If that is the case, then n as a prerequisite for m contradicts m being an effectively foundational stance. N can’t be both before and after m if m is the foundation.

I’d say being rational means no more than being non-contradictory. If so, n is rational in relation to m as long as n doesn’t contradict m. ‘Course, that doesn’t say squat about the rationality of m, but if it is a effectively foundational stance, it better not be self-contradictory.

Right? Maybe?

if we have an understanding of what is involved in moral duty, that it is nonetheless the case that we still need the unadulterated intention to carry it out. — Janus

I think that because Kant stipulates that morality is a fundamental human condition, and such morality in human form at least, is claimed to be predicated on the principle of duty, intentionality is given automatically. I mean...we couldn’t be not moral, so not matter what we actually do with respect to it, we are going to do something. We intend to do something in conjunction with the being of moral agency. That is not to say that other theories in moral philosophy doesn't or shouldn’t attribute more value to intentionality, so you might be quite right in stating our need.

Intentionality maybe arises from the connection of an imperative with its result. I judge an imperative as an action with the intent that the end to which the imperative aims is actually attained. But I might have misjudged, in which case my intentionality, while still there, was not met.

I understand philosophy in general makes a big deal out of intentionality, but like the language thing, I don’t see much power in it.

One can hold the maxim “one should not kill”, and still go about his business as a soldier in the combat field with his morality intact. — Mww

So morality is something more than sticking to a rule, or are you saying here, as below that one determines what is a moral action by reference to its objective "one shouldn't kill, but sometimes one must and that is then moral as long as one has tried hard enough not to kill? I'm struggling to understand what" one should not kill" could possibly mean in terms of rationally determining that which is moral.

thou shall not kill”, an absolute declarative statement per the Ten Commandments, e.g., is irrational, because it is impossible in all cases to avoid it and simultaneously hold with a more valuable maxim “the wonton violation of ownership of life is wrong”. — Mww

OK, so how is the relative value of these two conflicting maxims judged? How does rationality alone determine which should be abandoned in favour of the other?

“no life has preference over another”, and the hypothetical imperative standing for what the possible volition actually becomes, “ therefore one has no right to kill”. Because killing is not always avoidable, this hypothetical, while not tacit permission to kill, maintains an agent’s sense of personal moral worthiness if he should be put in a position where he must exercise his prerogatives. — Mww

Right, so this is Anscombe's argument (and others). All this comes down to is the tail wagging the dog. "Why did you kill that person?", "Well...it was one of those special circumstances where I exercised my prerogative"

Not to mention of course the fact that "no life has preference over another" remains just an opinion, unless you support it with rational argument, the only version of which that has so far been advanced is universalisation, which is the very thing you're now saying doesn't apply to murder - the example we've been working with from the start.

The "too entrenched" bit was about your answer being in Kant's framework. The good man bit was about Kant.

How can one overcome racism in the example provided s/he has no external source aside from the racist imbedded language use s/he learns?

That is our focus, right?

So morality is something more than sticking to a rule — Isaac

I see it that way, yes. Morality is a fundamental condition of being human. It’s not a thing; it’s the name given to one of the things that makes us human, separates us from any other biological agent.
———————-

......(or, as below) one determines what is a moral action by reference to its objective — Isaac

I see it as one determines what is a moral action by reference to its law. Here is is where relativism enters; a law is determined by the will so can be variable by the will determining what it is. One is free to choose that which defines him. It’s what makes all the same (we’re moral) but different (we’re free).
————————

what "one should not kill" could possibly mean in terms of rationally determining that which is moral. — Isaac

That which is moral is always a rational determination, so “one should not kill” is just one more in an constant barrage of them.
————————

how is the relative value of these two conflicting maxims judged? — Isaac

I can’t unpack what you’re calling these two conflicting maxims. “Thou shall not kill” is not a maxim, and being a command, doesn’t require any rationality in response to it anyway. Why would it, if under any possible circumstance, the agent holding with this command isn’t going to kill anything. Period.

The maxim is “the wanton violation of ownership of life is wrong”, and the relative value in that relates solely to the will that determines it, the will which could have just as permissibly determined some other maxim. Or, it’s relative value could be with respect to some other freely determinant will inhering in some other moral agency, which is free to determine a completely different maxim. Then I guess the relative value would manifest in whether or not the one guy gets along with himself, or whether those two agents get along with each other.

Bear in mind, this “wanton violation.....” is just an example of what a maxim might look like. It is the correct form, but the idea it presents could be anything.
———————-

tail wagging the dog. — Isaac

I don’t understand. The idiom means some small thing overriding some big thing. Cart before the horse, and the like. How does this relate to anything? Are you saying a guy who kills for fun, while not admitting any immorality whatsoever, does so because he’s thinking he’s merely doing what feels good and therefore can’t be held liable? Yeah, so? What else would you expect? If that’s what you mean, all you’re doing is superimposing your morality where it doesn't belong. You get to judge his actions using your morality as a baseline, so to you his actions are atrocious, but you don’t get to judge his moral agency because his agency is exactly the same as yours. Hence.....subjective relativism in its proper sense.
———————

Not to mention of course the fact that "no life has preference over another" remains just an opinion, unless you support it with rational argument, — Isaac

Yes, it is an opinion. Any maxim is a product of reason, given from one mind, and internally maintained, which is the very definition of opinion. That opinion may be grounded in experience, teachings, culture, whatever, but the formulation of it is entirely a subjective enterprise. Similarly, the support is a product of reason antecedent to the formulation; reason is the means, opinion is the ends. When the opinion is expressed as a hypothesis in a theory, or a tenet of a philosophy, the rational argument is already given in order for the hypothesis or tenet to even exist. Although, I suppose a guy could advance a theory by just saying “x....” without saying why, but that’s pretty crappy theorizing and he probably doesn’t care about the seriousness with which it is received. Nevertheless, I, as a moral agent, am only concerned with the “life” part, not the content of it. No LIFE has preference, but certainly some life contents....what one has done with his....have greater value than others. But we don’t judge morality on content of life, but rather on content of self.
———————-

universalisation, which is the very thing you're now saying doesn't apply to murder — Isaac

Again...I’m not understanding this. If universalization means the end result of a maxim, then if I held the maxim “wanton violation of ownership of life” I would be happy if every single moral agent ever acted as if that were indeed a universal law that the ownership of no life be ever wantonly violated. Or, in short....conventionally spoken.....don’t murder anybody.

Yes. On here someplace was presented a scenario of a fully racist culture, with a single member’s instance of avowed non-racism, but without any visual experience of a non-racist conditions given in the scenario.

I agree with you that the instance of contrariness to a norm can only arise from some kind of doubt about that norm, which in turn can only arise from either experience, including language use, or feelings. I’m saying feelings are not sufficient for negating a norm, such that one is justified in claiming to be its opposite, even while feeling a dissatisfaction with it.

I see it that way, yes. Morality is a fundamental condition of being human. It’s not a thing; it’s the name given to one of the things that makes us human, separates us from any other biological agent. — Mww

Well, I agree with the first part. I'm not sure where you're getting your data from to support the second part, but that's probably a whole other discussion.

I see it as one determines what is a moral action by reference to its law. Here is is where relativism enters; a law is determined by the will so can be variable by the will determining what it is. One is free to choose that which defines him. It’s what makes all the same (we’re moral) but different (we’re free). — Mww

I completely agree with this, but this is really the whole of moral relativism as it's being presented here. No one is saying that morals are fished out of thin air at random. So the argument that rational thought is required to determine a course of action is never opposed. What is opposed is the presentation of objectivism here which states that, for example, murder is objectively wrong for all people at all times, which it appeared at first you were supporting.

That which is moral is always a rational determination, so “one should not kill” is just one more in an constant barrage of them. — Mww

Fine, but not only a rational determination, the subjective feeling that some law exists (I wouldn't put it that way myself, but I'm trying to use your terminology), must come first, and it is this which makes morality relative.

I can’t unpack what you’re calling these two conflicting maxims. — Mww

Don't worry, I had a completely different interpretation of what your paragraph here evidently meant, so my reply will make little sense in that context. I presumed you were referring to the circumstance of conflicting laws (where both states do not appear possible to bring about simultaneously. The trouble is, your deontological language just doesn't translate well into normal usage.

I don’t understand. The idiom means some small thing overriding some big thing. — Mww

The idiom refers to the wrong part of a duality being in charge (the dog should be the one wagging it's tail, not the other way round). What I'm saying here is that from my position people tend to justify, post hoc, that which they desire to do anyway. The complexity and flexibility of deontology in the regard you mention is exactly how this happens. I think it's a mistake to hide behind a woven rationalisation.

Again...I’m not understanding this. If universalization means the end result of a maxim, then if I held the maxim “wanton violation of ownership of life” I would be happy if every single moral agent ever acted as if that were indeed a universal law that the ownership of no life be ever wantonly violated. Or, in short....conventionally spoken.....don’t murder anybody. — Mww

We seem to have come from possible agreement back round to this absolutism. If you don't want to murder anyone, or live in a world where people do, then that's great, by me. But there's nothing irrational about saying I don't want anyone to murder me, but I shall murder whomever I please. Most of us do not need any rational calculation whatsoever to know that murder is wrong, and that's a good thing, it saves a lot of time and reduces errors.

But there's nothing irrational about saying I don't want anyone to murder me, but I shall murder whomever I please. — Isaac

Not if you restrict yourself to expressing desires. How about as a matter of reason? Seem reasonable to you? Not, what do I want, but rather what is, at the least, non-contradictory?

if it is reasonable that a) you don't want to be murdered, but b) you can yourself murder as you desire, then it is reasonable that others feel the same way. Not they they do, but that it is reasonable that they might. If, then, no one wants to be murdered, how can you reasonably - in this model - murder anyone?

The only possible answer is that in order to murder someone who does not want to be murdered, you must disregard both their desire and their reason (assuming that they were also being reasonable). But if there is any reason in morality, then this is neither moral nor reasonable. If by relativism you mean that morality is individual, that claim does not withstand this argument.

Or by "morality" do you mean you can do what you want, when you want?

Edit: I meant to add that I am sure this argument adds nothing to what you already know. So, if you've got a counter, I'd be an interested reader.

What is opposed is the presentation of objectivism here which states that, for example, murder is objectively wrong for all people at all times, which it appeared at first you were supporting. — Isaac

I have no truck with moral objectivism; it’s actually an impossible view, simply because humans are fundamentally all the same, but our entire evolution has been predicated on territory and culture, rather than uniting as a species. Some here have, nevertheless, advanced propositions favoring the possibility of specific inclinations in which murder, slavery, racism and such, are very close to being abhorant to all humans, which I don’t have any problem with. But inclinations are very far from moral interests, and are provably absent any aspect of universality whatsoever. What I do support, is if all humans held the categorical imperative, act only in such a way that the ownership of life be never violated.

Hopefully you recognize that while a categorical imperative describes one agent, the universality of it only has any relevance as if the same categorical imperative operates in all minds. You could say it is the hope of absolutism, or objective universality, but no one ever expects it as a result. It’s just a high-falootin’ way of saying, if you want to be the best you can possibly be, this is how.
——————

What I'm saying here is that from my position people tend to justify, post hoc, that which they desire to do anyway. The complexity and flexibility of deontology in the regard you mention is exactly how this happens. I think it's a mistake to hide behind a woven rationalisation. — Isaac

Deontology allows for this, because of the fragility and inconsistency in human activities. The categorical imperative is one thing, very strict, the bottom line, that which is the end game. But end games don’t permit inconsistencies, so if categorical imperatives were all there was, morality would always be contradicting itself. Hypothetical imperatives, as those with “should” as the actuator, as opposed to “shall”, only pronounce those acts which permit acquiescence to desires, wants, that for which the ends are always something else. Yes, the flexibility of deontology grants this, but it is not thereby post hoc, nor a woven rationalization. It is just weak, permissive....like us.
—————

But there's nothing irrational about saying I don't want anyone to murder me, but I shall murder whomever I please. — Isaac

You know, just these words, even in context, can only be understood as the epitome of irrational. I’m going to leave it alone until it becomes clearer to me exactly what you mean. Somehow I don’t think you meant what the words say.

I think that because Kant stipulates that morality is a fundamental human condition, and such morality in human form at least, is claimed to be predicated on the principle of duty, intentionality is given automatically. I mean...we couldn’t be not moral, so not matter what we actually do with respect to it, we are going to do something. We intend to do something in conjunction with the being of moral agency. That is not to say that other theories in moral philosophy doesn't or shouldn’t attribute more value to intentionality, so you might be quite right in stating our need. — Mww

My understanding is that Kant grounds the practical belief in human freedom on the universal fact of moral responsibility. You cannot live in any society and not be considered responsible for your actions towards others. Others may be inadvertently affected by your actions, but that is not generally considered to be a matter of moral responsibility unless it involves some definite negligence. I think the idea of deliberately acting towards others and being responsible for those actions is where the intentional dimension comes into play.

I might be concerned, for example, with appearing to do my duty, however that duty might be inter-subjectively conceived rather, than with actually doing it, and I might, on the strength of that concern, despite my lack of intention to do anything beyond keeping up the appearances, actually do my duty superlatively. Kant will not praise me for that!

Kant actually accords greater moral merit to one who does something that they really don't want to do out of a sense of duty, than someone who does their duty because that is what they love to do. Although I must say that seems perverse to me.

Not to mention of course the fact that "no life has preference over another" remains just an opinion, unless you support it with rational argument, — Isaac


Yes, it is an opinion. Any maxim is a product of reason, given from one mind, and internally maintained, which is the very definition of opinion. — Mww

I don't think it is merely an opinion. Considered in the absence of emotional bias, no life does have preference over any other, and that is precisely because there is no purely rational justification for preferring one life over another. There may be practically rational justifications for doing so such as 'her life is more important because she is the queen' and so on.

On the other hand, of course anyone is going to prefer the lives of their family over the lives of strangers, but that preference is exactly what the Kantian notion of duty would exhort you to ignore in determining where your duty lies.

Kant actually accords greater moral merit to one who does something that they really don't want to do out of a sense of duty, than someone who does their duty because that is what they love to do. Although I must say that seems perverse to me. — Janus

It’s a never ending reduction, seems like, doesn’t it? One does his duty when he doesn’t really want to, which is much more morally meritorious because it’s more painful than pleasurable, out of respect for the law to which duty requires your adherence. Coincidentally enough, respect is what Kant uses to replace the prevalent atttitude of his day, feelings. We normal people don’t usually consider respect a feeling, so it fits well as a replacement for it. That he was Prussian certainly didn’t hurt.
—————

her life is more important because she is the queen' — Janus

I’ll go ahead and disagree with this. Her actions may be more important because she must do queenly things, but her life, irrespective of Her Highness, still occupies space and time, is created, suffers, and belongs to her alone, just like mine. Just as in your “On the other hand.....”
—————-

I think the idea of deliberately acting towards others and being responsible for those actions is where the intentional dimension comes into play. — Janus

You know.....nobody talks too much about the responsibility side, do they. I know I’m more into the causation rather than the correlation, but one does necessarily follow from the other, true enough.

We normal people don’t usually consider respect a feeling, so it fits well as a replacement for it. — Mww

That's an interesting question; is respect a feeling? We may respect others, which if it were a feeling, would be a positive feeling, even if we don't like them, which is a negative feeling. I think this, inter alia, shows that feeling is not the primary element in moral dispositions. So for me the separation of thought from feeling and the privileging of one over the other, as expressed in formulas like "Reason is, and ought to be, slave to the passions" betrays somewhat simpleminded thinking.

I’ll go ahead and disagree with this. Her actions may be more important because she must do queenly things, but her life, irrespective of Her Highness, still occupies space and time, is created, suffers, and belongs to her alone, just like mine. Just as in your “On the other hand.....” — Mww

I agree, and I was not intending to support any kind of general claim that some people's lives could have, on account of their greater importance to the community, greater ethical value than the lives of others. On the other hand (as with my other "On the other hand") would we not think there was something wrong with a person who did not value the lives of his friends and family more than those of acquaintances, not to mention strangers? From a deontological perspective valuing your family over strangers could not be a virtue; but from the perspective of virtue ethics it might be.

I tend take some things from deontological ethics and some from virtue ethics; but I don't tend to take utilitarian ethics into general account (although I can imagine that it might have a place in some special circumstances).

Yes. I'd like to confirm points of agreement and/or mutual understanding.

One can change one's mind about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Everyday fact bears witness to this. We can look for ourselves. There are accounts/reports of it all over the place. We can look at those. We can be a part of it, and/or watch another go through it. We can - as a matter of everyday fact - help another go through it iff we know what it takes, want to do what it takes, and circumstances do not stand in the way.

That's a bit of our agreement, I think. Correct me if I'm wrong.

If all the above is acceptable enough...

So, one can doubt their original morality. It happens. How does it happen was the question I then sought answer for. You and I gave differing answers. I do not think/believe that they are utterly incommensurate/incompatible with one another. There seems to be much agreement. Although, I do think that there is a choice to made between which account is more reliable, truthful, dependable, trustworthy, etc.

We're talking about the same events. We're talking about the necessary preconditions of those events. The notion of a priori reason may well be capable of taking account of such an event. Everyone can understand the event despite not being able to use Kant's terminological framework as he did. So, neither the event nor understanding the event requires Kant's framework.

What is it doing here?

Morality, as current convention has it, is a term used in many ways. It is well-worn. There are a plurality of referents, conceptions, notions, and/or ideas referred to by the one who uses the term. That is true of all terminological usage. To avoid misinterpretation, I am using the term "morality" as a rigid designator. It always refers to codes of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. I want to see where this leads when held in light of my own notion of thought/belief.

When I use the term "moral belief", it refers to belief about the aforementioned rules(belief about morality). It is a kind of belief that is determined solely by virtue of it's content. All kind of thought/belief is determined by virtue of what it's about.

What counts as "moral" behaviour follows from one's notion of morality. Here I've not used the term "moral" as a synonym for good and/or acceptable. It is not being used to indicate my approval.

Is morality the sort of thing that can exist in it's entirety prior to language acquisition?

If we follow current convention, it cannot, unless the written rules for acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour are not existentially dependent upon common language. They are by definition existentially dependent upon common language use.

So, according to current convention. No. Morality cannot exist in it's entirety prior to common language.

This comes up against my own understanding of what counts as moral thought/belief. If moral thought/belief is about codes of conduct, then it only follows that moral thought/belief is itself existentially dependent upon common language. Moral thought/belief then, it must be admitted, is a product of thinking about one's own pre-existing thought/belief.

That would fail to draw the distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. It would relegate all moral thought/belief as metacognitive in it's nature. But it's not. All deliberate oppositional change in one's original adopted morality is.

Something is wrong here... Clearly.

Interesting things happen when considering this; language is not required for thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. It is required for thought/belief about unacceptable thought, and/or belief.

So here we must make some sort of decisions.. Some may include...

1. Deny that a non-linguistic and/or pre-linguistic creature can form and/or hold meaningful thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour
2. Deny that all thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour counts as moral belief
3. Admit that current convention is found to be lacking explanatory power in this regard
4. Reject the framework(my method or convention's definition of "morality")

Or...

5. Come to the realization that the written rules of conduct consist entirely of and/or are otherwise underwritten by thought/belief statements:Thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

If all thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour counts as morality, then morality - in rudimentary form - is not existentially dependent upon common language.

But there's nothing irrational about saying I don't want anyone to murder me, but I shall murder whomever I please.
— Isaac

You know, just these words, even in context, can only be understood as the epitome of irrational. I’m going to leave it alone until it becomes clearer to me exactly what you mean. Somehow I don’t think you meant what the words say. — Mww

Double standard hard at work.

To doubt what is being taught, one must have a baseline from which to doubt. All doubt is belief-based. To doubt 'X' is to doubt that 'X' is true. Let X be a statement of thought/belief.

During the formation of one's first world-view, the teachers can be many, and the teachers can be few. It is entirely possible to doubt the truthfulness of what is being taught in all those cases, if the student has pre-existing thought/belief that is contrary and/or otherwise places the teaching under scrutiny. If one attempts to teach a child that all people of a certain group are this or that, and the student knows someone of that group that is not, then the student already has the black swan in mind.

Sapientia's candidate does not preclude this.

If the candidate had but one teacher or set of teachers all of whom held the same sort of unshakable certainty, and whose belief system actually glorified and looked fondly upon continuing to hold that belief even in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary...

In these cases it ain't so easy to change one's mind.

I'd say that any moral stance, n, is rational only in relation to some other, effectively foundational stance or desire, goal, etc., m, where n is either a consequence of or prerequisite for m. — Terrapin Station

That's what certain rationalist philosophers and their fanboys either miss or try in vain to overcome. This was Hume's great contribution to moral philosophy. From what I know of Kantian philosophy, and from what I've seen presented here, nothing in the aforementioned even comes close to a refutation of this point. It is just words on a screen which achieve nothing. Those continually submitting this text seem to be under the illusion that they've actually achieved something of substance. It is quite absurdly humorous.

if it is reasonable that a) you don't want to be murdered, but b) you can yourself murder as you desire, then it is reasonable that others feel the same way. — tim wood

First of all, you've made a very important change to what I actually said which makes all the difference. I said "I shall murder whomever I please" and you re-quoted it as "you can yourself murder as you desire".

The use of the word 'can' begs the question because it presumes a priori that there is a universal moral code that one might consult to see if I 'can' murder someone, otherwise what would the opposite mean? So the first problem is that the proposition you're asking me to counter makes no sense unless I already presume moral objectivism (we've been here before). I mean, what else would "I can murder" mean without presuming there is a universal moral law? - I'm physically capable of murder? - Well, that definitely could be the case for some and not others.

Secondly, even if one were to get around the 'can' issue. Let's say hypothetically that the whole world is sat round a table deciding what 'The Law' should be, and I propose "No one can murder me, but I can murder whomever I choose". You might say then that is not a very rational suggestion because if everyone adopted it, my first desire (to not be murdered) would be logically frustrated by my second (that I may murder whomever I choose). But this being the case relies not on pure reason, but on a fact about the world. If I behave some way, others are likely to copy. If I think it reasonable that I can murder whomever I please, others may too. Again here you're begging the question with regards to reason being universal. In reality, I have no reason at all to think that, just because I propose to murder whomever I please, that other people will reach the same conclusion (note will reach, not may reach, because without already assuming a universal moral law, 'may reach', as in 'allowed to' doesn't make any sense). I actually observe a world in which most people refrain from murder even when they can get away with it, so I've no reason not to presume they will continue to do so despite my new law.

Thirdly, the desire to avoid being murdered, and the desire to murder are not necessarily equal, so to say that the second part irrationally frustrates the first is incorrect. It may frustrate the first (in specific social environments, as mentioned above), but that is often entirely necessary of two conflicting desires. Saying "I may eat as much chocolate as I like, and others may restrict my access to chocolate" is not irrational, its a sensible diet plan. There is the desire to eat chocolate, and the desire to stay thin, and they conflict with one another.

Fourthly, there is the issue of granularity. Even if, despite all that, we remain committed deontologists, but nonetheless psychopaths. We can simply re-write our law. I {people called Jim born on 15th July 1965, with brown hair, blue eyes and an evil mustache} may murder whomever I please, but no one without those credentials may murder me. Now, if I presume that is rational, then I may presume everyone else would reach the same conclusion, which is fine by me.

Hopefully you recognize that while a categorical imperative describes one agent, the universality of it only has any relevance as if the same categorical imperative operates in all minds. You could say it is the hope of absolutism, or objective universality, but no one ever expects it as a result. It’s just a high-falootin’ way of saying, if you want to be the best you can possibly be, this is how. — Mww

I see what you're saying, but think you're fixing something which isn't broken. I don't think there is any evidence at all that people need guidance rationally through such a vague mechanism. Ask a five year old if they think it's OK to kill another person, or steal. They've already picked up that it isn't and they're hardly masters of rational thought. Our biology is far more powerful than our rationality and is, by weight of overwhelming evidence, very obviously the thing in charge. Luckily, for our rapidly changing environment, we come built in with a mechanism to adapt, we copy others. We behave the way we see others behave. We induct rules from those observations in the same way we learn the rules of language. So we don't need complex deontology. Basic functional society is enough and that requires that we get the social environment right, not moralise. It's like trying to talk a cog into playing the right role in a machine rather than just putting it in the right place for it to do so.

You know, just these words, even in context, can only be understood as the epitome of irrational. I’m going to leave it alone until it becomes clearer to me exactly what you mean. Somehow I don’t think you meant what the words say. — Mww

Please see my reply to Tim above.

How can one overcome racism in the example provided s/he has no external source aside from the racist imbedded language use s/he learns? — creativesoul

What are you even doing with the thought experiment I introduced? Must you take everything on one of your peculiar tangents? The point I was making was simple enough and seems uncontroversial. People are only resisting it because they don't want to concede.

Allow me to get you back on track:

There's nothing which makes it impossible for one to deviate from the herd-morality prevalent in a society, and to deviate in a good way. The adherents of herd-morality commit the fallacy of only considering scenarios where the herd-morality conforms with their own morality, and so they naturally judge deviation as bad. But when they're confronted with a scenario where the herd-morality doesn't conform with their own morality, as with the racism example, they don't know how to reasonably justify their stance, which explains the irrational dismissiveness I have received. Special pleading and irrational denial is no reasonable justification.

These denialists don't even realise that they're tacitly appealing to their own individual sense of morality here, which is evidently primary.

And again, to be clear, I have not once suggested any sort of absolute isolation or immunity of any external influential factors. Nonconformity is very much possible, and very much not attributable to the herd. Though it can be somewhat rare for an individual to stand out from the herd, to deviate from a dominant culture, it can and does happen, and that is because we are individual moral agents and not Borg.

This is the nail in the coffin. The responses, if there are any, will probably just be more words on a screen which achieve nothing. And one thing is certain, ramblings about "thought/belief" and "existential dependency" and "prior to language acquisition" won't do anything except provide those of us in the know with entertainment. It is even more entertaining when someone actually takes it seriously and tries to make sense out of nonsense. (Perhaps by "all mimsy were the borogoves", he meant...). So by all means, please continue down this route, and I'll grab some more popcorn.

I remember when @Mww was still sensible enough to side with me over @creativesoul. Now those two are all chummy and he is bitterly set against me, even though I talk way more sense.

I’m saying feelings are not sufficient for negating a norm, such that one is justified in claiming to be its opposite, even while feeling a dissatisfaction with it.

Well they are in my case. If you were to take me to a time and place where racism was very much the norm, then I assure you I would stand by my feelings against it. I'm not that fickle or sheeplike.

Fine, but not only a rational determination, the subjective feeling that some law exists (I wouldn't put it that way myself, but I'm trying to use your terminology), must come first, and it is this which makes morality relative. — Isaac

Yes, and again, this relates to Hume. It was he who made these brilliant points revealing the fundamental nature of morality. The subjective feeling comes first, and is primary, and then the rational determination follows suit. Or, as Hume famously put it, reason is the slave of the passions.

Kant is mostly known in ethics for introducing a novel way of going about morality, how to determine right and wrong, which pales in comparison to what Hume did in this branch of philosophy, in my opinion.

The idiom refers to the wrong part of a duality being in charge (the dog should be the one wagging it's tail, not the other way round). What I'm saying here is that from my position people tend to justify, post hoc, that which they desire to do anyway. The complexity and flexibility of deontology in the regard you mention is exactly how this happens. I think it's a mistake to hide behind a woven rationalisation. — Isaac

Yes!

But there's nothing irrational about saying I don't want anyone to murder me, but I shall murder whomever I please. — Isaac

Yes, and "tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger".

If that is the case, then n as a prerequisite for m contradicts m being an effectively foundational stance. N can’t be both before and after m if m is the foundation. — Mww

For example, let's say that Joe has a love of a particular part of the Amazon and really wants to live there, so he wants to build a house there. It turns out that he won't be able to do that without the approval and assistance of a nearby tribe. But the nearby tribe won't cooperate unless Joe, who is a doctor, agrees to provide free medical care for the tribe in emergencies, and free checkups every year. So it's a prerequisite for meeting Joe's desire to build his house that he agrees with the moral stance that he should provide free medical care to the tribe in exchange for their cooperation. So a moral stance that's a prerequisite to a foundational desire for Joe is rational to adopt.

It's easy to set up a foundational moral stance example in a similar vein.

To doubt what is being taught, one must have a baseline from which to doubt. All doubt is belief-based. To doubt 'X' is to doubt that 'X' is true. Let X be a statement of thought/belief. — creativesoul

Struggling to see what any of this has to do with morality, but my best attempt at piecing together your line of argument is to something like -

Morality is a set of rules we learn by observation and we cannot doubt the rules we first learn unless we have cause to doubt. We must be presented with some alternative belief system to weigh against the baseline one.

But if I have your line of argument right, then how does it explain the fact that lesions in the medial prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and different locations within the bilateral temporal lobes, can cause people previously disposed to sociable behaviour to become prone to violence, theft and even murder. If the proscription against those things is a linguistic, or learned one which can only be changed by doubt, why would specific brain damage have an effect on moral behaviour?

First of all, you've made a very important change to what I actually said which makes all the difference. I said "I shall murder whomever I please" and you re-quoted it as "you can yourself murder as you desire".

The use of the word 'can' begs the question because it presumes a priori that there is a universal moral code that one might consult to see if I 'can' murder someone, otherwise what would the opposite mean? So the first problem is that the proposition you're asking me to counter makes no sense unless I already presume moral objectivism (we've been here before). I mean, what else would "I can murder" mean without presuming there is a universal moral law? - I'm physically capable of murder? - Well, that definitely could be the case for some and not others. — Isaac

Indeed, we have. How many times now? A hundred? A thousand? I lost count a long time ago. We have over fifty pages of this now. Pretty crazy.

I see what you're saying, but think you're fixing something which isn't broken. I don't think there is any evidence at all that people need guidance rationally through such a vague mechanism. Ask a five year old if they think it's OK to kill another person, or steal. They've already picked up that it isn't and they're hardly masters of rational thought. Our biology is far more powerful than our rationality and is, by weight of overwhelming evidence, very obviously the thing in charge. Luckily, for our rapidly changing environment, we come built in with a mechanism to adapt, we copy others. We behave the way we see others behave. We induct rules from those observations in the same way we learn the rules of language. So we don't need complex deontology. Basic functional society is enough and that requires that we get the social environment right, not moralise. It's like trying to talk a cog into playing the right role in a machine rather than just putting it in the right place for it to do so. — Isaac

Yes! I agree. The gist of that criticism of the categorical imperative is what I was getting at in my criticism of it in the last paragraph here, though we come at it from slightly different angles. You're good at explaining things. You have a way with words. Here's what I said of it earlier:

Bringing up hypothetical imperatives seems to miss the point of my criticism. Kant might well have had them in his sights, but so what? They make way more sense, and are way more relatable than his categorical imperative. I am criticising his categorical imperative. I am asserting that he largely failed, because the categorical imperative is largely alien and useless and ineffectual. I know enough about logic to recognise a logical conditional when I see one, and that is how it is commonly argued. I'm just skipping ahead to that key bit. One can ask, "Why should I act only according to that maxim whereby I can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law?". And that's when the conditional kicks in. "Well, if you were to...". But I don't. And my morality is just fine, thanks. I know that intuitively. The categorical imperative is redundant and artificial. I am not subservient to any supposed universal moral laws. That is not my measure of right and wrong. My own conscience is sufficient for the job. How can that objection be overcome? I don't think that it can. That's what I meant when I said that it has no force over myself and others. It cannot override my moral foundation in moral feelings. It is just a curious little thought experiment, but it isn't at all practical or realistic. What's practical and realistic is simply appealing to your conscience without any need for Kant's abstract and rationalist way of thinking.

Indeed, we have. How many times now? A hundred? A thousand? I lost count a long time ago. We have over fifty pages of this now. Pretty crazy. — S

Yes. Half the arguments in this thread could be summed up as "if we presume moral universals, then morality must be universal". The issue at stake is really what it is reasonable to presume, not what is the case once we have made certain presumptions.

Yes! I agree. That's what I was getting at in my criticism here. — S

Yes, I see you've already covered this. I particularly liked your "I am not subservient to any supposed universal moral laws". Its hard to keep track of all everyone's said as I think everyone has said everything at least ten times by now.

Still... Once more unto the breach...

Struggling to see what any of this has to do with morality... — Isaac

He's just running off on a pet tangent like he usually does. This time it began by picking up on my thought experiment directed against Janus's weak position, where I contrasted individual morality with herd-morality regarding racism. I accept that it can work both ways: that the individual can be wrong or that the herd can be wrong, but Janus seemed to be suggesting that the herd is right by default and individual morality doesn't matter, which is easily refuted by multiple examples, racism being just one of them.

Half the arguments in this thread could be summed up as "if we presume moral universals, then morality must be universal". — Isaac

Yes!!! That's their argument exposed in true form! Yet there's over fifty pages of text! Unbelievable.

Yes, I see you've already covered this. I particularly liked your "I am not subservient to any supposed universal moral laws". Its hard to keep track of all everyone's said as I think everyone has said everything at least ten times by now.

Still... Once more unto the breach... — Isaac

Haha, I remember about thirty pages ago predicting that the same problems would just reoccur over another twenty pages.

Lo and behold! :lol: