Grammar, usually taken to consist of the rules of correct syntactic and semantic usage, becomes, in Wittgenstein’s hands, the wider—and more elusive—network of rules which determine what linguistic move is allowed as making sense, and what isn’t. This notion replaces the stricter and purer logic, which played such an essential role in the Tractatus in providing a scaffolding for language and the world. Indeed, “Essence is expressed in grammar … Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar)” (PI 371, 373). The “rules” of grammar are not mere technical instructions from on-high for correct usage; rather, they express the norms for meaningful language. Contrary to empirical statements, rules of grammar describe how we use words in order to both justify and criticize our particular utterances. But as opposed to grammar-book rules, they are not idealized as an external system to be conformed to. Moreover, they are not appealed to explicitly in any formulation, but are used in cases of philosophical perplexity to clarify where language misleads us into false illusions. — SEP article
The use of a word, Wittgenstein averred, is determined by the rules for the use of that word (AWL 30). For using words in speech is a rule-governed activity. The rules for the use of a word are constitutive of what Wittgenstein called 'its grammar'. He used the expression 'grammar' in an idiosyncratic way to refer to all the rules that determine the use of a word, i.e. both rules of grammar acknowledged by linguists and also what linguists call 'the lexicon' and exclude from grammar - i.e. the explanations of meaning (LWL 46f.). To grammar belongs everything that determines sense, everything that has to be settled antecedently to questions about truth. The grammar of an expression, in Wittgenstein's generous use of 'grammar', also specifies the licit combinatorial possibilities of the expression, 'i.e. which combinations make sense and which don't, which are allowed and which are not allowed' (ibid.; emphasis added). 'What interests us in the sign', he wrote, 'the meaning which matters for us, is what is embodied in the grammar of the sign.... Grammar is the account books of language' (PG 87). Wittgenstein contended that the questions 'How is the word used?' and 'What is the grammar of the word?' are one and the same question (ibid.). The use of a word is what is defined by the rules for its use, just as the use of the king in chess is defined by the rules (AWL 48). The meaning of a sign lies in the rules according to which it is applied, in the rules that prescribe its use (MS 114 (Vol. X), 4r). Two words have the same meaning, he said, if they have the same rules for their use (AWL 3). — G. P. Baker P. M. S. Hacker
One of the things Witty does in the PI is to expose the differential nature of rules, the fact that rules can and do play different roles in language (e.g. §54), so to say something like "For using words in speech is a rule-governed activity" is not so much wrong as simply empty - this says nothing in particular. — StreetlightX
Furthermore, Witty's constant refrain about rules governing rules ad infinitum (e.g. §84, §86) - and the ridiculousness of such an idea - also shows, to me anyway, what little stock he put in the idea of rules 'governing' language. — StreetlightX
The rule itself is dead. — StreetlightX
But then the use of the word is unregulated — the ‘game’ we play with it is unregulated.” —– It is not everywhere bounded by rules; but no more are there any rules for how high one may throw the ball in tennis, or how hard, yet tennis is a game for all that, and has rules too. (§68)
133. We don’t want to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.
To follow a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (usages, institutions).
To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to have mastered a technique. (§199)
There can be no debate about whether these or other rules are the right ones for the word “not” (I mean, whether they accord with its meaning). For without these rules, the word has as yet no meaning; and if we change the rules, it now has another meaning (or none), and in that case we may just as well change the word too. (Boxed note (b), p. 155)
558. What does it mean to say that the “is” in “The rose is red” has a different meaning from the “is” in “Two times two is four”? If it is answered that it means that different rules are valid for these two words, the retort is that we have only one word here. — And if I attend only to the grammatical rules, these do allow the use of the word “is” in both kinds of context. — But the rule which shows that the word “is” has different meanings in these sentences is the one allowing us to replace the word “is” in the second sentence by the sign of equality, and forbidding this substitution in the first sentence.
How do we learn rules? How do we follow them? Wherefrom the standards which decide if a rule is followed correctly? Are they in the mind, along with a mental representation of the rule? Do we appeal to intuition in their application? Are they socially and publicly taught and enforced? In typical Wittgensteinian fashion, the answers are not pursued positively; rather, the very formulation of the questions as legitimate questions with coherent content is put to the test. For indeed, it is both the Platonistic and mentalistic pictures which underlie asking questions of this type, and Wittgenstein is intent on freeing us from these assumptions. Such liberation involves elimination of the need to posit any sort of external or internal authority beyond the actual applications of the rule. — SEP article
To grammar belongs everything that determines sense, everything that has to be settled antecedently to questions about truth. — G. P. Baker P. M. S. Hacker
Rules are everywhere spoken about with suspicion, — StreetlightX
There can be no debate about whether these or other rules are the right ones for the word “not” (I mean, whether they accord with its meaning). For without these rules, the word has as yet no meaning; and if we change the rules, it now has another meaning (or none), and in that case we may just as well change the word too. — W
If Wittgenstein shows that "rules can and do play different roles in language", then clearly there are "rules...in language". These rules must govern the language, given that is the purpose of rules. — Luke
Rules of use, (grammar) determine sense. Without these rules a word has no meaning, meaning is use. — unenlightened
If Wittgenstein shows that "rules can and do play different roles in language", then clearly there are "rules...in language". These rules must govern the language, given that is the purpose of rules. — Luke
Grammar is structural, form without content.
