That is, the argument fails to move from human being (organism) to person.

it makes absolutely no attempt to do so, nor is personhood of the fetus a requirement of the argument.

and I have made no claim at all the fetus is a person. — Rank Amateur

Perhaps not, but you argue the fetus has an FOV like a person. Sorry, but this step doesn't hold. Now, rather than tighten your fist on it, which makes all this more difficult than it needs to be. Relax and let's look at it. After all, it has to stand on its own, and will, or not, whatever you may think or say about it.

What you argue that a fetus has, is in terms that do not bestow any moral worth, and in such terms that steer as far away as possible from anything reasonable. It has a future. Well does it? It has a possible future, and that future is problematic; viz, there's a possible future, and that possibility is subject to probability. So there is no future per se. Further, what is this future? Properly considered it is just nothing at all - a convenient fiction. Disagree? On what grounds? If the future is not-yet, how do you get from here to there or there to here? Perhaps you argue we can think about it. Think about what? The future? Again, that's not available. The trick lies in properly identifying that all we have to work with is the now, in the now. For you to confuse anything of the now with the not-yet of the future is just a mistake fatal to your argument.

And this is just a start, but fatigue sets in....

But that can't be right. We owe little, morally, to a mere organism in virtue of their biology. It's other stuff, like the capacity to suffer, self-awareness, ability to prosper, that provide the basis our for choosing one act over another.

That's not to say that the body is without value; but unlike a person, it's value is that it is a means to personhood; whereas a person has value in themselves.

your right, you win the argument is awful and is completely destroyed by your awesome summation.

I never for a second believed it would change anyone’s mind. Just thought thoughtful people like to consider arguments counter to their beliefs.

Time to call it a night

I suppose one might argue that the body has value because it houses a soul. But that would void the pretence of secularism.

Further, dead bodies no longer house souls. What evidence is there that a soul enters a foetus before birth?

Well, that was fun. Thanks for your part.

not the point of the argument. As with Tim, I am not in any delusion that I would change your mind, just think it is always useful to hear the counter argument.


As an aside to you both. The pro choice academics really only attack the argument on the ideal desire point. Saying one does not get the assumption of ideal desire until one can have a desire, or cognative ability in week 25 give or take

There were other objections earlier in life of the argument, that have been addressed and Answered.

Saying one does not get the assumption of ideal desire until one can have a desire, or cognative ability in week 25 give or take — Rank Amateur

That's close enough for me. Looks much the same.

You stood in. Not easy. I appreciate it. Good sport!

:rofl:

What doesn't make sense is if someone opposes abortion but does not help suffering children.

If someone thinks abortion is wrong then why would they not think all suffering of children is wrong and take action?

As the saying goes actions speak louder than words. So children are not being brought into a fair world where they can be guaranteed a good outcome and that is not just something created by humans but inherent in nature.

If abortion is illegal people will either try and abort the child themselves, or have backstreet abortion or abandon the child at birth which increases the ,Likelihood of it having a poor quality of life.

The reason I posted that video is to illustrate that there are children suffering appallingly with no opportunities and yet people want more children born that are unwanted that could be aborted painlessly before they have left the womb and experienced life fully.

I am not desperate for people to have abortions but I think it is the route of least suffering. — Andrew4Handel

I understand. A complete solution should involve the welfare of children but isn't that another issue. The two issues are related, yes, but they can be considered separately, no?

Well, if, as you say, women are concerned only about rights to their own bodies then you make sense.

The point is, unfortunately in this case, a woman's body is also a receptacle for life. Call it fetus if you will but it becomes a person who, you'll agree, is guaranteed basic rights.

''I wanted to go to see a movie but I had to take care of my niece.'' I heard someone say. Stories like these are commonplace and illustrate that, sometimes, there are other pressing concerns that take precedence over our own rights. There are no laws that cover such but people, good ones, know instinctively that our own personal rights take second place to moral responsibility.

Women should be free but also cognizant of their own power - the power to create life - and as Spiderman's uncle said ''with great power comes great responsibility''.

Then it wasn't absolute freedom you were speaking of. — tim wood

I know exactly what I was speaking of. You can of course use whatever term you like to refer to the position I was describing, but I'll stick with the term I used. I do not wish to argue semantics over it with you.

