Goodnight.

Being subjective is dependent upon thought/belief. — Mww

In what way can something be dependent upon something else if that something else doesn't exist? In what way can something be dependent upon something else if not existentially?

Being subjective is dependent upon thought/belief. I suppose then that being objective is not dependent upon thought/belief.

But if morality is subjective and has objective consequences, then it only follows that the objective consequences are dependent upon thought/belief.

Us evaluating something and us valuing something, our personal perspectives, our perceptions, etc. aren't properties of the action itself. If the moral property is a property of the action itself, it has to be in the action itself whether anyone evaluates or values anything at all. — Terrapin Station

Right. So the issue is that we can fail to value what is valuable. For example, Alice owns a diamond ring but thinks it is cubic zirconia.

Similarly if human life and well-being is valuable independently of being valued then actions can be morally right or wrong.

That question seems to raise others:

What is meant by "valuable" in the context of the question? If to be valuable does not entail actually being valued, then does it at least entail the potential to be valued? And then, valued by whom, by how many and so on? — Janus

Yes, I think to be valuable entails the potential to be valued. But it need not actually be valued by anyone. Just as with any other aspect of the world, we can be mistaken about what is valuable.

What scientific test can be performed to determine whether something is immoral, if I don't feel such that I judge it to be immoral? Immoral as per what's customary or popular? Sure. A survey could be conducted, I suppose. An anthropologist could conduct research. It'd be immoral relative to what's customary or popular, but not relative to my judgement. I'm okay with that. — S

What scientific test can be performed to determine whether something is blue, if I don't feel such that I judge it to be blue? Blue as per what's customary or popular? Sure. A survey could be conducted, I suppose. An anthropologist could conduct research. It'd be blue relative to what's customary or popular, but not relative to my judgement. I'm okay with that.

Never.

So the issue is that we can fail to value what is valuable. For example, Alice owns a diamond ring but thinks it is cubic zirconia. — Andrew M

Valuable in what sense? There's an obvious distinction to be made here between valuable in a variety of senses. Valuable in accordance with monetary value? Valuable in accordance with sentimental value? Valuable in accordance with use as a tool?

There is no simple "valuable" in a non-relative sense.

What scientific test can be performed to determine whether something is blue, if I don't feel such that I judge it to be blue? — Banno

It doesn't make sense to feel such that you judge it to be blue, because, unlike moral judgement, that sort of judgement isn't typically made based on how we feel. That would make you very peculiar.

Of course, you can parrot that back to me with some key terms switched around, but you'd be wrong. And you can parrot this back as well. And this. And this.

A tool can be used to measure the wavelengths in nanometres. If it has a dominant wavelength between approximately 450 and 495 nanometres, then it's blue.

Your turn. What scientific test can be performed to determine whether something is immoral, if I don't feel such that I judge it to be immoral?

Answer the question, please. Don't just be a parrot. Or a parrot-like dinosaur. :smirk:

Similarly if human life and well-being is valuable independently of being valued then actions can be morally right or wrong. — Andrew M

(1) you're not explaining how the action itself has value, (2) value in general isn't the same thing as a moral property anyway. Say that cubic zirconia and diamonds have value in themselves, independent of us (I don't agree that this is so, but we can imagine it is). Well, that's not moral value. Value in general isn't the same thing as moral value.

You're supposed to be telling me how the action itself has moral value. Do you not understand the challenge? How many times are you going to respond without producing what I'm asking for?

Well it's quite like my showing you a blue cup and you saying "But where is your evidence that it is blue?" — Banno

At which point I'll explain what the objective properties are, exactly--the surface of the cup reflects a particular frequency of electromagnetic radiation, etc., and how we'd provide evidence that it's blue. For example, with a blue cup, we could simply use a spectrophotometer to report the color. Or we could take a picture of it, look at it in photoshop, and check the RGB data. There are a bunch of different things we could do. Those are just two examples of ways that we evidence objective properties of something that has objective properties.

That's not to say that everyone is going to agree with all methods, but we can explain a lot of methods we could use as evidence of the objective properties of something, and then from that point, we could discuss the merits of the methods, etc.

So that's all I'm asking you. What is anything that would count as evidence of objective moral properties? Surely if you believe that moral properties are objective, you believe there's some evidence of this, no? It's not that you believe it via "faith" only like it's a belief in God or something, is it? (If that's the case, at least say so, and I won't ask you for evidence of it again; I'd accept that it's just a belief you have on faith.) So I'm just asking you to tell me what you take to be evidence of its objectivity.

The problem with the argument, taken from a myriad of manufactured moral dilemmas:

When person A says "X is immoral" they are stating their belief. When person B says "X is moral" they are stating theirs. The two contradict one another.

So what?

That's never been a problem. It's a problem if one claims that "X is immoral" is both true(relative to person A's belief) and false(relative to person B's). — creativesoul

If I am the one who claims, and I claim it is immoral for the Engineer Tom (person B) to maintain the Empire Cascade’s speed (behavior X) approaching Lady Jane (person A) tied to the tracks up ahead, while Boris waits in the bushes for Dudley to rush to the rescue. Poor ol’ Lady Jane certainly believes it truly immoral that Tom refuses to slow down. But Tom, on the other hand, with a train full of passengers trailing behind and a 7% grade he absolutely must ascend or he will roll backwards and wind up in the river, truly believes it sucks to be Lady Jane for sure, but he isn’t about to scatter 14 cars and 67.5 people over 1/2 mile of river bed for her, so he truly believes my claim is false, that is, it is not immoral to maintain speed.

It is clear my claim for X being immoral is true relative to one ground of belief and false relative to another.
——————

Behaviors, all and sundry X’s, are not moral or immoral; the agent is, in determining what such X’s will be. Behavior is an effect of one agent whose morality is the cause, and an affect on another whose morality is impressed. The possible difference in value arises strictly from the subjectivity of each.

