As I note, it's a judgment about the relation between a proposition and something else. I wouldn't say that judgments in this sense are beliefs.

A judgment about the relation between meaning and something else is the difference between P's being true and P's being called "true"?

This judgment(calling P "true") is not belief?

I'm not following here.

Much of my biography corresponds to yours. But not this:

So fundamentally, any belief is compatible with observations, which undermines the idea that science can tell us anything about an objective reality. — leo

As I've suggested before, the word objective gets in the way here. Consider instead: "the idea that science can tell us anything about reality".

This, of course, is true. Science tells us enough about reality for you and I to be able to communicate with each other using the lumps of sand, metal and crude oil on which we type.

But is it really, truely, objective reality? That's just a silly question. Like the Meaning of Life, the Universe and Everything, we never stoped to work out what objective means. See this thread, if you think otherwise.

More...

There's a difference between a proposition being true and a proposition being believed.

"p" is true only if p; the proposition "p" is made to fit the world, p

Believing implies that one will act in certain ways. The world is treated as if p were the case. The world is made to fit the proposition, "p"

The direction of fit for a truth is the reverse of the direction of fit for a belief.

This might be what @Terrapin Station means, that belief requires a judgement.

And it may be what @leo is missing in musing that science does not tell us how things are.

Perhaps your writings made while under the influence of hallucinatory substances do not make sense now because they did not make sense then. Altering your mind does not allow you to see things that you cannot see without the altering, or make sense of writings that you cannot makes sense of any other way.

Rather, you are seeing things that are not there, and making sense of nonsensical language use. — creativesoul

Talking past each other. Calling these substances "hallucinatory" is a point of view. You can choose to believe they are hallucinations, or you can believe they are more real than what we usually call reality, which is the feeling that many people get when they try them. I think there is no way you can understand what it's like if you have never tried. You call it altering, I call it seeing through.

What I have written while on them is not nonsensical at all, it is the kind of stuff that some spiritual people say, on the surface it doesn't sound deep, but there is much more to it than the surface. Except we usually only see the surface.

It is quite sad to get this sort of reaction, considering that I am talking about a substance (psilocybin) that is not addictive, not dangerous, and that has improved the lives of many people who have taken it.

Here's a peer-reviewed study published in Nature, on the effect of this substance for treatment-resistant depression: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-017-13282-7

functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) before and after treatment with psilocybin (serotonin agonist) for treatment-resistant depression (TRD). Quality pre and post treatment fMRI data were collected from 16 of 19 patients. Decreased depressive symptoms were observed in all 19 patients at 1-week post-treatment and 47% met criteria for response at 5 weeks

Read that again: out of 19 patients who had depression that resisted treatment, all of them had decreased depressive symptoms one week after taking that substance. Would you really expect nonsensical hallucinations to have that kind of effect, or might it be the sign that there is something more profound going on?

You want to be a good scientist? Give it a try and report your results. It is not addictive, it is not dangerous for your health (as long as you do it in a safe place), and you might come to realize things that you can't even imagine now.

Tried meditation instead?

Depression has a solution... one solution. It requires coming to different acceptable terms about what's happened and/or is happening. There are many ways to achieve it.

I wouldn't talk about hallucinogens had I not already had the experience of taking them. If it doesn't make sense or is not profoundly enlightening when you're sober, then it doesn't make sense when you're not... the writings, that is. The only reason it seems to make sense when under the influence is because you're under the influence.

There's a difference between a proposition being true and a proposition being believed.

"p" is true only if p; the proposition "p" is made to fit the word, p

Believing implies that one will act in certain ways. The world it treated as if p were the case. The world is made to fit the proposition, "p"

The direction of fit for a truth is the reverse of the direction of fit for a belief.

This might be what Terrapin Station means, that belief requires a judgement.

And it may be what @leo is missing in musing that science does not tell us how things are. — Banno

Nothing I would object to there... the direction of fit bit isn't understood rightly by me, I suspect.

