This fact, however, causes no problem whatsoever for us calling the cup 'blue' or talking as if blueness were a property of the cup. Therefore, it need cause us no problem whatsoever to refer to meaning being a property of a word, despite the fact that it too is only manifest when some properly calibrated device (a language use) hears the word. — Isaac

That's about conventional language usage per se, though. Where manners of speaking are ubiquitous, and so on. That's different than doing ontology.

by showing how the reaction of other objects is essential to the definition of loads of properties which we routinely call properties of the object. — Isaac

I've not been talking about definitions or what we call things, but what things are, regardless of definitions/what we call them. In short, I'm not talking about language (usage) per se.

If you're approaching this from an angle of "This is how we conventionally use language," that's fine, and there's no dispute about that, but that's not what I'm talking about. The way we conventionally use language can not line up very well with what's really the case.

Facts are simply "ways that things are" --their material make-up and their relations, including dynamic relations (and the relations obviously include "to other things"), and all of this is also identical to properties. This is also known as "states of affairs." — Terrapin Station

In Terrapinese, which is the name that I've just coined for your language, that is true. I, however, think that there are better available languages to use. We could just break what you're talking about down and call it something like "composition" and "relationship". Facts are simply what's the case.

Hammering nails does not happen in a vacuum (at least not normally). The air in the vicinity is affected, too, and it's a part of the system/process in question. — Terrapin Station

I'm not talking about a system or a process, I'm talking about a fact. I don't deny the stuff the fact is about. I just don't conflate the two.

Why do philosophy-types feel the need to conflate distinct things in a way that causes problems? I've encountered this multiple times now in varying contexts. What good could this possibly do? Horses aren't cats for crying out loud!

In Terrapinese, which is the name that I've just coined for your language, that is true. — S

What I said there, except possibly for the bit about properties, is completely non-controversial in analytic philosophy.

I'm not talking about a system or a process, I'm talking about a fact. — S

How would we have a fact that's not a system or process?

Facts arent about anything. "Fact" isnt the same thing as "true proposition." Facts are what true propositions are about.

If this stuff isn't clear to you it would have to be very confusing to read analytic philosophy.

That's about conventional language usage per se, though. Where manners of speaking are ubiquitous, and so on. That's different than doing ontology. — Terrapin Station

I've not been talking about definitions or what we call things, but what things are, regardless of definitions/what we call them. — Terrapin Station

So (again I suspect a serious axiomatic difference looming) how are you judging "what things are". When there is some disagreement as to what things are, what table of correct answers are you referring to to check who's right?

Of course, if your 'table of answers' is just the observable world, then your ontology becomes an exercise in looking, in which case, get out of your armchair and go look for stuff.

Yeah, you observe/examine/etc. the world

You've slipped in 'examine' there, which is a loaded term. If 'examine' is part of your process, beyond simple observation, then how do you check the results of your examination?

Examination is just a more rigorous approach to observation. The world is the arbiter.

So ontology as a philosophical exercise is pointless then? One merely need go look for a thing (rigourously) to check if it exists?

So ontology as a philosophical exercise is pointless then? — Isaac

I'm talking about ontology. You don't do ontology by looking at how we conventionally use language, as I said two or three times above.

Yeah, I get that. What I'm confused about is that it seems like your answer to the question "does meaning exist?" would be to check if you can see it, and if you can't it doesn't. We can't 'see' mental states either, so for you meaning simply doesn't exist, not in the word, nor anywhere.

You're not doing that (I'll refrain from using a colorful adjective) thing where you're (hopefully pretending to) reading me as saying something literally about employing (unaided) vision, are you?

And please tell me that you are indeed pretending to be that %&#$ if that was the idea there.

No, you can have as much machinery and other senses involved as you like. You still won't be able to 'detect' the meaning of a word somewhere.

Okay, so #1, there isn't zero evidence of mentality.

#2, if we're going to posit existents for which there is zero empirical evidence of them, what would you take to be good grounds for that?

Okay, so #1, there isn't zero evidence of mentality. — Terrapin Station

I didn't say there was. Evidence for the existence of mentality is a far cry from having directly identified the meaning of a word located in someone's brain. Earlier (in another conversation) you were very dismissive of the whole of neuropsychology pointing to unconscious mental states, now you seem to be sure it's basically discovered the location of the meaning of words.

