So fundamentally, any belief is compatible with observations, which undermines the idea that science can tell us anything about an objective reality. — leo
Perhaps your writings made while under the influence of hallucinatory substances do not make sense now because they did not make sense then. Altering your mind does not allow you to see things that you cannot see without the altering, or make sense of writings that you cannot makes sense of any other way.
Rather, you are seeing things that are not there, and making sense of nonsensical language use. — creativesoul
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) before and after treatment with psilocybin (serotonin agonist) for treatment-resistant depression (TRD). Quality pre and post treatment fMRI data were collected from 16 of 19 patients. Decreased depressive symptoms were observed in all 19 patients at 1-week post-treatment and 47% met criteria for response at 5 weeks
There's a difference between a proposition being true and a proposition being believed.
"p" is true only if p; the proposition "p" is made to fit the word, p
Believing implies that one will act in certain ways. The world it treated as if p were the case. The world is made to fit the proposition, "p"
The direction of fit for a truth is the reverse of the direction of fit for a belief.
This might be what Terrapin Station means, that belief requires a judgement.
And it may be what @leo is missing in musing that science does not tell us how things are. — Banno
Nothing I would object to there... — creativesoul
I was objecting to the notion of P's being true for me, or you, or someone else, and wanting to see how Terrapin deals with that. I suspect he's working from a notion of relative truth... in the sense that conflates truth and belief. — creativesoul
The ability to formulate that objective truth in a language, to say what it is or to give an example of it. But if we say that something is objective truth and some people disagree, then how is that an objective truth? — leo
A judgment about the relation between meaning and something else is the difference between P's being true and P's being called "true"? — creativesoul
I was objecting to the notion of P's being true for me, or you, or someone else, and wanting to see how Terrapin deals with that. I suspect he's working from a notion of relative truth... in the sense that conflates truth and belief.
P's being true does not require any particular person to believe it. — creativesoul
I think I understand the distinction and think it is a useful one, however I don't really like the word 'fact' for that one. I would prefer even an everday speech category like: the way things are. I associate facts way to much with things we know, or current knowledge, which may well be revised.The important thing to always keep in mind about my truth theory is that it's in the context of the traditional analytic philosophy tenets that truth and facts are importantly different things, that facts are largely mind-independent states of affairs, that truth is a property of propositions and that propositions are the meanings of statements. — Terrapin Station
It's what "being true" is--when you make a "positive" judgment about the relation (for example, judging that "yes, the proposition corresponds to this fact from my perspective," rather than "no, it does not," which would be the "negative" judgment--aka the proposition is false). "Being called true" occurs because one has made the positive judgment in question.
And again, no, I wouldn't call the judgment a belief. If a belief is strong enough, one makes a claim that so and so is the case, as in factually the case, where the claim can be wrong (but the subject believes that it's the case until convinced otherwise). That's not the sense in which I'm using "judgment" here. The judgment here is simply a personal assessment as to whether the meaning the subject has applied has the positive relation in question (such as correspondence, for example) to something else (such as facts from the subject's perspective, if we're talking about correspondence; if we were talking about coherence instead, for a different example, the positive judgment would be "yes, this coheres with the other propositions I have assigned "true" to). — Terrapin Station
Cool, I think. So belief does not require thinking about truth conditions/relations, whereas judgment does?
Judging that this or that is true results in belief, wouldn't you say? — creativesoul
Correspondence isn't. — creativesoul
I wouldn't talk about hallucinogens had I not already had the experience of taking them. — creativesoul
If it doesn't make sense or is not profoundly enlightening when you're sober, then it doesn't make sense when you're not... the writings, that is. The only reason it seems to make sense when under the influence is because you're under the influence. — creativesoul
As I use the phrase, to say thay something is objectively true is to say that it corresponds to the way things are, and this may hold whether or not anyone agrees that it does. — PossibleAaran
the people at the air craft control tower need to agree on objective truth — christian2017
If we dont mean the same thing when we use the same word then we are talking past each other. — Harry Hindu
Delusions would be just as true as any deductive conclusion, which is preposterous. — Harry Hindu
So you're misusing language by implying that you are talking about other's views when you're really talking only about your view. So you're really talking past everyone who talks about their views or about a mind independent world. What is the point of having such a conversation? What would it be about? — Harry Hindu
Another misuse of language. You're misusing the term "reality". — Harry Hindu
How do you believe the relation obtains outside of a judgment? — Terrapin Station
I don't think about that which exists in it's entirety prior to our account of it in such terms. — creativesoul
I don't think about that which exists in it's entirety prior to our account of it in such terms.
— creativesoul
Haha, well that's what you should be doing to do philosophy--think about this stuff. If we're going to claim that the relation obtains outside of a judgment, if we're going to claim that that's how it exists, how it works, then we should have some idea of what, exactly, we're claiming about it ontologically, some idea of how it works, some support of our contentions, etc. especially aside from the fact that it's a common belief or a common way to talk about it. — Terrapin Station
Correspondence to what's happened/happening does not. — creativesoul
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