I'll pause at this point, and wait for your response.

I hold that moral thought/belief can be prelinguistic on the basis that all things moral are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

You disagree on the basis that all moral thought/belief is moral judgment.

Does this capture one disagreement in a nutshell? — creativesoul

I think it identifies the discrepancy close enough for our purpose here. I'm interested to see what we find out. You've already began to address the relevant points...

The difference is that I hold a minimalist criterion for what counts as being moral - in kind - whereas you hold a more complex notion of what counts as moral thought/belief. — creativesoul

We agree: "all things moral are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour." I took the liberty to assume the terms "acceptable/unacceptable" were an inferrence to "right/wrong". Now I'm pretty sure that assumption was an error.

I think parsing out the difference between these terms will help us to better understand morality and thought/belief that is moral in kind. I also took these to be analogous. But I'm open to what their distinction may entail.

Let's continue...

We do agree regarding morality. Morality is codified moral thought/belief. Prelinguistic thought/belief that is moral - in kind - (on my view at least) is inadequate for morality. — creativesoul

I feel that we are not so far apart. Can you elaborate more on how prelinguistic thought/belief is moral in kind? I'm having trouble understanding this. Is there such thing as prelinguistic moral thought/belief? My thought was that thought/belief cannot be moral in kind unless it becomes actual moral thought/belief.

To reiterate my position, I hold all linguistic thought/belief to be predicated on pre-linguistic thought/belief. There are myriad modes of linguistic thought/belief, moral thought/belief is just one. Of the many things language acquisition brings with it, are 'conceptual' thought/belief, and 'abstract' thought/belief. Moral thought/belief is pre-conditioned and dependent on conceptualization and abstraction, and only arrives after these faculties are adequately developed.

Thought/belief that is moral in kind is a judgement about right thought/belief/intention/behavior. The act of judging is where morality first appears for the individual. It arrives with the encroachment of, what we can provisionally denote as, ethical authority, who exposes him to moral principles. All moral principles prescriptions and descriptions of right/wrong. The prescriptive principle "thou shalt not murder" is inherently descriptive by inferring "murder is wrong"; conversely, the descriptive principle "murder is wrong" is inherently prescriptive by inferring "thou shalt not murder". The appropriation of moral principles into moral thought/belief is necessary for judging, but the principles as they are in themselves, do not judge, rather judging occurs when principle is applied.

After considering all this, I am willing to retract certain speculations I've been pursuing, and re-assess both "moral principle" and "judgement" as thought/belief that is moral in kind, up to and including the above. Existential quantification, bitch! :joke:

I hope you appreciate that I am not an obstinate dick.

I'm hoping your response will fill in some gaps and clean up any faulty logic.

I'll wait for your response.

In the meantime I'll say that we are doing a rare thing on TPF. We are proving something. I don't mean about the source of morals, but about philosophical discourse. We are demonstrating a most effective way to conduct a philosophical thought experiment.

The one thing is that we are not dogmatic about our premise or methodology, as if methodologically building off a premise constitutes some gospel truth. A premise is just a starting point, a common ground where we unify our fundamental concepts. A methodology is just a conveyance, a consistent a way of proceeding. When we finish, we will have said nothing, but at least we will have said it, and that's something.

@creativesoul

In my first reboot of judgement, I begin by saying: judgement is the application of moral principle.

I find two apparent modes, which may turn out not to be judging at all. One is direct, in which I make a right/wrong decision in respect to moral principle (when I choose not to steal). The other is indirect, as in the implication of myself or another in right/wrong in respect to moral principle (when I rebuke the thief). Decision, obviously, poses more immediate consequence than implication.

What is the difference between being about thought, belief, and/or behaviour and being about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour?

Perhaps that is what underwrites your invocation of "valuation"? — creativesoul

My thought exactly.

The criterion you've put forth here cannot account for moral discourse because being moral according to your criterion requires moral judgment(approval/disapproval). Not all discourse about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour consists of such judgment. It is all moral discourse nonetheless.

How we arrive at our criterions matter. Universal criterions are easy enough to refute should one feel the need. One example to the contrary. That is what I've just done. Not all things moral consist of approval/disapproval(moral judgment). Thus I reject that offering. All things moral are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

Upon what ground are you rejecting it in lieu of your own? I've shown an exception to yours. There are none to my own. How do we reconcile this?

