That’s all a very good point. I had not considered any of that in context of meaning is use until your earlier post. Same sort of generalization issue also crops up for the phrase language games. If they’re all unique, then how does Witty genaralize to one phrase?

Well, I think that generalization arises from the public aspect, the plurality of use. I use a word in one way, you use it in a similar way, and for the sake of simplicity we assume that we are using it in the same way. This, saying that it is "the same way", is the agreement which bongo said that we strive for. If you and I say that we will use, or do use, the word in the same way, then we have agreement. Notice though, that it's a faulty sense of "the same", really meaning similar. But "similar" doesn't indicate agreement in the same way that "same" does. If a "game" requires multiple players with some such "agreement", then generalization is inherent within the "game".

The problem though is that all of this description is produced in retrospect, from analysis. In reality, we use words in similar ways, without any agreements. And when we reflect on this in a linguistic analysis we generalize, saying that this similar way is the same way. The generalization is produced by the analysis, which is an effort to understand, so "same" is posited to facilitate principles. It's a deficient "same" though. Then, we claim that we agree that this is the same way, and this supposed agreement supports the posited "same". The agreement is non-existent.

Yet we use language and therefore "play language games" without any such agreement. It is therefore, when we want to say that "I play the same game as you", or some such thing, that the problem of generalization crops up. We are apt to use "same" in a way which is not consistent with a rigorous interpretation of the law of identity. The generalization is dependent on that loose use of "same".

It's a deficient "same" though. — Metaphysician Undercover

Only if you hold "same" to the impossible standard that requires another person be in precisely the same place and time (and mind?) in order to replicate your usage. Nobody besides a misguided philosopher would ever use the word "same" in this way about meaning or use. We often speak of synonyms having the same meaning without requiring your impossible standard of sameness. If that's what it takes to mean the "same" then we ought to replace every use of the word "same" with the word "similar" instead. Thankfully, our everyday usage needn't meet your impossible standards simply because you deem it to be more logically correct. That's just not how the word is commonly used, especially when describing linguistic meaning.

I think Witty talks about the origin of usage; and usage is different from the origin of usage.

The origin of usage is using a word in a particular way, and many other users will use it in a similar, but not same way; this gives rise to a general form of the meaning, a sort of "mean" or "average".

After that the average takes over, and the meaning of the word will be considered in every subsequent use to be the meaning already averaged.

In my opinion Witty lacked the insight of accepting the status quo of language. He delved into apparent contradictions of language, and he conveniently ignored the social and cultural reconciliatory practices that eliminated the contradictions. He was a genius who stopped his thinking at a premature insight, whereas he ought to have proceeded further in his thinking.

"A conclusion is a place where you stop when you got tired of thinking." -- traditional, origin unknown.

I think Witty talks about the origin of usage; — god must be atheist

Where does he talk about this?

usage is different from the origin of usage.

The origin of usage is using a word in a particular way, — god must be atheist

What is "usage" (as opposed to "the origin of usage")?

In my opinion Witty lacked the insight of accepting the status quo of language. He delved into apparent contradictions of language, and he conveniently ignored the social and cultural reconciliatory practices that eliminated the contradictions. — god must be atheist

How and where does Wittgenstein reject "the status quo of language"?

Only if you hold "same" to the impossible standard that requires another person be in precisely the same place and time (and mind?) in order to replicate your usage. Nobody besides a misguided philosopher would ever use the word "same" in this way about meaning or use. — Luke

Don't be absurd, this is the "same" which is defined by the law of identity. It was stated by Aristotle as a means of expelling sophism from philosophy. If you want to call similar things "the same" then you are not engaged in philosophy, but sophistry.

We often speak of synonyms having the same meaning without requiring your impossible standard of sameness. — Luke

Sure, we use "same" in this way. But it's clearly a way which is unacceptable in logical, or philosophical arguments. "I have two distinct brothers who own the same car, and both drive their cars at the same time " Try to figure that one out. Oh, I really mean that they have similar cars, not "the same car". So, why didn't I say "similar" in the first place? I was just making use of a colloquialism to pull a trick on you. Ha, ha, isn't that a funny joke? Let's call it what it is, sophistry.

