Now the question I've been asking is why does Wittgenstein appear to persist in this misguided objective, to find the principles which exclude the possibility of misunderstanding, in On Certainty? — Metaphysician Undercover

He's not. He is not arguing that it is possible to eliminate doubt but that the role of certainty in our lives and language is not the certainty that Descartes and others sought.

And even here, at 85, where he says that the sign-post "sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because sometimes we have no doubt when following the signpost but other times we might. That, he points out, is an empirical proposition. We might, for example, see a sign in symbols for the men's room and one for the ladies' room and there is no doubt which is which, but there might be a case where we are not sure how to read the sign. Here there is room for doubt. But if someone gives us an explanation of the symbols and we know what they mean then there is no longer room for doubt.

... then why does he proceed in that text, On Certainty, as if he is seeking these principles? — Metaphysician Undercover

He is not:

139. Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules leave loopholes open, and the practice has to speak for itself.
140. We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning rules: we are taught
judgments and their connexion with other judgments. A totality of judgments is made plausible to
us.
141. When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a
whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)
142. It is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and
premises give one another mutual support.

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory. — On Certainty

Wittgenstein is saying that we should replace the picture of knowledge as what is built on unchanging foundations. There is no fixed point or ground:

166. The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing. — On Certainty

The point being that if there is a possibility of misunderstanding, then some degree of doubt is justified. Therefore doubt cannot be completely dismissed as irrational. — Metaphysician Undercover

In an earlier post I pointed to the parenthetical remark in §84 regarding doubt whether an abyss did not yawn behind it when we open the door. We have no such doubt, but he adds parenthetically:

... and he might on some occasion prove to be right. — PI

There are a couple of interesting points here. The first is that Wittgenstein thought it possible that there could be such an abyss. This goes further than the epistemological problem of causality. That things could be radically different from one moment to the next does not seem to be something he rules out. I take this to be part of his mystical attitude which he expressed in the Tractatus:

5.1361
We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present.
Belief in the causal nexus is superstition. — Tractatus

The second is that despite this he does think it irrational to doubt such things in practice. From On Certainty:

558. We say we know that water boils and does not freeze under such-and-such circumstances. Is it conceivable that we are wrong? Wouldn't a mistake topple all judgment with it? More: what could stand if that were to fall? Might someone discover something that made us say "It was a mistake"?
Whatever may happen in the future, however water may behave in the future, - we know that up to now it has behaved thus in innumerable instances.
This fact is fused into the foundations of our language-game. — On Certainty

A key to understanding On Certainty is his quoting Goethe:

402. In the beginning was the deed. — On Certainty

In order to understand language Wittgenstein does not begin with logic or thinking.

475. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination — On Certainty

He begins with behavior. A language game is an extension of primitive behavior (Z 545) Instinct first reason second (RPP 689)

287. The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well. And no more do we need a law of induction to justify our actions or our predictions. — On Certainty

The importance of this is far reaching. It reverses the order that has long been held and cherished by philosophers. Logic is arbitrary. It does not stand independent of language and thought, imposing a necessary order on all things, or on determining truth.

The logical rules or grammar are derived from within the lived context of the language game.

We might agree that the issues around knowledge and certainty had much still to be said after PI; hence On Certainty.

@Fooloso4 provides an account that ought be sufficient for our purposes here. @Sam26 provides some further explanation.

Perhaps one way to set out what is at hand that might satisfy @Metaphysician Undercover would be to say that we have no foundations as he thinks of it, but that the fact remains that we get on with it anyway. So far as language is concerned, to quote Churchill, we "Keeps buggering on". And as in language, so in life.

So, in the spirit of buggering on, I've thrice tried to summarise §109, but find it opaque.

Sugetions?

I've thrice tried to summarise §109, but find it opaque. — Banno

It was correct that our considerations must not be scientific ones. The feeling ‘that it is possible, contrary to our preconceived ideas, to think this or that’ a whatever that may mean a could be of no interest to us.

This refers back to the Tractatus. There he claimed that on the propositions of science which picture or represent the facts of the world could be thought.

