Are you now going to argue that rain is a judgment?

You'd need to provide the definition you're using of judgment, which I asked a few times and you just impolitely ignored

This is why I asked earlier whether you thought that the world only consisted of judgments. You said you didn't, and that whether it was raining wasn't a judgment. — Terrapin Station

No. I'm sorry, but you don't appear to be following the train of conversation. Do you want to continue? I'm OK with stopping.

Number one: Are you reading what I'm typing? (That's not a rhetorical question, I expect you to answer.)

When I write that, answering is not optional for a conversation.

Number one: Are you reading what I'm typing? (That's not a rhetorical question, I expect you to answer.) — Terrapin Station

Yes, I am.

I would prefer not to continue this conversation, thanks.

I would prefer not to continue this conversation, thanks. — Snakes Alive

Okay, you can stop anytime you like. (of course)

We can judge that it is raining, but this does not mean that that it is raining is not a judgment.
— Snakes Alive

How can you ask that right after I type: "We can make judgments about whether it's raining, but rain isn't a judgment"? — Terrapin Station

A miscommunication here because @Snakes Alive intended to say "... is a judgment" (see the original referenced post).

@Snakes Alive was simply stating what you had both agreed on to that point - that judgments about rain don't imply that that it is raining is itself a judgment.

Then his argument is that, similarly, judgments about the good don't imply that that something is good is itself a judgment.

Indeed. I recognize that problem. The definition is one that I grant due to current convention. Morality(the rules) is not always good.

What would you argue that "good" is if not a judgment, assessment, evaluative property, etc.?

Well, this just seems like a rehashing of Hume's is-ought problem. Isn't it? — Wallows

Yes, an ought cannot be derived form any is, but only from an if.

'If I want X, then I ought to do Y'. There are no absolute goods, unless there be an absolute moral authority, i.e. God. And as we all know: God is dead.

What would you argue that "good" is if not a judgment or assessment? — Terrapin Station

A state of affairs (presumably conditional on some standard or value). So the judgment "I ought to save the child from being run over" can be true (in some context) just as the judgment "it is raining" can be true (in some context).

A state of affairs (presumably conditional on some standard or value). So the judgment "I ought to save the child from being run over" can be true (in some context) just as the judgment "it is raining" can be true (in some context). — Andrew M

The difference is that the former will be true only in some intentional or inter-subjective context, not in any purely objective existential or empirical context, whereas the latter will be true in an objective existential or empirical context.

A state of affairs (presumably conditional on some standard or value) — Andrew M

Conditional on some standard or value that's not a judgment, assessment, evaluative property, etc.?

Yes, an ought cannot be derived form any is... — Janus

That's the common understanding and/or agreement. My approach challenges this long held notion.

The difference is that the former will be true only in some intentional context, not in any purely existential or empirical context, whereas the latter will be true in an existential or empirical context. — Janus

If you make that kind of distinction, sure. But you can also hold the view that the intentional is part of the existential or empirical context as, for example, Aristotle did.

Conditional on some standard or value that's not a judgment, assessment, evaluative property, etc.? — Terrapin Station

Right. So to give an Aristotelian example, if human well-being (eudaimonia) is the standard (independent of people's opinions about it), then that would ground moral judgments.

Yes. But your comments seem not to have been noticed hereabouts...

If you make that kind of distinction, sure. But you can also hold the view that the intentional is part of the existential or empirical context as, for example, Aristotle did. — Andrew M

I agree that the intentional may be understood to be a part of the empirical context, but not in the same way as perceptible events are.

Also the fact (if it is a fact) that most people think that something is good, and therefore ought to be valued, does not entail that the people who value whatever it is ought to do so.

Yes I noticed this. I think Moore’s big takeaway is that morality can never be explained by other terms as there is nothing that proves the goodness of something. You can’t define goodness by explanation essentially. Or at least that’s what I took from him. Sounds like it can only be gleaned at through actions or something like that.

I agree that the intentional may be understood to be a part of the empirical context, but not in the same way as perceptible events are. — Janus

Yes, it isn't something concrete that can be perceived like rain. Instead it is an abstraction that can be considered part of the world. Similar to information, as discussed in the Is 'information' physical? thread.

Also the fact (if it is a fact) that most people think that something is good, and therefore ought to be valued, does not entail that the people who value whatever it is ought to do so. — Janus

Right.

It can't be said. It can be shown.

"good" in a moral sense amounts to the person approving of or preferring the (usually interpersonal) behavior in question, if not directly, then as a means to some other end that they approve of or prefer. — Terrapin Station

"I prefer the behaviour in question, but it is not good".
"I approve: but it is still immoral".

The open question: it is preferable, but is it good?

SO, @Terrapin Station hasn't grasped the open question argument, or has grasped it but honestly thinks his preferences decide what is good and what is not.

Again, good is always to someone. That's part of what it means for good to be subjective. — Terrapin Station

If goodness is subjective, then you can be right and I can be right, even if our views contradict one another. — Banno

If goodness is subjective, then you can be right and I can be right, even if our views contradict one another. — Banno

Sometimes it's like that. I don't see it as a problem

The Trolley problem (and whatever variations) is good for some and bad for others.
Apparently it is good and bad. Or undecidable?

If someone says 'this feels good' we know what they mean. It would seem weird to ask them what they mean - they've already said it. If someone says 'this is good', the question 'how so?' or 'what do you mean?' makes perfect sense.

So, if we drop the moral question, in which we may have some theoretical stake, and look at actual linguistic behavior - there is something going on. What's going on?

Consider three vs. five. Contradictories, no?

If someone says 'this feels good'... — csalisbury

But I took it that we were instead considering if someone says "Good is this".

So can anyone analyse goodness? — Banno

For a Roman stoic, goodness means acting in accordance with nature. Since we don't always perceive nature's ways correctly, we can use health as a sign of goodness. Sickness is a sign of evil. The moral aspect of goodness is there, but weakly.

The ancient Jewish concept of goodness also uses health as a sign of goodness, but for a different reason. Goodness means acting in accordance with the mosaic law, not nature. Doing so assures blessings from God. To stray from the Mosaic law is to leave behind God's protection.

The Persian concept of good has to do with progress. To be good is to reach out for the good divinity and turn away from the bad one. Health isn't a sign of goodness because the poor and afflicted can embrace goodness just as well as a rich healthy person.

Christianity inherited all three of the above conceptions of good plus the neoplatonic conception: good is an aspect of the cosmic situation. Good is basically the divine mind, so you can contact the good within yourself rather than being good per se. In a way, matter is evil, but views vary on that. Augustine believed that since matter is an aspect of the whole of God, we shouldn't think of it as evil. So he seemed to be saying that everything is good. That is a anti-moralistic view though. It doesn't give the preacher any way to rail against society for its wrong-doing.

Why did Moore think goodness is unanalyzable?

Right. So to give an Aristotelian example, if human well-being (eudaimonia) is the standard (independent of people's opinions about it), then that would ground moral judgments. — Andrew M

So your task would be to explain either how we get to "x is human well being" without it being a judgment, preference, evaluative property etc., or if you're going to say that human well being is a brain state (re certain levels of dopamine, serotonin, etc.), how that has anything to do with moral judgments so that we're avoiding judgments, etc.

"I prefer the behaviour in question, but it is not good".
"I approve: but it is still immoral". — Banno

Both are incoherent.