#2, if we're going to posit existents for which there is zero empirical evidence of them, what would you take to be good grounds for that? — Terrapin Station

Convenience. Practicality. What's the point in doing anything? We just want to achieve our goals, and if some world-view is a pragmatic way of consistently doing that then I'd turn the question round - what possible grounds could we have for not?

Evidence for the existence of mentality is a far cry from having directly identified the meaning of a word located in someone's brain. Earlier (in another conversation) you were very dismissive of the whole of neuropsychology pointing to unconscious mental states, now you seem to be sure it's basically discovered the location of the meaning of words. — Isaac

I'm saying nothing at all about it being unconscious.

Are you now claiming that we don't actually think meanings, that meanings are in no sense a conscious phenomenon?

Convenience. Practicality — Isaac

What would an example of that be?

No, if you want to claim there is no inherent difference between objects intentionally produced and those naturally produced then you would need to provide an actual example of an object whose kind of origin, whether artifical or natural, cannot be determined. — Janus

I already did in a previous response to you. I also already pointed out that we have no way of telling how many artificial objects we have wrongly identified as natural.

So, the discussion cannot continue unless you clarify what you were referring to there; that is clarify what you think I was arguing for, why you think I was no longer arguing for it, and why you think what I was saying instead ( "pointing out its nuances") doesn't address the points you raised. You need to address specific points; if you just make sweeping statements how am I to know what you are referring to ? — Janus

I think what you were saying didn't adress the points I raised becuse it didn't adress the points I raised. You ignored my entire post save for the two sentences you quoted. Here is a relevant quote from my post:

You therefore have to explain how "the intention for the text to mean X", as a mental state, is represented by a brain state and this brain state is then fully represented by the text.

And for that, we need to identify a property of the text at present that carries that information. — Echarmion

As a response you simply repeated that you think that the text "embodies" something of the intentions of the author. You then went on to explain how that position is compatible with different interpretations. But that's taking several further steps ahead when we are still talking about how the intention is linked to the text in the first place.

The topic oft the thread is "the ontology of linguistic meaning". I think you were arguing in favor of the position that meaning is, ontologically, a property of the symbols or sounds themselves. As opposed of it being merely an interpretation created by minds.

It's not a "given definition of reasonable"; you have to give reasons for what you are saying, that is what it means to be reasonable. Of course any reasons will be based on some presupposition or other, there are no arguments that are not grounded on some presupposition or other. If our starting presuppositions are at odds, then there is no point arguing about anything because we will simply talk past one another and waste a lot of time and energy. — Janus

I am not disagreeing with any of that in principle. But it does mean that two conflicting positions can both be equally reasonable. That is not something everyone will agree with.

Also I am not merely concerned to set out definitions of meaning. I am simply saying that according to ordinary usage of the term an ancient manuscript is meaningful even if we cannot decipher it. We see it as a meaningful object even if we don't know what it means. I have also been arguing that since such an object is, in principle at least, decipherable, it must embody meaning. If it didn't embody any meaning then it would not be decipherable; that is, there would be nothing to decipher. It embodies meaning simply because it was intentionally produced to convey something, to be meaningful. — Janus

I am not disagreeing with a undeciphered manuscript being meaningful to humans. As long as it's identifiable as texts to humans, one could even say it has "linguistic meaning". I just don't think it follows that the object must therefore embody meaning absent of human minds. Humans can decipher symbols created by other humans because they can put themselves in the shoes of the hypothetical writer. That same process can also be used to "decipher" the meaning of natural disasters or illness, by presuming an intentional actor behind those events and imagining their thought process.

This explains both how a text can "have" a relatively stable meaning while at the same time being subject to various interpretations. And it does not have to explain how the meaning travels from the author to the text and then back to the reader, which again I haven't yet seen anyone explain.

Of course not. How on earth could we possibly judge which position was true? The question is whether meaning is best seen as something that persists objectively without minds or not. I can't think of any way we could check which is true. Maybe you mean something by 'true' that is different to my meaning. For me, it is true that P if P. So, it is true that meaning persist without minds if meaning persists without minds - something we can never possibly know empirically. — Isaac

And how can we possibly judge how to "best see" meaning if no true statements can be made about what meaning is? Of course we cannot know empirically what meaning is ontologically, but we're not doing empirical science. We are trying to figure out, with arguments, what can be known about the ontology of meaning.

