In practice it's often not a problem. For instance two political parties might argue over whether a particular taxation plan should be adopted. They might have goals to maximise equity and efficiency, and it is in selecting those goals that taste (aka values aka preferences) comes in. The disagreement will be about whether the plan will bring the taxation system closer to, or further from, those goals.

A classic standoff is the freedom vs equality debate. It is a matter of taste/values/preference as to whether one sees freedom as more important than equality. If one fins oneself arguing over a political measure it can save a lot of time if one first tries to ascertain what values are driving the two sides. If they are different, it's a waste of time discussing it. If they are the same and the dispute is just a question of the best way to aim for those values, the discussion may have some point.

They can't be disputed because there are no facts about them aside from a particular individual having whatever tastes they do. That individual can't be wrong or mistaken in their tastes--and they can't be right, either. There's nothing to get right or wrong. It's just how one feels about something.

I feel as though that when it comes to matters like the establishing meaning in life, that those issues have become a matter of 'taste'. That is to say, the issue has degraded or has been subjugated into a matter of preference. We don't talk about it because it's for us to decide what gives us meaning in life.

So, if we accept this now common notion that meaning is derived from tastes and preferences, which ought not to be disputed, then what? — Wallows

There's overwhelming logical rationality to the conclusion that an objective meaning of life doesn't exist. So that leaves automatically the subject of life's meaning to the subjective.

What we can talk about is a group of meaningful meaning-of-life-subjects without judging them to not have meaning, since we cannot collectively decide on the value. But we could gather a set of the most common valued meanings in people's lives and draw a framework on what seems meaningful to people within the context of the zeitgeist. Also transitioning and listing valued meanings throughout history might be an interesting framework for driving forces people have through their lives.

Let's say we pinpoint some of these that could be considered very common:
- Finding love
- Have children
- Finding comfort in a balanced life
- Pleasures of social life

And so on.

We could try and find common denominators to these common meanings. Like, "feeling good" or "understanding life".

In essence, there are interesting things to be found within this topic as long as it's handled through the lens of subjective perspective and a statistical point of view rather than trying to find an objective meaning of life or a meaning that is external to the subject.

A classic standoff is the freedom vs equality debate. It is a matter of taste/values/preference as to whether one sees freedom as more important than equality. If one fins oneself arguing over a political measure it can save a lot of time if one first tries to ascertain what values are driving the two sides. If they are different, it's a waste of time discussing it. — andrewk

It's only a waste of time if the discussion is about pitching these values against each other. One could argue that you could do a normal dialectic about freedom vs equality to try and find the position that is for the best of the people. A value-driven discussion based on what values the singular perspective of each candidate has is pointless, but politicians should have a discussion about what is best for the people. This, of course rarely, if ever, happens. They appeal to those with similar values to be elected, often falling further down into becoming demagogs.

But a true political discussion about what is best for the population should be a philosophical dialectic that reaches the most rational and best solution for the people. Doing that could pitch the freedom vs equality into a dialectic to reach the best balance between them. As it stands, almost all ideological ideas fall apart at the extreme end and most attempts through a demagog to balance them only reach a chaotic form that is neither balanced or optimal for any party.

A proper discussion between two political standpoints or values is possible if people detach emotion from these subjects.

If I say the colour green is the best, you can disagree, but you must be prepared to persuade me that your choice is actually the better of the two. This places the matter into an arena where the spectacle bringeth its charms, such as they are, to two unique and separate entities who are not likely to always form the same opinions, perspective, value judgements, etc on any one topic of their mutually agreed choosing.

Subjective assessments are the purview of the minds that beget them. Since all things are fluid in time, and since no two (commenting) observers are likely to have witnessed the events at the same time and from the same place, not to mention with the same learning already between their ears, their assessments will almost surely differ. It is learning, or experience, that forms one biases and preferences. The difference between 'taste' and preferences must be like picking fly s..t out of the pepper. Our tastes are mutable; almost all of us change in time (remember that fluid part?), and these reflect old experiences overlaid by the newest.

Green is the best colour….for me. It needn't be your best colour because I don't require you to agree with my preference any more than I would rationally require you to choose the same automobile, or even its colour, or the same hat. Besides, if I can't have that green hat, then it might go to you. and that would be an unhappy development. No, it should be my green hat because green hats are the best. Don't you agree?

Thanks, everyone for the responses. I have nothing to disagree with in particular with any of the posts except, one issue.

