Yes, you could say that. I'd more emphasise that I'm making the case for there being no purpose behind arguments to the contrary because there is no problem to solve by them. — Isaac

That sentence doesn't make much sense to me. You could argue the entire question is somewhat pointless, as it doesn't make any practical difference, but how can only one position on the question have "no purpose"? Isn't the question which position is true?

Exactly my point (except the last bit about utility). The object (Carbon-14) does not have to actually currently be emitting beta particles in order to have the property of being radioactive, even though radioactive means "emits particles of radiation". It is sufficient that it did emit such particles and that it could do again in the future.

So, with a word. If it did once cause a particular reaction in language users when spoken, then that is sufficient to say that the ability to cause such a reaction is a property of the word. — Isaac

But this is a very peculiar way to talk about properties. You're not really making an argument here, merely asserting that it's possible to define property in such a way as to refer to past events that were in some way caused by the object. Of course it's possible to define any word any way you like, but there is still a difference between properties that an object has, and which are detectable by only observing the object itself, and the entire history of an object, which you cannot know from just observing the object. This is why the actual configuration of the atom is different from the past uses the atom was put to.

I would say that a text, insofar as its author created it for some reason, embodies something of the intentions of its author. A text also possesses intentionality in the phenomenological sense that it is about something. But all texts can be transliterated or paraphrased in various ways which can yield a number of more or less different interpretations. The so-called "literal" meaning of an ancient text, as is the case with a modern text, will be detremined by the common use of the icons, symbols, words, phrases, and so on, in the culture in which it was created. — Janus

It seems to me, though, that you have essentially stopped actually arguing for your position, and are now imply pointing out it's nuances. Which is fine, it just doesn't adress the points I raised.

I haven't said a text "includes" all past states leading to its creation. What does "include" even mean here? The text is the result of all past states leading to its creation. Each instantiation of a text is thus unique, but all reproductions of an original text are obviously causally connected to the original. . — Janus

Right. But in that case, how exactly do the past states imbue the current text with meaning? What is your argument?

You cannot possibly know that it never will happen. — Echarmion

If you mean to say that the natural occurrence of an object indistinguishable from a carved stone tablet or a manuscript is possible, then I think you're dreaming. Of course nothing at all can ever be known with the kind of absolute certainty that you seem to be demanding, and many of the most wildly implausible things are logically possible.

It seems to me, though, that you have essentially stopped actually arguing for your position, and are now imply pointing out it's nuances. Which is fine, it just doesn't adress the points I raised. — Echarmion

What position did you take me to be arguing for before and now not? Set that out and I will tell you whether I was, and still am, arguing for what you think I was. I haven't changed my mind about what I have been arguing.

Right. But in that case, how exactly do the past states imbue the current text with meaning? What is your argument? — Echarmion

What we have been arguing about here is what it is reasonable to believe, and what it is reasonable to say, and also whether the terms we use in saying what we say are in accordance with ordinary usage. So, I have been arguing that it is reasonable to say that an intentionally produced inscribed stone tablet embodies meaning, on account of the fact that it was meaningful in the culture within which it was produced, and also on account of the possibility that what it meant could be, at least to some significant degree, deciphered.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decipherment

What we have been arguing about here is what it is reasonable to believe, and what it is reasonable to say, and also whether the terms we use in saying what we say are in accordance with ordinary usage. So, I have been arguing that it is reasonable to say that an intentionally produced inscribed stone tablet embodies meaning, on account of the fact that it was meaningful in the culture within which it was produced, and also on account of the possibility that what it meant could be, at least to some significant degree, deciphered. — Janus

This is supposedly an ontology thread, though. Are "manners of speaking" really good enough for ontology? And if so, wouldn't ontology simply turn into journalism about common ways to talk?

If you mean to say that the natural occurrence of an object indistinguishable from a carved stone tablet or a manuscript is possible, then I think you're dreaming. Of course nothing at all can ever be known with the kind of absolute certainty that you seem to be demanding, and many of the most wildly implausible things are logically possible. — Janus

I know of no law of physics that prohibits such a natural formation. It is, of course, highly unlikely. But the point of thought-experiments is not to provide probable predictions. It's to highlight the points at which arguments break down.