But that's my point. It isn't at all peculiar. We do it all the time. Do we not say that a property of Carbon-14 is that it is radioactive? And have we not just established that radioactive literally means emitting particles. Therefore we very clearly do talk about a property of an object being something it has done and will do but is not currently doing. — Isaac

We haven't "established" that. That's your interpretation of the phrase "X is radioactive". But what about this interpretation: "the atomic structure of X is such that it's unstable and prone to decay, with an average chance of Y per T"?

I took your line of argument to be that it was not possible to define property this way, so an argument that it is is a viable counter. Again (as you've yet to answer) if we're not comparing the merits of these alternative possible ways of talking, then what is it you think we're doing. If you think we're trying to find which one is 'right' how are you going to know when we've got there? — Isaac

The thread title is "the ontology of linguistic meaning". If we were comparing the merits of alternative possible ways of talking, then all we'd have to decide is whether or not we are communicating effectively. That is very clearly not what anyone in this thread has been doing so far. I have given arguments for why I think meaning is something that occurs in minds and is not part of the text absend any minds, i.e. without minds there will be no meaning. Obviously, I think that these arguments represent "knowing when we've got there". If you think these arguments do not work or cannot possibly answer the question, I'd like to know why.

I'm saying nothing at all about it being unconscious.

Are you now claiming that we don't actually think meanings, that meanings are in no sense a conscious phenomenon? — Terrapin Station

No, I've not made my analogy clear enough. I'm not referring to the facts themselves about unconscious states, I'm referring to the fact that you dismissed masses of scientific evidence pointing to their existence. That seemed incongruous to me with your attitude here that the mere suggestion of scientific investigation that mental states could hold meaning is now sufficient for us to presume it is so. Your threshold for required evidence seems to be inconsistent.

What would an example of that be? — Terrapin Station

Achieving your goals with it. If we were of the opinion that gravity were not predictable, how far do you think we'd get with our objectives? So treating gravity as if it were predicable and consistent seems to be a good idea. Doesn't matter if it really is until the approach we have stops working (or looks like it might).

This is basic pragmatism though, I'm sure I don't need to explain all this to you. Suffice to say I'm broadly a pragmatist, in the British tradition.

I'm referring to the fact that you dismissed masses of scientific evidence pointing to their existence. — Isaac

I don't believe that there are masses of evidence pointing to the existence of unconscious mental phenomena, though. And you simply went with the old chestnut that I should "look it up myself."

There may be plenty of evidence that's misinterpreted as being evidence of unconscious mental phenomena, but then that's the issue there. At any rate, that's getting off-topic per the thread.

That seemed incongruous to me with your attitude here that the mere suggestion of scientific investigation that mental states could hold meaning is now sufficient for us to presume it is so. — Isaac

Say what? I'm not saying anything about "scientific investigation" there. If someone thinks that meaning doesn't occur mentally, we can deal with that when we encounter that person. If you don't think this, then it's kind of pointless to spend time on it, because it's not at issue.

I said nothing whatsoever about my "theshold for evidence." If you think that meaning doesn't occur mentally, that's fine. Say so, and then we'll talk about that.

Achieving your goals with it. If we were of the opinion that gravity were not predictable, how far do you think we'd get with our objectives? So treating gravity as if it were predicable and consistent seems to be a good idea. Doesn't matter if it really is until the approach we have stops working (or looks like it might). — Isaac

Say what??? (with a couple more question marks this time). Are you claiming that we do not have empirical evidence of gravitational attraction?

I wanted you to give me an example of something that we'd posit, with there being zero empirical evidence of it, for good practical reasons.

And how can we possibly judge how to "best see" meaning if no true statements can be made about what meaning is? — Echarmion

By which works best to achieve our goals.

we're not doing empirical science. We are trying to figure out, with arguments, what can be known about the ontology of meaning. — Echarmion

Yes, and I've asked you several times now for an explanation of how we judge which arguments are true, if not by empirical methods.

what about this interpretation: "the atomic structure of X is such that it's unstable and prone to decay, with an average chance of Y per T"? — Echarmion

That's just not the definition though. The definition is emitting particles, it's an action, not a state. You can re-state the definition to suit your world-view, but I'd wonder why you were doing so.

Obviously, I think that these arguments represent "knowing when we've got there". — Echarmion

Yes, but others don't, so now what?

What I said there, except possibly for the bit about properties, is completely non-controversial in analytic philosophy. — Terrapin Station

Maybe I'll look into your claim out of interest, but obviously even if true, it wouldn't mean that you're not wrong, or that you're not speaking a language which clashes with ordinary language use. If you're right about this being normal in analytic philosophy, then it would just mean that Analyticese would be a better name for the language you're speaking.