What he means by the pneumatic conception of thinking? Pneuma means breath, and by extension, soul, life, spirit (spirit is Latin for breath). In other words, the pneumatic conception of thinking is one that presupposes some condition that makes thought possible in the way that breath or soul makes life possible. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein though that logic was this condition. Invoking Kant, he called it "transcendental" (it differed significantly from Kant's conception but that is another story).

In 108 he says:

The preconception of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole inquiry around. (One might say: the inquiry must be turned around, but on the pivot of our real need).

This too reminds us of Kant, the Copernican Revolution. Rather than the turn to transcendental conditions, however,he turns to language in practice, language in its role in a form of life.

And we may not advance any kind of theory.There must not be anything hypothetical
in our considerations. All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place.

He draws our attention to what we say and do with language. If we attend to how language is actually used rather than trying to discover something yet unknown about it, something still hidden from us, then we can untangle the tangles philosophy has become entangled in through the bewitchment of language. To be clear, it is not language that causes the entanglement but the misguided activity of philosophy generated by a misuse of language.

Because sometimes we have no doubt when following the signpost but other times we might. That, he points out, is an empirical proposition. — Fooloso4

This is the statement I disagree with. Doubt is not an all or nothing proposition, it exists by degree, because it is based in the possibility of error, and therefore we limit doubt through probability. So it is not the case that after one reads the sign-post, that the person either proceeds with certainty, or does not proceed because of doubt, the person may proceed with some degree of doubt. Therefore, it cannot be an empirical proposition, because even if the person is observed to proceed this does not mean that there is no doubt. Further, since the possibility of misunderstanding cannot be eliminated, it is illogical to conclude that there is no doubt. So not only is the claim "sometimes we have no doubt" not supported by empirical evidence, it is also illogical, and therefore an extremely irrational statement.

Wittgenstein is saying that we should replace the picture of knowledge as what is built on unchanging foundations. There is no fixed point or ground: — Fooloso4

This is inconsistent with your quote, in which he is talking about learning "propositions which stand fast for me". That sounds like an unchanging foundation to me.

166. The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing. — On Certainty

This is why I say there is incoherency. He was talking about learning proposition which are firmly believed, "stand fast". But at the same time he wants to say here, that there is no grounds for these beliefs. So we have beliefs which stand fast, and he also seems to say that it is irrational to doubt these beliefs, that being why they stand fast, yet they are "groundless" It makes no sense to say that there are beliefs which are groundless, yet it's irrational to doubt them. Since they are "groundless", what is really irrational is to accept them, believe them, and allow them to stand fast, without doubting them.

The second is that despite this he does think it irrational to doubt such things in practice. — Fooloso4

Do you not see this as fundamentally flawed? How can one truly believe that it is possible that one day there will be an abyss outside the door, but also say that it is irrational to have such a doubt? If the person truly believed that it is irrational to have such a doubt, then wouldn't the person in a move of reason deny the belief that it is possible. if you tell yourself such a doubt is irrational, then you will no longer believe it as a possibility, it's irrational. But if your belief in the possibility is stronger then your capacity to tell yourself that the doubt is irrational, then you will not think that the doubt is irrational, and you'll believe in the possibility. Isn't it impossible to truly hold two beliefs which you know to be incompatible, at the same time?

The importance of this is far reaching. It reverses the order that has long been held and cherished by philosophers. Logic is arbitrary. It does not stand independent of language and thought, imposing a necessary order on all things, or on determining truth.

The logical rules or grammar are derived from within the lived context of the language game. — Fooloso4

Right, I think that this is important. Logic is built on belief, which is a confidence, a type of certainty. These are simple principles which we can have confidence in, like I cannot believe that X is the case, and also that X is not the case, at the same time. And so logic is constructed on a firm commitment, confidence, belief. Language is prior to logic though, and doesn't require the same confidence and certainty. Language can exist without belief, it can exist and be used in cases when people do not know what to believe. Not knowing what to believe is the realm of doubt. So the foundation of language, being prior to logic, is doubt, language is based in doubt, a condition of not knowing what to believe. And from language came logic and belief, which is a form of certainty, because doubt is not a comfortable position to be in.

