Now the question I've been asking is why does Wittgenstein appear to persist in this misguided objective, to find the principles which exclude the possibility of misunderstanding, in On Certainty? — Metaphysician Undercover
And even here, at 85, where he says that the sign-post "sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not"? — Metaphysician Undercover
... then why does he proceed in that text, On Certainty, as if he is seeking these principles? — Metaphysician Undercover
139. Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules leave loopholes open, and the practice has to speak for itself.
140. We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning rules: we are taught
judgments and their connexion with other judgments. A totality of judgments is made plausible to
us.
141. When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a
whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)
142. It is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and
premises give one another mutual support.
152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.
305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory. — On Certainty
166. The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing. — On Certainty
The point being that if there is a possibility of misunderstanding, then some degree of doubt is justified. Therefore doubt cannot be completely dismissed as irrational. — Metaphysician Undercover
... and he might on some occasion prove to be right. — PI
5.1361
We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present.
Belief in the causal nexus is superstition. — Tractatus
558. We say we know that water boils and does not freeze under such-and-such circumstances. Is it conceivable that we are wrong? Wouldn't a mistake topple all judgment with it? More: what could stand if that were to fall? Might someone discover something that made us say "It was a mistake"?
Whatever may happen in the future, however water may behave in the future, - we know that up to now it has behaved thus in innumerable instances.
This fact is fused into the foundations of our language-game. — On Certainty
402. In the beginning was the deed. — On Certainty
475. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination — On Certainty
287. The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well. And no more do we need a law of induction to justify our actions or our predictions. — On Certainty
I've thrice tried to summarise §109, but find it opaque. — Banno
It was correct that our considerations must not be scientific ones. The feeling ‘that it is possible, contrary to our preconceived ideas, to think this or that’ a whatever that may mean a could be of no interest to us.
The preconception of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole inquiry around. (One might say: the inquiry must be turned around, but on the pivot of our real need).
And we may not advance any kind of theory.There must not be anything hypothetical
in our considerations. All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place.
Because sometimes we have no doubt when following the signpost but other times we might. That, he points out, is an empirical proposition. — Fooloso4
Wittgenstein is saying that we should replace the picture of knowledge as what is built on unchanging foundations. There is no fixed point or ground: — Fooloso4
166. The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing. — On Certainty
The second is that despite this he does think it irrational to doubt such things in practice. — Fooloso4
The importance of this is far reaching. It reverses the order that has long been held and cherished by philosophers. Logic is arbitrary. It does not stand independent of language and thought, imposing a necessary order on all things, or on determining truth.
The logical rules or grammar are derived from within the lived context of the language game. — Fooloso4
Perhaps one way to set out what is at hand that might satisfy Metaphysician Undercover would be to say that we have no foundations as he thinks of it, but that the fact remains that we get on with it anyway. — Banno
We should limit the possibility of misunderstanding (this is doubt, recognition of the possibility of misunderstanding), to the degree required for our purposes. — Metaphysician Undercover
The "logical result", of "misunderstanding is possible" is not "understanding is impossible", and I don't know what you would mean by "exact understanding". The point is that we ought to limit the possibility of misunderstanding to a degree acceptable, relative to the situation. — Metaphysician Undercover
But striving for certainty, in the sense of leaving no room for doubt, is nonsense in the context of PI. To strive for the ideal would actually defeat the purpose of the book. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is judgement after the fact, it's irrelevant. What we are talking about is avoiding misunderstanding, preventing misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover
A key to understanding On Certainty is his quoting Goethe:
402. In the beginning was the deed. — On Certainty
In order to understand language Wittgenstein does not begin with logic or thinking.
475. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination — On Certainty
He begins with behavior. A language game is an extension of primitive behavior (Z 545) Instinct first reason second (RPP 689) — Fooloso4
These are simple principles which we can have confidence in, like I cannot believe that X is the case, and also that X is not the case, at the same time. — Metaphysician Undercover
Exact understanding is where there is no doubt; where there is certainty. You state that we need to limit the possibility of misunderstanding to an acceptable degree, implying that the possibility of misunderstanding cannot be completely removed. If the possibility of misunderstanding cannot be completely removed (without any doubt), then we can never be certain to have understanding. Therefore, understanding is impossible. — Luke
But in that case, what is the threshold level of doubt at which understanding turns to misunderstanding? How many percentage points below 100% certainty before I am no longer sure whether I understand, or at which I misunderstand? — Luke
How? — Luke
I only asked whether you have ever avoided a misunderstanding before. Have you ever understood something, or is it a matter of degree? — Luke
I think a lot of the misunderstanding around the PI comes from a misplaced attempt to treat it as a treatise, as MU has done ("Wittgenstein's ontology" , "Wittgenstein's epistemology" ... neither of which he is presenting here), but it is also worth attaching to the comments of others about foundational beliefs. It should be borne in mind the the significance of Wittgenstein's view on such hinges are that they are post hoc, they do not represent a 'discovery', we have not learned some new fact about what is the case in learning the nature of such a device, only relieved ourselves of the burden of seeking further assurance. — Isaac
Debates on this whole site would be a lot more interesting and fruitful if people stopped trying to deduce what 'is the case' from their armchairs. — Isaac
Most modern psychologists would disagree with you here. Considering some of the outrageous things you claim to doubt, why so certain of this? — Isaac
This positions the rule as existing externally to the mind which interprets it, it is the sign-post. It is contrary to any ontology which positions the rule as a principle within the mind, an idea. It is also contrary to the common definition of "rule", which states that a rule is "a principle". This is clearly an ontology which gives the existence of "the rule", an unconventional description. — Metaphysician Undercover
If we cannot be certain concerning something so basic, like one is not the same as the other, why think that we can be certain about anything at all? — Metaphysician Undercover
You are mistaking 'acting as if...' for a claim that it is the case. The PI is a method, not a book of facts, Wittgenstein makes this pretty clear when he states quite unequivocally that philosophy does not discover new facts. Philosophy is not capable of deducing what exists and what does not. — Isaac
No, the point is that we are certain about some things whether we think it to be a good idea or not. The psychological state comes first, then we seek to understand it. — Isaac
We settle on the degree of precision required for our goals. To talk about exact understanding does not make sense. Your conclusion does not follow from your argument, because it requires the premise that certainty, or exactness is essential to "understanding", that a person cannot be said to have understood unless there is exactitude, and certainty to one's understanding. But that's not reality, as Wittgenstein is trying to say. If he says "stand roughly here", I understand that he's telling me that he wants me to stand somewhere in this general area, but I don't understand why he's just telling me to stand in this general area, rather than telling me to stand at this point or at that point. So despite the fact that there is understanding, there is also much which is also not understood. — Metaphysician Undercover
Only let’s understand what “inexact” means! For it does not mean “unusable”. And let’s consider what we call an “exact” explanation in contrast to this one. Perhaps like drawing a boundary-line around a region with chalk? Here it strikes us at once that the line has breadth. So a colour edge would be more exact. But has this exactness still got a function here: isn’t it running idle? Moreover, we haven’t yet laid down what is to count as overstepping this sharp boundary; how, with what instruments, it is to be ascertained. And so on. — PI 88
It is explicitly stated, at 81 and 98 for example, and implied all over the place, such as right here at 88, that seeking the ideal is the wrong approach. So if in this book, In which seeking the ideal is portrayed as the wrong approach, Wittgenstein is actually seeking the ideal, wouldn't his efforts to portray seeking the ideal as the wrong approach, defeat his purpose, of seeking the ideal? — Metaphysician Undercover
I'd say it's very clearly a matter of degree, as Wittgenstein describes. — Metaphysician Undercover
Let's be clear: the idea of exact understanding is yours, not mine. — Luke
The reason for his direction is irrelevant. — Luke
As Fooloso4 said, Wittgenstein "is not arguing that it is possible to eliminate doubt but that the role of certainty in our lives and language is not the certainty that Descartes and others sought". — Luke
No, that's your phrase, not mine... — Metaphysician Undercover
Did you not read 88 yet? Exactness is relative to the goal. The "reason for his direction" is the goal. Therefore, the reason why he says "stand roughly there", instead of marking a spot, and saying "stand exactly there", or some other thing, is relevant. The exactness required to fulfill the goal intended by "roughly there", can only be known by apprehending the goal. So to fully understand what is meant by "stand roughly there" requires understanding the reason for saying those words. To go where the sign-post directs (the goal), requires apprehending the goal. — Metaphysician Undercover
Why the obsession with certainty? — Metaphysician Undercover
Forget about certainty, there is no such thing... — Metaphysician Undercover
What we need to discuss is doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover
You originally used the "stand roughly there" example in the context of doubt/certainty, which is irrelevant to Wittgenstein's usage of it. Now you want to pretend that you were originally using the example in the context of exactness as he does at §88? Please. — Luke
There definitely is such a thing. — Luke
§89 - if you will permit me to take my own advice... — Banno
However, the purpose of this thread is to discuss Wittgenstein's philosophy and his Philosophical Investigations. You appear to have no interest in either, and only seem interested in discussing your own personal philosophy about Christianity or something — Luke
I think you captured most of 109: look without theorising. — Banno
"looking" - already implies a theory... — Banno
His reference to doubt at 87 is in the context of understanding, and his reference to inexact at 88, is likewise in the context of understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover
It wouldn't surprise me that we're wrong about 50% of the time, in terms of paraphrasing his thoughts. — Sam26
Wittgenstein's IQ was probably somewhere around 190, so to think we can get into his head all the time is a fool's errand. And for anyone to think, as MU does, that he was wrong about this or that thing, is just silly. — Sam26
Wittgenstein's method for restricting doubt does not fulfil its purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover
Whose head can you get into at any time? No one but your own. That's why doubt is justified. And, no matter how high one's IQ is, we all make mistakes, and sometimes it's the person with the low IQ who points out the mistake of the person with high IQ. It's just a matter of how we see the same things in different ways. — Metaphysician Undercover
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