Yes, you could say that. I'd more emphasise that I'm making the case for there being no purpose behind arguments to the contrary because there is no problem to solve by them. — Isaac
Exactly my point (except the last bit about utility). The object (Carbon-14) does not have to actually currently be emitting beta particles in order to have the property of being radioactive, even though radioactive means "emits particles of radiation". It is sufficient that it did emit such particles and that it could do again in the future.
So, with a word. If it did once cause a particular reaction in language users when spoken, then that is sufficient to say that the ability to cause such a reaction is a property of the word. — Isaac
I would say that a text, insofar as its author created it for some reason, embodies something of the intentions of its author. A text also possesses intentionality in the phenomenological sense that it is about something. But all texts can be transliterated or paraphrased in various ways which can yield a number of more or less different interpretations. The so-called "literal" meaning of an ancient text, as is the case with a modern text, will be detremined by the common use of the icons, symbols, words, phrases, and so on, in the culture in which it was created. — Janus
I haven't said a text "includes" all past states leading to its creation. What does "include" even mean here? The text is the result of all past states leading to its creation. Each instantiation of a text is thus unique, but all reproductions of an original text are obviously causally connected to the original. . — Janus
You cannot possibly know that it never will happen. — Echarmion
It seems to me, though, that you have essentially stopped actually arguing for your position, and are now imply pointing out it's nuances. Which is fine, it just doesn't adress the points I raised. — Echarmion
Right. But in that case, how exactly do the past states imbue the current text with meaning? What is your argument? — Echarmion
What we have been arguing about here is what it is reasonable to believe, and what it is reasonable to say, and also whether the terms we use in saying what we say are in accordance with ordinary usage. So, I have been arguing that it is reasonable to say that an intentionally produced inscribed stone tablet embodies meaning, on account of the fact that it was meaningful in the culture within which it was produced, and also on account of the possibility that what it meant could be, at least to some significant degree, deciphered. — Janus
If you mean to say that the natural occurrence of an object indistinguishable from a carved stone tablet or a manuscript is possible, then I think you're dreaming. Of course nothing at all can ever be known with the kind of absolute certainty that you seem to be demanding, and many of the most wildly implausible things are logically possible. — Janus
What position did you take me to be arguing for? Set that out and I will tell you whether I was arguing for what you think I was. — Janus
What we have been arguing about here is what it is reasonable to believe, and what it is reasonable to say, and also whether the terms we use in saying what we say are in accordance with ordinary usage. So, I have been arguing that it is reasonable to say that an intentionally produced inscribed stone tablet embodies meaning, on account of the fact that it was meaningful in the culture within which it was produced, and also on account of the possibility that what it meant could be, at least to some significant degree, deciphered. — Janus
I know of no law of physics that prohibits such a natural formation. It is, of course, highly unlikely. But the point of thought-experiments is not to provide probable predictions. It's to highlight the points at which arguments break down. — Echarmion
That's an absurd approach to a debate. If you think I have misunderstood you, I am happy to apologize and allow you to clarify. — Echarmion
It seems to me, though, that you have essentially stopped actually arguing for your position, and are now imply pointing out it's nuances. Which is fine, it just doesn't adress the points I raised. — Echarmion
For a given definition of reasonable, sure. You can define terms any way you like. But what was the point in arguing if all you wanted to do was tell us one of the possible definitions of "meaning"? — Echarmion
I have also been arguing that since such an object is, in principle at least, decipherable, it must embody meaning. If it didn't embody any meaning then it would not be decipherable; that is, there would be nothing to decipher. It embodies meaning simply because it was intentionally produced to convey something, to be meaningful. — Janus
Meaning doesn't require a subject due to a definition. The realization that it requires a subject is the result of an ontological investigation/analysis. — Terrapin Station
Do you think the fact that a hammer is used to drive nails is a property of the hammer?
— Isaac
No, that wouldn't just be a property of the hammer. It would be a property of the hammer, the nails, the air between the hammer and the nails, the person or machine swinging the hammer, etc. — Terrapin Station
No, but neither does the hammer. All use is contingent on a user. If you prefer we could refer to the hammer's potential use. It's still a property of the hammer (that it is potentially used to drive nails) and we still derive what that use is from its history (even if only a minute ago), not its current state. — Isaac
To record blue, sure. x having property F is a different thing than D recording that x has property F. — Terrapin Station
We're really having a communication problem if you believe that I said anything at all like that.
What I said was that I don't buy that potentials are real, except as a manner of speaking about something not being impossible. — Terrapin Station
Isn't the question which position is true? — Echarmion
But this is a very peculiar way to talk about properties. — Echarmion
You're not really making an argument here, merely asserting that it's possible to define property in such a way as to refer to past events that were in some way caused by the object. — Echarmion
The only part I disagree with is where you say that this is a property of the hammer. That seems to take our way of talking about the hammer far too literally. — S
No. Properties of the air between the hammer and the nails would be nitrogen, oxygen, argon and carbon dioxide. You won't find a fact in the air. That's crazy talk. — S
Facts are consituted in meaning — TheWillowOfDarkness
Any given fact has a meaning, — TheWillowOfDarkness
some sort of relation to other facts. — TheWillowOfDarkness
As I asked before, in the depths of darkest space, is the cup still blue? — Isaac
Is it such that there is light reflecting off of it of a certain range in wavelength which corresponds to that categorised as the colour blue? — S
Of course, it wouldn't look blue. It wouldn't look blue to anyone if no one was even looking at it. But who cares about that, except people who like creating problems for no good reason? — S
So, it is true that meaning persist without minds if meaning persists without minds - something we can never possibly know empirically. — Isaac
Empirically. That's the key word. And it trivialises things in my assessment. — S
I agree that an argument could be made for ensuring that when we say "the hammer is used for driving nails" we know that such use is not literally contained in it, such that we could draw it out and examine it alone, but I don't see a problem with defining a property of an object as being those responses it has some tendency to produce. My reason for this is that, firstly, I'm far more comfortable than most here seem to be with fuzzy-edges and definitions which do not have clear criteria, "stand roughly there" and defining "game" being the classic examples. This means that I'm not at all bothered that a hammer only has a propensity to be used for driving nails, that's good enough for me. If I saw a hammer in a builder's yard I wouldn't suspect it to part of the builder's lunch. — Isaac
Secondly, I think that it eliminates what might otherwise be an unhelpful line between those properties we're happy to assign to object on account of their constancy (like 'blueness') and those which are not constant (like use). 'Blueness' is not as constant as we think, it still require calibration to interpret, it's still, to a certain extent, only a tendency. The division is a gradation, not a clean line. — Isaac
To say the hammer is blue (as a property) is to say that it has a tendency to cause properly calibrated objects capable of registering 'blueness' to register blue. — Isaac
To say the hammer is used to drive nails (as a property) is to say that it has a tendency to cause properly calibrated devices (in this case humans wishing to drive nails) to drive nails with it. — Isaac
don't see that as a valid basis for what you're doing. You could just say that it has a use. You don't have to say that its use is a property of it. — S
No, it doesn't require any interpretation. These question begging assertions from people like you are a massive problem. — S
That's not a property, at least per my way of speaking. But hey ho. — S
Categorised as 'blue' by what? — Isaac
Exactly my point. We say the cup is blue, we say that its blueness is a property of the cup. Its being blue, however, is only something which is manifest relative to some device responding to its blueness (and responding correctly). This fact, however, causes no problem whatsoever for us calling the cup 'blue' or talking as if blueness were a property of the cup. Therefore, it need cause us no problem whatsoever to refer to meaning being a property of a word, despite the fact that it too is only manifest when some properly calibrated device (a language use) hears the word. — Isaac
I'm not following you. Trivialise how? And what things?
I get the first bit, you're saying the empirical evidence isn't the only evidence of a thing being true. I'm not entirely on board with that, but I get the idea. It's the last bit I don't get. — Isaac
I'm not quite sure what it is you think I'm doing, so I don't know whether to argue the point, or correct you. If 'it has' anything, then the thing 'it has' is a property of 'it'. If I say walnuts have a hard shell, then a hard shell is a property of a walnut. — Isaac
That seems to take our way of talking about the hammer far too literally. To say that the hammer has a use, or a potential use, is not to say that the hammer has this as a property, it would just be to say that the hammer is used in this way, or that it could be, given its properties, e.g. a rubber grip with an ergonomic design, a metal head with a broad, flat end, etc. — S
But the more relevant point here is what problem you are trying to solve. If I call an object's uses (either past or potential) a property of the object, what problems does that cause that I might be advised to change my approach here? — Isaac
Again, I disagree with your conclusion here, but much more importantly, I'm missing what these problems are it is causing. — Isaac
So explain how such a thing does not fit exactly into the same set of conditional statements you just parsed for the ability to describe 'blue' as a property of the hammer?
If there was a device capable of {driving nails with a hammer} , and if it {wanted to drive some nails, with no other impeding factor}, and if the {hammer had the property of tending to be used to drive nails} , then it is {used to drive nails} . — Isaac
Are you getting this stuff from Heidegger, by the way?
— S
I've never been so insulted in my whole life! — Isaac
I don't get why you're turning this molehill into a mountain. It has properties which could make it a tool, like almost everything else. But the properties of the object and what the object could be used for are two distinct things. I prefer to be clear and logical, so I reject a conflation of the two. — S
I don't go on about hammers in a way that seems reminiscent of something I recall once reading about Heidegger. — S
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