Perhaps one way to set out what is at hand that might satisfy Metaphysician Undercover would be to say that we have no foundations as he thinks of it, but that the fact remains that we get on with it anyway. — Banno

I agree with this, so long as we do not use the fact "that we get on with it anyway", as empirical evidence that doubt has been removed. That's what I object to, because I believe that despite having doubts, we get on with it anyway.

We should limit the possibility of misunderstanding (this is doubt, recognition of the possibility of misunderstanding), to the degree required for our purposes. — Metaphysician Undercover

The "logical result", of "misunderstanding is possible" is not "understanding is impossible", and I don't know what you would mean by "exact understanding". The point is that we ought to limit the possibility of misunderstanding to a degree acceptable, relative to the situation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exact understanding is where there is no doubt; where there is certainty. You state that we need to limit the possibility of misunderstanding to an acceptable degree, implying that the possibility of misunderstanding cannot be completely removed. If the possibility of misunderstanding cannot be completely removed (without any doubt), then we can never be certain to have understanding. Therefore, understanding is impossible.

Otherwise, you are saying that understanding is possible despite the fact that some degree of doubt or some possibility of misunderstanding remains. But in that case, what is the threshold level of doubt at which understanding turns to misunderstanding? How many percentage points below 100% certainty before I am no longer sure whether I understand, or at which I misunderstand?

But striving for certainty, in the sense of leaving no room for doubt, is nonsense in the context of PI. To strive for the ideal would actually defeat the purpose of the book. — Metaphysician Undercover

How?

This is judgement after the fact, it's irrelevant. What we are talking about is avoiding misunderstanding, preventing misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not irrelevant. If we are not able to judge whether a misunderstanding has been avoided in the past, then how can we know how to prevent one in the future?

I only asked whether you have ever avoided a misunderstanding before. Have you ever understood something, or is it a matter of degree?

A key to understanding On Certainty is his quoting Goethe:

402. In the beginning was the deed. — On Certainty


In order to understand language Wittgenstein does not begin with logic or thinking.

475. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination — On Certainty


He begins with behavior. A language game is an extension of primitive behavior (Z 545) Instinct first reason second (RPP 689) — Fooloso4

Just catching up on this thread and came across this gem which I wanted to re-post to emphasise the importance of it to understanding the text, in case it got lost in to and fro with MU.

It's a more significant point than its current purpose of just convincing someone that Wittgenstein was not being incoherent.

I think a lot of the misunderstanding around the PI comes from a misplaced attempt to treat it as a treatise, as MU has done ("Wittgenstein's ontology" , "Wittgenstein's epistemology" ... neither of which he is presenting here), but it is also worth attaching to the comments of others about foundational beliefs. It should be borne in mind the the significance of Wittgenstein's view on such hinges are that they are post hoc, they do not represent a 'discovery', we have not learned some new fact about what is the case in learning the nature of such a device, only relieved ourselves of the burden of seeking further assurance.

Debates on this whole site would be a lot more interesting and fruitful if people stopped trying to deduce what 'is the case' from their armchairs.

These are simple principles which we can have confidence in, like I cannot believe that X is the case, and also that X is not the case, at the same time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Most modern psychologists would disagree with you here. Considering some of the outrageous things you claim to doubt, why so certain of this?

Exact understanding is where there is no doubt; where there is certainty. You state that we need to limit the possibility of misunderstanding to an acceptable degree, implying that the possibility of misunderstanding cannot be completely removed. If the possibility of misunderstanding cannot be completely removed (without any doubt), then we can never be certain to have understanding. Therefore, understanding is impossible. — Luke

Read Wittgenstein's example of time at 88. We settle on the degree of precision required for our goals. To talk about exact understanding does not make sense. Your conclusion does not follow from your argument, because it requires the premise that certainty, or exactness is essential to "understanding", that a person cannot be said to have understood unless there is exactitude, and certainty to one's understanding. But that's not reality, as Wittgenstein is trying to say. If he says "stand roughly here", I understand that he's telling me that he wants me to stand somewhere in this general area, but I don't understand why he's just telling me to stand in this general area, rather than telling me to stand at this point or at that point. So despite the fact that there is understanding, there is also much which is also not understood.

