I might have mistaken M. for N. Seeing N. and M. or photographs of them I will realize my mistake and might say: "Oh, I meant M." And here we see why my meaning N. or M. does not consist in having a mental picture. — Fooloso4
I think this could easily be tweaked to be a Gettier problem, which is, imho, much more interesting. — NKBJ
I also understand all cases of knowing anything as being examples of familiarity. — Janus
think what Wittgenstein is breaking the connection we may have formed of meaning as consisting of a mental picture. To mean N. does not mean to have a picture of N. in my mind. Having a picture of N. in my mind is not to mean N. The picture may come unbidden. I do not have to mean N. to have that picture. It may come "suddenly". — Fooloso4
So what is it to mean N?
— frank
It might be the person I am talking about who says things on a philosophy forum that others cannot make sense of, or the person I am pointing to rather than the person right next to him or he who shall not be named. — Fooloso4
So to mean N is to hold some fact about N in mind? — frank
So knowing that 2+2=4 reduces to knowing how to do addition. Knowing that Canberra is the capital of Australia reduces to knowing how to use maps and political notions. Knowing that this is a photo of N. reduces to knowing how to address N, identify him in a group, ask him about his wife and so on. — Banno
Knowing how to do something is more like applied knowledge. One might know the steps but never performed the steps and gets better with experience. In this case, knowledge comes in the form of degrees of behavioral effeciency. One can know how to add larger numbers faster, or tie their shoes more efficiently, because of experience.For my part, I think we are wrong to think of a distinction between knowing that and knowing how. It seems to me that all examples of knowing that reduce to examples of knowing how.
So knowing that 2+2=4 reduces to knowing how to do addition. Knowing that Canberra is the capital of Australia reduces to knowing how to use maps and political notions. Knowing that this is a photo of N. reduces to knowing how to address N, identify him in a group, ask him about his wife and so on. — Banno
So to mean N is to hold some fact about N in mind?
— frank
Not necessarily. Pointing to N. does not mean to hold some fact about him in mind. I might mention some fact about N. in order to help identify the person I mean, but that fact might only come to mind at that point to help identify him. — Fooloso4
Do you, Sam26, find it curious that so many here remain convinced that one does know that this is a picture of N., and rush to provide the justification that appears to be missing? — Banno
Do you, Sam26, find it curious that so many here remain convinced that one does know that this is a picture of N., and rush to provide the justification that appears to be missing? — Banno
If to know is to hold a justified true belief, then what is the justification here? — Banno
I don't think it has anything to do with justified true belief.
The question of whether I know that the picture I have of him is a picture of him is odd. When the picture of N suddenly floated before him there was no question that it is a picture of N. It is only subsequently, after the fact, that the question arises. — Fooloso4
Hinge propositions are anti-philosophical. — schopenhauer1
It's simply a way of stopping inquiry. — schopenhauer1
Why does the limit have to be how we use language ... — schopenhauer1
... and not how it is grounded in the world or our minds? — schopenhauer1
So if you drank from the coffee cup and said, "I am doing a game", someone might look at you funny. But you tried to justify yourself by saying, "Yes, every time I pick up the coffee cup and put it to my mouth, I call that "game"", someone would just say you are crazy. They would tell, you, "Just say "sip" or "drink"!. In other words, you should be using a different set of family resemblances (to drink, sip, imbibe, ingest, partake in, guzzle, gulp, etc.) than the set we usually employ when we say "game". These have historical precedents in the language community and thus these are the proper words to use. If before you sipped from the coffee mug you looked around suspiciously, then stated, "I am getting myself a drink", then winked at me, I might infer "drink" to mean you spiked your coffee. It is all kind of related in a web of notions because of the community's use. So community "grounds" words (i.e. Form of Life), and as far as I see, context grounds how the words are employed (language games). And by "ground" I don't mean metaphysical, but one can say as a some sort of "error checker" for permitted or non-traditional use of words.
But all this being said, my particular critique is that Witt insufficiently posits his theory because it is very common sensical. Communities form language games and their use in context grounds the meaning. But I believe, any anthropologist could have told you that even by his time, so what else is he saying? And that's where I fail to see anything of interest. There are a ton of questions that can arise from this view (common sensical as is it is). For example, how does Wittgenstein explain how it is that social facts exist outside of some sort of linguistic solipsism? There are beliefs that prima facie are not facts of the world, but interpretations we have. So what is a "community" outside a set of individual points of view interpreting information? So you see, there has to be a greater theory for how something like "community" obtains outside of individual perceptions if one doesn't want to maintain solipsism. How does this get beyond the Cartesian Demon? And if you say we can't, we shouldn't, or we shan't try, okay, then it's not that interesting to me as it is essentially just more explicitly coming up with ways we use language that don't correspond to a direct "truth correspondence theory of logical positivism, which is just tedious to me as someone who never cared for logical positivism to begin with. — schopenhauer1
For example, how does Wittgenstein explain how it is that social facts exist outside of some sort of linguistic solipsism? — schopenhauer1
In the beginning was the deed.
So you see, there has to be a greater theory for how something like "community" obtains outside of individual perceptions if one doesn't want to maintain solipsism. — schopenhauer1
How does this get beyond the Cartesian Demon? — schopenhauer1
What else do we have to express ourselves but language? And who else can we communicate with if not other people?Why does the limit have to be how we use language and not how it is grounded in the world or our minds? — schopenhauer1
A computer can identify a picture of you as Banno. It must be matching various criteria against something in its database. That's what I'm doing at some level.
— Hanover
This claim carries all the paraphernalia around the guess that mind involves unconscious algorithmic processing.
I'm not buying that, and hence I am not buying your point here. — Banno
A community is not made up of individual perceptions but of shared beliefs, practices, and language. A common form of life. — Fooloso4
That we do things is not something that Wittgenstein, or for that matter, as far as I know, anyone else attempt to explain. — Fooloso4
A community is not made up of individual perceptions but of shared beliefs, practices, and language. A common form of life. — Fooloso4
The role of the hypothetical demon is to establish that there is something that cannot be doubted, something we can be certain of even if we are deceived about everything else. Wittgenstein has an interesting response: in order to doubt there must be things that are not doubted. — Fooloso4
What else do we have to express ourselves but language? And who else can we communicate with if not other people? — baker
But what exactly does this "shared" mean? — baker
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