The a priori/a posterior distinction has its merits in explaining some things... — Merkwurdichliebe

I'm certainly not sold. For that matter, I'm even less sold on the idea that the same correlations are currently being drawn between many instances of it's use on this forum and what it was meant to refer to by Kant himself.

If use of "a priori" denotes that which is necessarily presupposed for experience to even happen(the necessary and sufficient pre-conditions claimed to give rise to all experience), then we're doing nothing more than describing our own notion of "experience" in greater detail. If that notion does not include drawing a distinction between nonlinguistic thought/belief and linguistic thought/belief, then it will inevitably conflate the two.

There's no way for us to know how a bat experiences the world, if we attempt to do so by shoehorning a kind of experience that only humans can have, into a bat's world.

I don't believe any philosophical framework aptly takes into account any of those metaphysical dichotomies which "consist of both, and are thus... neither". — Merkwurdichliebe

I'm not claiming that any dichotomy consists of both and is thus neither, although I would not disagree with such a claim... strictly and quite literally speaking.

What I'm pointing out is that all dichotomies are inherently lacking in explanatory power in the very same way. None can take account of that which consists of both sides of the dichotomy.

The only framework that comes close, is the dialectical one, which includes movement/transition into its logic, allowing it to essentially negate the law of contradiction. — Merkwurdichliebe

I don't follow you here.

Just to be clear though. I've no issue with judicious use of the true/false dichotomy. The important thing by my lights is having a good grasp upon the sort of things that can be true/false in addition to what makes them so. One's use of true/false shows one's grasp of that.


It's an aside, but I'm dying to know...

Can you demonstrate such a negation of the law of contradiction?

Just recently Janus and I were involved in a discussion about whether or not a promise could be true/false at the time of utterance. I learned something from that exchange. Promises consist of more than one thought/belief(proposition). Janus argues from a position that led to saying that one promise could be both true and false at the same time. On my view, promises are not the sort of thing that can be true/false.

P.S.

You've extracted a couple of the key points, and expressed some fairly well-grounded concerns regarding the project itself. I'm neither ignoring nor wanting to distract our attention from those by this post. Rather, I've been methodically replying to snippets in the order that they came after having read them all a few times in their entirety. So... the next post is one I'm looking forward to.

No, you are right...

Cameras freeze three dimensional fields of color onto two dimensional a surface.

...so, yes, you are wrong. — Merkwurdichliebe

Re the principle of charity, I'm trying to figure out any way your comment might make sense in the context of understanding my comment and . . . well, I just can't figure out a way.

It's an aside, but I'm dying to know...

Can you demonstrate such a negation of the law of contradiction? — creativesoul

Glad to oblige (I find it to be a fascinating topic).

The short answer:

In the dialectical methodology, logic is not static and finite, but is in infinite motion which subsumes all potential necessity in every possible variant (of a logical system).

I will attempt to describe the basic dialectical sense. Any relation of "+A" to "-A" withdraws into the unity of "A" (as Hegel pointed out). If "A" becomes contextualized in a snapshot of propositional form (viz. as a logical relation concerning "+A", or "-A"), then it is impossible to factor "A" through the true/false dichotomy without depredating the proposition of all sense (it is analogous to using thought/belief to pin down thinking). In this sense, contradiction only occurs within the content of a proposition, and never within the defining contextual subtext (from where propositional sense is derived).

The law of contradiction, then, can be regarded as an apparatus that does not negate its opposite (by making it something else), but by necessarily defining its essence (as the antithetically opposed reflection within a rationally motivated schematic). In the dialectical approach, "+A"/"-A" does not gain its propositional sense from the contrary "-A"/"+A" (a tautological assumption), rather, from the contradictory "not 'A'"/"not '-A". Hence, the law of contradiction (that a thing cannot be simultaneously true and false, but must be one or the other) is negated by the fact that contradiction is logically precluded by necessity.
That is, within the sense of any proposition, the "either/or" does not matter since the contradictory (negative) term essentially establishes the positive existence of the interrogative object within the propositional context.

It's very stupid. :rofl:

(Add. I could care less, but, imo, theists would be wise to pursue this thread if they intend on arguing with atheists.)

However, I don't see how we can avoid beginning at an unverifiable metaphysical premise. The necessary abstraction of concepts inevitably places us on metaphysical ground. I don't know how it is possible to nullify this problem (in totality) through any methodology.