What position did you take me to be arguing for? Set that out and I will tell you whether I was arguing for what you think I was. — Janus

That's an absurd approach to a debate. If you think I have misunderstood you, I am happy to apologize and allow you to clarify.

What we have been arguing about here is what it is reasonable to believe, and what it is reasonable to say, and also whether the terms we use in saying what we say are in accordance with ordinary usage. So, I have been arguing that it is reasonable to say that an intentionally produced inscribed stone tablet embodies meaning, on account of the fact that it was meaningful in the culture within which it was produced, and also on account of the possibility that what it meant could be, at least to some significant degree, deciphered. — Janus

For a given definition of reasonable, sure. You can define terms any way you like. But what was the point in arguing if all you wanted to do was tell us one of the possible definitions of "meaning"?

I know of no law of physics that prohibits such a natural formation. It is, of course, highly unlikely. But the point of thought-experiments is not to provide probable predictions. It's to highlight the points at which arguments break down. — Echarmion

No, if you want to claim there is no inherent difference between objects intentionally produced and those naturally produced then you would need to provide an actual example of an object whose kind of origin, whether artifical or natural, cannot be determined.

That's an absurd approach to a debate. If you think I have misunderstood you, I am happy to apologize and allow you to clarify. — Echarmion

No it's not an absurd approach. I have no idea what you are referring to with this:

It seems to me, though, that you have essentially stopped actually arguing for your position, and are now imply pointing out it's nuances. Which is fine, it just doesn't adress the points I raised. — Echarmion

So, the discussion cannot continue unless you clarify what you were referring to there; that is clarify what you think I was arguing for, why you think I was no longer arguing for it, and why you think what I was saying instead ( "pointing out its nuances") doesn't address the points you raised. You need to address specific points; if you just make sweeping statements how am I to know what you are referring to ?

For a given definition of reasonable, sure. You can define terms any way you like. But what was the point in arguing if all you wanted to do was tell us one of the possible definitions of "meaning"? — Echarmion

It's not a "given definition of reasonable"; you have to give reasons for what you are saying, that is what it means to be reasonable. Of course any reasons will be based on some presupposition or other, there are no arguments that are not grounded on some presupposition or other. If our starting presuppositions are at odds, then there is no point arguing about anything because we will simply talk past one another and waste a lot of time and energy.

Also I am not merely concerned to set out definitions of meaning. I am simply saying that according to ordinary usage of the term an ancient manuscript is meaningful even if we cannot decipher it. We see it as a meaningful object even if we don't know what it means. I have also been arguing that since such an object is, in principle at least, decipherable, it must embody meaning. If it didn't embody any meaning then it would not be decipherable; that is, there would be nothing to decipher. It embodies meaning simply because it was intentionally produced to convey something, to be meaningful.

I have also been arguing that since such an object is, in principle at least, decipherable, it must embody meaning. If it didn't embody any meaning then it would not be decipherable; that is, there would be nothing to decipher. It embodies meaning simply because it was intentionally produced to convey something, to be meaningful. — Janus

You could just say that you'd not call it "deciphering," but deciphering a text can simply be a matter of assigning meaning to it--not discovering meaning that's somehow literally in it, ontologically.

Meaning doesn't require a subject due to a definition. The realization that it requires a subject is the result of an ontological investigation/analysis. — Terrapin Station

Sure... if you say so...

I assert that meaning is use and thus the word has a meaning (its use, or history of use) independent of humans currently using it. — Isaac

:up:

:up: — S

:up: :up:

Do you think the fact that a hammer is used to drive nails is a property of the hammer?
— Isaac

No, that wouldn't just be a property of the hammer. It would be a property of the hammer, the nails, the air between the hammer and the nails, the person or machine swinging the hammer, etc. — Terrapin Station

This is very, very peculiar. The fact is a property of the air between the hammer and the nails, amongst other things?

No. Properties of the air between the hammer and the nails would be nitrogen, oxygen, argon and carbon dioxide. You won't find a fact in the air. That's crazy talk.

What you're saying here is just as absurd as those moral objectivists who suggest that wrong is an objective property of kicking puppies.