There's also a difference between a proposition and a belief. What makes a proposition true, depends upon several different possible meanings. What makes a belief(in propositional form) true depends upon one, and only one.

I was objecting to the notion of P's being true for me, or you, or someone else, and wanting to see how Terrapin deals with that. I suspect he's working from a notion of relative truth... in the sense that conflates truth and belief.

P's being true does not require any particular person to believe it.<------ in that sense, it(the truth of P) is objective. Although, I prefer a different framework.

Nothing I would object to there... — creativesoul

Didn't think there would be.

I was objecting to the notion of P's being true for me, or you, or someone else, and wanting to see how Terrapin deals with that. I suspect he's working from a notion of relative truth... in the sense that conflates truth and belief. — creativesoul

I agree. It's unclear. But he is (it seems) working within a model of meaning as mental furniture, transmitted and translated from head to head. So there's that.

Might start another thread.


edit: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6148/language-is-not-moving-information-from-one-head-to-another

Yes. On a strictly individual - not shared - level. I forgot about that.

The ability to formulate that objective truth in a language, to say what it is or to give an example of it. But if we say that something is objective truth and some people disagree, then how is that an objective truth? — leo

In this sense, everyone has access to objective truth. Everyone (who knows at least one language) can say objectively true things in a language.

As to your question: if I say that P is the objective truth and you disagree, that does not entail that P is not the objective truth, since "objectivity" doesn't mean "what everyone agrees on" (at least I don't mean this by "objectivity"). As I use the phrase, to say thay something is objectively true is to say that it corresponds to the way things are, and this may hold whether or not anyone agrees that it does.

PA

A judgment about the relation between meaning and something else is the difference between P's being true and P's being called "true"? — creativesoul

It's what "being true" is--when you make a "positive" judgment about the relation (for example, judging that "yes, the proposition corresponds to this fact from my perspective," rather than "no, it does not," which would be the "negative" judgment--aka the proposition is false). "Being called true" occurs because one has made the positive judgment in question.

And again, no, I wouldn't call the judgment a belief. If a belief is strong enough, one makes a claim that so and so is the case, as in factually the case, where the claim can be wrong (but the subject believes that it's the case until convinced otherwise). That's not the sense in which I'm using "judgment" here. The judgment here is simply a personal assessment as to whether the meaning the subject has applied has the positive relation in question (such as correspondence, for example) to something else (such as facts from the subject's perspective, if we're talking about correspondence; if we were talking about coherence instead, for a different example, the positive judgment would be "yes, this coheres with the other propositions I have assigned "true" to).

Thanks for sharing all of that.

Wouldn't other conclusions for most of that simply be that

(a) people can believe things, including theoretical things, etc., that are incorrect,
(b) people can and some do make whatever psychological moves necessary to not arrive at a subsequent belief that previous beliefs were incorrect,
(c) beliefs can "color" experiences,

and so on?

I was objecting to the notion of P's being true for me, or you, or someone else, and wanting to see how Terrapin deals with that. I suspect he's working from a notion of relative truth... in the sense that conflates truth and belief.

P's being true does not require any particular person to believe it. — creativesoul

Obviously truth is always to someone on my view, and the notion of it possibly being the case independently of anyone is incoherent on my view (incoherent because it winds up making a category error about what meaning is/how it works, what assessment relations are and how they work, etc.)

The important thing to always keep in mind about my truth theory is that it's in the context of the traditional analytic philosophy tenets that truth and facts are importantly different things, that facts are largely mind-independent states of affairs, that truth is a property of propositions and that propositions are the meanings of statements.

The important thing to always keep in mind about my truth theory is that it's in the context of the traditional analytic philosophy tenets that truth and facts are importantly different things, that facts are largely mind-independent states of affairs, that truth is a property of propositions and that propositions are the meanings of statements. — Terrapin Station

I think I understand the distinction and think it is a useful one, however I don't really like the word 'fact' for that one. I would prefer even an everday speech category like: the way things are. I associate facts way to much with things we know, or current knowledge, which may well be revised.