But in that case, what is the threshold level of doubt at which understanding turns to misunderstanding? How many percentage points below 100% certainty before I am no longer sure whether I understand, or at which I misunderstand? — Luke

Well that's a complex problem isn't it? And that's where doubt is useful, to prevent unnecessary haste in such a judgement. But just because it's a complex problem which has no one solution to fit all situations, doesn't mean that we should reject this conclusion as not the way reality is. When our description of reality gives us a complex problem, it doesn't solve the problem to just say that the description must be wrong.

How? — Luke

It is explicitly stated, at 81 and 98 for example, and implied all over the place, such as right here at 88, that seeking the ideal is the wrong approach. So if in this book, In which seeking the ideal is portrayed as the wrong approach, Wittgenstein is actually seeking the ideal, wouldn't his efforts to portray seeking the ideal as the wrong approach, defeat his purpose, of seeking the ideal?

I only asked whether you have ever avoided a misunderstanding before. Have you ever understood something, or is it a matter of degree? — Luke

I'd say it's very clearly a matter of degree, as Wittgenstein describes. When someone says something to me I often grasp what the person intends, to the point of fulfilling that person's purpose. Sometimes not. I never assume to understand with certainty, another's intentions.

I think a lot of the misunderstanding around the PI comes from a misplaced attempt to treat it as a treatise, as MU has done ("Wittgenstein's ontology" , "Wittgenstein's epistemology" ... neither of which he is presenting here), but it is also worth attaching to the comments of others about foundational beliefs. It should be borne in mind the the significance of Wittgenstein's view on such hinges are that they are post hoc, they do not represent a 'discovery', we have not learned some new fact about what is the case in learning the nature of such a device, only relieved ourselves of the burden of seeking further assurance. — Isaac

I disagree with this. Wittgenstein presents an ontology of rules which is very clearly stated in this section. The rule is the sign-post. This positions the rule as existing externally to the mind which interprets it, it is the sign-post. It is contrary to any ontology which positions the rule as a principle within the mind, an idea. It is also contrary to the common definition of "rule", which states that a rule is "a principle". This is clearly an ontology which gives the existence of "the rule", an unconventional description. If you do not fully understand this, and give respect to the ontological status which Wittgenstein gives to 'the rule", you are likely to equivocate in other parts of the book, thinking that Wittgenstein talks of "rule" in the conventional way, as a principle.

The consequence of this ontological status which Wittgenstein gives to "the rule", is the need for interpretation of rules. This suggests the appearance of an infinite regress of explanation. The problem of infinite regress can be approached in two distinct ways. It can be approached as an ontological problem, in which case the appearance of infinite regress is assumed to be the result of a deficient ontology. Or, it can be approached as an epistemological problem, in which case the appearance of infinite regress is treated as a deficiency in the mind which is trying to understand according to the description established by the ontology. Wittgenstein chooses the latter. He wants to stand fast with his ontology of rules, but this means that the real existence of possibility lies between the mind and the rules by which we understand. Therefore the doubt created by the existence of possibility between the mind and the rules, is inherent within knowledge and understanding.

Debates on this whole site would be a lot more interesting and fruitful if people stopped trying to deduce what 'is the case' from their armchairs. — Isaac

I suggest that the armchair is the best place for reading and trying to understand books like this. Do you think that philosophers ought to follow the example of Socrates, wondering around with their heads in the clouds? I suppose you believe that philosophers should all meet the same fate as Socrates as well.

Most modern psychologists would disagree with you here. Considering some of the outrageous things you claim to doubt, why so certain of this? — Isaac

That's exactly the point. If we cannot be certain concerning something so basic, like one is not the same as the other, why think that we can be certain about anything at all?