The criterion you've put forth here cannot account for moral discourse because being moral according to your criterion requires moral judgment(approval/disapproval). Not all discourse about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour consists of such judgment. It is all moral discourse nonetheless. — creativesoul

The posts were made out of order, so you may not have read my earlier post. After further considerations, I've determined that moral thought/belief is not just limited to judgement. I have now identified moral principle as another type of moral thought/belief. As it stands now, principle and judgment represent two of the primary types of moral thought/belief. Perhaps there are more.

We might consider another type of moral thought/belief to be involved in the feeling/intuition of conviction (as in the adoption of or conformity to a set of moral principles).

Moral principle is an ethically charged intellectual assessment on acceptable/unacceptable thought/belief/behavior, and functions by introducing moral thought/belief to a preexisting framework of nonmoral thought/belief. It gives us a fundamental basis for moral learning/teaching, a precondition for moral discourse...judgement can then be considered the application of moral principle.



One thing that we need to address is prelinguistic thought/belief that is moral in kind...in other words, prelinguistic thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. My question is how can we account for the notion of "acceptable/unacceptable" in the absence of language?

Imo, prelinguistic thought/belief is limited to nonrational and immediate corellations/associations/connections - primitive assessments. From the perspective of linguistic thought/belief, it is easy to impose the terms of acceptable/unacceptable upon the prelinguistic form, but from the perspective of prelinguistic thought/belief, the faculty of conceptualization has not yet been developed. As such, there can be no concept of acceptable/unacceptable. Prelinguistic thought/belief is incapable of the mode of thought/belief necessary to create/discover a rational worldview, and it certainly is incapable of abstraction, which is a necessary faculty for applying more complex concepts (like moral principles) onto particulars.

After further considerations, I've determined that moral thought/belief is not just limited to judgement. I have now identified moral principle as another type of moral thought/belief. As it stands now, principle and judgment represent two of the primary types of moral thought/belief. — Merkwurdichliebe

My question is what makes them both moral - in kind?

My question is what makes them both moral - in kind? — creativesoul

That brings up a great point...how are we defining "moral in kind"? How does it differ from morality?

An astute reader ought already know the answer.

All things called "moral" are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. There are no exceptions. Thus, there is no stronger justificatory ground upon which to build a knowledge base regarding morals. We look to language use of the term "moral". We look to language use of the term "morality". We look to language use of all terms prefixed by and/or otherwise adjoined to the term "moral". Do they all have anything else in common aside from sharing a namesake?

Yes. They do.

All of these things called "moral", all of these uses of the term "moral" share a binding and relevant common denominator. Their content. What all of them are about. We can readily acknowledge this.

Discourse. Thought/belief. Intuition. Feeling. Attitude. Disposition. Lessons. Principles. Guidelines.

The above list provides additional elements to our consideration. This is meant as a deliberate attempt to further drive this point home. All of the above can be sensibly pre-fixed with the term "moral". Doing so is to say that those things are moral - in kind. Some kinds of discourse, thought/belief, intuition, feelings, attitudes, dispositions, lessons, principles and guidelines are moral in kind because they are moral in their constitution, not just because we call them "moral". They all consist entirely of thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

This is also immune to Witt's argument against essentialism. I'm not arguing for the essence of anything. Nor would I. Rather, I acknowledge that Witt has made a great point. Here's what I walked away with, so to speak...

There are many names that pick out and/or refer to a plurality of different individual things. Such things sometimes have nothing in common to all aside from sharing the namesake. Hence, I agree with Witt regarding what all games have in common. I further acknowledge that any subsequent consideration regarding these kinds of groups(the ones that share only the namesake) is not amenable to arriving at a universal criterion based upon that namesake.

All things called "moral" are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

Perhaps we need to also set out how we arrived at the universal criterion for thought/belief?

Morality is codified moral thought/belief:The rules of acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

This is well trodden ground.

An astute reader ought already know the answer. — creativesoul

How dare you assume I'm astute, you inconsiderate bastard. :joke:



Ok, just clarifying. So, we can say, that which is moral in kind is equivalent to:

Morality is codified moral thought/belief:The rules of acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. — creativesoul

I would say anything codified would require language. I don't see how I have been considering it otherwise in any of my posts. Please feel free to point out where I have done so.

Perhaps we need to also set out how we arrived at the universal criterion for thought/belief? — creativesoul

I'm game. I believe we called it something like existential quantification.