You say "synonyms have the same meaning". If you are using this as a premise for a logical argument, it's very clear that it ought to be rejected as unsound. What you really mean is "similar". So if you are trying to use this as a premise for an argument, please state it in an acceptable form. Don't use the form of sophistry.

That's just not how the word is commonly used, especially when describing linguistic meaning. — Luke

No wonder there is so much confusion in the land of linguistic meaning. Sophistry abounds.

As I stated in my reply to Marchesk, we need to differentiate between the use of language itself, and the analysis of language use. Generalization enters when we look at how language was used, in retrospect, it is not an essential part of using language in the first place. When we generalize, we class similar things as the same. This use of "same" does not mean to say that similar things are the same, it means to say that they have been classed into the same category. The category here is the distinct "way of using" the word. When you say "synonyms have the same meaning", you are saying that these words belong to the same category (way of using).

By the way, we haven't gotten anywhere near to the bottom of this problem of the sophistic use of "same" in the land of linguistic meaning. In this illusory world, two distinct occurrences of a word are said to be occurrences of "the same" word. So the mother says "function", and then the daughter says "function", and we say that this is two occurrences of "the same" word. Clearly if we adhere to the law of identity we can see that this is a misleading use of "the same". And, we can also see that the sophism in this land of linguistic meaning has a very strong base.

Don't be absurd, this is the "same" which is defined by the law of identity. It was stated by Aristotle as a means of expelling sophism from philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's a shame that your use of the word "same" cannot be identical to Aristotle's definition, by your own argument, since he lived so long ago. I wonder what you can possibly mean by "same" in your current, unique use of the word.

If we say that there is a "way of using" a word, then the generalization is intrinsic to this concept, "way of using". What would validate a "way of using", if not some faulty assumption that X (a particular instance of use) is the same as Y (a particular instance of use)? — Metaphysician Undercover

Nominalist, heal thyself!

It's a shame that your use of the word "same" cannot be identical to Aristotle's definition, by your own argument, since he lived so long ago. — Luke

Of course my instance of using "same" is not the same as Aristotle's, that's exactly the point, and it's quite obvious according to how "same" is defined by the law of identity. Whether it's "identical" depends on how one would define "identical". Do we adhere to "identity" as described in the law of identity as the basis for "identical", or do we subscribe to some form of similarity to define "identical"? Leibniz argues, with his principle "identity of indiscernibles" that "identical" ought to remain consistent with "same"

But Wittgenstein offers a very adept demonstration of a difference between "same" and "identical" at 253-256 of the Philosophical Investigations. You should read it, since I know that you take Wittgenstein as an authority. Notice at 253, that two distinct chairs can be said to be "exactly the same", yet they are distinct and therefore not "the same" by any rigorous standard of identity. Then, at 254 he mentions this switching of "identical" for "same", as if it were a philosophical ploy. (This is the sophism I refer to, two chairs are said to be "the same", because they appear to be identical, when in fact they are distinct chairs and not the same.) .

It is very important to understand this distinction in the way that we use "same", as a foundation for understanding how we attach names to our sensations, which is what Wittgenstein is discussing in that section. We will assign two distinct sensations the designation of "the same", based on some judgement of similarity, despite the fact that they are not "the same" by any rigorous criterion of identity. So when he proceeds to discuss how a symbol "S" is used to stand for a "certain sensation", what the "S" really stands for is a generalized multiple occurrence of multiple sensations, which have been judged as being similar (identical), but are not really "the same" according to the rigorous law of identity. It is only by circumventing the law of identity, and the rigorous criterion for "same" which is associated with it, that a symbol may be used to refer to a sensation in this way.

When I said Witty talks about the original use of a word, or the original use of language, I meant to say he did not spell that out, but obviously he did talk about word's meanings in original use.

You asked me, Luke, what's the difference between usage and original usage. The answer is original usage is the first occurrence of he word in the language; and use of the word or language is the ensuing historical or current use of the word.