This positions the rule as existing externally to the mind which interprets it, it is the sign-post. It is contrary to any ontology which positions the rule as a principle within the mind, an idea. It is also contrary to the common definition of "rule", which states that a rule is "a principle". This is clearly an ontology which gives the existence of "the rule", an unconventional description. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are mistaking 'acting as if...' for a claim that it is the case. The PI is a method, not a book of facts, Wittgenstein makes this pretty clear when he states quite unequivocally that philosophy does not discover new facts. Philosophy is not capable of deducing what exists and what does not.

If we cannot be certain concerning something so basic, like one is not the same as the other, why think that we can be certain about anything at all? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the point is that we are certain about some things whether we think it to be a good idea or not. The psychological state comes first, then we seek to understand it.

You are mistaking 'acting as if...' for a claim that it is the case. The PI is a method, not a book of facts, Wittgenstein makes this pretty clear when he states quite unequivocally that philosophy does not discover new facts. Philosophy is not capable of deducing what exists and what does not. — Isaac

It is a statement. If you want to describe statements as "acting as if...", I have no problem with that. But then all ontological statements are "acting as if..", and Wittgenstein's instance of "acting as if..." is no different from any other ontological statement, which are all instances of 'acting as if...".

No, the point is that we are certain about some things whether we think it to be a good idea or not. The psychological state comes first, then we seek to understand it. — Isaac

This is where you, along with what seems like everyone else here except fooloso4, have things backwards. Doubt is the primitive condition, which precedes certainty. The first time you see a specific type of sign-post you will not know what it is telling you unless someone explains it to you. Certainty is created through things like memory exercises and logical practises. Logic, certainty, and belief (which is a form of certainty), follow from language. Prior to this, we have curiosity and wonder, which Socrates described as the foundation of philosophy, and these are forms of doubt.

The result of this reversal which you express, is things like people claiming that doubt must be justified. Doubt does not need to be justified, it is the product of not knowing, it is the primitive condition. Certainty is what needs to be justified. So if unenlightened asserts that there is a tree outside the window, and I doubt that, I need to give no reason for my doubt, because doubt is inherently grounded in a lack of understanding. The burden of proof is on the one who claims certainty, because certainty requires justification. If psychologists disagree, then perhaps this is just another instance in a long history of psychologists being wrong. Or perhaps, Wittgenstein's ontology of rules is wrong, and there is some sort of underlying certainty, as expressed by Plato's theory of recollection.

We settle on the degree of precision required for our goals. To talk about exact understanding does not make sense. Your conclusion does not follow from your argument, because it requires the premise that certainty, or exactness is essential to "understanding", that a person cannot be said to have understood unless there is exactitude, and certainty to one's understanding. But that's not reality, as Wittgenstein is trying to say. If he says "stand roughly here", I understand that he's telling me that he wants me to stand somewhere in this general area, but I don't understand why he's just telling me to stand in this general area, rather than telling me to stand at this point or at that point. So despite the fact that there is understanding, there is also much which is also not understood. — Metaphysician Undercover

You start out by saying that certainty is inessential to understanding, but end up saying that without certainty we only have a partial understanding. Let's be clear: the idea of exact understanding is yours, not mine. You may not have used that phrase, but you are speaking in those terms.

Furthermore, the issue is not why he's telling you to "stand roughly there". The reason for his direction is irrelevant. The point Wittgenstein is making is that "stand roughly there" makes perfect sense as a direction despite being imprecise. More importantly, the more precise we try to make this direction, the less sense it makes. You are critical that Wittgenstein does not direct you to stand at "this point or that", but if it were a very precise point, how would you stand at it? On one foot? On which part of the foot? With how much surface area of that part of the foot? Or, maybe you are thinking of outline drawings for both of your feet:

Only let’s understand what “inexact” means! For it does not mean “unusable”. And let’s consider what we call an “exact” explanation in contrast to this one. Perhaps like drawing a boundary-line around a region with chalk? Here it strikes us at once that the line has breadth. So a colour edge would be more exact. But has this exactness still got a function here: isn’t it running idle? Moreover, we haven’t yet laid down what is to count as overstepping this sharp boundary; how, with what instruments, it is to be ascertained. And so on. — PI 88