In both cases, you won't find what is said to be there through an examination the things themselves: of air or hammers or swinging, or of kicking or puppies.

The inconsistencies among your various positions are becoming more apparent over time. Your own reasoning can be used against you.

No, but neither does the hammer. All use is contingent on a user. If you prefer we could refer to the hammer's potential use. It's still a property of the hammer (that it is potentially used to drive nails) and we still derive what that use is from its history (even if only a minute ago), not its current state. — Isaac

The only part I disagree with is where you say that this is a property of the hammer. That seems to take our way of talking about the hammer far too literally. To say that the hammer has a use, or a potential use, is not to say that the hammer has this as a property, it would just be to say that the hammer is used in this way, or that it could be, given its properties, e.g. a rubber grip with an ergonomic design, a metal head with a broad, flat end, etc. And more specific meanings can be further qualified or clarified, so that, for example, when someone says that you don't use a hammer to saw a piece of plywood, they're talking about what it was designed to be used for.

Are you getting this stuff from Heidegger, by the way?

To record blue, sure. x having property F is a different thing than D recording that x has property F. — Terrapin Station

How so? What is the property of 'being blue' if not the fact that any properly calibrated recording device (human or machine) when intercepting reflected white light from the object in question would register it as 'blue'? As I asked before, in the depths of darkest space, is the cup still blue?

We're really having a communication problem if you believe that I said anything at all like that.

What I said was that I don't buy that potentials are real, except as a manner of speaking about something not being impossible. — Terrapin Station

Yes, I get that, but the justification you gave me for believing that was that the word (in our example) does not cause the same response in each person, therefore (you say) the response it causes cannot be a property of the word. If that's not the justification, then what is?

To make a general point here, I'm mostly pretty clear now on what it is you believe. I'm interested now in why you believe it, but quite a bit of your responses are taken up re-stating what it is you believe. Let's presume, for the time being that I get that, and get into the more interesting points about why.

Isn't the question which position is true? — Echarmion

Of course not. How on earth could we possibly judge which position was true? The question is whether meaning is best seen as something that persists objectively without minds or not. I can't think of any way we could check which is true. Maybe you mean something by 'true' that is different to my meaning. For me, it is true that P if P. So, it is true that meaning persist without minds if meaning persists without minds - something we can never possibly know empirically.

But this is a very peculiar way to talk about properties. — Echarmion

But that's my point. It isn't at all peculiar. We do it all the time. Do we not say that a property of Carbon-14 is that it is radioactive? And have we not just established that radioactive literally means emitting particles. Therefore we very clearly do talk about a property of an object being something it has done and will do but is not currently doing.

You're not really making an argument here, merely asserting that it's possible to define property in such a way as to refer to past events that were in some way caused by the object. — Echarmion

I took your line of argument to be that it was not possible to define property this way, so an argument that it is is a viable counter. Again (as you've yet to answer) if we're not comparing the merits of these alternative possible ways of talking, then what is it you think we're doing. If you think we're trying to find which one is 'right' how are you going to know when we've got there?

The only part I disagree with is where you say that this is a property of the hammer. That seems to take our way of talking about the hammer far too literally. — S

For me, our way of talking is all there is to discuss about the matter. Obviously our way of talking reflects, and to an extent constructs, a world-view which could be more or less useful to us, but that is the full extent to which it matters, in my view.

I agree that an argument could be made for ensuring that when we say "the hammer is used for driving nails" we know that such use is not literally contained in it, such that we could draw it out and examine it alone, but I don't see a problem with defining a property of an object as being those responses it has some tendency to produce. My reason for this is that, firstly, I'm far more comfortable than most here seem to be with fuzzy-edges and definitions which do not have clear criteria, "stand roughly there" and defining "game" being the classic examples. This means that I'm not at all bothered that a hammer only has a propensity to be used for driving nails, that's good enough for me. If I saw a hammer in a builder's yard I wouldn't suspect it to part of the builder's lunch.

Secondly, I think that it eliminates what might otherwise be an unhelpful line between those properties we're happy to assign to object on account of their constancy (like 'blueness') and those which are not constant (like use). 'Blueness' is not as constant as we think, it still require calibration to interpret, it's still, to a certain extent, only a tendency. The division is a gradation, not a clean line.

