The form of all propositions is the same. The form of all relations between objects is the same. Just because we say things about both houses and cows does not mean that houses and cows are the same. — Fooloso4

Yes, in the Tractatus it was put forward that all propositions have the same form, however this was abandoned later on. Anyway, what both houses and cows have in common, according to the Tractatus, is the pictorial/representational form, and so they can be depicted, we can form pictures of them, portray them in language. But we cannot make a picture of the pictorial form itself, and thus we cannot talk about it in the same way, or maybe at all, as we do with what this form represents, which was a common error made by philosophers.

But we cannot make a picture of the pictorial form itself, and thus we cannot talk about it in the same way, or maybe at all, as we do with what this form represents, which was a common error made by philosophers. — Pussycat

Extend this to the whole realm of the ethical and maybe then you will catch on and the misguided questioning will end.

Extend this to the whole realm of the ethical and maybe then you will catch on and the misguided questioning will end. — Fooloso4

Can't do that, since the ethical is treated differently: ethical propositions are not like factual propositions where we can talk about the facts but cannot depict their form. But rather they are alltogether senseless, in form and content both. Maybe this is where you are confused.

They are alike in that neither can be represented, yet you want to keep talking about them.

They are alike in that neither can be represented, yet you want to keep talking about them. — Fooloso4

Yes, because there is something about them that bugs me.

In factual propositions, facts can be represented - their content, but not the representational form. In ethical propositions, nothing can be represented.

I can extend something that is in analogy with something else. But here, factual propositions are not in analogy with ethical propositions, so I cannot extend, sorry. What I can do though, is similes. For which Wittgenstein says in the Lecture, if you remember, that once the simile goes away, then you are left with nonsense.

There are three kinds of propositions in the Tractatus: elementary, logical and ethical. They do not have the same form, in fact I think that ethical propositions are formless. But later on, Wittgenstein was forced to abandon elementary propositions, I guess this had an impact on the ethical as well.

In factual propositions, facts can be represented — Pussycat

All propositions are factual propositions.

In ethical propositions, nothing can be represented. — Pussycat

There are no ethical propositions. Once again:

6.42
Hence also there can be no ethical propositions.

There are three kinds of propositions in the Tractatus: elementary, logical and ethical. — Pussycat

There is only one kind of proposition. Elementary propositions are logical propositions.

They do not have the same form, in fact I think that ethical propositions are formless. — Pussycat

All propositions have the same form - logical form. It is not that ethical propositions are formless, it is that statements about ethics are not propositions.

6.53
The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions.

What he refers to as 'propositions' here are not strictly speaking propositions at all. They are senseless statements. Statements that do not represent any state of affairs.

But later on, Wittgenstein was forced to abandon elementary propositions, I guess this had an impact on the ethical as well. — Pussycat

He abandoned them because he abandoned the idea of simple objects and thus the connection of names that are elementary propositions. It has nothing to do with ethics.

There are no ethical propositions. Once again — Fooloso4

Yes, this is the conclusion, but we start our investigation assuming there are.

All propositions have the same form - logical form. It is not that ethical propositions are formless, it is that statements about ethics are not propositions — Fooloso4

Yes I suppose you could say that. Why can you not say that ethical propositions are not propositions because they lack form?

There is only one kind of proposition. Elementary propositions are logical propositions — Fooloso4

What about logical propositions such as the modus ponens? Does it represent a state of affairs?

Yes, this is the conclusion, but we start our investigation assuming there are. — Pussycat

That may be your assumption but it is not an assumption that informs any part of the Tractatus.

Why can you not say that ethical propositions are not propositions because they lack form? — Pussycat

It is not simply lacking form but lacking logical form, which means they do not say anything about what is the case.

What about logical propositions such as the modus ponens? Does it represent a state of affairs? — Pussycat

6.1264 Every proposition of logic is a modus ponens presented in signs. (And the modus ponens can not be expressed by a proposition.)

That may be your assumption but it is not an assumption that informs any part of the Tractatus. — Fooloso4

I don't think it is just my assumption. I mean, in our time and in Wittgenstein's time, there is a vast amount of ethical propositions before me and him, so in order to examine them, we need to take them at face value, what these ethical propositions purport themselves to be, regardless what you, me or anybody else think of them. But anyway, little does it matter.

It is not simply lacking form but lacking logical form, which means they do not say anything about what is the case. — Fooloso4

So there, you agree that they lack form or logical form?

6.1264 Every proposition of logic is a modus ponens presented in signs. (And the modus ponens can not be expressed by a proposition.)