Let's start with, "It's her body, she can do what she wants with it." Actually, him or her, it's not - if we're under law. And I think the moral stance runs alongside law. — tim wood

The "absolute freedom" moral stance, as I defined it, isn't necessarily law abiding - at least not with regard to UK law.

As I said, some people do take the stance I described, whether you accept it or not. I don't accept it myself. My moral view is in line with UK law in this regard.

You may want to refine this to "No law or moral rule permits an individual complete freedom of the use of his or her body." If this, then I would agree with you. — tim wood

What I said didn't need "refining". But, at least insofar as it relates to the UK, and abortion, I do agree with that needless rewording of my position.

But then, what do you mean? It can only mean that, so far as abortion is concerned, women are somehow not able to make that decision, but are subject to external rule. — tim wood

They're subject to the rule of law, yes. But no, that doesn't mean that women are somehow not able to make that decision. It just means that it would be in violation of the law.

With respect to a fetus-as-person, I cannot disagree; the stricture would be binding on all, not just the mother. Before that, however, how does it, in a free society, come to be any of your business? — tim wood

"Free"? Anyway, as I've said, it is my judgement that certain irresponsible behaviour is immoral, and that intervention of some form would be warranted in some cases.

Perhaps not, but you argue the fetus has an FOV like a person. Sorry, but this step doesn't hold. — tim wood

Because, you go on

What you argue that a fetus has, is in terms that do not bestow any moral worth, and in such terms that steer as far away as possible from anything reasonable. — tim wood

Because, you go on

. It has a future. Well does it? It has a possible future, and that future is problematic; viz, there's a possible future, and that possibility is subject to probability. So there is no future per se. Further, what is this future? Properly considered it is just nothing at all - a convenient fiction. Disagree? On what grounds? If the future is not-yet, how do you get from here to there or there to here? Perhaps you argue we can think about it. Think about what? The future? Again, that's not available. The trick lies in properly identifying that all we have to work with is the now, in the now. For you to confuse anything of the now with the not-yet of the future is just a mistake fatal to your argument.[/quote

In that entire description of “future “. Is there any part of that only applies to the fetus and not to Tim wood?

If there is, I don’t see it. All it says is the fetus doesn’t have a future like ours, and then a paragraph about your view on the concept about future.

But nothing that differentiate your future from the fetus

You have not even tried to support the lead sentence — tim wood

Well, if, as you say, women are concerned only about rights to their own bodies then you make sense. — TheMadFool

Never said it, or thought it.

it is my judgement that certain irresponsible behaviour is immoral, and that intervention of some form would be warranted in some cases. — S

Granted, but who decides what's irresponsible, and by what standard?

"The last thread on abortion". I didn't need to read the thread, the title alone was sufficiently entertaining. :smile:

I understand. A complete solution should involve the welfare of children but isn't that another issue. The two issues are related, yes, but they can be considered separately, no? — TheMadFool

It depends on how an anti abortion argument is framed. On the future value of life argument that video presents a refutation.

I think the value of a child's life is quite tied up with the environment they will be in. That has been my own experience.

I could argue that I would have been better off being aborted and people do commit suicide everyday which is a rejection of life.

I am not sure what the value of someones life is. But I have a whole thread on quality of life. I am not sure if value of life can be separated from quality of life.

I have mentioned the spirit or soul in another thread and if you believe in a spirit or soul I don't think these can be destroyed and that might be where the value lies. Some people are dualists (I am probably one) What matters is the quality of life and one may have an abortion to prevent the unborn child having a poor quality of life.

Alright, fair enough. Then you consider the fact that the fetus can become a human to have enough value to warrant some sort of moral stop on abortion at some point.

But, why? Is it just a brute value for you? — Moliere

It's just the way that I feel. I could try to put into words why I feel that way, but I can't explain it beyond it's emotional foundation.

See, to me this seems to be less about the value of the fetus, then, and more about the moral worth of the parent's actions in relation to the fetus. So if someone is irresponsibly pregnant then the fetus has more value than the woman's right to choose, whereas if someone is responsibly pregnant then the fetus has less value than the woman's right to choose, perhaps where the fetus is on a sliding scale of value of some sort depending on development and emotional commitment.

