This fact, however, causes no problem whatsoever for us calling the cup 'blue' or talking as if blueness were a property of the cup. Therefore, it need cause us no problem whatsoever to refer to meaning being a property of a word, despite the fact that it too is only manifest when some properly calibrated device (a language use) hears the word. — Isaac
by showing how the reaction of other objects is essential to the definition of loads of properties which we routinely call properties of the object. — Isaac
Facts are simply "ways that things are" --their material make-up and their relations, including dynamic relations (and the relations obviously include "to other things"), and all of this is also identical to properties. This is also known as "states of affairs." — Terrapin Station
Hammering nails does not happen in a vacuum (at least not normally). The air in the vicinity is affected, too, and it's a part of the system/process in question. — Terrapin Station
In Terrapinese, which is the name that I've just coined for your language, that is true. — S
I'm not talking about a system or a process, I'm talking about a fact. — S
That's about conventional language usage per se, though. Where manners of speaking are ubiquitous, and so on. That's different than doing ontology. — Terrapin Station
I've not been talking about definitions or what we call things, but what things are, regardless of definitions/what we call them. — Terrapin Station
So ontology as a philosophical exercise is pointless then? — Isaac
Okay, so #1, there isn't zero evidence of mentality. — Terrapin Station
#2, if we're going to posit existents for which there is zero empirical evidence of them, what would you take to be good grounds for that? — Terrapin Station
Evidence for the existence of mentality is a far cry from having directly identified the meaning of a word located in someone's brain. Earlier (in another conversation) you were very dismissive of the whole of neuropsychology pointing to unconscious mental states, now you seem to be sure it's basically discovered the location of the meaning of words. — Isaac
Convenience. Practicality — Isaac
No, if you want to claim there is no inherent difference between objects intentionally produced and those naturally produced then you would need to provide an actual example of an object whose kind of origin, whether artifical or natural, cannot be determined. — Janus
So, the discussion cannot continue unless you clarify what you were referring to there; that is clarify what you think I was arguing for, why you think I was no longer arguing for it, and why you think what I was saying instead ( "pointing out its nuances") doesn't address the points you raised. You need to address specific points; if you just make sweeping statements how am I to know what you are referring to ? — Janus
You therefore have to explain how "the intention for the text to mean X", as a mental state, is represented by a brain state and this brain state is then fully represented by the text.
And for that, we need to identify a property of the text at present that carries that information. — Echarmion
It's not a "given definition of reasonable"; you have to give reasons for what you are saying, that is what it means to be reasonable. Of course any reasons will be based on some presupposition or other, there are no arguments that are not grounded on some presupposition or other. If our starting presuppositions are at odds, then there is no point arguing about anything because we will simply talk past one another and waste a lot of time and energy. — Janus
Also I am not merely concerned to set out definitions of meaning. I am simply saying that according to ordinary usage of the term an ancient manuscript is meaningful even if we cannot decipher it. We see it as a meaningful object even if we don't know what it means. I have also been arguing that since such an object is, in principle at least, decipherable, it must embody meaning. If it didn't embody any meaning then it would not be decipherable; that is, there would be nothing to decipher. It embodies meaning simply because it was intentionally produced to convey something, to be meaningful. — Janus
Of course not. How on earth could we possibly judge which position was true? The question is whether meaning is best seen as something that persists objectively without minds or not. I can't think of any way we could check which is true. Maybe you mean something by 'true' that is different to my meaning. For me, it is true that P if P. So, it is true that meaning persist without minds if meaning persists without minds - something we can never possibly know empirically. — Isaac
But that's my point. It isn't at all peculiar. We do it all the time. Do we not say that a property of Carbon-14 is that it is radioactive? And have we not just established that radioactive literally means emitting particles. Therefore we very clearly do talk about a property of an object being something it has done and will do but is not currently doing. — Isaac
I took your line of argument to be that it was not possible to define property this way, so an argument that it is is a viable counter. Again (as you've yet to answer) if we're not comparing the merits of these alternative possible ways of talking, then what is it you think we're doing. If you think we're trying to find which one is 'right' how are you going to know when we've got there? — Isaac
I'm saying nothing at all about it being unconscious.
Are you now claiming that we don't actually think meanings, that meanings are in no sense a conscious phenomenon? — Terrapin Station
What would an example of that be? — Terrapin Station
I'm referring to the fact that you dismissed masses of scientific evidence pointing to their existence. — Isaac
That seemed incongruous to me with your attitude here that the mere suggestion of scientific investigation that mental states could hold meaning is now sufficient for us to presume it is so. — Isaac
Achieving your goals with it. If we were of the opinion that gravity were not predictable, how far do you think we'd get with our objectives? So treating gravity as if it were predicable and consistent seems to be a good idea. Doesn't matter if it really is until the approach we have stops working (or looks like it might). — Isaac
And how can we possibly judge how to "best see" meaning if no true statements can be made about what meaning is? — Echarmion
we're not doing empirical science. We are trying to figure out, with arguments, what can be known about the ontology of meaning. — Echarmion
what about this interpretation: "the atomic structure of X is such that it's unstable and prone to decay, with an average chance of Y per T"? — Echarmion
Obviously, I think that these arguments represent "knowing when we've got there". — Echarmion
What I said there, except possibly for the bit about properties, is completely non-controversial in analytic philosophy. — Terrapin Station
How would we have a fact that's not a system or process? — Terrapin Station
Facts aren't about anything. — Terrapin Station
"Fact" isn't the same thing as "true proposition." — Terrapin Station
Facts are what true propositions are about. — Terrapin Station
By which works best to achieve our goals. — Isaac
Yes, and I've asked you several times now for an explanation of how we judge which arguments are true, if not by empirical methods. — Isaac
That's just not the definition though. The definition is emitting particles, it's an action, not a state. You can re-state the definition to suit your world-view, but I'd wonder why you were doing so. — Isaac
Yes, but others don't, so now what? — Isaac
I don't believe that there are masses of evidence pointing to the existence of unconscious mental phenomena, though. — Terrapin Station
Say what? I'm not saying anything about "scientific investigation" there. — Terrapin Station
I said nothing whatsoever about my "theshold for evidence." If you think that meaning doesn't occur mentally, that's fine. Say so, and then we'll talk about that. — Terrapin Station
Say what??? (with a couple more question marks this time). Are you claiming that we do not have empirical evidence of gravitational attraction?
I wanted you to give me an example of something that we'd posit, with there being zero empirical evidence of it, for good practical reasons. — Terrapin Station
Are you now claiming that we don't actually think meanings, that meanings are in no sense a conscious phenomenon? — Terrapin Station
As opposed of it being merely an interpretation created by minds. — Echarmion
Of course we cannot know empirically what meaning is ontologically, but we're not doing empirical science. We are trying to figure out, with arguments, what can be known about the ontology of meaning. — Echarmion
The thread title is "the ontology of linguistic meaning". If we were comparing the merits of alternative possible ways of talking, then all we'd have to decide is whether or not we are communicating effectively. That is very clearly not what anyone in this thread has been doing so far. I have given arguments for why I think meaning is something that occurs in minds and is not part of the text absent any minds, i.e. without minds there will be no meaning. Obviously, I think that these arguments represent "knowing when we've got there". If you think these arguments do not work or cannot possibly answer the question, I'd like to know why. — Echarmion
But that leads to seemingly absurd logical consequences. A sign saying "Caves up ahead" wouldn't mean that there are caves up ahead? Just because no one is there interpreting it? :brow:
How do people even take this claim seriously? — S
But this is exactly what your opposition here are doing with words and meaning.
I don't get why you're turning this molehill into a mountain. It has properties which could make it a {meaningful word}, like almost {any other pattern of marks}. But the properties of the object and what the object could {mean to a language user} are two distinct things. I prefer to be clear and logical, so I reject a conflation of the two. — Isaac
I'm trying to argue that the meaning of a word is a property of the word, by showing how the reaction of other objects is essential to the definition of loads of properties which we routinely call properties of the object. I'm thus saying that the fact that words require humans to interpret need not prevent us from treating their meaning as a property. — Isaac
It seems to me that your argument is that for some properties, the fact that they require some interaction to manifest them is trivial, for others it is non-trivial but irrelevant to possession of a property and for a third group it is very relevant and effectively prohibits us from treating the property as a property of the object in question. Your basis for this seems to be "that's just the way thing are... obviously!". — Isaac
You'll have to spell out the connection there as I'm not seeing it. As far as I'm concerned, I've just said that it is unproblematic to refer to the use an object is generally put to as a property of that object, wheras Heidegger made up a load of shit about 'being' and then tried to claim German was the best language because he was a Nazi. Not seeing the similarity. — Isaac
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