So are propositions of logic indeed propositions, or something else? Do they have the same form as elementary propositions?

I don't think it is just my assumption. — Pussycat

Wittgenstein rejects that assumption. If you reach the end of the Tractatus and still hold to that assumption then you have not understood the text.

So there, you agree that they lack form or logical form? — Pussycat

If you have read what I have been saying with due care and attention that is not a question you would ask. I made this point explicit when I discussed the relevant passages. It is not a question of form but of logical form. They do not lack the form that governs sentence structure, that is, they are, in the ordinary sense, grammatically correct. They are not, however, based on names for objects in the world.

So are propositions of logic indeed propositions, or something else? Do they have the same form as elementary propositions? — Pussycat

6.1
The propositions of logic are tautologies.

6.11
The propositions of logic therefore say nothing. (They are the analytical propositions.)

6.12
The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal—logical— properties of language, of the world.

6.121
The propositions of logic demonstrate the logical properties of propositions by combining them so as to form propositions that say nothing.

6.124
The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they represent it. They have no ‘subject-matter’. They presuppose that names have meaning and elementary propositions sense; and that is their connexion with the world. It is clear that something about the world must be indicated by the fact that certain combinations of symbols—whose essence involves the possession of a determinate character—are tautologies. This contains the decisive point. — Tractatus

If you reach the end of the Tractatus and still hold to that assumption then you have not understood the text. — Fooloso4

If you have read what I have been saying with due care and attention that is not a question you would ask. — Fooloso4

You are so nice! :) You should have been a teacher or something similar, if you are not already, that is. But your approach to discourse resembles very much that of Wittgenstein's - I would say it is of the same form, logical or otherwise - at least in his early years, where he would beat the shit out of people, literally or metaphorically; Like he wrote to Russell at some point: "It distresses me that you did not understand the rule dealing with signs in my last letter because it bores me beyond words to explain it. If you thought about it for a bit you could discover it for yourself! I beg you to think about these matters for yourself: it is intolerable for me to repeat a written explanation which even the first time I gave only with the utmost repugnance".

One could say that this would be somewhat justified, if criticism was just, or the will good, but I don't think this is the case here.

You are so nice! :) — Pussycat

You set the adversarial tone several months ago.

You should have been a teacher or something similar, if you are not already, that is. — Pussycat

Kongzi (Confucius) said:

I will not enlighten a heart that is not already struggling to understand, nor will I provide the proper words to a tongue that is not already struggling to speak. If I hold up one corner of a problem and the student cannot come back to me with the other three, I will not attempt to instruct him again. (Analects 7.8)

You have been struggling to find where my interpretation goes wrong and/or where Wittgenstein's does, but the only things that you have pointed to is where you have gone wrong.

Socrates spoke differently to different people depending on their needs.

Lin Chi hit them with his stick ... out of kindness.

You seem to be unaware of the extent of my patience, even after it has been pointed out by another member.

A delicacy I say, a delicacy!

I'm thinking of buying this book, let me know what you think about it:

https://www.amazon.com/Wittgensteins-Tractatus-Critical-Exposition-Thought/dp/0631060707#customerReviews

I really can't say. I do not know the author or anything other than the title of the book and one positive review.

If you like to collect books that's one thing, but if your interest is in reading then there are, in my opinion, better sources, some of them free.

I really can't say. I do not know the author or anything other than the title of the book and one positive review.

If you like to collect books that's one thing, but if your interest is in reading then there are, in my opinion, better sources, some of them free. — Fooloso4

I've read PMS Hacker, and some others. The book I linked is very critical and technical, unlike others I've come across. What book would you recommend?

I have not read this work but I have read both editors and can strongly recommend them:

http://the-eye.eu/public/WorldTracker.org/Sociology/Philosophy%20-%20The%20Cambridge%20Companion%20Series/The%20Cambridge%20Companion%20to%20Wittgenstein.pdf

Thanks!

From the intro:

Ludwig Wittgenstein occupies a unique place in twentieth-century philosophy and he is for that reason difficult to subsume under the usual philosophical categories. What makes it difficult is first of all the unconventional cast of his mind, the radical nature of his philosophical proposals, and the experimental form he gave to their expression. The difficulty is magnified because he came to philosophy under complex conditions which make it plausible for some interpreters to connect him with Frege, Russell, and Moore, with the Vienna Circle, Oxford Language Philosophy, and the analytic tradition in philosophy as a whole, while others bring him together with Schopenhauer or Kierkegaard, with Derrida, Zen Buddhism, or avant-garde art. Add to this a culturally resonant background, an atypical life (at least for a modern philosopher), and a forceful yet troubled personality and the difficulty is complete. To some, he may appear primarily as a technical philosopher, but to others, he will be first and foremost an intriguing biographical subject, a cultural icon, or an exemplary figure in the intellectual life of the century.1 Our fascination with Wittgenstein is, so it seems, a function of our bewilderment over who he really is and what his work stands for.