Witty did not say "I reject the status quo of the language". It is my judgment that he has, and hence his entire body of work.

I hope this post answers your questions and objections to your satisfaction.

Of course my instance of using "same" is not the same as Aristotle's, that's exactly the point, and it's quite obvious according to how "same" is defined by the law of identity — Metaphysician Undercover

You appear to have missed the point. A definition of the law of identity gives its meaning, yet it is your claim that no two meanings are the same or that we can ever be sure that they are the same, since agreement in ways of use are non-existent, and we can at best have only similar but not the same ways of use. Therefore, how can you use the law of identity as a law or a standard of sameness when the agreement of use is non-existent? You cannot be using it the same way as anybody else, including Aristotle, by your own argument. There is no such thing as the "same" because you have made it an impossible standard.

I don't suppose you have any specific references, other than his entire body of work?

@StreetlightX I was thinking about this at work today. For some reason, I got into literature in high school as like an important thing I felt like I needed to get good at (whatever that means.)A big part of that for me was mastering words. And I did really well with SAT conceptual words, like ambivalent and sedulous and desultory. But I would get really hung up on architectural terms, nautical terms (sooo many nautical terms), flowers/trees and so forth.

They kept coming up but I couldn't get them to stick. I'd get legit frustrated encountering them, they were like little opaque blocks in the reading. But I guess the point of them is they're not meant to convey concepts (like the sat words I could master) but build worlds, and that only works if you have some sense of the world theyre a part of. Its hard to just learn one at a time, while theyre easy as pie if you have a sense of the world of a ship, and can place 'binnacle' in terms of a bigger lived-in space of which its a part.


Definitions work for the SAT words because definitions are conceptual and if you've already got the basic concepts, you're in a position to see how other conceptual words are situated. definitions of the other sort of term tho are almost inherently unsatisfying - almost like replacing a single word with a longer phrase which is just as ungraspable.

the only satisfying definition of 'binnacle' is 'that thing over there' when youve been on a ship long enough to already kind of get it. Just like you only get 'I can't function without...' if you've done a few tours and get mom, her coffee, her emotions etc.

no point really, just something that hit me at work.

That’s all a very good point. I had not considered any of that in context of meaning is use until your earlier post. Same sort of generalization issue also crops up for the phrase language games. If they’re all unique, then how does Witty genaralize to one phrase? — Marchesk

I think it's a matter of sharing the same function, or at least the same kinds of functions. So, a cup (to refer to MU's example) is designed, and predominately used for, drinking from. Of course, it will be objected that different instances of drinking are not the same either, but the point is that taken in abstraction they are the same.

The question about generalization in general ( :wink:) is as to how we are able to abstract away all the differences between two things or events to see what they have in common, or how they resemble one another. It seems that difference and similarity are fundamental to human cognition and recognition, and are therefore not explicable in more basic terms. All explications rely on the cognition and recognition of difference and similarity, otherwise we could say nothing about anything, and then there would be no use or meaning.

It seems that difference and similarity are fundamental to human cognition and recognition, and are therefore not explicable in more basic terms. All explications rely on the cognition and recognition of difference and similarity, otherwise we could say nothing about anything, and then there would be no use or meaning. — Janus

Yes, it would seem that is so. I would contend this only works if the world has a related structure.

A definition of the law of identity gives its meaning, yet it is your claim that no two meanings are the same or that we can ever be sure that they are the same, since agreement in ways of use are non-existent, and we can at best have only similar but not the same ways of use. — Luke

No, we were working with the premise that meaning is use, and attempting to determine how "use" is being used in this sense. To say that a definition is what gives the law of identity meaning is way off track. It is the use of the law of identity which gives it meaning, and I readily admit that we do not use it in the same way, but similar ways. So I do not see that you are making any point here whatsoever.

Therefore, how can you use the law of identity as a law or a standard of sameness when the agreement of use is non-existent? You cannot be using it the same way as anybody else, including Aristotle, by your own argument. There is no such thing as the "same" because you have made it an impossible standard. — Luke

That's your opinion, it's not mine. If you think that the criteria for "same", as described by the law of identity is an impossible standard, and therefore you refuse to agree to it, then so be it. I agree to it, and other philosophers (Leibniz for example) agree to it, and therefore the agreement does exist. That you refuse to agree does not negate the agreement.