It's what "being true" is--when you make a "positive" judgment about the relation (for example, judging that "yes, the proposition corresponds to this fact from my perspective," rather than "no, it does not," which would be the "negative" judgment--aka the proposition is false). "Being called true" occurs because one has made the positive judgment in question.

And again, no, I wouldn't call the judgment a belief. If a belief is strong enough, one makes a claim that so and so is the case, as in factually the case, where the claim can be wrong (but the subject believes that it's the case until convinced otherwise). That's not the sense in which I'm using "judgment" here. The judgment here is simply a personal assessment as to whether the meaning the subject has applied has the positive relation in question (such as correspondence, for example) to something else (such as facts from the subject's perspective, if we're talking about correspondence; if we were talking about coherence instead, for a different example, the positive judgment would be "yes, this coheres with the other propositions I have assigned "true" to). — Terrapin Station

Cool, I think. So belief does not require thinking about truth conditions/relations, whereas judgment does?

Judging that this or that is true results in belief, wouldn't you say?

Cool, I think. So belief does not require thinking about truth conditions/relations, whereas judgment does?

Judging that this or that is true results in belief, wouldn't you say? — creativesoul

You have a belief that the cat is on the mat, say. You have a belief that such and such is the state of affairs that obtains.

Truth, on the other hand, is a judgment about the relationship of the proposition "the cat is on the mat" to the fact (as you believe) that the cat is on the mat.

(Again, under correspondence theory, by the way.)

the people at the air craft control tower need to agree on objective truth. If i think you are a bad person you can probably deal with that. If 10000 of your neighbors think you are a bad person, you might be in trouble. Life is extremely complex, stay away from the dark side. lol

Truth... ...is a judgment... — Terrapin Station

Correspondence isn't.

Correspondence isn't. — creativesoul

How do you believe the relation obtains outside of a judgment?

I agree with Leo. The notion of "objective" truth is rooted in the age old "subject/object", "inner/outer" nonsensical Cartesian dichotomies. Calling something objectively true is tantamount to calling something truly true. It is nonsensical.

I wouldn't talk about hallucinogens had I not already had the experience of taking them. — creativesoul

They do not have the same effects, have you tried the one I mentioned? Also the effects can be different on different people.

If it doesn't make sense or is not profoundly enlightening when you're sober, then it doesn't make sense when you're not... the writings, that is. The only reason it seems to make sense when under the influence is because you're under the influence. — creativesoul

That's not my point of view. If you are blind and you take something that makes you see, would you call it an hallucination? The only reason you wouldn't call it an hallucination is if what you saw is part of the socially accepted reality. If most people were blind, colors would not be part of the socially accepted reality, then if you saw a world of colors others would deem you to be hallucinating. In my view, what we call a reality and what we call hallucination is a social convention.

If you are blind and you take something that makes you temporarily see, and you write about what you see, when you become blind again what you wrote doesn't make as much sense, not because your thoughts have become clear again, but because you don't have access anymore to what you were seeing. That's how I see it. What I saw was real to me, as real as anything else we call real, but I didn't see with my eyes, I was seeing some other way. If you can't relate to what I'm saying, then again to me that means you haven't had the experiences I've had, you try to rationalize what I say so it fits your world view, but your rationalization doesn't explain what I experienced, only to you it does. Using a common language is not sufficient to understand one another, words can't communicate experiences that the other hasn't had.

So, again, we have different realities, there is only a problem if you force the assumption that you have access to objective reality. The problem I see with your rationalization is that if you were blind, you would explain away reports of visual experiences the same way you explain away my experiences. Unless the majority disagreed with you, in which case you would probably go with the majority and accept that others see while you don't.

As I use the phrase, to say thay something is objectively true is to say that it corresponds to the way things are, and this may hold whether or not anyone agrees that it does. — PossibleAaran

The problem is how can you tell the way things are? You can tell the way things are to you, if others disagree with your idea of the way things are what then? Who is right?