I like.

An insightful, succinct, overview. One could write a book on several different things he touched on.

Well, it is such a common thing that discussions regarding ethics lead to the most violent of clashes, that would make anyone wonder what ethics is really about, what is really going on here. So much love, so much ethos, it's really mind blowing, I must say! :) One thing is certain though, no love is lost amidst the brotherhood, or the sisterhood.

what is really going on here. So much love, so much ethos, it's really mind blowing, I must say! :) — Pussycat

A delicacy!

You have been struggling to find where my interpretation goes wrong and/or where Wittgenstein's does, but the only things that you have pointed to is where you have gone wrong. — Fooloso4

Is this what I've been struggling to do? Because I was under the impression this whole time that we were working as a team, trying to figure out the text. Never crossed my mind that we were playing crossbows and catapults, with myself in the role of the attacker and you the defender. Are you in for teamwork or do you prefer going solo?

Never crossed my mind that we were playing crossbows and catapults, with myself in the role of the attacker and you the defender. — Pussycat

I will let the record speak for itself.

Are you in for teamwork or do you prefer going solo? — Pussycat

What teamwork? What part of the heavy lifting did you contribute when I went through the text?

How you say, it's the bollocks man! :yum:

You set the adversarial tone several months ago. — Fooloso4

Yes I did, I am no angel myself. Nevertheless, I gave you the benefit of the doubt, if you remember, whereas you did not. A lot has changed since, and it seems that the tables have turned. But I don't want any benefits, just to be treated fairly. I used to take your judgement seriously, but now it saddens me that I cannot do that anymore, since I believe it has been compromised by empathy towards my person. Unfair!

I will let the record speak for itself. — Fooloso4

Well let it, because statements like this one: "the only things that you have pointed to is where you have gone wrong", don't seem to do that, but rather speak on behalf of the record, or otherwise manipulate it.

What teamwork? What part of the heavy lifting did you contribute when I went through the text? — Fooloso4

On several occasions I tried to help you make your points clearer, either by paraphrasing them myself through my own eyes, or with my questions. On others, not so much. But I feel that you haven't given me this chance for my own contributions at all.

You seem to be unaware of the extent of my patience, even after it has been pointed out by another member. — Fooloso4

Ah yes, Amity, she fell sick of our bickering, and eventually left. To which I responded that she should look at it from my perspective as well. I mean, I certainly appreciate your efforts, as well as of others here, or elsewhere, regarding these so important existential matters, but what about me, what about my efforts, my patience, my world? Just because it hasn't been pointed out, it doesn't mean that they are non-existent, or otherwise worthless and meaningless. In any case, Wittgenstein said that all propositions carry the same value, as they cannot express anything higher.

You seem to be unaware of the extent of my patience, even after it has been pointed out by another member.
— Fooloso4

Ah yes, Amity, she fell sick of our bickering, and eventually left — Pussycat

Bickering-schmickering.
Still at it after all these years ?

...what about me, what about my efforts, my patience, my world? — Pussycat

'If not for you
Babe, I couldn't even find the door
I couldn't even see the floor
I'd be sad and blue, if not for you...

- George Wittgenstein

You are right about this: it does help to have a questioner. And having one who goes from an adversary to thinking of himself as part of a team is interesting. The problem is, I was not aware of this turn in your thinking. I often wondered whether you found any of my explanations helpful or were just moving on to the next thing, trying to catch me up, to demonstrate that you were right in your initial judgment of me and my lack of understanding of the text. It sometimes seemed to be a bit of both.

Yes, I am sorry for wronging you, but you were right that sometimes it was a bit of both. Anyway, I don't think that in order to understand these things, the transcendent or transcendental, how is it that they are called or whatever the hell they mean, I doubt that one can or should go about them alone, this is where I think all these great minds like Wittgenstein erred, and why. Wittgenstein most probably realized this at some point, but with noone in sight to accompany him, designed all these games in his Investigations, to be played by everyone, we are playful beings after all, like cats and dogs.

Amity! Why did you change Harrison's name to Wittgenstein??? Got me fooled there for a moment.. :smile: