"X is wrong".

Person A agrees. Person B does not.

According to S, neither person can be mistaken. That would require the statement to be both true and false at the same time. True for person A. False for person B.

Clearly that cannot be the case.

The problem is a conflation of truth and belief. More precisely, a conflation between truth conditions and belief conditions.

Well it's quite like my showing you a blue cup and you saying "But where is your evidence that it is blue?"

What your request has shown is that you either are blind or do not understand what blue is.

But you don't see this, it seems, and hence you have missed the rather good discussion going on around you in this thread an the language of morality thread.

So be it.

What stops you from applying this argument to almost anything, though? You can place everything in 'the background' for some purpose or in some context.

So X's being wrong is determined solely by virtue of being contrary to one's belief.

:yikes:

If that were the case no one could ever be wrong, and everybody would be wrong all at the same time, in the same sense, and by the very same standard.

Moral relativism conflates belief and truth. — creativesoul

None of that follows from moral relativism. You either don't understand the basics of moral relativism, or you're not very good at logic, or both.

You're also not clear enough in specifying what sense of right and wrong you mean. That's bad form, because it's very important in this context and makes a big difference.

Yep. Depends what you want to do.

Remember that replacing one set of words with another leads to circularity. At some stage you have to actually do something with words to show what they mean.

It looks to me like you want to have your cake and eat it too, though. You once wrote 'The problem with quietism isn't the quiet, it's the ism', but you're still analysing these things philosophically and putting it into its philosophical context - this is how you put the 'ism' onto the quiet. The quiet's just not writing.

The quiet's just not writing. — fdrake

Quite. But teasing you is such fun.

You are aware that this is not the open question mentioned in the title, which is an argument against naturalist ethics presented by Moore?

Though it worth asking. — Banno

Yes. Nevertheless, it seemed fitting, and it has the upshot of catching your attention.

The Open Question argument claims to show that being good is indefinable - what he would have called a simple, but what we might be more inclined to call fundamental. — Banno

Yes, funnily enough, this isn't the first I've heard of the argument. And, as I said earlier, it looks like a good argument. It's compatible with my position. I don't try to define "good". I can't remember the last time I attempted that. It probably didn't go so well. I just talk about it in other ways.

What's the difference between believing that X is immoral, and X being immoral?

So, if you can background anything, and it depends on the context, why is it legitimate to background 'is good', 'ought' etc /after/ their relation to emotions and norms and not before? You engender a different a priori (or set of assumptions) for each, and you have no means with your strategy of distinguishing them. If you want to play the game of treating things as given, and you have contextually dependent principles for treating things as given, what makes your perspective any more accurate than @S's or @Terrapin Station? You just treating different things as given, using different framing devices.

What's the difference between believing that X is immoral, and X being immoral? — creativesoul

I find this quite amusing. Does anyone else? Or is it just me?

Okay, I'll bite, if you insist. Although there's only so much of you I can take before I give up trying.

That X is immoral, if interpreted as per moral objectivism, is much like other claims, such as whether the cat is on the mat, only they're unsubstantiated, as far as I can tell. So, for me to be a wise man, as per Hume, if you expect me to believe that, then I ask where is the evidence? Not evidence that it is immoral (as there are obviously different senses), but evidence that it is objectively so.

That X is judged to be immoral is fairly selfexplanatory, but I could go into further detail about moral feeling if necessary.

"X is wrong". — creativesoul

In what sense?

"X is immoral".

Person A agrees. Person B does not.

According to S, neither person can be mistaken. That would require the statement to be both true and false at the same time. True for person A. False for person B.

Clearly that cannot be the case.

The problem is a conflation of truth and belief. More precisely, a conflation between truth conditions and belief conditions. — creativesoul

@S
You've neglected to answer relevant objections. You've neglected to answer relevant questions. And you've made it a habit here in this thread to be dick.

Not interested in the rhetorical drivel...

But a moral relativist has to ask that question. They do not accept a simple, absolute "wrong", as you seem to indicate. Only a relative "wrong". So you're way off the mark from the very beginning.

If someone can't understand that, then they'll never understand moral relativism. This is the fundamental basis of moral relativism.

@creativesoul, I genuinely want you to understand moral relativism, and I have tried, but I am not going to be an unpaid teacher. Sorry.

Quite. But teasing you is such fun. — Banno

And posturing...?

All you've done is overstate the case regarding the fact that different people have different moral belief.

So what?

Yes, person A holds that behaviour X is immoral. Person B disagrees.

When person A says "X is immoral" they are stating their belief. When person B says "X is moral" they are stating theirs. The two contradict one another.

So what?

That's never been a problem. It's a problem if one claims that "X is immoral" is both true(relative to person A's belief) and false(relative to person B's).

But a moral relativist has to ask that question. They do not accept a simple, absolute "wrong".

If someone can't understand that, then they'll never understand moral relativism. This is the fundamental basis of moral relativism. — S

We are talking about morality. Thus, it should be obvious that when someone says "X is wrong", the sense of the term wrong is a moral one... equivalent to unacceptable, for all morality is about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.

Acceptable is good/moral and unacceptable is bad/immoral...

All you've done is overstate the case regarding the fact that different people have different moral belief.