If you belong to an objective reality, you don't look at it from the outside, you are within, your thoughts and perceptions depend on that reality in some unknown way, so you don't have access to the way things are, your thoughts and perceptions do not show you the way things are, they show you something that depends on the way things are. If we can't tell what's objectively true then what's the point of using the concept?

But that problem disappears if we stop assuming we have access to an objective reality, rather each of us has their own reality. If we want to assume there is an underlying objective reality, then we can say that our realities stem from the objective reality, but we can't say what the objective reality is, so there's no point in talking about objective truth.

the people at the air craft control tower need to agree on objective truth — christian2017

They share a truth. There are some aspects most of us agree on, and there are some aspects where most of us disagree. If you only focus on the agreements you get the idea that we share the same reality, but when you focus on the disagreements you realize that it's not so simple.

If we dont mean the same thing when we use the same word then we are talking past each other. — Harry Hindu

That's what I implied, you don't understand me.

Delusions would be just as true as any deductive conclusion, which is preposterous. — Harry Hindu

Preposterous in your own view, indeed. The funny thing is you elevate deductive conclusions as more true than delusions, but you can't deductively conclude what is a delusion and what isn't, so your stance is preposterous to me.

So you're misusing language by implying that you are talking about other's views when you're really talking only about your view. So you're really talking past everyone who talks about their views or about a mind independent world. What is the point of having such a conversation? What would it be about? — Harry Hindu

I'm not misusing language, I made it clear several times that I am talking about my own view, I'm not gonna start every sentence with "to me", "in my view", it's implied. I also talk about what the view of others is in my view. To me, others are only talking about their own view as well, that doesn't mean I find what they say useless, because as I mentioned, in my view again, our realities intersect partially, and we can communicate about our realities through speech to some extent.

Another misuse of language. You're misusing the term "reality". — Harry Hindu

I'm using the term "realities", to refer to the idea that we don't have access to the supposed objective reality, rather each person has their own reality, their own set of experiences, truths, facts. You could see it as a neologism, seeing it as a misuse of language is, again, your own point of view, not an objective one, and not mine.

The problem is many post modernists can't judge correctly what are important issues. Many post modernists such as Richard Dawkins think that pedaphilia is ok. When a society gets that dumb, the end of that society is right around the corner.

How do you believe the relation obtains outside of a judgment? — Terrapin Station

I don't think about that which exists in it's entirety prior to our account of it in such terms.

I don't think about that which exists in it's entirety prior to our account of it in such terms. — creativesoul

Haha, well that's what you should be doing to do philosophy--think about this stuff. If we're going to claim that the relation obtains outside of a judgment, if we're going to claim that that's how it exists, how it works, then we should have some idea of what, exactly, we're claiming about it ontologically, some idea of how it works, some support of our contentions, etc. especially aside from the fact that it's a common belief or a common way to talk about it.

I don't think about that which exists in it's entirety prior to our account of it in such terms.
— creativesoul

Haha, well that's what you should be doing to do philosophy--think about this stuff. If we're going to claim that the relation obtains outside of a judgment, if we're going to claim that that's how it exists, how it works, then we should have some idea of what, exactly, we're claiming about it ontologically, some idea of how it works, some support of our contentions, etc. especially aside from the fact that it's a common belief or a common way to talk about it. — Terrapin Station

Truth is not judgment. That's where you arrived. That's not my problem. "We" is the wrong pronoun to use here. I reject the position you argue for/from.

Judgment - per your description - is very complex metacognitive thought/belief. Judgment about the truth conditions of a statement requires language use.

Correspondence to what's happened/happening does not. True and false belief is prior to language. Judgment is based upon pre-existing thought/belief. Sound judgment is based upon true thought/belief. Poor judgment, well...

Stop, while you're ahead.

There's more than one way to take account of things. I should not use a framework that I know is riddled with issues.

Correspondence to what's happened/happening does not. — creativesoul

That's a claim. I'm asking for your support of that claim. How does correspondence work sans thought?

Never said it did, nor need I. You'll have to do better than this Terrapin. I'm not going to assent to what you're asserting. It's wrong on several levels.

So correspondence requires thought on your view?