Observing that pre-linguistic humans find certain behaviours unacceptable. — creativesoul
thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. — creativesoul
Observing that pre-linguistic humans find certain behaviours unacceptable.
— creativesoul
Ah, so not agreeing that concepts are (necessarily) linguistic becomes important here. — Terrapin Station
...thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.
— creativesoul
When I talk about feelings in a moral context the above is what I'm referring to. So it's simply using different terms to refer to the same thing. — Terrapin Station
When I talk about feelings in a moral context the above is what I'm referring to. So it's simply using different terms to refer to the same thing.
In other words, the reason he picks one over the other is because of his preferences. You don't have to personally query his preferences to make a prediction about which he'll choose with a great chance of success, because that's such a common preference. But that doesn't imply that it's not about a preference he has. — Terrapin Station
Unless we want to know what we're referring to ontologically re something being valuable. That is, we want to know what's going on ontologically to make that the case if it is.
You can proceed where you don't care about it so you're just not going to bother figuring out what's going on ontologically there, but we can be interested in it. That's what I've been focusing on. — Terrapin Station
The words "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour" has a different referent on your view than mine. — creativesoul
...when I talk about "feelings" re what we're doing when we make utterances about morality, I'm talking about "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour." — Terrapin Station
That is, if what you say here is true, then one ought be able to replace all your use of the term "feelings" with "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour" in all the situations where you are making utterances about morality, and the transformation not suffer any loss of meaning. — creativesoul
Do you want to get into concepts? I would argue that all concepts are existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul
Morality, as it is conventionally understood is the rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. — creativesoul
Say that your referent of "thoughts/beliefs about acceptable/unacceptable behavior" is α. — Terrapin Station
Morality, as it is conventionally understood is the rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.
— creativesoul
I don't agree with that either. — Terrapin Station
Well, your referent of "feelings" in a context of talking about what we're basing morality upon... — Terrapin Station
All thought/belief(my referent) consists of the same basic set of necessary elemental constituents. Necessity is determined by existential dependency. Thought/belief cannot be properly accounted for and/or reported upon by a single variable. A single variable cannot properly account for a plurality of things. — creativesoul
Look it up at SEP. Definition of morality. — creativesoul
That was in the post you quoted. Maybe we should avoid longer posts until we can get anything running smoothly?If you would like to have me go over another conception of morality, say yours?... — creativesoul
It is often the case that when someone says "X ought happen", they are making a prediction — creativesoul
I was asking how you'd know that my referent of "thoughts/beliefs about acceptable/unacceptable behavior" isn't α. — Terrapin Station
If it does then we can remove all your use of "feelings" and replace them with "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour" and not lose any meaning. — creativesoul
It is often the case that when someone says "X ought happen", they are making a prediction
— creativesoul
What you're describing there is "if x is correct, then y should obtain"--what in the world does your example have to do with morality? — Terrapin Station
Is an apple equivalent to an apple fritter?
— creativesoul
Not in my usage. — Terrapin Station
That's not a good translation. A prediction need not take if/then form. — creativesoul
She promised to do X. X ought be done. — creativesoul
Feelings, like apples to apple pies, are necessary but insufficient for thought/belief. — creativesoul
She promised to do X. X ought be done.
— creativesoul
That's a preference that someone has about behavior in relation to promises. It's a way they feel. If it's moral to them, they approve of following through with promises and do not approve of not following through. — Terrapin Station
Feelings, like apples to apple pies, are necessary but insufficient for thought/belief.
— creativesoul
When we're talking about thought/belief in a moral context, we're talking about ways that people feel about behavior. This has nothing to do with apples/apple fritters. — Terrapin Station
Say we have a gambler who owes a lot of money to a loan shark. The loan shark tells the gambler "Since you owe me and cannot pay, I promise you that your family will suffer"...
Anyone who knows what the meaning of that is knows that it ought be the case that the family will suffer. — creativesoul
When we're talking about thought/belief in any context, it is never equivalent to feelings. — creativesoul
How much would you wager on this:
We take 1,000 random people and tell them the first paragraph.
We then ask them, "Agree or disagree: it ought to be the case that the family will suffer"?
There's more to this, but what would you wager on the the majority of respondents saying "agree"? We can talk about why after you answer that. — Terrapin Station
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