To say the hammer is blue (as a property) is to say that it has a tendency to cause properly calibrated objects capable of registering 'blueness' to register blue.

To say the hammer is used to drive nails (as a property) is to say that it has a tendency to cause properly calibrated devices (in this case humans wishing to drive nails) to drive nails with it.

Does that make any sense to you?

Are you getting this stuff from Heidegger, by the way? — S

I've never been so insulted in my whole life!

No. Properties of the air between the hammer and the nails would be nitrogen, oxygen, argon and carbon dioxide. You won't find a fact in the air. That's crazy talk. — S

Facts are simply "ways that things are" --their material make-up and their relations, including dynamic relations (and the relations obviously include "to other things"), and all of this is also identical to properties. This is also known as "states of affairs."

Hammering nails does not happen in a vacuum (at least not normally). The air in the vicinity is affected, too, and it's a part of the system/process in question.

Facts are consituted in meaning. Any given fact has a meaning, some sort of relation to other facts.

When we talk about a fact, our words refer to it because they capture meaning of the thing we are talking about. It's how, for example, "the tree in my backyard" picks out one specific thing amongst the many in the world.

Our ideas show us the world. Every single time we understand a fact, we do so by our idea which is an awareness of the fact we are talking about.

Meaning is one fact distinguished from another, one properly present compares to another, one thing (e.g. "this tree) rather than another (e.g. "that other tree" ).

Without meaning, there are no facts/relations present, no world we might understand or investigate.

Facts are consituted in meaning — TheWillowOfDarkness

No idea what that would be saying exactly.

Any given fact has a meaning, — TheWillowOfDarkness

Only insofar as someone thinks about it associatively.

some sort of relation to other facts. — TheWillowOfDarkness

If you use the word "meaning" for relations in general, what word are we going to use for associative thinking?

. . . I'd have to do something in the vein of the above for every phrase in your post, basically.

As I asked before, in the depths of darkest space, is the cup still blue? — Isaac

Is the scenario such that there is light reflecting off of the cup of a certain range in wavelength which corresponds to that categorised as the colour blue? If so, then yes, in accordance with this criterion; this criterion which makes sense, unlike other criteria which lead to problems, like colourless things floating around in space, in spite of this. Of course, it wouldn't look blue. It wouldn't look blue to anyone if no one was even looking at it. But who cares about that, except people who like creating problems for no good reason? Why should any serious philosophy care about these pointless troublemakers?

Is it such that there is light reflecting off of it of a certain range in wavelength which corresponds to that categorised as the colour blue? — S

Categorised as 'blue' by what?

Of course, it wouldn't look blue. It wouldn't look blue to anyone if no one was even looking at it. But who cares about that, except people who like creating problems for no good reason? — S

Exactly my point. We say the cup is blue, we say that its blueness is a property of the cup. Its being blue, however, is only something which is manifest relative to some device responding to its blueness (and responding correctly). This fact, however, causes no problem whatsoever for us calling the cup 'blue' or talking as if blueness were a property of the cup. Therefore, it need cause us no problem whatsoever to refer to meaning being a property of a word, despite the fact that it too is only manifest when some properly calibrated device (a language use) hears the word.

So, it is true that meaning persist without minds if meaning persists without minds - something we can never possibly know empirically. — Isaac

Empirically. That's the key word. And it trivialises things in my assessment. That we can't know something empirically is not that we can't know something.

Empirically. That's the key word. And it trivialises things in my assessment. — S

I'm not following you. Trivialise how? And what things?

I get the first bit, you're saying the empirical evidence isn't the only evidence of a thing being true. I'm not entirely on board with that, but I get the idea. It's the last bit I don't get.

I agree that an argument could be made for ensuring that when we say "the hammer is used for driving nails" we know that such use is not literally contained in it, such that we could draw it out and examine it alone, but I don't see a problem with defining a property of an object as being those responses it has some tendency to produce. My reason for this is that, firstly, I'm far more comfortable than most here seem to be with fuzzy-edges and definitions which do not have clear criteria, "stand roughly there" and defining "game" being the classic examples. This means that I'm not at all bothered that a hammer only has a propensity to be used for driving nails, that's good enough for me. If I saw a hammer in a builder's yard I wouldn't suspect it to part of the builder's lunch. — Isaac

I'm fine with what Wittgenstein called family resemblance. I don't see that as a valid basis for what you're doing. You could just say that it has a use. You don't have to say that its use is a property of it.

Secondly, I think that it eliminates what might otherwise be an unhelpful line between those properties we're happy to assign to object on account of their constancy (like 'blueness') and those which are not constant (like use). 'Blueness' is not as constant as we think, it still require calibration to interpret, it's still, to a certain extent, only a tendency. The division is a gradation, not a clean line. — Isaac

No, it doesn't require any interpretation. These question begging assertions from people like you are a massive problem.

To say the hammer is blue (as a property) is to say that it has a tendency to cause properly calibrated objects capable of registering 'blueness' to register blue. — Isaac

Stuff like that is best put in the form of a logical conditional which ensures objectivity, thereby eliminating problems associated with subjectivism:

If there was a device capable of measuring the wavelength, and if it was used to measure the wavelength, and if the measured wavelength was within the corresponding range for the colour, then it is that colour.

For all cases where that conditional is true, it would be that colour.

I've resolved this "problem" in philosophy. We can move on to the next "problem" in philosophy.

To say the hammer is used to drive nails (as a property) is to say that it has a tendency to cause properly calibrated devices (in this case humans wishing to drive nails) to drive nails with it. — Isaac

That's not a property, at least per my way of speaking. But hey ho.

don't see that as a valid basis for what you're doing. You could just say that it has a use. You don't have to say that its use is a property of it. — S

I'm not quite sure what it is you think I'm doing, so I don't know whether to argue the point, or correct you. If 'it has' anything, then the thing 'it has' is a property of 'it'. If I say walnuts have a hard shell, then a hard shell is a property of a walnut.

But the more relevant point here is what problem you are trying to solve. If I call an object's uses (either past or potential) a property of the object, what problems does that cause that I might be advised to change my approach here?

No, it doesn't require any interpretation. These question begging assertions from people like you are a massive problem. — S

Again, I disagree with your conclusion here, but much more importantly, I'm missing what these problems are it is causing.

That's not a property, at least per my way of speaking. But hey ho. — S

So explain how such a thing does not fit exactly into the same set of conditional statements you just parsed for the ability to describe 'blue' as a property of the hammer?

If there was a device capable of {driving nails with a hammer} , and if it {wanted to drive some nails, with no other impeding factor}, and if the {hammer had the property of tending to be used to drive nails} , then it is {used to drive nails} .

Categorised as 'blue' by what? — Isaac

It has already been categorised as blue, by us. It is set in the rules.

Exactly my point. We say the cup is blue, we say that its blueness is a property of the cup. Its being blue, however, is only something which is manifest relative to some device responding to its blueness (and responding correctly). This fact, however, causes no problem whatsoever for us calling the cup 'blue' or talking as if blueness were a property of the cup. Therefore, it need cause us no problem whatsoever to refer to meaning being a property of a word, despite the fact that it too is only manifest when some properly calibrated device (a language use) hears the word. — Isaac

Manifest? But what we're talking about - things like whether the cup is blue or a word has a meaning - are determined irrespective of what you call "manifestation". This "manifestation" of which you speak just seems to be about a sort of relationship which becomes "active" when it involves a subject or a device as a receiver in the relationship. But I think that that's beside the point. The "passive" shouldn't be discounted. There's no gap which needs to be covered over by a certain way of talking. It really is blue, and the word really does mean something, even when this is not "manifest" to someone or something.

I'm not following you. Trivialise how? And what things?

I get the first bit, you're saying the empirical evidence isn't the only evidence of a thing being true. I'm not entirely on board with that, but I get the idea. It's the last bit I don't get. — Isaac

What I meant is that it trivialises things without a logical connection which makes it relevant. (And in that case, it would be relevant but mistaken, so it is actually lose-lose here, but at least it is better to be wrong then to miss the point entirely). And people sometimes don't even make the logical connections they're making explicit, let alone attempt a proper justification. Just look at this discussion and others like it! It can be like trying to get blood out of a stone with some people.

