if there were machines that resembled our bodies and if they imitated our actions as much as is morally possible, we would always have two very certain means for recognizing that, nonetheless, they are not genuinely human.
The first is that they would never be able to use speech, or other signs composed by themselves, as we do to express our thoughts to others. For one could easily conceive of a machine that is made in such a way that it utters words, and even that it would utter some words in response to physical actions that cause a change in its organs—for example, if someone touched it in a particular place, it would ask what one wishes to say to it, or if it were touched somewhere else, it would cry out that it was being hurt, and so on. But it could not arrange words in different ways to reply to the meaning of everything that is said in its presence, as even the most unintelligent human beings can do.
The second means is that, even if they did many things as well as or, possibly, better than any of us, they would infallibly fail in others. Thus one would discover that they did not act on the basis of knowledge, but merely as a result of the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument that can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need a specific disposition for every particular action. — Rene Descartes
existence of your interest or ability to decipher meaning says nothing about the existence of meaning itself — Janus
Relevant quote from Rene Descartes:
if there were machines that resembled our bodies and if they imitated our actions as much as is morally possible, we would always have two very certain means for recognizing that, nonetheless, they are not genuinely human.
The first is that they would never be able to use speech, or other signs composed by themselves, as we do to express our thoughts to others. For one could easily conceive of a machine that is made in such a way that it utters words, and even that it would utter some words in response to physical actions that cause a change in its organs—for example, if someone touched it in a particular place, it would ask what one wishes to say to it, or if it were touched somewhere else, it would cry out that it was being hurt, and so on. But it could not arrange words in different ways to reply to the meaning of everything that is said in its presence, as even the most unintelligent human beings can do.
The second means is that, even if they did many things as well as or, possibly, better than any of us, they would infallibly fail in others. Thus one would discover that they did not act on the basis of knowledge, but merely as a result of the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument that can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need a specific disposition for every particular action. — Rene Descartes
Discourse on Method, 1637. — Wayfarer
If the universe exists without conscious minds inhabiting it, then of course it must embody meaningful information. Which would just mean that there is information there which would be meaningful to a conscious mind if there was a conscious mind. Why is this so difficult to understand? — Janus
So... when looking at a text how do you know that it's been correctly deciphered? — creativesoul
Is anyone here arguing that the universe would hold meaningful information without conscious minds existing to make it “meaningful information”? — Noah Te Stroete
If the universe exists without conscious minds inhabiting it, then of course it must embody meaningful information. Which would just mean that there is information there which would be meaningful to a conscious mind if there was a conscious mind. Why is this so difficult to understand? — Janus
are those two patterns the same?
What about these?: — Janus
No physically instantiated pattern can represent the whole series, or even any more than the tiniest part of it. So, although both natural and man-made patterns may instantiate the intentionally conceptualized series, the series as mathematically expressed is not a visual pattern, but a pattern that consists merely in a recurring specific operation of addition. — Janus
So, I'm thinking of linguistic meaning here as a kind of orientation. Meaning is meaning to ____ or meaning for ____ . As long as you can fill in the blank with a perspective holder capable, at least in theory, of making meaning from x mark or set of marks orientated to their perspective then that's enough for me to say that x is a meaningful set of marks. — Baden
Wouldn't that require there to be some material difference between the two texts? And does the meaning of the intentional text then travel with every copy or representation of the text? How could a viewer tell whether the text they are looking at is a copy of the original, intentional sonnet by Shakespeare or the random work of monkeys? — Echarmion
Generally, however, it must be admitted an intelligence is required for the existence of meaning, whether the instantiation of it, or the subsequent recognition of it. Given the abundance of theories on the topic over the centuries suggests a serious lack of consensus on the very idea of meaning itself. — Mww
If we were to artificially build a human.... — Terrapin Station
↪Wayfarer
To whom are you addressing the quote and what's its purpose? — fdrake
Your examples are not the same, because you cannot represent the Fibonacci series in a partial way, starting in the middle. It has a unique starting point of one unit, which is replicated. And the whole series relies on replicating that original unit. The pattern is not properly represented without the starting point. — Metaphysician Undercover
What if all universes were incapable of supporting life? Would they still hold meaningful information?
— Noah Te Stroete
Obviously there could then be no intentionally meaningful information unless they were created by an intentional entity (God). Would there be any energetic relations, processes and differences or inorganic entities in your scenario? If so, I say they would still embody accidental meaningful information. — Janus
Machines are built, but organisms grow. The organic and the mechanical are different. — Wayfarer
A potential decipherability is still a decipherability and indicates the presence of meaning to be deciphered, — Janus
To those suggesting that meaning can be understood in terms of 'brain states'. I think Descartes' quotation is a succinct refutation of the possibility (all the more impressive, as it was written in 1633.) — Wayfarer
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