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Did you even read my post?

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Does not anyone in this thread consider reason? — tim wood

That's exactly what I asked. Reason is not a thing on its own. It does not, on its own provide answers. It is a means, not an end. To what end do you wish to apply reason? That is what I am asking.

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How about moral as the result of a process of thinking, not of feeling - a difference there, yes? — tim wood

Yes, the difference being that we generally speak of 'thinking' as a means to and end, and of 'feeling' as something which merely occurs to one unbidden. To what end should this 'thinking' be put? What are we 'thinking' for?

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But none of that captures morality. If I wish to join two pieces of wood, I might make an argument that nailing them together would be a good move. This is a reasonable solution. What's that got to do with morality?

is there any moral proposition that is impervious to reason in the sense that reason cannot determine which view of the proposition is right/better/correct? — tim wood

Not to correct, but to suggest........

......there are not moral propositions; there are propositions that determine, or are the expression of, morality. The moral quality of an expression is explicit in its compliance. All propositions are subject/predicate constructions, so if a proposition uses a principle of will for the subject and uses a logically relevant action conforming to the principle for the predicate, there is a moral determination contained in it, it is an expression of morality, and as a matter of mere convention, is inaptly called a moral proposition. It can now be said no proposition having moral implications is impervious to reason, because reason is absolutely necessary in its construction.

The subjective relativitism arises in the choice of the principle as the subject of the proposition, and by necessity of law, the action in the predicate. Morality arises in the compliance between the latter to the former, re: favorable treatment is always in my best interest (the principle), therefore I ought to treat others in their best interest (the action), whereby compliance is met and I am authorized to call myself a moral agent proper. Similarly, the strong are naturally more apt to thrive (the principle), therefore, to thrive, even if I am not strong, I ought to prey on the weaker (the action), whereby compliance is met and I am authorized to call myself moral proper.

Nothing whatsoever to do with feelings, and such sentimental emotivist tomfoolery, nosiree, bob!!

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What?

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This debate is about what 'morality' is, so it makes no sense to use the term as having an assumed meaning within your argument. And what does 'pure of reason' even mean?

speak reason against horror — tim wood

This is just garbage.

After all, one man's horror is just another man's just stretching out, yes? — tim wood

Yes, obviously. Hitler clearly was not horrified by what he did, so it's pretty irrefutable that one man's horror is just another man's stretching out. Are you suggesting that Hitler was horrified by what he did?

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No, I didn’t distinguish argument, imperative, or proposition as such, from each other, anyway. These certainly can be distinguished, depending on the philosophical/ethical domain one works from.

What you’re describing, I think, is relativism writ large, one’s anthropological or psychological view opposed to another’s, but moral relativism isn’t so large. Besides, there’s so many damn -ism’s and sub-ism’s and sub-sub-ism’s in relativism, it’s like those guys can’t figure it out wtf their talking about.

I am suggesting that a relativist had better not be, though, because he defines his view as absent reason and entirely subjective. — tim wood

But 'horrified' is not a state of reason, it is an emotion. So why can a relativist not be horrified?

And part of this is establishing if morality means what anyone feels like saying it means, or it it has a backbone. And you're correct in this, I assume morality is a creature with a backbone, and more besides. — tim wood

Right. This is why I asked the question in the first place. In in the scenario I described, I, a moral relativist, would not torture the child because to do so feels abominable. A feeling, not a rational conclusion to some calculus. Your argument seems to be that moral action is the 'correct' result of some calculus. So if the calculus came out with the result of torturing the child, would you do it? Or is there some feature of the world which prevents that from ever being the result, if so, what is it, and why is it impossible to remove?

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I assign value. — tim wood

Right, well that's moral relativism for a start. If you assign a value, not a value is pre-assigned. If you're doing the assignment of value, then what is to prevent others for assigning other values in the same circumstances?

Consider: to build a battleship or a spaceship to Mars you have to deal with things like "1" and "2"; but what do they have to do with battleships or spaceships? — tim wood

Absolutely. One of the main reasons why I'm so opposed to utilitarianism. The calculus is far too complicated for anyone to have a chance of working it all out correctly.

The underlying reason being that the question is either partially or entirely illegitimate. — tim wood

So which is it in this case, and why?

As I said, I don’t hold with moral propositions per se, but rather with propositions expressing moral implications, and of a particular construction. So, with respect to your examples, I wouldn’t consider them moral expressions because, while, i.e., “slavery is bad” may be considered a subjective principle, it doesn’t have an action, or, if you wish, an imperative, associated with it.

Apodeitic means clearly established, indisputable. A priori means absent immediate experience, but possibly derivable from mediate experience. Given the latter form, an apodeitic, a priori moral expression might be, my suicide is contradictory to the purpose of Nature, therefore never permit the possibility of my own suicide.

If you’re looking for an expression suitable apodeitically to all humanity, I’m not so sure, simply from the nature of reason itself. Whatever one’s reason can think, another’s reason can re-think. One would have to reduce the substance so far as to become almost meaningless. If it be given reason is common to all human interests, then an objectively valid moral expression might be, all inter-personal connections aim towards community based on reason, therefore always reason in favor of an action as if it were universal law.

Relativism cannot stand up to that, but then......neither can humanity.

My view is (I think) informed by Kant. No thing needs mind to exist. — tim wood

So thoughts, desires? They don't need mind to exist?

But what does it matter? — tim wood

For one, it matters for an argument that morality is objective because it is based on reason. If reason isn't objective, then that doesn't work as an argument for the objectivity of morality.

It also matters for how we know whether some claim of reason is correct rather than just a statement of how some individual(s) happens to think. If reason is something aside from that, then when there's a dispute we can simply check the mind-independent stuff we're referring to to see who is right about it (assuming that people are really making a claim about mind independent stuff, and aren't simply making a claim about how they happen to think in the first place).

Than would you say moral relativism would require the individual moral judgements to be authentic and honest need to be in accord with one’s conscience — Rank Amateur

Yes--it's simply a matter of whether something is really the judgment someone is making or not. We can't say it's their moral judgment if the utterance in question isn't really the judgment they make. (At least not ideally--again, they could be lying to us, and we might not have very good clues to tell us that they are . . . )

Just a question. If, in a future world, some evil genius had arranged things such that torturing an innocent child brought about a harmonious society, would that make torturing the child morally right? Because that's the way your argument sounds. — Isaac

Torturing an innocent child could never bring about a harmonious society, so I cannot see that such a far out thought experiment has any bearing on what I have been arguing. As I see it morality is based on moral feeling, a feeling which most basically consists in the empathic desire not to hurt others, and that moral feeling is normative insofar as it is shared by most people.

Society could not be harmonious if most of its members did not have such feelings. Those who don't have such feelings, if they want to participate in human communities, will still have to adhere in their actions to the mores which naturally evolve out of such feelings.

Of course fearful self-interest can undermine feelings of empathy; to imagine what a society where those feelings no longer predominate would look like, imagine what would happen if food supplies to supermarkets were radically disrupted due to curtailment of the fuel supply.

Thanks. Wondering what your opinion would be if I posited this. No way i guess to argue or reason such a thing. But I would posit that with maybe an infinitesimally small number of exceptions, every human conscience on the planet would say slavery is immoral. Some may say they do, some may rationalize or justify they do, but I think that in their heart they know they are acting against their conscience.

Torturing an innocent child could never bring about a harmonious society, — Janus

How would we know such things, unless you're just defining them tautologously to things like if a child is ever tortured . . . but then that wouldn't be telling us much besides how you're choosing to use a word.

Torturing an innocent child could never bring about a harmonious society, so such a far out thought experiment has no bearing on what I have been arguing. — Janus

OK. So what is it about the world which makes this impossible? Is there some fact about the way the world is which prevents torturing a child, say in one generation, from being the start of a long chain of causative links which eventually end with an harmonious society which persists for the remainder of the earth's existence?

For me morality is based on moral feeling, a feeling which most basically consists in the empathic desire not to hurt others, and that moral feeling is normative insofar as it is shared by most people. — Janus

If it is a feeling, why must those who don't feel it, feel it. Why is it normative simply because it is shared by most people? I'm not seeing the link between 'shared by most people' and 'everyone must feel this way'.

If it is a feeling, why must those who don't feel it, feel it. Why is it normative simply because it is shared by most people? I'm not seeing the link between 'shared by most people' and 'everyone must feel this way'. — Isaac

It's normative because its the feeling or the kind of feeling that allows people to live together more or less harmoniously.

I've said all I'm going to say in this thread. I lack the time or energy required to continue responding unproductively to what appears to me as so many distortions and so much sophistry from some of those here.