— Fooloso4
This is not Wittgenstein's idea of grammar. — Luke
… network of rules which determine what linguistic move is allowed as making sense, and what isn’t.
“Essence is expressed in grammar … Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar)” (PI 371, 373).
If Wittgenstein shows that "rules can and do play different roles in language", then clearly there are "rules...in language". These rules must govern the language, given that is the purpose of rules. — Luke
Rules of use, (grammar) determine sense. Without these rules a word has no meaning, meaning is use. — unenlightened
125 ... The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique,
for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not
turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled
in our own rules.
This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e.
get a clear view of).
It throws light on our concept of meaning something. For in those
cases things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is
just what we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: "I didn't
mean it like that."
The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is
the philosophical problem.
126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither
explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view
there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no
interest to us.
One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible
before all new discoveries and inventions.
127. The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders
for a particular purpose. — PI
the meaning of the words used is unique to that particular instance of use. That's the basis of "meaning is use". — Metaphysician Undercover
I very much dislike readings of Wittgenstein which equate him with saying that language is a 'rule governed activity'. There is a sense in which this is the case, but it's a sense that must be so heavily qualified and so massively underwritten by conditionals that I think it does far more to obscure and mislead than clarify the issues. One of the things Witty does in the PI is to expose the differential nature of rules, the fact that rules can and do play different roles in language (e.g. §54), so to say something like "For using words in speech is a rule-governed activity" is not so much wrong as simply empty - this says nothing in particular. Furthermore, Witty's constant refrain about rules governing rules ad infinitum (e.g. §84, §86) - and the ridiculousness of such an idea - also shows, to me anyway, what little stock he put in the idea of rules 'governing' language. — StreetlightX
In other words, our analysis of what he's saying tends to be the kind of analysis that Wittgenstein is criticizing, not always, but much of the time. We tend to look at his thinking in terms of - is this true or false, but there is a sense where it goes beyond this kind of bipolar thinking. — Sam26
There must be some consistency of use, to be able to use words at all. Even my lying monkey is using 'ook' ground-wise. 'Slab' means slab, the same every time. it might mean pass a slab, I want a slab, have you a slab, look there's a slab, slabs are the greatest, this is a slab... it always means slab-wise. — unenlightened
Words evolve — Isaac
'I don't know what you mean by "glory",' Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. 'Of course you don't — till I tell you. I meant "there's a nice knock-down argument for you!"'
'But "glory" doesn't mean "a nice knock-down argument",' Alice objected.
'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.'
'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.'
'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master — that's all.'
Tractatus Wittgenstein saw language as the screwdriver, Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein sees it as the stick. — Isaac
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein sees language in very precise terms, that is, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the names within a proposition and the objects that make up facts. — Sam26
His aim is to justify the vagueness of propositions (Nb p. 70), which is also his aim in the Investigations — Sam26
It's probably the case that teaching children in the early 20's helped him view language in a much more pragmatic way. — Sam26
Yes, but does he not go on to say "It is clear that I know what I mean by the vague proposition", I think the one-to-one correspondence is part of the aim, and I would probably say that makes a significant enough difference. — Isaac
That cannot be true.There must be some consistency of use, to be able to use words at all. — unenlightened
I'm not comfortable with these formulations which smell too much of metaphysics. And they seem out of keeping with the paragraphs both before and after it. Any thoughts? — StreetlightX
We predicate of the thing what lies in the method of representing it. Impressed by the possibility of a comparison, we think we are perceiving a state of affairs of the highest generality,
101. We want to say that there can't be any vagueness in logic. The idea now absorbs us, that the ideal 'must' be found in reality. Meanwhile we do not as yet see how it occurs there, nor do we understand the nature of this "must". We think it must be in reality; for we think we already see it there.
102. The strict and clear rules of the logical structure of propositions appear to us as something in the background—hidden in the medium of the understanding. I already see them (even though
through a medium): for I understand the propositional sign, I use it to say something.
103. The ideal, as we think of it, is unshakable. You can never get outside it; you must always turn back. There is no outside; outside you cannot breathe.—Where does this idea come from? It is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off
(from 108) The preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination round. (One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need)
Kant identifies transcendental illusion with the propensity to “take a subjective necessity of a connection of our concepts…for an objective necessity in the determination of things in themselves” (A297/B354). Very generally, Kant’s claim is that it is a peculiar feature of reason that it unavoidably takes its own subjective interests and principles to hold “objectively.” And it is this propensity, this “transcendental illusion,” according to Kant, that paves the way for metaphysics. — SEP
"Language (or thought) is something unique"—this proves to be a superstition (not a mistake!), itself produced by grammatical illusions.
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