Namely, as mentioned in the OP, if we reduce matters of what gives one meaning in life or purpose to a matter of taste or personal whim, then haven't we idiotized the issue of what gives one meaning in life to a simple matter of what I like best or dislike most?

if we reduce matters of what gives one meaning in life or purpose to a matter of taste or personal whim, then haven't we idiotized the issue of what gives one meaning in life to a simple matter of what I like best or dislike most? — Wallows

Why would meaning or purpose be of divine status when it objectively doesn't exist? Then again, why would we even define trivialities to be the meaning or purpose of our personal lives? If we think of purpose and meaning in life as the single idolized thing to reach in order to feel fulfillment and being able to die with a sense of reaching our life goal, then it is far from being idiotized. Just because the meaning or purpose is personal, doesn't mean it's trivial and if we think of it as trivial, we aren't really thinking of the true meaning or purpose in our lives, but something that's just trivial. If we don't know, we haven't searched for our personal purpose in our life yet.

Why would meaning or purpose be of divine status when it objectively doesn't exist? — Christoffer

Isn't that a paradox? Meaning that if one can objectively state that life has no meaning, then that objective statement in itself provides grounds to establish some meaning. This is the issue in a nutshell. To provide meaning to a life that objectively has no meaning. Hence, should we treat meaning as something of greater importance than tastes and preferences?

I have always thought "de gustibus non est disputandum" referenced nothing very weighty, but about which much dispute could occur. So, if its a matter of "I say garum from Greece is better than garum from Egypt", one might say, "De gustibus non disputandum est." Or "You know, Heinz catsup is better than Hunts." Rather than argue over it for an hour, just say de gustibus non est disputandum, or there's just no accounting for taste.

One certainly would not say that the justification for impeaching Donald Trump was a matter of mere taste. Law is not taste or vice versa.

De gustibus non est disputandum — Wallows

Well, isn't this the classic subjectivity vs objectivity dichotomy.

That such a distinction exists seems to support the Latin maxim.

The relation is an inequality though. Objectivity > Subjectivity. This is true especially in philosophy and science. Logicians have discovered many pitfalls to clear thinking in the form of fallacies and cognitive biases. In this context, subjectivity refers more to the latter than the former - unconscious illogical patterns of thinking that lead us away from truth and to falsehoods.


It seems, hence, that subjectivity is viewed in a negative sense. Subjectivity is bad and must be avoided, most logic books warn. There is truth in this as above explained but we must remember that this only applies to fields which are wholly logical enterprises like philosophy and science.

Some of our experiences don't have to be logical. For instance preference of color, food, clothes, art, women, etc. aren't reasoned positions. We simply prefer one thing for another. In these cases objectivity doesn't apply.

Statements of preference can be considered subjective truths. I like the color black and that's subjective and also a truth.

So, if we're to deny subjective truths (taste/preference) we would be ignoring this aspect of truth itself. Look at the market - a multitude of products in various colors, shapes and sizes. If there were no subjective truths like I mentioned then such variety, deliberately created to match our tastes/preferences, shouldn't exist. So, subjective truths are a real and active part of what makes us human.

What is interesting though is that even when taste/preferences are different, at the extremes we tend to be in agreement. A woman x may be beauiful to one, so-so to another and ugly to another. Yet, a supermodel gets a unanimous vote for beautiful. Similarly, a misshapen face will be ugly for all.

This seems to suggest, at least to me, that there's an underlying structure to taste and preference. Some have calimed that symmetry is a condition for beauty. Likewise, our other tastes and preferences may hide an underlying structure. In other words, our subjectivity may be just an illusion. The differences in our tastes/preference may be just our individual failures/successes to recognize the structure of what appeals/doesn't appeal to us. The truth, in fact, is objective but, we either see it not at all/partially/wholly causing the diversity in taste/preference.

Until we do understand the basis of our tastes and preferences we must continue to hold that there are subjective truths. In this enterprise, if we're to arrive at truth, we must be objective.

Isn't that a paradox? Meaning that if one can objectively state that life has no meaning, then that objective statement in itself provides grounds to establish some meaning. This is the issue in a nutshell. To provide meaning to a life that objectively has no meaning. Hence, should we treat meaning as something of greater importance than tastes and preferences? — Wallows

Objective meaning can only exist if you can prove it to exist. It's like proving the existence of God. The burden of proof requires you to prove there to be an objective meaning or purpose of life. So far no one has provided such proof and anyone claiming so seem to not have much insight into cognitive bias and argument fallacies.

But if we speak about subjective meaning, or sense of meaning, our personal search for the purpose to our own lives. It should still be the highest point of our life, not just taste and preferences. I like chocolate is a taste and preference in candy, but that's not a purpose or meaning of my life. Searching for my own purpose in my life should be about finding the place and state of mind in which I feel my identity is in line with the life I live. It's a broader aspect of my life. The search for it should not stop at "I feel pleasure, therefore my life has found meaning", it should be deeper than such trivial feelings. In a sense, a personal divine feeling of purpose. Problem is that people who have found such a feeling of divine purpose apply this to the rest of the world as the truth in objective meaning, which is false. It becomes false as soon as you try to apply your meaning to the external world.

Meaning is, in my opinion, greater than taste and preferences, but my meaning and purpose is not greater than myself. I and my purpose/meaning is one and the same by internal measurements never to be external.

Taste and preference is something else. It's the foundation for my identity within society. If I had tastes and preferences being the only living human in the universe, then my taste and preference is universal human law. As soon as there are two human beings or more, it's an identity marker within that group of humans. In a larger society, it becomes an identity marker for you and for a group of people with similar taste and preferences. There are no right or wrong tastes and preferences, it's only a definition of identity for the individual or group. If a racist has the preference of hate against another ethnicity, that is not wrong in terms of taste and preferences, because it's individual and it identifies that racist's identity in society. Law, justice, and morals define how we judge this racist identity in society, but that is the result of that identity, not ruling taste and preferences as a concept to be a problem or objective. We cannot say a taste and preference is wrong since it's only a marker. It's like saying apples are wrong and bananas are right, it makes no sense. But we identify apples by it's building blocks to come to the conclusion that we hate apples. We cannot hate the building blocks that define the apple, but the apple itself. We cannot hate the taste and preference of the racist, but we can hate the racist.

My taste and preferences define me as a person in front of you who experience me and my identity. All people on this forum has a taste and preference to like philosophy, that's why we are here. That doesn't mean that it is an objective truth about people that it's true and considered right to like philosophy, but it defines us who are here within society and the civilization we're in. That's why it makes no sense to try and apply taste and preferences as a foundation for meaning or purpose on an objective level.

But, what if you take the concept and apply it to existential questions regarding having meaning in one's life?

Hear hear. Great post. I just wonder about whether anything can be said about ethics objectively if that is the case. What about the golden rule?

Objective meaning can only exist if you can prove it to exist. — Christoffer

Nice post. Just sad that you had to start it with a statement equal in merit to one that begs the question. What do you think?

Nice post. Just sad that you had to start it with a statement equal in merit to one that begs the question. What do you think? — Wallows

Maybe that went into somewhat of a fallacy, but I think the general note is that people talk a lot about objective meaning to life or similar, but there isn't a single rational argument that can provide a notion that there is any objective meaning to our lives or to anything. We are too biased to our own existence and therefore we give ourselves more value than we have in comparison to the entire universe. So we believe irrationally that there is a grand meaning to our existence when any reasonable induction points to there being none. We can only invent a meaning, meaningful to ourselves as human beings and because of our individuality we can't invent an objective meaning, only individual ones. We might be able to conclude a meaning, value or purpose that might be true for as many people in as many different cultures and situations as possible, but we could never find anything truly universally objective.

We can only invent a meaning, meaningful to ourselves as human beings and because of our individuality we can't invent an objective meaning, only individual ones. We might be able to conclude a meaning, value or purpose that might be true for as many people in as many different cultures and situations as possible, but we could never find anything truly universally objective. — Christoffer

Personally, I see a false dichotomy being drawn here. There's also a subsidiary no true Scotsman fallacy being drawn here. Let me explain:

1. Meaning can only be true if it is objective.
2. We don't know what is objective due to our subjectivity.
3. Hence, life is meaningless until we create meaning for ourselves.

Does that sound like your argument or is it just a clumsy strawman on my part?

Matters of taste might have existential gravity. It is quite possible that someone might so strongly prefer to speak French rather than German, prefer certain foods very strongly over others, prefer a certain manner of dress, that those preferences define who they are. For instance, I started growing a beard in 1970. Once it was an inch long or so, I realized that "that's me" and I have not cut it off since (Trim, yes -clean shave, no). It's a matter of taste, a matter of appearance which I define as "me".

Come to think of it, there are several matters of taste I consider existentially central, or have in the past.

So, on closer examination owing to your question and prompt, i"ll elevate matters of taste to a higher level of significance than I did earlier.

Oscar Wilde shed aphorisms like golden retrievers shed hair, so there are a lot of them, and many of them have kind of a snarky quality. But apparently Wilde valued matters of taste very highly. For instance, sober types say that it is shallow to judge by appearances. Wilde says that "Only shallow people don't judge by appearances."

Hear hear. Great post. I just wonder about whether anything can be said about ethics objectively if that is the case. What about the golden rule? — Wallows

Well, if I were a detective I'd notice that the golden rule popped up in so many culturally and geographically isolated societies. What could explain it?

A pattern of moral reasoning that has almost universal appeal implies a shared basis of origin. My guess, for what it's worth, is the universal ability to feel pain, dislike it and the ability to feel joy and like it is the common ground. Barring the few exceptions of sadism, masochism and other perversions, we share a biology (mind and body) that, in all probability, causes us to come to the same conclusion - the golden rule. This suggests an objective ethics.

Notice, though, that there are differences. Some religions have animal sacrifice rituals while, in others, they're forbidden. Does this mean that ethics is subjective?

Well, what could explain the differences in ethics between cultures which supports subjective ethics? We'll leave aside the counter-evidence of the golden rule

The moral differences between cultures can be, in my humble opinion, explained in two ways:

1. Rationality: Not all people are created equal. Some are afflicted of stupidity by nature and can't be helped but the vast majority are within the reach of the helping hand of reason.

Imagine a society which, by virtue of the universal golden rule recognizes that killing another fellow human is wrong. Yet, if this society practices brutal animal sacrifices isn't it clear that rationaliy is wanting. After all if that society had the knowledge that animals, just as humans, feel pain they would perforce logic realiize they were doing something wrong.

2. Knowledge: This is related to 1 but is yet distinct enough to be put on the list. Imagine a world of perfectly logical beings who lack knowledge of pain or joy. These beings would fail to have any ethics since the primary motivating principles are lacking in them. The above example of a society that practices animal sacrifice can be considered a good example. Their ignorance of the pain sensing ability of animals would make them think that nothing's wrong with the practice.

So, firstly the golden rule is evidence that morality (probably based on suffering and happiness) is objective and secondly, the differences observed, although hinting at morality being subjective, are just due to irrationality and/or ignorance.

I think morality is objective and its ''apparent'' subjectivity is not a correct diagnosis but simply symptoms of poor reasoning and ignorance.

Anyway, wouldn't a similarity (the golden rule) that transcends geographical and cultural barriers carry more weightage than dissimilarities (different ethics) that are ''obviously'' due to geographical and cultural isolation?

Namely, as mentioned in the OP, if we reduce matters of what gives one meaning in life or purpose to a matter of taste or personal whim, then haven't we idiotized the issue of what gives one meaning in life to a simple matter of what I like best or dislike most? — Wallows

Only if epistemology is premised upon a hard object-subject distinction. Or put equivalently, that one's epistemology is based upon the correspondence theory of truth, or alternatively, that pre-existing truth is interpreted as being discovered rather than presently constructed by the observer, whereby their preferences and decision-making are considered irrelevant to the truth they obtained.

Once the correspondence theory of truth is rejected, epistemological scepticism is transformed into ethical and aesthetic preferences.

For example, consider the so called epistemological problem of other minds. According to the correspondence theory of truth, either other minds exist or other minds do not exist and their ontological status is independent of the way human behaviour is judged by an observer. This leads to sceptical doubt , the problem of individuality, the hard-problem of consciousness etc.

On the other hand, suppose the "truth maker" concerning the existence of other minds, is viewed more holistically as being as much a function of an observer's perceptual relationship to the entity he is observing. According to this anti-realist account, an observer's conception of other minds is as much an account of his personal preferences that guide his perceptual and cognitive actions than it is the behavioural data he is viewing.

So in short, if correspondence theory is rejected, then preferences are epistemologically relevant.

then haven't we idiotized the issue of what gives one meaning in life to a simple matter of what I like best or dislike most? — Wallows

Why would that be "idiotizing" it?

It's insightful that some people think we're in "idiot" territory if we're only talking about persons' feelings, emotions, desires, preferences, etc.

Meaning that if one can objectively state that life has no meaning, then that objective statement in itself provides grounds to establish some meaning. — Wallows

One would state that objectively, there is no meaning. That's not "objectively stating" something--the statement itself isn't objective. It's a subjective statement (as all statements are) about what's the case in the objective world. If it's the case in the objective world that there is no meaning, then you're not going to have any objective grounds for meaning.

Aren't tastes and personal preferences also truth-apt?

For isn't it possible to doubt our own tastes and preferences?

Don't we often say that we want something, but regret having done it? Don't we often say we prefer something but regularly do the opposite? And aren't we sometimes glad to have been forced to do something that we wouldn't have done voluntarily?

I've noticed for instance, that when I am depressed I will insist that I don't want to do something, say go for a walk, but when forced to do it I actually enjoy the walk.

So if a person's verbally expressed tastes and preferences are understood to convey information about their future behaviour, then they are falsifiable and hence truth apt. Perhaps society does know what is best for each of us.

Well, both your tastes and preferences can change, and sometimes rapidly, and yeah, sometimes we don't introspect well enough to know our preferences well at that moment.

Aren't tastes and personal preferences also truth-apt? — sime

I don't know, You tell me. It's interesting.