Ok, just clarifying. So, we can say, that which is moral in kind is equivalent to:

Morality is codified moral thought/belief:The rules of acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.
— creativesoul

I would say anything codified would require language. I don't see how I have been considering it otherwise in any of my posts. Please feel free to point out where I have done so. — Merkwurdichliebe

:meh:

I'm considering moving on without you Merk. I do not like the signs here.

I'm considering moving on without you Merk. I do not like the signs here. — creativesoul

That would only mean that I win. Sounds like a tragic outcome to me.

@Janus What is the ultimate source of morals...Strangelove! :razz:

What's the problem? — Merkwurdichliebe

There has been considerable groundwork done heretofore. It stands without subsequent refutation and/or valid objection.

The recent current veins of thought are not taking the groundwork into proper and rightful consideration. That seems to be the problem I'm seeing.

The recent current veins of thought are not taking the groundwork into proper and rightful consideration. That seems to be the problem I'm seeing. — creativesoul

Then all you need to do is specify where my specific assertions are at odds with that groundwork, and I will gladly correct my mistakes. There has to be one clear cut example. Please present it as elementarily as you can.

Ok, just clarifying. So, we can say, that which is moral in kind is equivalent to:

Morality is codified moral thought/belief:The rules of acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. — Merkwurdichliebe

No. We cannot. At least not if we hold to our groundwork.

All moral things are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief and/or behaviour. Morality requires language. Thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour does not. That which is moral in kind is not equivalent to morality. The aforementioned list of moral things are all moral things. They are not all morality. Not all moral things are morality.

By the way, I have retracted and re-assessed many claims I have previously made, based on your criticisms.

Perhaps we need to review some of these considerations.

Perhaps.

Establishing a well grounded timeline of the evolution of moral thought/belief will require implementing existential dependency. It's common sense logic. That's the best kind. We're not even close to being there yet.

Hopefully that time will come. Knowing the evolutionary origen of anything depends upon knowing that much... morals notwithstanding.

Thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour does not. That which is moral in kind is not equivalent to morality. The aforementioned list of moral things are all moral things. They are not all morality. Not all moral things are morality. — creativesoul

That is what I needed to hear. Do you not agree, that this distinction between moral-in-kind and morality is of essential importance here? We have barely discussed it.

I just need it clarified a bit more and we will be back on track.

That's philosophy.

Btw, we have worked out these misunderstandings numerous time throughout the course of this thread. Why would we assume this misunderstanding would condemn the conversation.

Knowing the evolutionary origen of anything depends upon knowing that much... morals notwithstanding. — creativesoul

Go on...I'm listening.

That is what I needed to hear. Do you not agree, that this distinction between moral-in-kind and morality is not of essential importance here? We have barely discussed it.

I just need it clarified a bit more and we will be back on track. — Merkwurdichliebe

What question would you like an answer to?

Knowing the evolutionary origen of anything depends upon knowing that much... morals notwithstanding.
— creativesoul

Go on...I'm listening. — Merkwurdichliebe

As I said in the portion of my reply that has been left unattended...

We're not even close to being there yet.

What question would you like an answer to? — creativesoul

Can you explain what you mean by "moral-in-kind" and "morality". What is it that unifies them, and in what ways are they different?

I admit, I have made no distinction the entire discussion. What a fuck up on my part. So as a philosopher, heal my wound, I'm bleeding bad understanding.

Can you explain what you mean by "moral-in-kind" and "morality". What is it that unifies them, and in what ways are they different? — Merkwurdichliebe

They are both names. I do not even know what it could even mean to talk about 'unifying' them.

What they pick out to the exclusion of all other things is what makes them different. They pick out different things. "Moral in kind" picks out all things called "moral", in particular, it points - when properly understood - to exactly what it is that makes them moral things and not some other kind of thing.

Moral discourse. Moral thought. Moral belief. Moral sentiment. Moral judgment. The moral of the story. Etc.

Being about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour is what makes something moral in kind.

"Morality" is one of those things that is moral - in kind. Morality is the written rules of acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Moral belief is belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. That's what makes it moral - in kind. Morality is codified moral belief. All morality is moral thought/belief. Not all moral thought/belief is morality.

Btw, we have worked out these misunderstandings numerous time throughout the course of this thread. Why would we assume this misunderstanding would condemn the conversation. — Merkwurdichliebe

I should've attended to some of the earlier posts you made. Some seemed like a misunderstanding was at work. It's nice when they work themselves out. I'm certain they can.