As I see it, we are left with two choices: to keep trying to metholologically locate a non-metaphysical premise from which we can proceed with absolute certaity; or to simply accept a metaphysical premise as self-evident, and proceed methodologically to investigate its consequence. The latter is obviously naive; but the former requires blind faith in a methodology that will only have proved itself, once it has indisputably proven itself. The only other way to validate a methodology is to test it by another method. What independent method could we use to determine the effectiveness of our methodology here (not that we actually have one)? It would seem to require another method to determine that methodology . . . ad infinitum. — Merkwurdichliebe

Let us, for the sake of novelty, momentarily set aside the notions of metaphysical and non-metaphysical. Those categories are a consequence of inadequate dichotomy. As such, they are contaminated in the same way that logical notation/transcription/translation is. The lack of explanatory power inherently within dichotomy has been transmitted/transferred into the categories.

That's step one, and it makes perfect sense given what's been argued for thus far, particularly the bits about the shortcomings of all dichotomies. They quite simply cannot take into account anything that consists of both sides of the dichotomy.

Conventionally, we know that metaphysics is the branch of philosophy whose adherents concern themselves with what exists and/or the nature thereof. There are virtually countless different stances all of which revolve around two basic categories. That which is dependent upon the mind, and that which is not. This places the notion of mind dependence and/or mind independence front and center. It is of utmost importance for it is the measure of all things further considered when one is using a framework resting it's laurels upon that dichotomy. So, what counts as a mind is paramount to such subsequent thinking. That is also where the dichotomy of subjective/objective arises from. The former being all things that are mind dependent and the latter being all things that are not.

Let's pause here for second...

If all minds are existentially dependent upon thought/belief, then we better make sure that we have thought/belief right.

So... it's the method of approach that matters. What steps do we take, which things ought we consider, what can we know and how can we know it when it comes to thought and belief itself? Are thought and belief things? What sorts of things could they be? Do they exist? Are they real? In what way do they exist. How can we establish some sound foundation?

I chose to first look towards statements.

It is of utmost importance for it is the measure of all things further considered when one is using a framework resting it's laurels upon that dichotomy. — creativesoul

How can we avert the Notion of: man as the measure of all things?

I'll not get into the negation. Thanks for taking the time to set it out.

How can we avert the Notion of: man as the measure of all things? — Merkwurdichliebe

By not saying it?

Relevance?

By not saying it? — creativesoul

:lol:

I'll not get into the negation. Thanks for taking the time to set it out. — creativesoul

Np. It's flatulence.

If all minds are existentially dependent upon thought/belief, then we better make sure that we have thought/belief right.

So... it's the method of approach that matters. What steps do we take, which things ought we consider, what can we know and how can we know it when it comes to thought and belief itself? Are thought and belief things? What sorts of things could they be? Do they exist? Are they real? In what way do they exist. How can we establish some sound foundation? — creativesoul

Ok. Let's get back on topic. We only need to satisfy those categories insofar as they satisfy us, and I think you and I both know that my indirect, flanking strateegery will not permit for any nonsense, as it is completely responsive to the creative and the originally derived.

All explanations of thought/belief are themselves existentially dependent upon pre-existing thought/belief. That is to say that all explanations of thought/belief are metacognitive endeavors(they require thinking about thought/belief). Thought/belief cannot be pointed at. It does not have a spatiotemporal location. So, unlike thinking about physically perceptible things, thinking about thought/belief requires quite a bit more than just brains/nervous systems replete with physiological sensory perception and the innate ability to experience the effects/affects of basic emotion(contentment/discontentment/fear).
— creativesoul

Nice point, possibly something to build upon. I'll try not to get too excited and jump the gun.

Emotional affection, at the physiological level, corresponds directly to the behavioral disposition of desire/aversion. But, at this point, I can not say whether that the valuation of behavioral disposition marks a transition into the ethical, or, rather, stands as merely an aesthetic assessment of what seems most conducive to attaining the desirable.

Consider, that early in life, the infant begins to evaluate the desirable somewhere in the interplay of her nerve stimuli, and her emotional responses. As primitive as it is, this does constitute a valuation, despite the absence of any language skills. The primitive level in which value is imposed on emotional affection does not constitute a proper ethical judgement - it is more like an observation of what seems pleasing to me, rather than a moral choice about what I ought to do.

Then we can think about the toddler who has begun to acquire language. At this point, he is being linguistically conditioned (with some corporal conditioning) so that he can be assimilated into the culture to which he belongs. It is somewhere in this process that the evaluation of his primitive valuations commences; most importantly any evaluations of his primitive valuations are primarily acquired externally from culture, and not internally as a result of primitive valuation.