Is that a right or wrong way of interpreting you? — Moliere

I suppose you could look at it that way.

I guess my value is mostly with respect to a person. The woman is a person, which means they have moral autonomy -- they are the one's who weigh and deliberate in their own personal circumstances about what is right and what is wrong, because no one is better suited to the task than the person who is weighing that decision. — Moliere

That's understandable to some extent. As you know, I haven't posited an equivalence in value. I'm just saying that, the way I judge it, it's valuable enough to warrant, at the very least, more than a careless disregard, as though it's nothing or just some kind of biological waste matter that we can simply dispose of without a second thought.

Would the choice effect some other person then the sort of infinite value I assign to person's would require some other means of deliberation -- but I really, honestly do not view the fetus as a person in the least. Value, I grant -- but not anything in relation to the value of a person. — Moliere

And I don't view an acorn as an oak tree. I wish that people would get out of that mindset. But the value of an acorn obviously relates to the value of an oak tree, even if they're not of equal value, and even if there's quite a difference between them. The crazy thing that some of the people in this discussion seem to be neglecting to properly consider is that, all things being equal, a planted acorn grows into an oak tree. Imagine if someone judged oak trees to be of infinite value, yet, being ignorant and failing to see the value in acorns, when given one, they just throw it out of the window into their garden. Then imagine that they move out and don't return until fifty years later. They look out of their window, and to their surprise, there's an infinitely valuable oak tree! "How did that get there?", they wonder. After it had been explained to them, don't you think that they would think that they had misjudged the value of acorns?

I agree with your conclusion, but not how you get there. I don't think there's an opposition to be had between our emotive and cognitive capacities -- when it comes to judgment they work in tandem, and answering moral questions requires judgment. — Moliere

Evidently they're not always fully compatible, hence my argument for greater subjectivity and less of a reliance on rule following. This rules-based approach allows for the cutting out of subjectivity. "If we follow this rule, then it's not of value, so there's nothing to worry about".

Rules are proposed just because they give cognitive content that we can consider. Of course in so considering them we use our emotions, it's just easier to share linguistic expressions -- rules -- than it is to share our base emotions when we are in disagreement (clearly if we are in agreement this isn't as hard!) — Moliere

I think you're missing the point. I never argued that there's no emotional basis involved in the rules-based approach. On the contrary, I've said the opposite: there's always an emotional basis. My point was that the rules-based approach cuts out subjectivity where it shouldn't.

Do you acknowledge a difference between morally righteous, morally permissive , and morally repugnant? — Moliere

Sure.

I don't care about what words are used so much, but I do think there is a middle category between good and evil -- and I tend to think a great deal of our actions fall into that middle category, and abortion is one of those. — Moliere

I wouldn't say that it's a grey area. I would judge it on a case-by-case basis, and I would say that some cases are more clearcut than others.

activities, projects, experiences, and enjoyments — Rank Amateur

So in murder these are the future-goods which are deprived, according to your rationale for murder being categorized as wrong.

Now I would say a bird has activities, projects, experiences, and enjoyments -- eating, building a nest, whatever the now feels like to a bird, and the pleasures of birds. Dogs too. Animals of all sorts have a future of this sort. And they also have a value.

But I would say that animals are not as valuable as humans. I don't say this with respect to their biology -- as clearly humans are just animals as all the rest -- but because of the ethical category they fall into.

For myself I would just say murder is the immoral and intentional killing of a person -- immoral because sometimes the killing of person's is warranted, even if it is not praiseworthy. It is permissable -- such as cases of self-defense, in cases of war, and in cases of euthanasia (in order from less to more controversial). Whether a person has a future or not, such as the case where a person does not wake up from a coma, is not relevant to my thoughts -- the person has value regardless of their future.