The only possible contradiction will arise when I derive congruent moral *and* immoral judgements simultaneously, which is quite impossible. But never from making a claim of morality *or* immorality with respect to observation of a determination I did not myself make.

When one says “X is immoral” he is not stating his belief. He is stating a conclusion from the fact he must know what is moral given necessarily from his own constitution, which makes explicit he must know the negation of it as well.

I missed a bunch of posts, but re the above, (logically problematic) contradictions require that we're not equivocating --it needs to be the same exact claim, in the same respect, etc. that's being both asserted and denied at the same time. Different people having different beliefs is not a (logically problematic) contradiction.

Not that moral utterances are really beliefs about something else (something external to the individual in question) anyway, and they're not true or false.

Who said anything about 'moral properties'? — creativesoul

People were claiming that moral whatever-you-want-to-call-thems (properties, judgments, qualities--whatever word they'd want to use, whatever word they think makes their case best) are objective.

Really now. So you don't believe what you write? — creativesoul

Obviously we're using "disposition" differently .

Not that moral utterances are really beliefs about something else (something external to the individual in question) anyway, and they're not true or false. — Terrapin Station

Agreed.

but re the above, (logically problematic) contradictions — Terrapin Station

I’m the above. The directly above anyway. Would you re-write the part about logically problematic and relate it to something specific in the above you’re talking about?

If someone were to come to me, in some hypothetical scenario, and tell me that what I'm seeing is not green, but red, I'd tell them that what I am seeing is green even if the nanometers of the wavelength of light happened to roughly correspond to what most people call red.

So the issue is that we can fail to value what is valuable. For example, Alice owns a diamond ring but thinks it is cubic zirconia.
— Andrew M

Valuable in what sense? — S

Monetary. Alice values the ring at a few dollars but it is worth thousands.

The example shows that the perceived value and the actual value can be different (by some metric).

Now suppose the natural standard for morality is promoting human life and well-being. Even Joe can see that his murdering of Bill doesn't meet that standard. He might not care, or he might disagree that that should be the standard, or he might think that standards are merely subjective. Nonetheless, if that is the standard, then Joe's action is wrong simpliciter, regardless of Joe's opinions on the matter.

You're supposed to be telling me how the action itself has moral value. — Terrapin Station

An action is right or wrong if there is a natural standard of value that it is measured against. I've specified what I think that standard is.

An action is right or wrong if there is a natural standard of value that it is measured against. I've specified what I think that standard is. — Andrew M

Is the natural standard of value in the act itself?

No. It is something more like the basic physiological and psychological needs of human beings.

Then the act itself doesn't have a moral whatever-you-want-to-call-it. That only occurs in relation to something that's not the act itself. And you're saying that part of what it being moral or not is in relation to is the psychological needs of human beings.

I don't follow your point. Joe acted. He is a human being. So Joe's action can be measured against the value standard applicable to human beings. Whether his action is moral or not is a logical consequence of applying that standard.

This is no different to the idea that a statement is true or not as a logical consequence of its use in some context. Morality is to actions as truth is to statements.

If it has a dominant wavelength between approximately 450 and 495 nanometres, then it's blue. — S

Even if you see green?

So Joe's action can be measured against the value standard applicable to human beings. Whether his action is moral or not is a logical consequence of applying that standard. — Andrew M

You just agreed that the standard is not in the action itself.

If the standard is necessary for determining whether the action is moral or not, then the action being moral or not is not in the action itself.

Yes, I think to be valuable entails the potential to be valued. But it need not actually be valued by anyone. — Andrew M

But could something be valuable if it was never valued in the past, is not valued now, and will never come to be valued in the future?

"Never say "Never"".

Even if you see green? — Banno

When we're talking about objective properties, what you see is irrelevant.

What you see matters if we're trying to figure out if something unusual is going on with you subjectively, if we want to figure out what's going on with your perceptual faculties in a case where they seem to be responding unusually to the objective properties at hand, but what you see is irrelevant to the objective properties qua the objective properties.

You just agreed that the standard is not in the action itself.

If the standard is necessary for determining whether the action is moral or not, then the action being moral or not is not in the action itself. — Terrapin Station

Fair enough. The standard is implicit in the action, since the action is done by a human being (for whom the standard applies).

But could something be valuable if it was never valued in the past, is not valued now, and will never come to be valued in the future? — Janus

It seems a logically coherent possibility. It just requires it to either not be recognized as valuable or always disvalued. Do you disagree?

it needs to be the same exact claim, in the same respect, etc. that's being both asserted and denied at the same time — Terrapin Station

Then it's not the same exact claim.

You just agreed that the standard is not in the action itself.

If the standard is necessary for determining whether the action is moral or not, then the action being moral or not is not in the action itself.
— Terrapin Station

Fair enough. — Andrew M

No. Andrew. You're ok here.

The standard is necessary for us to determine whether or not the action is moral or not... that is... it is necessary for us to acquire knowledge of the morality of the action. It is not necessary for the action to be moral/immoral.

What it takes for us to acquire knowledge of what's moral is not the same as what it takes for something to be so.

Good things existed in their entirety prior to our coming to that realization. Such things are not existentially dependent upon our report/account of them. It only follows that those particular good things are not equivalent to linguistic conceptions. We can be mistaken about such things.

It is clear my claim for X being immoral is true relative to one ground of belief and false relative to another. — Mww

No. All you've done is further prove my earlier point/criticism of relative/subjective morality. You're conflating belief and truth.

It is clear that it is believed relative to one's belief-system and not believed relative to another's.

It is believed by one, but not the other.