesoul

Yes.

I'm asking you to explain to me what is meant by "empty name"... — creativesoul

An empty name has no referent. Examples include; a unicorn, Pegasus, Harry Potter?

I'm asking you to given an example.

Is that your example? — creativesoul

I just did.

So "Santa c

Are you actually claiming that "Santa Claus" has no referent?
— creativesoul

Yes. — Wallows

What's being described again? Are imaginary entities somehow not entities?

Well, Santa Claus, clearly had no referent. Think about the sentence, "It is raining". The "it" in that sentence stands in as a dummy referent. Now, think analogously to empty names that are "entities" or semantically have content due to their descriptions.

Simple.