It is explicitly stated, at 81 and 98 for example, and implied all over the place, such as right here at 88, that seeking the ideal is the wrong approach. So if in this book, In which seeking the ideal is portrayed as the wrong approach, Wittgenstein is actually seeking the ideal, wouldn't his efforts to portray seeking the ideal as the wrong approach, defeat his purpose, of seeking the ideal? — Metaphysician Undercover

As Fooloso4 said, Wittgenstein "is not arguing that it is possible to eliminate doubt but that the role of certainty in our lives and language is not the certainty that Descartes and others sought".

Therefore, Wittgenstein is not seeking some ideal certainty. Whereas you are seeking some ideal understanding where all doubt has been eliminated.

I'd say it's very clearly a matter of degree, as Wittgenstein describes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where does Wittgenstein describe understanding as a matter of degree?

Let's be clear: the idea of exact understanding is yours, not mine. — Luke

No, that's your phrase, not mine, that's why I said to you, I don't know what you would mean by "exact understanding"..

The reason for his direction is irrelevant. — Luke

Did you not read 88 yet? Exactness is relative to the goal. The "reason for his direction" is the goal. Therefore, the reason why he says "stand roughly there", instead of marking a spot, and saying "stand exactly there", or some other thing, is relevant. The exactness required to fulfill the goal intended by "roughly there", can only be known by apprehending the goal. So to fully understand what is meant by "stand roughly there" requires understanding the reason for saying those words. To go where the sign-post directs (the goal), requires apprehending the goal.

As Fooloso4 said, Wittgenstein "is not arguing that it is possible to eliminate doubt but that the role of certainty in our lives and language is not the certainty that Descartes and others sought". — Luke

I don't see how Descartes is relevant. If Wittgenstein is seeking a certainty which is other than the exclusion of doubt, I haven't yet seen this other type of certainty described. And he did mention at 85, that sometimes there is no room for doubt. Simply saying that Wittgenstein is seeking a type of certainty different from the type of certainty Descartes was seeking doesn't tell me anything; especially since Wittgenstein is telling me that he's seeking a certainty which leaves no room for doubt.

Why the obsession with certainty? Certainty is an ideal. Wittgenstein is arguing here that these ideals are not real, and ought not be sought. Forget about certainty, there is no such thing, discussing it is a waste of time. What we need to discuss is doubt.

Consider this proposition. There is a certainty which is foundational to Christian society, certainty in the existence of God. But don't you see that it's not a real certainty at all? It's a false certainty. There is no certainty there at all, in fact it's an uncertainty, a fundamental doubt, which is foundational to Christian society. However, this fundamental uncertainty, this doubt which is foundational to our society, somehow managed to get itself disguised as certainty. Confidence allows us to overcome our doubt, and that's often a virtue, like courage, but when confidence makes what is uncertain appear to be certain, that's a vice. So if, when you say that Wittgenstein is looking at a different type of certainty, you mean that he is looking at a type of certainty which is really not a certainty at all, it's really an uncertainty, a form of doubt, then I might believe you.

No, that's your phrase, not mine... — Metaphysician Undercover

Which is why, if you had read the next sentence, I said "You may not have used that phrase, but you are speaking in those terms."

Did you not read 88 yet? Exactness is relative to the goal. The "reason for his direction" is the goal. Therefore, the reason why he says "stand roughly there", instead of marking a spot, and saying "stand exactly there", or some other thing, is relevant. The exactness required to fulfill the goal intended by "roughly there", can only be known by apprehending the goal. So to fully understand what is meant by "stand roughly there" requires understanding the reason for saying those words. To go where the sign-post directs (the goal), requires apprehending the goal. — Metaphysician Undercover

You originally used the "stand roughly there" example in the context of doubt/certainty, which is irrelevant to Wittgenstein's usage of it. Now you want to pretend that you were originally using the example in the context of exactness as he does at §88? Please.

