Just a question. If, in a future world, some evil genius had arranged things such that torturing an innocent child brought about a harmonious society, would that make torturing the child morally right? — Isaac

Zero. Not even a little bit. Never mind the innocent child; just consider the nature of what we suppose torture to be. Btw, you don't need a future evil "genius." We have Hell and the devil a/k/a evil, and as well fate. These have long been with us. And, as Mephistopheles said, "Why, this is hell, nor are we out of it!"

In short, and in general terms, you imply that a taking of what should not be taken, from people who properly speaking cannot even give it, is justified on primitive utilitarian grounds. This is bankrupt morality. The address for the home of this kind of thinking just is Hell.

Did you even read my post?

Which means that the term 'moral' is a term we apply to action which we feel a certain way about, not actions which bring about some end. — Isaac

Does not anyone in this thread consider reason?

Does not anyone in this thread consider reason? — tim wood

That's exactly what I asked. Reason is not a thing on its own. It does not, on its own provide answers. It is a means, not an end. To what end do you wish to apply reason? That is what I am asking.

Basically I can only see two ways things that 'moral' could mean as a class of actions. Either it describes a feeling - actions which feel this way are those we're calling 'moral'. Or it describes a logical outcome - actions which bring about x are those we're calling 'moral'. — Isaac

Did you even read my post? — Isaac

Yep.

How about moral as the result of a process of thinking, not of feeling - a difference there, yes? - to comply with a standard, not a mere end.

"The end justifies the means," oft cited, is misquoted. The ends justifies some means, not all means. Just sayin'.

How about moral as the result of a process of thinking, not of feeling - a difference there, yes? — tim wood

Yes, the difference being that we generally speak of 'thinking' as a means to and end, and of 'feeling' as something which merely occurs to one unbidden. To what end should this 'thinking' be put? What are we 'thinking' for?

That's exactly what I asked. Reason is not a thing on its own. It does not, on its own provide answers. It is a means, not an end. To what end do you wish to apply reason? That is what I am asking. — Isaac

Reason as argument produces a conclusion. The conclusion is part of the argument.

To what end? Both/either to create reasonable solutions, or given a solution, to test it to see if it is reasonable. Is there more to this?

But none of that captures morality. If I wish to join two pieces of wood, I might make an argument that nailing them together would be a good move. This is a reasonable solution. What's that got to do with morality?

is there any moral proposition that is impervious to reason in the sense that reason cannot determine which view of the proposition is right/better/correct? — tim wood

Not to correct, but to suggest........

......there are not moral propositions; there are propositions that determine, or are the expression of, morality. The moral quality of an expression is explicit in its compliance. All propositions are subject/predicate constructions, so if a proposition uses a principle of will for the subject and uses a logically relevant action conforming to the principle for the predicate, there is a moral determination contained in it, it is an expression of morality, and as a matter of mere convention, is inaptly called a moral proposition. It can now be said no proposition having moral implications is impervious to reason, because reason is absolutely necessary in its construction.

The subjective relativitism arises in the choice of the principle as the subject of the proposition, and by necessity of law, the action in the predicate. Morality arises in the compliance between the latter to the former, re: favorable treatment is always in my best interest (the principle), therefore I ought to treat others in their best interest (the action), whereby compliance is met and I am authorized to call myself a moral agent proper. Similarly, the strong are naturally more apt to thrive (the principle), therefore, to thrive, even if I am not strong, I ought to prey on the weaker (the action), whereby compliance is met and I am authorized to call myself moral proper.

Nothing whatsoever to do with feelings, and such sentimental emotivist tomfoolery, nosiree, bob!!

This is a reasonable solution. What's that got to do with morality? — Isaac

With morality? What does reason have to do with morality? Why, nothing at all. I need some lebensraum. Hmm. I think I'll murder 6,000,000 or more on the way to 60,000,000 or more. And you shall speak no word of reason against it!

What?

What "what"? If your morality is pure of reason, then how might you speak reason against horror? After all, one man's horror is just another man's just stretching out, yes?

This debate is about what 'morality' is, so it makes no sense to use the term as having an assumed meaning within your argument. And what does 'pure of reason' even mean?

speak reason against horror — tim wood

This is just garbage.

After all, one man's horror is just another man's just stretching out, yes? — tim wood

Yes, obviously. Hitler clearly was not horrified by what he did, so it's pretty irrefutable that one man's horror is just another man's stretching out. Are you suggesting that Hitler was horrified by what he did?

Not-so-simple. Right now I'm thinking you're not distinguishing moral argument, imperative, and proposition.

Ex.: Slavery is bad. Neither imperative (don't have slaves); nor argument (and therefore, don't have slaves).

The relativist argument as I understand it is that the P (proposition) that slavery is bad, is meaningless, or if meaningful, derives its entire meaning from some longer proposition of the form, "So-and-so feels that slavery is bad." To which they can oppose another P, "Somebody else feels that slavery is good."

To the relativist, these are exhaustive of all that can be said on the subject, and as on the face of it there is nothing to choose between them, both are efficacious with respect to a justification for (for those folks) or against (for them folks). (Per our interlocutor, I mustn't call either right or wrong; these terms are misused here, and don't apply.)

Are you suggesting that Hitler was horrified by what he did? — Isaac

Not at all. I am suggesting that a relativist had better not be, though, because he defines his view as absent reason and entirely subjective. Not, in my opinion, a view that on scrutiny even qualifies as sane, never mind reasonable

And what does 'pure of reason' even mean? — Isaac

Untainted with, unstained by, reason. Self-proclaimed relativists on this thread have made it explicitly clear that to them, morality is just a feeling, and what is moral depends on how someone feels about it. After all, to quote one quoting what he does not understand, "Reason is the slave of the passions." Yes?

This debate is about what 'morality' is, — Isaac

And part of this is establishing if morality means what anyone feels like saying it means, or it it has a backbone. And you're correct in this, I assume morality is a creature with a backbone, and more besides.

No, I didn’t distinguish argument, imperative, or proposition as such, from each other, anyway. These certainly can be distinguished, depending on the philosophical/ethical domain one works from.

What you’re describing, I think, is relativism writ large, one’s anthropological or psychological view opposed to another’s, but moral relativism isn’t so large. Besides, there’s so many damn -ism’s and sub-ism’s and sub-sub-ism’s in relativism, it’s like those guys can’t figure it out wtf their talking about.

I am suggesting that a relativist had better not be, though, because he defines his view as absent reason and entirely subjective. — tim wood

But 'horrified' is not a state of reason, it is an emotion. So why can a relativist not be horrified?

And part of this is establishing if morality means what anyone feels like saying it means, or it it has a backbone. And you're correct in this, I assume morality is a creature with a backbone, and more besides. — tim wood

Right. This is why I asked the question in the first place. In in the scenario I described, I, a moral relativist, would not torture the child because to do so feels abominable. A feeling, not a rational conclusion to some calculus. Your argument seems to be that moral action is the 'correct' result of some calculus. So if the calculus came out with the result of torturing the child, would you do it? Or is there some feature of the world which prevents that from ever being the result, if so, what is it, and why is it impossible to remove?

What you’re describing, I think, is relativism writ large, one’s anthropological or psychological view opposed to another’s, — Mww

I prefer to think in terms of reason, which is exactly not just someone's view. Can you think of a single moral proposition that is apodeictic? Or true a priori, if you prefer?

I'm not looking for the argument, just the proposition. Imo there are lots of them, e.g., slavery is bad; boiling babies for fun is bad, and so on - you get the idea. Can you think of one? The fate of relativism is in your hands.

Right. This is why I asked the question in the first place. I in the scenario I described, I, a moral relativist, would not torture the child because to do so feels abominable. A feeling, not a rational conclusion to some calculus. Your argument seems to be that moral action is the 'correct' result of some calculus. So if the calculus came out with the result of torturing the child, would you do it? Or is there some feature of the world which prevents that from ever being the result, if so, what is it, and why is it impossible to remove? — Isaac

Fair question. I assign value. (Usually I accept for the most part the valuations of others.) Then I do my calculus. It should not surprise that the values may at first seem to have little to do with the question at hand. Consider: to build a battleship or a spaceship to Mars you have to deal with things like "1" and "2"; but what do they have to do with battleships or spaceships?

In order to resolve the question of whether to torture the child, I already have the values I need determined. In all of this I channel Kant, though to be sure my mistakes are my own.

I confess to a trick. Often these conundrums are put in the form of a question: would I do this to achieve that, or not and suffer something else? The trick is to un-ask the question. The underlying reason being that the question is either partially or entirely illegitimate.

I assign value. — tim wood

Right, well that's moral relativism for a start. If you assign a value, not a value is pre-assigned. If you're doing the assignment of value, then what is to prevent others for assigning other values in the same circumstances?

Consider: to build a battleship or a spaceship to Mars you have to deal with things like "1" and "2"; but what do they have to do with battleships or spaceships? — tim wood

Absolutely. One of the main reasons why I'm so opposed to utilitarianism. The calculus is far too complicated for anyone to have a chance of working it all out correctly.

The underlying reason being that the question is either partially or entirely illegitimate. — tim wood

So which is it in this case, and why?

As I said, I don’t hold with moral propositions per se, but rather with propositions expressing moral implications, and of a particular construction. So, with respect to your examples, I wouldn’t consider them moral expressions because, while, i.e., “slavery is bad” may be considered a subjective principle, it doesn’t have an action, or, if you wish, an imperative, associated with it.

Apodeitic means clearly established, indisputable. A priori means absent immediate experience, but possibly derivable from mediate experience. Given the latter form, an apodeitic, a priori moral expression might be, my suicide is contradictory to the purpose of Nature, therefore never permit the possibility of my own suicide.

If you’re looking for an expression suitable apodeitically to all humanity, I’m not so sure, simply from the nature of reason itself. Whatever one’s reason can think, another’s reason can re-think. One would have to reduce the substance so far as to become almost meaningless. If it be given reason is common to all human interests, then an objectively valid moral expression might be, all inter-personal connections aim towards community based on reason, therefore always reason in favor of an action as if it were universal law.

Relativism cannot stand up to that, but then......neither can humanity.

My view is (I think) informed by Kant. No thing needs mind to exist. — tim wood

So thoughts, desires? They don't need mind to exist?

But what does it matter? — tim wood

For one, it matters for an argument that morality is objective because it is based on reason. If reason isn't objective, then that doesn't work as an argument for the objectivity of morality.

It also matters for how we know whether some claim of reason is correct rather than just a statement of how some individual(s) happens to think. If reason is something aside from that, then when there's a dispute we can simply check the mind-independent stuff we're referring to to see who is right about it (assuming that people are really making a claim about mind independent stuff, and aren't simply making a claim about how they happen to think in the first place).

Than would you say moral relativism would require the individual moral judgements to be authentic and honest need to be in accord with one’s conscience — Rank Amateur

Yes--it's simply a matter of whether something is really the judgment someone is making or not. We can't say it's their moral judgment if the utterance in question isn't really the judgment they make. (At least not ideally--again, they could be lying to us, and we might not have very good clues to tell us that they are . . . )

Just a question. If, in a future world, some evil genius had arranged things such that torturing an innocent child brought about a harmonious society, would that make torturing the child morally right? Because that's the way your argument sounds. — Isaac

Torturing an innocent child could never bring about a harmonious society, so I cannot see that such a far out thought experiment has any bearing on what I have been arguing. As I see it morality is based on moral feeling, a feeling which most basically consists in the empathic desire not to hurt others, and that moral feeling is normative insofar as it is shared by most people.

Society could not be harmonious if most of its members did not have such feelings. Those who don't have such feelings, if they want to participate in human communities, will still have to adhere in their actions to the mores which naturally evolve out of such feelings.

Of course fearful self-interest can undermine feelings of empathy; to imagine what a society where those feelings no longer predominate would look like, imagine what would happen if food supplies to supermarkets were radically disrupted due to curtailment of the fuel supply.

Thanks. Wondering what your opinion would be if I posited this. No way i guess to argue or reason such a thing. But I would posit that with maybe an infinitesimally small number of exceptions, every human conscience on the planet would say slavery is immoral. Some may say they do, some may rationalize or justify they do, but I think that in their heart they know they are acting against their conscience.

Torturing an innocent child could never bring about a harmonious society, — Janus

How would we know such things, unless you're just defining them tautologously to things like if a child is ever tortured . . . but then that wouldn't be telling us much besides how you're choosing to use a word.

Torturing an innocent child could never bring about a harmonious society, so such a far out thought experiment has no bearing on what I have been arguing. — Janus

OK. So what is it about the world which makes this impossible? Is there some fact about the way the world is which prevents torturing a child, say in one generation, from being the start of a long chain of causative links which eventually end with an harmonious society which persists for the remainder of the earth's existence?

For me morality is based on moral feeling, a feeling which most basically consists in the empathic desire not to hurt others, and that moral feeling is normative insofar as it is shared by most people. — Janus

If it is a feeling, why must those who don't feel it, feel it. Why is it normative simply because it is shared by most people? I'm not seeing the link between 'shared by most people' and 'everyone must feel this way'.

If it is a feeling, why must those who don't feel it, feel it. Why is it normative simply because it is shared by most people? I'm not seeing the link between 'shared by most people' and 'everyone must feel this way'. — Isaac

It's normative because its the feeling or the kind of feeling that allows people to live together more or less harmoniously.

I've said all I'm going to say in this thread. I lack the time or energy required to continue responding unproductively to what appears to me as so many distortions and so much sophistry from some of those here.