What seems controversial to me is not that the fact that there's a cat on the mat is about stuff which can be described as you described it. That's the important difference as I see it.

How would we have a fact that's not a system or process? — Terrapin Station

Easy. That's not how I use the word. Nor is it how it is ordinarily used. It doesn't even make sense to say that facts like that today is Saturday, or that I am in my room, or that I can't run faster than the speed of light, and so on, are systems or processes. They're just facts.

Facts aren't about anything. — Terrapin Station

Of course they are! And this is where you're clashing with ordinary language usage big time. The fact that there's a cat on the mat is about a cat and a mat and location. Even a child could tell you that it's about a cat.

"Fact" isn't the same thing as "true proposition." — Terrapin Station

I agree. Facts and true propositions are distinct, and correspond.

Facts are what true propositions are about. — Terrapin Station

Lol, no. The true proposition "I am in my room" is not about a fact. It is about me and my room and my location. It just corresponds with a fact. A true proposition like "It is a fact that I'm in my room" is about a fact.

By which works best to achieve our goals. — Isaac

That only works if our goals are not connected to the question what meaning is, which is to say the goals are entirely off-topic for this discussion. Again I feel I need to point out that this thread has a topic, which you are now apparently entirely ignoring.

Yes, and I've asked you several times now for an explanation of how we judge which arguments are true, if not by empirical methods. — Isaac

Empirical methods don't judge arguments. We have the scientific method, which is empirical, and it generates theories. Arguments are judged by their logical validity. And the premises can be judged based on whether they agree with current theories generated by the scientific method, or they can be derived from synthetic a priori statements. An example for the latter would be the famous "I think, therefore I am".

If you deny any knowledge outside of empirical theories, you run into the problem of having to explain why the scientific method works to generate those theories.

That's just not the definition though. The definition is emitting particles, it's an action, not a state. You can re-state the definition to suit your world-view, but I'd wonder why you were doing so. — Isaac

But we're not talking about what the definitions say. Your argument goes like this: radioactivity, as defined by the dictionary, is a property, radioactivity is defined in the dictionary as having emitted radioation. Therfore, the definition of radioactivity references past events. Therefore, properties can reference past events.

But I disagree with the premise. I don't think "radioactive" is a property if you stick to the letter of that definition. I think the dictionary definition provides a shorthand reference to the actual property of radioactive substances, which is that their atoms are unstable and therefore prone to emit radiation.

Yes, but others don't, so now what? — Isaac

They either think about it and revise their decision, think about it and point out the flaws in my argument, or ignore me and go on with their lifes.

I don't believe that there are masses of evidence pointing to the existence of unconscious mental phenomena, though. — Terrapin Station

I know, that's the point. There are masses of evidence, but without actually checking you've just decided to believe there isn't. I have no problem with that, if it works for you, I'm just wondering why you don't want the same principle to apply to locating meaning. I think there's scarcely any different level of evidence of the meaning of a word being located in the brain yet you seem to think that matter to be basically settled.

Say what? I'm not saying anything about "scientific investigation" there. — Terrapin Station

My bad, I simply paraphrased your "rigourous observation with examination" into 'scientific investigation', it seemed not an unreasonable shorthand to me, apologies if it doesn't properly capture what you meant.

I said nothing whatsoever about my "theshold for evidence." If you think that meaning doesn't occur mentally, that's fine. Say so, and then we'll talk about that. — Terrapin Station

I don't think that 'meaning' is a thing that can occur anywhere. 'Meaning' is a word which we use for various purposes depending on the context. If you're asking me where do people store the data by which they use words consistently for the same successful purposes, then I'd say that's almost certainly in their head, but I don't think anyone would disagree. The OP is about ontology, what exists, not where some specific data is located.

Say what??? (with a couple more question marks this time). Are you claiming that we do not have empirical evidence of gravitational attraction?

I wanted you to give me an example of something that we'd posit, with there being zero empirical evidence of it, for good practical reasons. — Terrapin Station

We have (as far as I know) no evidence at all that gravity will continue tomorrow as it was yesterday. See Hume.

Evidence for the existence of mentality is a far cry from having directly identified the meaning of a word located in someone's brain. — Isaac

:up:

Are you now claiming that we don't actually think meanings, that meanings are in no sense a conscious phenomenon? — Terrapin Station

At best, that's hugely incomplete. There's the meaning that I'm thinking about right now. But to jump to the conclusion that meaning is therefore a mental activity would be completely unwarranted.

