It's bad philosophy to just arrogantly assert things are right or wrong without argument or justification, which you have repeatedly done in this thread. — dukkha
I'm not sure quite what work 'dynamic' is doing here. States, as I understand them, are generally static. — csalisbury
All states are really processes, yes.Anyway would it be fair to say that 'states' as you here define them could equally be called 'processes'? — csalisbury
How long can a brain-state last? — csalisbury
Pinch yourself, in what way is that subjective experience of pain physical?
— dukkha
It's a brain state. Whether one can give a blueprint of how it works so that someone thinks it's a satisfactory blueprint has no bearing on whether it's a brain state or whether it's physical. It's not as if something isn't physical just in case we can't produce a blueprint for it that someone finds satisfactory. — Terrapin Station
I'm not 'trolling' you. I have an undergraduate degree in philosophy and a Master's in a related subject — Wayfarer
But never refer to any other philosopher, or any articles that support your argument. — Wayfarer
So why should I accept that you have some particular knowledge or insight about the question of 'identity of brain states with experience' when you say nothing to support it? — Wayfarer
So, since we're talking 15 minutes here, it would be fair to say that an individual goes through a lot of brain states throughout their life? — csalisbury
I present just as much support for my views as anyone else does. — TerrapinStation
Hence why there's no conceivable reason that you'd need to ask me to explain identity to you. — TerrapinStation
Would you be up for an empirical research project on this? We need to set out just how we're going to define what counts or not, just how we're going to enumerate it, and then we'll look at a bunch of past posts. Are you up for that?But you don't. — Wayfarer
And the countless brain states throughout an individuals life aren't identical to one another, right? — csalisbury
Right. I don't buy identity through time.
If Alex has brain state one at one time and brain state 2 at another time, there's two different Alexs. — csalisbury
Thus if nervous Alex (brain state 1) is nervous because he is about to be tortured (the pain of brain state 2) (I'm abstracting here! of course there are multiple brain states throughout!) then he is confused. He won't be the one being tortured. There's nothing to worry about. — csalisbury
Clearly you don't need the brain-state part to talk about identity-over-time in general, but we're talking about identity apropos of brain states and consciousness.You don't need the brain state part. Just simply, any x at T1 isn't identical to "x" at T2. That's what it means to not buy identity through time.
Can you elaborate on what you mean by a connection which isn't related to identity? Alex 1 and Alex 2 aren't the same person, they're just connected, is that right? Can you explain how that works? I hope you won't say that I know quite well what you're talking about. People tend to do that same thing with Qualia or the sense of having a soul. It just won't do!That something is non-identical through time doesn't imply that there's no connection through time.
First, you need to make sure that you're not conflating "personal identity" with the more general, logical notion of identity. I'm not sure that you're not conflating the two. They're two different ideas.
???The executioner's feeling of duty is causally connected to Alex's anguish. — csalisbury
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