I don't suppose you have any specific references, other than his entire body of work? — Luke

That is correct. I was making an opinion on Wittgenstein's entire work, and not making an opinion on a specific quote or passage in his works.

Dear Luke, please refer to this post for a considered reply to your query:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6291/is-it-an-unwritten-community-lawscustom-to-demand-factual-proof-when-making-a-reasoned-opinion

A definition of the law of identity gives its meaning, yet it is your claim that no two meanings are the same or that we can ever be sure that they are the same, since agreement in ways of use are non-existent, and we can at best have only similar but not the same ways of use. — Luke

I think this is where your confusion lies Luke. I never said that agreements in ways of use are non-existent. I said that such generalizations about ways of use come about through retrospection. I do not deny the existence of generalizations, nor do I deny agreements in ways of use. What I deny is that generalizations indicate sameness within the things generalized, and that agreements in ways of use create same use. What is indicted by generalizations is similarity, and what is created through agreement is similarity.

And being similar is distinct from being the same. Is this difficult for you to understand?

Well, it works because the world that we experience is like this. Whether the world "as it is in itself" is like this is undecidable; but we can at least say that it is such as to give rise to the common world that we all experience.

And being similar is distinct from being the same. Is this difficult for you to understand? — Metaphysician Undercover

What you seem to fail to understand is that similarity is not a concept sufficient to substitute in all uses of 'same'. "Two dogs are the same kind of animal"; I cannot substitute "two dogs are similar kinds of animal" without losing the sense of the statement. It all depends on criteria; I can say that cats and dogs are similar kinds of animal insofar as they are both placental mammals, both predators, both covered in fur, and so on. So saying that two dogs are similar kinds of animals entails that the sameness (of genome, for example) is lost.

I never said that agreements in ways of use are non-existent. I said that such generalizations about ways of use come about through retrospection. I do not deny the existence of generalizations, nor do I deny agreements in ways of use. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see. I must have misunderstood when you said:

I use a word in one way, you use it in a similar way, and for the sake of simplicity we assume that we are using it in the same way. This, saying that it is "the same way", is the agreement which bongo said that we strive for. If you and I say that we will use, or do use, the word in the same way, then we have agreement. [...] In reality, we use words in similar ways, without any agreements. [...] The agreement is non-existent. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was making an opinion on Wittgenstein's entire work, and not making an opinion on a specific quote or passage in his works. — god must be atheist

Well, it's my "reasoned opinion" that you are completely wrong about Wittgenstein.

Well, it's my "reasoned opinion" that you are completely wrong about Wittgenstein. — Luke

I accept your disagreement, but I see no reason accompanying your opinion.

I offer my opinion that you are wrong about my being wrong. My opinion is based on reasons that are not stated.

I accept your disagreement, but I see no reason accompanying your opinion. — god must be atheist

Likewise.

What you seem to fail to understand is that similarity is not a concept sufficient to substitute in all uses of 'same'. "Two dogs are the same kind of animal"; I cannot substitute "two dogs are similar kinds of animal" without losing the sense of the statement. — Janus

Yes I went through that already. It is appropriate, in a philosophical discussion, or logical argument, to say that two distinct things are of the same kind. It is inappropriate in a philosophical discussion, or logical argument, to say that two distinct things are the same. Despite the fact that we often say two distinct things are "exactly the same" in everyday language use, in philosophy this amounts to sophistry.

I see. I must have misunderstood when you said: — Luke

I apologize for lack of clarity at that point. I didn't mean that there is never any agreement, in an absolute sense, only that in those instances there is no agreement. I believe that is what the op indicates, there is no agreement in that instance of use, yet there is still meaning in that instance.

Bongo had said that we strive for agreement, but I think that people strive for agreement sometimes, and other times not, so striving for agreement is not essential, just like agreement itself is not essential.