I'm claiming that meanings (my interpretation, not yours) aren't necessarily thought, and aren't necessarily a conscious phenomenon. Meaningful thoughts aren't the same as meanings. Meanings don't have to be thought.

As opposed of it being merely an interpretation created by minds. — Echarmion

But that leads to seemingly absurd logical consequences. A sign saying "Caves up ahead" wouldn't mean that there are caves up ahead? Just because no one is there interpreting it? :brow:

How do people even take this claim seriously?

Of course we cannot know empirically what meaning is ontologically, but we're not doing empirical science. We are trying to figure out, with arguments, what can be known about the ontology of meaning. — Echarmion

It's a relief to see that I'm not alone on this. I've learnt to see the word "empirical" as a red flag now in contexts like this.

The thread title is "the ontology of linguistic meaning". If we were comparing the merits of alternative possible ways of talking, then all we'd have to decide is whether or not we are communicating effectively. That is very clearly not what anyone in this thread has been doing so far. I have given arguments for why I think meaning is something that occurs in minds and is not part of the text absent any minds, i.e. without minds there will be no meaning. Obviously, I think that these arguments represent "knowing when we've got there". If you think these arguments do not work or cannot possibly answer the question, I'd like to know why. — Echarmion

Oh dear. I think that that's a massive error. It very much has to do with the use of language. And I did even question in my opening post whether this could all boil down to that. You're matching up your language with what you think works best. But I've pointed out big problems with using "meaning" in that way.

The rather obvious problem with your argument is that any truth to it is only trivial. If meaning is [insert any definition you like], then [logical consequence of definition]. So it does become an issue beyond what meaning is. It becomes an issue of what definition works best.

But that leads to seemingly absurd logical consequences. A sign saying "Caves up ahead" wouldn't mean that there are caves up ahead? Just because no one is there interpreting it? :brow:

How do people even take this claim seriously? — S

The only thing I can offer you at this point is a bit of armchair psychology, namely that I think your problem is that you are imagining a scenario without humans, but when you are then trying to look at that which remains, you are looking at it from a human view (in this case, literally imagining a yellow sign with text on it).

As an exercise, let's imagine the only humans left are blind, and have been for generations. How would you explain to them what a yellow sign with text on it even is?

But this is exactly what your opposition here are doing with words and meaning.

I don't get why you're turning this molehill into a mountain. It has properties which could make it a {meaningful word}, like almost {any other pattern of marks}. But the properties of the object and what the object could {mean to a language user} are two distinct things. I prefer to be clear and logical, so I reject a conflation of the two. — Isaac

I don't doubt that! I don't doubt that even if you replace {mean to a language user} with {mean}! I never said that they weren't two distinct things!

Do you remember what the issue here is actually about? Or what my position actually is? Because that doesn't seem to address it.

I'm trying to argue that the meaning of a word is a property of the word, by showing how the reaction of other objects is essential to the definition of loads of properties which we routinely call properties of the object. I'm thus saying that the fact that words require humans to interpret need not prevent us from treating their meaning as a property. — Isaac

There's a lot in there that I simply don't accept at face value, and I would therefore need to see your support.

It seems to me that your argument is that for some properties, the fact that they require some interaction to manifest them is trivial, for others it is non-trivial but irrelevant to possession of a property and for a third group it is very relevant and effectively prohibits us from treating the property as a property of the object in question. Your basis for this seems to be "that's just the way thing are... obviously!". — Isaac

I judge these things on a case by case basis. And merely pointing out that it seems to you as though my basis is, "that's just the way thing are... obviously!", is about as helpful as being handed a bottomless bucket in a boat that is overflowing with water. If it were so that that's my basis, then how do you expect me to rectify that? You'd have to be a lot more specific for starters. It's not at all clear what exactly you're even talking about.

You'll have to spell out the connection there as I'm not seeing it. As far as I'm concerned, I've just said that it is unproblematic to refer to the use an object is generally put to as a property of that object, wheras Heidegger made up a load of shit about 'being' and then tried to claim German was the best language because he was a Nazi. Not seeing the similarity. — Isaac

:rofl:

Well, you made me doubt myself, so I googled "Heidegger" and "hammer" and stuff came up. The hammer is apparently a "ready-to-hand". :rofl: