However, in any scenario where there are no meaning makers at all left and no potential, even in theory, for decipherability, the connection is short-circuited, and I don't think it then makes sense to identify meaning (or non-meaning). So, the most sensible way of talking about this from my point of view is to admit meaning does not have to be in the here and now (it's not tied to some active brain state etc) but there must be potentializability for it to make sense to talk about it being instantiated in any given text. — Baden
(This is not to get at the "truth" of the matter, but to try to offer the least problematic solution.) — Baden
Mine seems less problematic. — S
I have been trying to address the question just from the 'commonsense' perspective of ordinary language use where 'meaning' indicates that something that has been encoded is either deciphered or at least decipherable. — Janus
So, if there is, for example, an ancient tablet inscribed a million years ago by a now extinct literate species on a planet 200.000.000 light years from any other sentient beings, that is potentially decipherable then we would ordinarily say that it is meaningful, even though there may be zero possibility of its ever actually being deciphered. — Janus
I suppose a succinct way to put it would be: If there is to be a question of meaning, there must, in principle, be a question poser (meaning-maker). And where there is a question poser, there must, in principle, be an answer to the question. — Baden
I don't have a huge problem with your straightforward view (less so than the opposition's alternatives). It mostly works, but I'm going for some extra nuance that deals with the sneaking-in-the-meaning-maker-by-the-back-door thing. Where do you see my view being more problematic? — Baden
Zero possibility? Wouldn't there just be an extremely low probability - next to nothing, but not zero? — S
I would say you get into murky territory when you posit a scenario that brackets out all meaning-makers to the extent that the question becomes somewhat incoherent. Is something still meaningful? There's no-meaning-maker, even in principle, to decide unless, again, they get snuck in by the back door. — Baden
Again, I mean in principle, not necessarily in practice. There doesn't have to be a decision on meaning only the theoretical possibility of one to allow for a world where the presence of meaning makes sense. — Baden
It is verging on introducing the idea of the impossibility of saying anything about the noumenal. And that is to 'step up' to another level of discourse about what can meaningfully be said about 'things in themselves' in general. — Janus
What do you mean by "Fibonacci sequence"? Do you refer to natural phenomena such as the whorls of seeds on the face of a sunflower, or a written series of numbers where each one (except of course the first) is the sum of the two preceding numbers? — Janus
That's an interesting question. I guess it depends on what is physically possible. Is it physically possible for any vessel to travel at light-speed? At greater than light-speed? We just don't know, so I guess all we can say is that there seems to be "an extremely low probability". — Janus
But in any case, it seems absurd to think that whether or not the tablet is meaningful is dependent upon whether or not anyone could get to see it, regardless of whether anyone actually does get to see it. — Janus
I'm a bit of a Humean on "laws" of physics. It's possible that tomorrow I'll turn on the tap and the water will flow upwards. — S
It is verging on introducing the idea of the impossibility of saying anything about the noumenal. And that is to 'step up' to another level of discourse about what can meaningfully be said about 'things in themselves' in general. — Janus
Of course it is logically possible that the water may flow upwards, and it may even be physically possible; but it may also not be physically possible; the latter possibility is what I was getting at. — Janus
I tend to think of the Kantian insight as being not merely a language game, but as stemming from the realization that, although we can think of the independent existence of things, the actual existence of things that we can speak in positively meaningful terms about is always the existence of things for us. — Janus
You really don't remember? — S
Of course, we could never know, so, for us, only the logically impossible can be definitely impossible. But it is logically possible that there are absolute limits inherent in the nature of any possible physical thing as to what is physically possible. It is also logically possible that there may not be any such limits. — Janus
Yes, from a commonsense perspective that is true. — Janus
Really. (And people expect me to remember something like a Schopenhauer book I read 40 years ago., haha.)
Sometimes I can't even remember what movie I watched yesterday (I'll remember it when I look it up, but offhand, sometimes it's a challenge to remember what it was without looking it up). I would blame it on age, but I've always been like that. — Terrapin Station
Anything that can be said at all can be said clearly, and whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. — S
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