So what?

Yes, person A holds that behaviour X is immoral. Person B disagrees.

When person A says "X is immoral" they are stating their belief. When person B says "X is moral" they are stating theirs. The two contradict one another.

So what? — creativesoul

Indeed, so what? I have no problem with that. I have a problem when someone suggests that there's an objective correct or incorrect, because I don't see sufficient evidence supporting that.

That's never been a problem. It's a problem if one claims that "X is immoral" is both true (relative to person A's belief) and false (relative to person B's). — creativesoul

It's not a problem, because it's not a contradiction, and I'm done trying to get you to understand what a contradiction requires and why that doesn't count. Putting a relevant distinction in brackets does nothing at all. They're not the same. End of.

The relevant statement is not even "X is immoral", it's "X is immoral relative to Person A" and "X is immoral relative to Person B". There is no "X is immoral" under moral relativism. They reject that, if you mean what I think you mean. Again, this is the whole damn basis of moral relativism. You are incessantly looking at moral relativism through non-moral-relativism blinkers, and then you erroneously think that you've demonstrated an internal contradiction. Well, you haven't, and you won't ever demonstrate an internal contradiction that way. Only an external contradiction, which is much more trivial, given that the moral relativist rejects the assumptions you're relying on in your demonstration.

I'm not sure you'll ever understand this. I remember having this discussion with you many years ago, and you haven't changed a bit.

Well it's quite like my showing you a blue cup and you saying "But where is your evidence that it is blue?"

What your request has shown is that you either are blind or do not understand what blue is.

But you don't see this, it seems, and hence you have missed the rather good discussion going on around you in this thread an the language of morality thread.

So be it. — Banno

:rofl:

I accept that the cup is blue. I see that it is blue, and even if I did not, it could be determined scientifically. There is sufficient evidence for that. Where is the comparable evidence for morality? What scientific test can be performed to determine whether something is immoral, if I don't feel such that I judge it to be immoral? Immoral as per what's customary or popular? Sure. A survey could be conducted, I suppose. An anthropologist could conduct research. It'd be immoral relative to what's customary or popular, but not relative to my judgement. I'm okay with that.

All you've done is overstate the case regarding the fact that different people have different moral belief.

So what?

Yes, person A holds that behaviour X is immoral. Person B disagrees.

When person A says "X is immoral" they are stating their belief. When person B says "X is moral" they are stating theirs. The two contradict one another.

So what?
— creativesoul

Indeed, so what? I have no problem with that. I have a problem when someone suggests that there's an objective correct or incorrect, because I don't see sufficient evidence supporting that. — S

I reject the objective/subjective distinction for reasons given. Other than that, we're in agreement here. Moving on...

That's never been a problem. It's a problem if one claims that "X is immoral" is both true(relative to person A's belief) and false(relative to person B's).
— creativesoul

It's not a problem, because it's not a contradiction, and I'm done trying to get you to understand what a contradiction requires and why that doesn't count. Putting a relevant distinction in brackets does nothing at all. They're not the same. End of — S

Are you claiming that "X is immoral" can be true/false as a result of agreeing with a person's moral belief?

We are talking about morality. Thus, it should be obvious that when someone says "X is wrong", the sense of the term wrong is a moral one... equivalent to unacceptable, for all morality is about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.

Acceptable is good/moral and unacceptable is bad/immoral... — creativesoul

What is your problem? Someone says "X is wrong". Okay. Under subjective moral relativism, that's false or at least unwarranted if interpreted as per moral objectivism, which is the interpretation which you seem to be stuck on.

Problem resolved.

Are you claiming that "X is immoral" can be true/false as a result of agreeing with a person's moral belief? — creativesoul

Aren't you reading what I'm saying about "X is immoral" for the position of moral relativism? The claim needs to be clarified, otherwise I'm not saying anything about it. That's the whole problem with your line of criticism and questioning. Until you sort this out, you won't get anywhere.

We are talking about morality. Thus, it should be obvious that when someone says "X is wrong", the sense of the term wrong is a moral one... equivalent to unacceptable, for all morality is about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.

Acceptable is good/moral and unacceptable is bad/immoral...
— creativesoul

What is your problem? Someone says "X is wrong". Okay. Under subjective moral relativism, that's false or at least unwarranted if interpreted as per moral objectivism, which is the interpretation which you seem to be stuck on.

Problem resolved. — S

My problem is that you do not seem to understand that "X is wrong(immoral)" is a statement of moral belief, regardless of one's moral philosophy. In all cases, X is believed to be unacceptable behaviour.

Are you claiming that "X is immoral" can be true/false as a result of agreeing with a person's moral belief?
— creativesoul

Aren't you reading what I'm saying about "X is immoral" for the position of moral relativism? — S

It's a yes or no question, that I would like to read. Care to answer it?

Here I was, thinking we were moving on.

Ah we'll get there...

Add something.

My problem is that you do not seem to understand that "X is immoral" is a statement of moral belief, regardless of one's moral philosophy. In all cases, X is believed to be unacceptable behaviour. — creativesoul

This is silly. Not everyone interprets this stuff the way that you do. Not everyone is of the same meta-ethical position as you. So you're a moral universalist? Good for you. Why should I care?