Why the obsession with certainty? — Metaphysician Undercover

Seriously? You were the one who introduced the line of questioning and discussion about certainty a few pages ago.

Forget about certainty, there is no such thing... — Metaphysician Undercover

There definitely is such a thing.

What we need to discuss is doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover

We don't need to discuss anything. However, the purpose of this thread is to discuss Wittgenstein's philosophy and his Philosophical Investigations. You appear to have no interest in either, and only seem interested in discussing your own personal philosophy about Christianity or something.

You originally used the "stand roughly there" example in the context of doubt/certainty, which is irrelevant to Wittgenstein's usage of it. Now you want to pretend that you were originally using the example in the context of exactness as he does at §88? Please. — Luke

It seems you still haven't read 88. His reference to doubt at 87 is in the context of understanding, and his reference to inexact at 88, is likewise in the context of understanding. Therefore the two are related through the means of the context, "understanding". But this relationship does not necessitate the claim that doubt is anything like "inexact understanding". As I said already, doubt relates to the possibility of misunderstanding.

As he explains at 88, "inexact" and "exact" are expressions of judgement (reproach and praise), as to whether the words used are sufficient to achieve the intended goal. Notice the necessity of a judgement in application of the terms exact and inexact, and therefore the possibility of doubt in making that judgement. It is very similar to the earlier judgement referred to at the end of 87:
"The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose."
What he is talking about in both of these instances is a judgement as to whether the sign-posts (the words used) are sufficient to fulfil the purpose. A judgement of sufficiency would constitute a judgement of understanding, but this requires knowing the purpose. Your attempt to exclude "doubt" from this judgement is totally unjustified. Likewise, Wittgenstein's attempt to put an end to the infinite regress of explanation which is required to ensure understanding (by removing the possibility of misunderstanding), with this principle which itself is a judgement subject to doubt, is a failure.

There definitely is such a thing. — Luke

If you really believe that there is such a thing as certainty, then you ought to be able to show me this thing empirically. Doubt can be seen in a person's actions. Confidence can be seen in a person's actions. Certainty cannot be seen in a person's actions. Where do we see, or perceive certainty in any way?

§89 - if you will permit me to take my own advice... — Banno

I would argue that Wittgenstein' characterization of logic at 89 is completely backward. Logic does not seek to see the bottom of things. It relies on premises, and can only proceed outward (or upward) from the premises. The premises are the bottom, and logic proceeds from that bottom. The premises dictate the conclusions. So logic is not at the bottom of the sciences at all. What is at the bottom is the empirical descriptions (the propositions), which provide the premises from which logic may proceed.

Of course, Wittgenstein says logic "seemed" to be like this, so I would think that his effort is going to be to dispel this backward opinion of what logic is.

Read past that and come back to it. His is a self-critique.

However, the purpose of this thread is to discuss Wittgenstein's philosophy and his Philosophical Investigations. You appear to have no interest in either, and only seem interested in discussing your own personal philosophy about Christianity or something — Luke

To disagree with the effectiveness of my example is one thing, but the conclusion you've made about my purpose is absurd, so I think this serves as a good example of what Wittgenstein is calling misunderstanding.

If they were empirical problems we would need empirical theory in order to understand; but we we need is just to look?

Reminds me of Kripke's quip that all philosophical theories are wrong.

  §110. We're not to treat language as something extraordinary. Keep it simple.

Banno, did you see my response or did it get lost in all the noise?

I support your attempt to try and move things forward.

I did. Slow to write at the moment. The post to you above was a response. I have misgivings about how he has phrased §109, in that to me an observation - "looking" - already implies a theory...

I will not pursue that, but take it as a different way of using 'theory'.

I think you captured most of 109: look without theorising.

§111, depth.

This part of the PI is a critique of the Tractatus, so this is an interesting section. The Tractatus sought to find the deep meaning of sentences by explicitly displaying their propositional content. Here Wittgenstein explicitly disclaims such depth...

