if we have an understanding of what is involved in moral duty, that it is nonetheless the case that we still need the unadulterated intention to carry it out. — Janus
One can hold the maxim “one should not kill”, and still go about his business as a soldier in the combat field with his morality intact. — Mww
thou shall not kill”, an absolute declarative statement per the Ten Commandments, e.g., is irrational, because it is impossible in all cases to avoid it and simultaneously hold with a more valuable maxim “the wonton violation of ownership of life is wrong”. — Mww
“no life has preference over another”, and the hypothetical imperative standing for what the possible volition actually becomes, “ therefore one has no right to kill”. Because killing is not always avoidable, this hypothetical, while not tacit permission to kill, maintains an agent’s sense of personal moral worthiness if he should be put in a position where he must exercise his prerogatives. — Mww
So morality is something more than sticking to a rule — Isaac
......(or, as below) one determines what is a moral action by reference to its objective — Isaac
what "one should not kill" could possibly mean in terms of rationally determining that which is moral. — Isaac
how is the relative value of these two conflicting maxims judged? — Isaac
tail wagging the dog. — Isaac
Not to mention of course the fact that "no life has preference over another" remains just an opinion, unless you support it with rational argument, — Isaac
universalisation, which is the very thing you're now saying doesn't apply to murder — Isaac
I see it that way, yes. Morality is a fundamental condition of being human. It’s not a thing; it’s the name given to one of the things that makes us human, separates us from any other biological agent. — Mww
I see it as one determines what is a moral action by reference to its law. Here is is where relativism enters; a law is determined by the will so can be variable by the will determining what it is. One is free to choose that which defines him. It’s what makes all the same (we’re moral) but different (we’re free). — Mww
That which is moral is always a rational determination, so “one should not kill” is just one more in an constant barrage of them. — Mww
I can’t unpack what you’re calling these two conflicting maxims. — Mww
I don’t understand. The idiom means some small thing overriding some big thing. — Mww
Again...I’m not understanding this. If universalization means the end result of a maxim, then if I held the maxim “wanton violation of ownership of life” I would be happy if every single moral agent ever acted as if that were indeed a universal law that the ownership of no life be ever wantonly violated. Or, in short....conventionally spoken.....don’t murder anybody. — Mww
But there's nothing irrational about saying I don't want anyone to murder me, but I shall murder whomever I please. — Isaac
What is opposed is the presentation of objectivism here which states that, for example, murder is objectively wrong for all people at all times, which it appeared at first you were supporting. — Isaac
What I'm saying here is that from my position people tend to justify, post hoc, that which they desire to do anyway. The complexity and flexibility of deontology in the regard you mention is exactly how this happens. I think it's a mistake to hide behind a woven rationalisation. — Isaac
But there's nothing irrational about saying I don't want anyone to murder me, but I shall murder whomever I please. — Isaac
I think that because Kant stipulates that morality is a fundamental human condition, and such morality in human form at least, is claimed to be predicated on the principle of duty, intentionality is given automatically. I mean...we couldn’t be not moral, so not matter what we actually do with respect to it, we are going to do something. We intend to do something in conjunction with the being of moral agency. That is not to say that other theories in moral philosophy doesn't or shouldn’t attribute more value to intentionality, so you might be quite right in stating our need. — Mww
Not to mention of course the fact that "no life has preference over another" remains just an opinion, unless you support it with rational argument, — Isaac
Yes, it is an opinion. Any maxim is a product of reason, given from one mind, and internally maintained, which is the very definition of opinion. — Mww
Kant actually accords greater moral merit to one who does something that they really don't want to do out of a sense of duty, than someone who does their duty because that is what they love to do. Although I must say that seems perverse to me. — Janus
her life is more important because she is the queen' — Janus
I think the idea of deliberately acting towards others and being responsible for those actions is where the intentional dimension comes into play. — Janus
We normal people don’t usually consider respect a feeling, so it fits well as a replacement for it. — Mww
I’ll go ahead and disagree with this. Her actions may be more important because she must do queenly things, but her life, irrespective of Her Highness, still occupies space and time, is created, suffers, and belongs to her alone, just like mine. Just as in your “On the other hand.....” — Mww
But there's nothing irrational about saying I don't want anyone to murder me, but I shall murder whomever I please.
— Isaac
You know, just these words, even in context, can only be understood as the epitome of irrational. I’m going to leave it alone until it becomes clearer to me exactly what you mean. Somehow I don’t think you meant what the words say. — Mww
I'd say that any moral stance, n, is rational only in relation to some other, effectively foundational stance or desire, goal, etc., m, where n is either a consequence of or prerequisite for m. — Terrapin Station
if it is reasonable that a) you don't want to be murdered, but b) you can yourself murder as you desire, then it is reasonable that others feel the same way. — tim wood
Hopefully you recognize that while a categorical imperative describes one agent, the universality of it only has any relevance as if the same categorical imperative operates in all minds. You could say it is the hope of absolutism, or objective universality, but no one ever expects it as a result. It’s just a high-falootin’ way of saying, if you want to be the best you can possibly be, this is how. — Mww
You know, just these words, even in context, can only be understood as the epitome of irrational. I’m going to leave it alone until it becomes clearer to me exactly what you mean. Somehow I don’t think you meant what the words say. — Mww
How can one overcome racism in the example provided s/he has no external source aside from the racist imbedded language use s/he learns? — creativesoul
I’m saying feelings are not sufficient for negating a norm, such that one is justified in claiming to be its opposite, even while feeling a dissatisfaction with it.
Fine, but not only a rational determination, the subjective feeling that some law exists (I wouldn't put it that way myself, but I'm trying to use your terminology), must come first, and it is this which makes morality relative. — Isaac
The idiom refers to the wrong part of a duality being in charge (the dog should be the one wagging it's tail, not the other way round). What I'm saying here is that from my position people tend to justify, post hoc, that which they desire to do anyway. The complexity and flexibility of deontology in the regard you mention is exactly how this happens. I think it's a mistake to hide behind a woven rationalisation. — Isaac
But there's nothing irrational about saying I don't want anyone to murder me, but I shall murder whomever I please. — Isaac
If that is the case, then n as a prerequisite for m contradicts m being an effectively foundational stance. N can’t be both before and after m if m is the foundation. — Mww
To doubt what is being taught, one must have a baseline from which to doubt. All doubt is belief-based. To doubt 'X' is to doubt that 'X' is true. Let X be a statement of thought/belief. — creativesoul
First of all, you've made a very important change to what I actually said which makes all the difference. I said "I shall murder whomever I please" and you re-quoted it as "you can yourself murder as you desire".
The use of the word 'can' begs the question because it presumes a priori that there is a universal moral code that one might consult to see if I 'can' murder someone, otherwise what would the opposite mean? So the first problem is that the proposition you're asking me to counter makes no sense unless I already presume moral objectivism (we've been here before). I mean, what else would "I can murder" mean without presuming there is a universal moral law? - I'm physically capable of murder? - Well, that definitely could be the case for some and not others. — Isaac
I see what you're saying, but think you're fixing something which isn't broken. I don't think there is any evidence at all that people need guidance rationally through such a vague mechanism. Ask a five year old if they think it's OK to kill another person, or steal. They've already picked up that it isn't and they're hardly masters of rational thought. Our biology is far more powerful than our rationality and is, by weight of overwhelming evidence, very obviously the thing in charge. Luckily, for our rapidly changing environment, we come built in with a mechanism to adapt, we copy others. We behave the way we see others behave. We induct rules from those observations in the same way we learn the rules of language. So we don't need complex deontology. Basic functional society is enough and that requires that we get the social environment right, not moralise. It's like trying to talk a cog into playing the right role in a machine rather than just putting it in the right place for it to do so. — Isaac
Bringing up hypothetical imperatives seems to miss the point of my criticism. Kant might well have had them in his sights, but so what? They make way more sense, and are way more relatable than his categorical imperative. I am criticising his categorical imperative. I am asserting that he largely failed, because the categorical imperative is largely alien and useless and ineffectual. I know enough about logic to recognise a logical conditional when I see one, and that is how it is commonly argued. I'm just skipping ahead to that key bit. One can ask, "Why should I act only according to that maxim whereby I can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law?". And that's when the conditional kicks in. "Well, if you were to...". But I don't. And my morality is just fine, thanks. I know that intuitively. The categorical imperative is redundant and artificial. I am not subservient to any supposed universal moral laws. That is not my measure of right and wrong. My own conscience is sufficient for the job. How can that objection be overcome? I don't think that it can. That's what I meant when I said that it has no force over myself and others. It cannot override my moral foundation in moral feelings. It is just a curious little thought experiment, but it isn't at all practical or realistic. What's practical and realistic is simply appealing to your conscience without any need for Kant's abstract and rationalist way of thinking.
Indeed, we have. How many times now? A hundred? A thousand? I lost count a long time ago. We have over fifty pages of this now. Pretty crazy. — S
Yes! I agree. That's what I was getting at in my criticism here. — S
Struggling to see what any of this has to do with morality... — Isaac
Half the arguments in this thread could be summed up as "if we presume moral universals, then morality must be universal". — Isaac
Yes, I see you've already covered this. I particularly liked your "I am not subservient to any supposed universal moral laws". Its hard to keep track of all everyone's said as I think everyone has said everything at least ten times by now.
Still... Once more unto the breach... — Isaac
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