Now for some they do not acknowledge a moral difference between beasts and persons. I don't know where you fall on that spectrum. But for me, I do -- I don't think it is immoral to own a dog, but I do think it is immoral to own a human regardless of how well treated. I don't think it is immoral to kill a deer for food, but I do think it is immoral to kill a person for food no matter how humanely done. These are some of the advantages, if we believe there is a moral difference between person's and beasts at least, of the personhood approach: it acknowledges that there is something almost infinite in the worth of others and that they, as ourselves, are owed consideration if we are to count our moral tokens (be they actions, thoughts, or character) as good.

Another advantage to this approach is that it is common sensical: Generally speaking we think other people are worthwhile. Why? Well, we can invent any rationale we want, but there isn't as much a why as there is a who or a what. Whether it be because the body has a soul, because love is all there is, because they are ends in themselves, or what-have-you the metaphysical basis for our actions doesn't matter as much as making the judgment about who is treated like this.

To me it seems that your own argument sneaks personhood, of this sort, in by referencing the activities, projects, experiences, and enjoyments -- things which, say, a stone or an apple will not have. It just misses some of the important things that makes us specifically persons, rather than just beasts, and then tries to write off personhood accounts by saying the personhood of such-and-such does not matter, its the future of such-and-such that does. For msyelf the history matters ethically because it's the history of persons -- its not just any future, its the future of persons. But maybe there is some way of construing the future in a way that does not reference activities, projects, experiences, and enjoyments -- or maybe there is some way to differentiate this from animals while at the same time not resembling what most of us mean by persons. But I'm not seeing how.

Not twins. I'd go with individual human. — Banno

I hope you're not suggesting that twins aren't unique from each other.

Oddly enough, we know the herbs once used by Native American women for abortion. Wonder if they sat around having these types of discussions. Probably not. — frank

Good point. Let's all shut up about it and live like savages.

Did you know that we also used to give babies heroin as a "soothing syrup", lobotomise people, and try to treat various ailments with toxic mercury? Isn't ignorance great?

It's just the way that I feel. I could try to put into words why I feel that way, but I can't explain it beyond it's emotional foundation. — S

Cool.

That's understandable to some extent. As you know, I haven't posited an equivalence in value. I'm just saying that, the way I judge it, it's valuable enough to warrant, at the very least, more than a careless disregard, as though it's nothing or just some kind of biological waste matter that we can simply dispose of without a second thought. — S

I think we'd actually agree here in all except for where you say "to some extent". For myself it seems foolish to compare the worth of a person to anything else, hence why I say its infinite -- it's not something that's really quantifiable or qualifiable. It's more like a beginning for ethical thinking. So there is no extent about it.

But, yes, I don't think careless disregard is the quite right attitude either. For instance I don't think it would be morally permissable to impregnate yourself in order to sell a developed fetus for stem-cell research. Legally, by my lights, sure -- since I don't think the law and morality are one -- but I'd put that pretty squarely in the "wrong" category as having no respect for human life.

And I don't view an acorn as an oak tree. I wish that people would get out of that mindset. But the value of an acorn obviously relates to the value of an oak tree, even if they're not of equal value, and even if there's quite a difference between them. The crazy thing that some of the people in this discussion seem to be neglecting to properly consider is that, all things being equal, a planted acorn grows into an oak tree. Imagine if someone judged oak trees to be of infinite value, yet, being ignorant and failing to see the value in acorns, when given one, they just throw it out of the window into their garden. Then imagine that they move out and don't return until fifty years later. They look out of their window, and to their surprise, there's an infinitely valuable oak tree! "How did that get there?", they wonder. After it had been explained to them, don't you think that they would think that they had misjudged the value of acorns? — S

Sure, I'd agree with this.

This rules-based approach allows for the cutting out of subjectivity. "If we follow this rule, then it's not of value, so there's nothing to worry about". — S

Heh. I don't want to get too sidetracked -- put this aside for another discussion? It seems to me that it's a bit tangential.

I wouldn't say that it's a grey area. I would judge it on a case-by-case basis, and I would say that some cases are more clearcut than others. — S

Okie dokie. Well, at least you can understand what I'm saying, I think. I judge it to basically fall squarely in the middle insofar as we're talking about prior to birth -- to myself, it's the sort of thing that one has to weigh and judge for themselves more than it is for us to all judge and think about for others -- unlike, say, murder, which is clear cut.

Granted, but who decides what's irresponsible, and by what standard? — tim wood

Obviously people do, and obviously I'm going to argue in favour of the standard I go by. Obviously.

"The last thread on abortion". I didn't need to read the thread, the title alone was sufficiently entertaining. :smile: — Jake

:lol:

My remarks were about future. We can dream and think about it, if we're wise plan for it, but we never ever have it or own it or possess it. What we have, then, is matters of cognition - relatively high level brain/mind activity. No one today argues that a fetus has any of these things.

So it would seem that you attribute to a fetus something it has not the capacity to have. Actually, something that cannot be had, to something that couldn't have it if it could be had.

You remarked earlier about your expectations of persuading anyone on these arguments. I have not for a moment thought about persuasion, but instead about the qualities of the arguments. That is, about demonstration, persuasion and demonstration being different things for different purposes.

Then it wasn't absolute freedom you were speaking of.
— tim wood

I know exactly what I was speaking of. You can of course use whatever term you like to refer to the position I was describing, but I'll stick with the term I used. I do not wish to argue semantics over it with you. — S

Obviously people do, and obviously I'm going to argue in favour of the standard I go by. Obviously. — S

Perhaps you know what you were speaking of, but the point here is communication, getting the other person to know what you're speaking of. You get to have your private world of meanings, but clearly that doesn't do for communication. And if communication is your intention, then it becomes a fair question if indeed you know what you're talking about, if your communication of it isn't near the target.

And if that's in question, then how is it that it's obvious you should or anyone should favor your standard, if in fact your standard is open to question, i.e., is non-standard?

I think we'd actually agree here in all except for where you say "to some extent". For myself it seems foolish to compare the worth of a person to anything else, hence why I say its infinite -- it's not something that's really quantifiable or qualifiable. It's more like a beginning for ethical thinking. So there is no extent about it. — Moliere

I don't agree. Nothing's infinitely valuable. I get where you're coming from, but I wouldn't take it that far. I mean, don't get me wrong, I would save a person over a cat, for instance.

But, yes, I don't think careless disregard is the quite right attitude either. For instance I don't think it would be morally permissable to impregnate yourself in order to sell a developed fetus for stem-cell research. Legally, by my lights, sure -- since I don't think the law and morality are one -- but I'd put that pretty squarely in the "wrong" category as having no respect for human life. — Moliere

Yes, a kind of middle ground between extremes seems sensible here.

Sure, I'd agree with this. — Moliere

:up:

Heh. I don't want to get too sidetracked -- put this aside for another discussion? It seems to me that it's a bit tangential. — Moliere

What? It's very relevant for anyone who considers personhood to be the key determining factor with regards to value and morality in relation to abortion. Quite a few people here have made it clear that that's what they consider, yourself included it seems.

Okie dokie. Well, at least you can understand what I'm saying, I think. I judge it to basically fall squarely in the middle insofar as we're talking about prior to birth -- to myself, it's the sort of thing that one has to weigh and judge for themselves more than it is for us to all judge and think about for others -- unlike, say, murder, which is clear cut. — Moliere

I think that my position is liberal enough, and that if it were any more so it would be excessive.

I just quote this below because I think we've come to a terminus on the other subjects.

What? It's very relevant for anyone who considers personhood to be the key determining factor with regards to value and morality in relation to abortion. Quite a few people here have made it clear that that's what they consider, yourself included it seems. — S

How so?

It seems to me the question of personhood is just when something is considered worthy of such and such a consideration. One could frame this cognitively or non-cognitively, though, so whether our meta-ethical stance is one or the other doesn't seem to bare on the normative question. So if we are non-cognitivists about persons then there would be no real rule, but rather an emotive state, which decides when we treat such and such as a person, whereas if we are cognitivists then we'd set out some criteria to assist in judging this that or the other.

Or if we are somewhere in-between, which I think I'd say I am, then we'd say that our emotions are clearly a determining factor in which rules we follow, but rules are the means by which we discuss moral matters and consider them for revision or change --so you'd have both.

Further, we could frame things in terms of actions instead of in terms of personhood -- so the values we are thinking of are the acts one chooses. But whether we be cognitivists or non-cognitivists on the matter we can make an argument both ways.