It's interesting that even Wittgenstein couldn't remember what he had in mind in certain passages. So, the fact that we can't quite grasp what Wittgenstein was saying in a particular passage isn't anything unusual. Wittgenstein's IQ was probably somewhere around 190, so to think we can get into his head all the time is a fool's errand. And for anyone to think, as MU does, that he was wrong about this or that thing, is just silly. I don't think any of us can keep up with his thinking. It wouldn't surprise me that we're wrong about 50% of the time, in terms of paraphrasing his thoughts.

If we can just grasp bits of his method, I think that would be progress.

Yep.

You posted this right before I finished asking if you had seen it. My post was originally longer but I decided to edit out comments about the discussion getting bogged down.

Now I see that you have posted again before I finished this.

I think you captured most of 109: look without theorising. — Banno

Right. Elsewhere (115) he talks about a picture getting in the way of seeing.

"looking" - already implies a theory... — Banno

Are you referring to the Greek idea of theoria? The term has undergone an interesting historical change. If you mean theory in the contemporary sense of explanation, I take Wittgenstein's point to be that this stands in way and occludes what is to be looked at. If you mean "seeing as" it is not that looking implies some set of assumptions or practices by which we see something as this or that, that does raise some interesting questions about whether we can ever simply look at something without some sort of framework or context, and whether we can ever simply see something rather than conceptualize it.

If we think of this in chess terms, it's like comparing a 1600 rating with someone who is rated 2700 or above. We don't have a clue. We think we do, but we're stumbling in the fog. You may have a few opening moves that you memorized, but the middle and end game eludes you.

His reference to doubt at 87 is in the context of understanding, and his reference to inexact at 88, is likewise in the context of understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

You introduced an absurd "doubt" into Wittgenstein's example of "stand roughly there", which is that you don't know why he would give this direction to someone. Maybe that's relevant to your philosophy or to some point that you're trying to make, but it has nothing to do with Wittgenstein's philosophy or to the text. It is not Wittgenstein's point that there is some doubt about the phrase "stand roughly there".

That's right, it's the point I've been trying to make for days now, Wittgenstein's method for restricting doubt does not fulfil its purpose. Clearly the doubt is not at all absurd. If someone told me "stand roughly there", I'd wonder why they were saying "roughly there" instead of "stand there". I'd have doubt as to where they actually wanted me to stand, and for what reason they phrased it in that strange way. I'd think perhaps it's a trick, to see if I would stand there, or some other place which I thought qualified as "roughly there". To apprehend where that person actually wanted me to stand, I'd ask for an explanation, "what do you mean by 'roughly there'". We can't limit doubt by saying that we need as much clarity as the situation calls for, because we are all different, and see the situation differently. As Sam26 says, we have different IQs, so what is cause for doubt for me may not be cause for doubt for you, but this does not mean that my doubt is absurd.

It wouldn't surprise me that we're wrong about 50% of the time, in terms of paraphrasing his thoughts. — Sam26

That's why it's best to take our time and consider each passage individually, most of them contain an important point. This way we can lower that number substantially.

Wittgenstein's IQ was probably somewhere around 190, so to think we can get into his head all the time is a fool's errand. And for anyone to think, as MU does, that he was wrong about this or that thing, is just silly. — Sam26

Whose head can you get into at any time? No one but your own. That's why doubt is justified. And, no matter how high one's IQ is, we all make mistakes, and sometimes it's the person with the low IQ who points out the mistake of the person with high IQ. It's just a matter of how we see the same things in different ways.

Wittgenstein's method for restricting doubt does not fulfil its purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

What method?

Whose head can you get into at any time? No one but your own. That's why doubt is justified. And, no matter how high one's IQ is, we all make mistakes, and sometimes it's the person with the low IQ who points out the mistake of the person with high IQ. It's just a matter of how we see the same things in different ways. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ya, and if we look throughout history it's the people with the low IQ's who have corrected the Newton's, the Beethoven's, the Einstein's, and the Plato's of the world. Even on something so obvious as this your wrong. What a silly thing to say. And of course everyone makes mistakes, that's obvious, but according to you, you know so much more, right, MU?