We can look at "definition" as a type of agreement, and agreement clearly has a place in language use, especially philosophy and logical proceedings. For example, "I agree, for the purpose of this logical argument, to use "same" in the way indicated by the law of identity. But such an agreement wouldn't restrict the way that I use "same" in my day to day use, which might be full of bad habits. And so long as people understand my day to day use of "same" there is no problem.

However, if I slip outside of the defined usage, which I have agreed to in the proceeding of the logical argument, if my bad habits overwhelm my will to maintain what I've agreed to, then I may be charged with equivocation.

Here is the problem which Wittgenstein exposes at 253 of PI. When we are talking about our sensations, and how one person may experience "the same" sensation as another, by what criteria of identity are we using "same" in this case? Clearly we are not using "same" in the way outlined by the law of identity, as the example of the chair demonstrates. However, there are enormous epistemological consequences which follow from this use of "same", as Witty outlines in the following section. Unless there is some clearly stated criteria (a definition, or agreement) for how "same" ought to be used in this type of situation, all the epistemology which is built on this use of "same" is completely unsound.

I didn't mean that there is never any agreement, in an absolute sense, only that in those instances there is no agreement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Rubbish. What does "in an absolute sense" mean here? What "instances" are you talking about? You said: "we use language and therefore "play language games" without any such agreement." There was no qualification; you meant that there is never any agreement. "The agreement is non-existent."

Bongo had said that we strive for agreement, — Metaphysician Undercover

... about, specifically, which words (or pictures or sunsets) are pointed (already or eventually) at which things.

I was aware that as a description of human discourse this calls for plenty of clarification, and I was trying to begin it by alluding to the "inscrutability of reference": the (alleged) fact that any actual connection between symbol and object is in our imagination or diagram. (Straw man version: no bolt of energy passes between symbol and object.) MU thought this irrelevant, so I wasn't surprised to find it difficult to know how best to engage with their subsequent critique, or whether it really engaged with mine.

But I fancy that their evident fear and loathing of equivocation might be related to my own fascination with what I see as a kind of equivocation at the heart of the social game (of agreeing what is pointed at what). As when, for example, we equivocate between implying that a particular token is (or isn't) pointed at a thing and implying rather that every single token "of the word" is (or isn't) pointed at the thing. Not to mention the equivocation dual with this, between referring to a single thing and referring to each of a whole class of ("same") things.

Not that I would think that all of this equivocating is necessarily a problem, if properly understood. Nor that I'm assuming anyone else would think it necessarily a problem, or that they don't already understand it better than I do. Hard to know what people's assumptions are in a discussion of this sort. Well, obvs.

I think our poor little three year old has suffocated under her blanket. It seems that no one has been paying attention to her.

I think our poor little three year old has suffocated under her blanket. It seems that no one has been paying attention to her. — Fooloso4

Fair, if snooty, point. If my last post above is in any way to blame for your sense of dislocation then I should admit that I didn't explain how I might have expected MU, or anyone, to appreciate the relevance of "inscrutability" to the girl's efforts. In fact, I didn't even link back to here,

But if you think of "meaning" in this way, as something which is attributed to words, you would have to accept that we can use words without knowing the meaning of the words. How would we characterize this type of use then? The child gets some sort of message across to the parents, but we cannot call it "meaning", because the child doesn't know the meaning. What is the child doing?
— Metaphysician Undercover

She is doing what we all have to do all the time, to a greater or lesser extent. Play the game of pointing the words (or pictures or sunsets) at what they (already, or are destined eventually to) point at. About which there obviously can be (as famously noted) "no fact of the matter". But about which we are nonetheless happy to strive to agree. — bongo fury

... which might have helped - since neither of us, here, is badly neglecting the child. I generalising unashamedly, yes.

Do you, also, find there being or not being a fact of the matter of meaning to be irrelevant to the girl's concerns?

Fair, if snooty, point. — bongo fury

I prefer the term arch. It was a joke.

If my last post above is in any way to blame for your sense — bongo fury

Don't take it personally. I won't name names or initials.