So, just saying something about what we can know empirically, in itself, doesn't really say anything at all.

I'm not quite sure what it is you think I'm doing, so I don't know whether to argue the point, or correct you. If 'it has' anything, then the thing 'it has' is a property of 'it'. If I say walnuts have a hard shell, then a hard shell is a property of a walnut. — Isaac

As I explained, if you apply that in every case, then in some cases you will end up making the mistake of an overly literal interpretation. This is one of those cases. Your example of the walnut is not.

Here was my explanation from earlier:

That seems to take our way of talking about the hammer far too literally. To say that the hammer has a use, or a potential use, is not to say that the hammer has this as a property, it would just be to say that the hammer is used in this way, or that it could be, given its properties, e.g. a rubber grip with an ergonomic design, a metal head with a broad, flat end, etc. — S

But the more relevant point here is what problem you are trying to solve. If I call an object's uses (either past or potential) a property of the object, what problems does that cause that I might be advised to change my approach here? — Isaac

I just find it a funny way of using the language. It doesn't seem right to me, so you can speak funny if you want to, but I decline.

Again, I disagree with your conclusion here, but much more importantly, I'm missing what these problems are it is causing. — Isaac

Why would it require interpretation? It wouldn't. And that results in colourless things in space, in spite of conditions whereby it makes sense to say that they're coloured. Why not go with what makes sense? Why turn the role that we or our devices play into a more fundamental role, when that isn't necessary? It seems like a backwards way of thinking, like anthropocentrism, like Ptolemy's way of thinking whereby the Earth is at the centre of the solar system. Does the Earth need to be at the centre? No. So don't make it that way.

My way is more in line with the principle of Ockham's razor, it seems.

So explain how such a thing does not fit exactly into the same set of conditional statements you just parsed for the ability to describe 'blue' as a property of the hammer?

If there was a device capable of {driving nails with a hammer} , and if it {wanted to drive some nails, with no other impeding factor}, and if the {hammer had the property of tending to be used to drive nails} , then it is {used to drive nails} . — Isaac

I don't get why you're turning this molehill into a mountain. It has properties which could make it a tool, like almost everything else. But the properties of the object and what the object could be used for are two distinct things. I prefer to be clear and logical, so I reject a conflation of the two.

Are you getting this stuff from Heidegger, by the way?
— S

I've never been so insulted in my whole life! — Isaac

Wait, what? Seriously? :lol:

I mean, I would be insulted too, but then I don't go on about hammers in a way that seems reminiscent of something I recall once reading about Heidegger.

I don't get why you're turning this molehill into a mountain. It has properties which could make it a tool, like almost everything else. But the properties of the object and what the object could be used for are two distinct things. I prefer to be clear and logical, so I reject a conflation of the two. — S

But this is exactly what your opposition here are doing with words and meaning.

I don't get why you're turning this molehill into a mountain. It has properties which could make it a {meaningful word}, like almost {any other pattern of marks}. But the properties of the object and what the object could {mean to a language user} are two distinct things. I prefer to be clear and logical, so I reject a conflation of the two.

I'm trying to argue that the meaning of a word is a property of the word, by showing how the reaction of other objects is essential to the definition of loads of properties which we routinely call properties of the object. I'm thus saying that the fact that words require humans to interpret need not prevent us from treating their meaning as a property.

It seems to me that your argument is that for some properties, the fact that they require some interaction to manifest them is trivial, for others it is non-trivial but irrelevant to possession of a property and for a third group it is very relevant and effectively prohibits us from treating the property as a property of the object in question. Your basis for this seems to be "that's just the way thing are... obviously!".

I don't go on about hammers in a way that seems reminiscent of something I recall once reading about Heidegger. — S

You'll have to spell out the connection there as I'm not seeing it. As far as I'm concerned, I've just said that it is unproblematic to refer to the use an object is generally put to as a property of that object, wheras Heidegger made up a load of shit about 'being' and then tried to claim German was the best language because he was a Nazi. Not seeing the similarity.