I hope this takes us one step closer to adequately understanding the source of morals. I could be mistaken, it's a terrible tragedy. — Merkwurdichliebe

That's not a bad summary of pre linguistic thought/belief as it pertains to morals.

The last statement seems to be claiming or at least has the consequence of claiming that all evaluations of primitive thought/belief are primarily acquired from culture, and not as a result of the primitive thought/belief.

Do I understand you correctly?

We are on same page, same sentence.

We are on same page, same sentence. — Merkwurdichliebe

This is the best time to disagree.

@creativesoul

This is the best time to disagree. — Merkwurdichliebe

Seriously, it's not just a joke.

If only thinking were not so indefinitely fluid - infinite, as it were. Perhaps, then, we could approach the topic of thinking about thought/belief in a direct manner. But, as it is, we cannot directly communicate actual thinking, and thusly, we can do nothing but approach it indirectly - as thought/belief about thought/belief. — Merkwurdichliebe

We could always be more direct, I suppose.

Do you agree that humans are capable of thinking and/or believing prior to language acquisition?

Yes I do

Good. I want to circle back to the skepticism/criticism that you've levied. It's worth unpacking.

The last statement seems to be claiming or at least has the consequence of claiming that all evaluations of primitive thought/belief are primarily acquired from culture, and not as a result of the primitive thought/belief. — creativesoul

Can we discuss this further?

@creativesoul

Let us approach it as a live dialectic, a proven methodology, you ask the questions and I will answer. It is an experiment, so it won't be emotionally charged. We can assume our role in the context of experiment, and discourse therefrom.

Why, of cours3!!!

The last statement seems to be claiming or at least has the consequence of claiming that all evaluations of primitive thought/belief are primarily acquired from culture, and not as a result of the primitive thought/belief. — creativesoul

I would amend this position by assuming that it isn't so universal. That is, not all evaluation of primitive thought/belief are primarily acquired from culture. But I might argue that the most significant which carry through to maturity are, indeed.

I'm just looking for you to set out the nuance. I do not think I understand what you're claiming.

Culture is existentially dependent upon individual pre-linguistic thought/belief.

I cannot seem to reconcile that with...

...all evaluations of primitive thought/belief are primarily acquired from culture, and not as a result of the primitive thought/belief.

I readily agree that all evaluations of primitive thought/belief are primarily acquired from culture. Evaluations of pre-linguistic thought/belief are existentially dependent upon language.

Culture is existentially dependent upon individual thought/belief. — creativesoul

I don't necessarily agree. I believe it is an entity beyond the individual. Just try to change culture through your purest conviction. Won't happen, not like a conviction could change your personal belief.

More likely, culture will change your individual convictions.

Culture is certainly an entity beyond the individual. Not everything in culture is existentially dependent upon one in the same particular individual. However, culture is existentially dependent upon individuals, not the other way around. All cultural change stems from individuals.

Hmmmmm...I dont know if culture is so much , determined by individuals, as much as that it is determined by an intentional conformity to the interests of the culture.

(Add. I would call such intentionality non moral, or one factor in the source of morals)

Individuals(some of them at least) determine what counts as the interests of the culture, no?

Anyway, let's circle back to the moral thought/belief aspect. Particularly, I think that the role of language in moral thought/belief could be set out further.

We can agree that culture is existentially dependent upon many different individuals' thought/belief, can't we?

We can agree that culture consists of many individuals' thought/belief, can't we? — creativesoul

I can agree upon that. Let's leave the individual's influence on culture on the margin for now, may become relevant later.

Ok.

So, on my view all moral thought/belief is thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. If the converse is also true, if all thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour is moral thought/belief, then we arrive at moral thought/belief prior to language. However, morals are quite a bit different than mere moral thought/belief.

The social aspect is certainly relevant.

Anyway, let's circle back to the moral thought/belief aspect. Particularly, I think that the role of language in moral thought/belief could be set out further. — creativesoul

I'm following.

Well, I think we've come to some agreement regarding the source of morals, haven't we?

Morals consist of thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. They are the basis for morality. They vary according to cultural and/or familial particulars.

This is true of all morals. We agree here don't we?

I cannot see how morality comes prior to cultural indoctrination. And in fact, I cannot see the arrival to ethical existence prior to the ability of the individual to separate herself from the culture into which she has been indoctrinated (even if, at that point, she chose to abide with the cultural indoctrination).

This is just my hypothesis.