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It's bad philosophy to just arrogantly assert things are right or wrong without argument or justification, which you have repeatedly done in this thread. — dukkha

Oh, you mean like just mentioning the PLA as if that's sufficient?

I'm not sure quite what work 'dynamic' is doing here. States, as I understand them, are generally static. — csalisbury

The work that "dynamic" is doing is emphasizing that I don't believe that anything is really static.

Good to hear. Would you be willing to answer the other questions I posed? Or not worth it?

I still want to understand more about brain states, consciousness and personal identity!

I'm not referring to anything unusual by identity. We can simply talk about objective definitions and usage. Definitions are different than meanings.

The reason I provided the reference to the SEP article on brain-mind identity, is because it is about the argument you seem to be pressing. When you say that 'love and hope are simply brain-states', you're arguing from what is called, in philosophy of mind, 'brain-mind identity theory'. That's what the theory is about. But then when I point that out, you say 'I don't mean that'. So I think everyone here is struggling to understand what you are saying.

In regards to 'identity' - the basic 'law of identity' is expressed very simply: 'In logic, the law of identity is the first of the three classical laws of thought. It states that "each thing is the same with itself and different from another". Symbolically, a = a.

Is that what you mean by 'identity'?

For some of those, I don't see how you're figuring that they have anything in particular to do with quantification. But the point I made earlier is that it's an interpretive matter if any of them count as a model or not. For example, a CAD model of a car--cars are actually nothing like computer code and pixels on a screen and so on. It's an interpretive matter whether that counts as a model of a car.

Identity in mind/brain identity theory isn't some special or unusual sense of identity. When you ask what identity refers to, I take you to be saying that in general, you're simply unfamiliar with the philosophical concept of identity, even though you apparently have at least a basic education in philosophy--so that "what do you mean by identity" thus simply seems trollish. And yes, identity as it's used in the "law of identity" is the same sense.

csalisbury, Since everyone is pouncing on me, but people are ignoring a bunch of stuff I'm typing, I'm doing one point at a time mode:

Anyway would it be fair to say that 'states' as you here define them could equally be called 'processes'? — csalisbury

All states are really processes, yes.

Thank you. I understand that you feel pounced-upon, and I understand that any individual poster has limited bandwidth, especially when under siege. That being said, it's the second set of questions I'm really interested in.

How long can a brain-state last? Are we using the term right when we talk of a 35 year long brain state?

And does a person have the same brain-state for the entirety of their life?

If these questions seem faux-naif, I'll admit they are, but walk with me down this path?

I'm not trying to counter your view with another (because I quite sincerely don't have one, just some confusions). I'm trying to get you to articulate your own.

I'm not 'trolling' you. I have an undergraduate degree in philosophy and a Master's in a related subject. Every time I post an article or a reference to one, you simply brush it aside. But you never refer to any other philosopher, or any articles or books that support your argument. Have you got one book, one source, that you think spells out 'the philosophical notion of concept of identity' that apparently I know nothing about?

How long can a brain-state last? — csalisbury

Since its dynamic, and since time is identical to change/motion anyway, brain states, just like states of anything else, are always changing. Re abstractions, we can say things like "Joe was hysterically laughing for 15 minutes," as if an identical state persisted for 15 minutes, but that's an abstraction, it's glossing over details to parse a temporal range of states as "one thing."

So, since we're talking 15 minutes here, it would be fair to say that an individual goes through a lot of brain states throughout their life?

(Especially since even this 15 minute long state is an 'abstraction,' which suggests that it's just a way we have of thinking and talking about things, something that isn't quite accurate. Unless you're saying that the abstraction itself exists? Everything points, in your account, to there being only very short pre-abstracted states/processes (which are always changing, so never fully the same.) Already we're in murky territory - can brain-states be abstractions? If something is constantly changing and never static, then how do we determine whether it's the same as itself? -but we can pass this over for now. And we probably should.)

Pinch yourself, in what way is that subjective experience of pain physical?
— dukkha

It's a brain state. Whether one can give a blueprint of how it works so that someone thinks it's a satisfactory blueprint has no bearing on whether it's a brain state or whether it's physical. It's not as if something isn't physical just in case we can't produce a blueprint for it that someone finds satisfactory. — Terrapin Station

Do you have a reason for believing this? You seem to just be asserting/assuming the conclusion that conscious experience is physical.

I'm not 'trolling' you. I have an undergraduate degree in philosophy and a Master's in a related subject — Wayfarer

Hence why there's no conceivable reason that you'd need to ask me to explain identity to you.

But never refer to any other philosopher, or any articles that support your argument. — Wayfarer

For a couple reasons. In my experience online, any "chumming up" is taken as a wholesale endorsement of the other person's views, at least for the issue at hand. Two, there is never any other philosopher where I agree with their views wholesale on any issue--typically, no matter who we're talking about and no matter on what issue, I disagree at least as much as I agree. And three, it has no bearing on whether something is correct that some particular philosopher forwarded whatever view they did.

The views I present are my views. I'm not parroting anyone else's views.

So why should I accept that you have some particular knowledge or insight about the question of 'identity of brain states with experience' when you say nothing to support it? — Wayfarer

Again, that someone else has the same view that you do isn't at all a support of a view.

I present just as much support for my views as anyone else does. I don't present formal arguments for anything typically, and that's not how I typically formulate views for a number of reasons, including my views about what logic is. But no one else typically presents anything like a formal argument for their views either.

I'm not expecting to persuade anyone to change their mind about anything. I fully expect that that won't happen in any case in general. I'm simply presenting my views as such. You're going to think that my views are wrong, not well supported, perhaps fallacious, perhaps incoherent, etc., and I'm going to think just the same thing about many of your views. I'm going to think just the same thing about most views I disagree with.

So, since we're talking 15 minutes here, it would be fair to say that an individual goes through a lot of brain states throughout their life? — csalisbury

Of course. It's countless, really, since it's always changing and since any way of counting it is going to be essentially arbitrary.

I present just as much support for my views as anyone else does. — TerrapinStation

But you don't.

Hence why there's no conceivable reason that you'd need to ask me to explain identity to you. — TerrapinStation

The implication being, you understand it, and I don't, which I don't accept.

Forums are for arguments, you express a viewpoint, and then hopefully defend it. On the basis of all the posts I have read of yours, there are only a couple of things you say - love, hope, etc, are brain states; you're against moral realism. But you don't give reasons, nor provide arguments, or references. So, I think that's about all to discuss, otherwise it's just wheel-spinning.

Yes, there area bunch of reasons. Let's take turns presenting some. You'll present your reasons for thinking it's nonphysical.

My first reason is that the idea of nonphysical existents is incoherent.

Okay, what's your first reason?

And the countless brain states throughout an individuals life aren't identical to one another, right?

But you don't. — Wayfarer

Would you be up for an empirical research project on this? We need to set out just how we're going to define what counts or not, just how we're going to enumerate it, and then we'll look at a bunch of past posts. Are you up for that?

And the countless brain states throughout an individuals life aren't identical to one another, right? — csalisbury

Right. I don't buy identity through time.

How about, first, you say whether you agree with the dictionary definition of what 'identity' means. After all you said that I don't know what it means, I provided a citation, and you ignored it again. So, let's just start with that question - what are you saying 'identity' means?

Here it is again: The basic 'law of identity' is expressed very simply: 'In logic, the law of identity is the first of the three classical laws of thought. It states that "each thing is the same with itself and different from another". Symbolically it is represented as a = a.

So, are you in agreement that this is what identity means?

You brought up the "law of identity." I wrote, "And yes, identity as it's used in the 'law of identity' is the same sense." Why doesn't that count as an answer to you? How is that ignoring what you wrote?

At any rate, sure, what dictionary do you have in mind?

Right. So when you say that 'an experience is a brain state', you mean they're identical, they're the same. Is that what you mean by 'identity'?

Yes, since that's the standard definition of identity, and I said a number of times that I'm not using that word unusually.

Right. I don't buy identity through time.

Ok, got you.

If Alex has brain state 1 at one time and brain state 2 at another time, then we're talking about two different Alexs. Thus if nervous Alex (brain state 1) is nervous because he is about to be tortured (this will be agonizing brain state 2) (I'm abstracting here! of course there are multiple brain states throughout!) then he is confused. He won't be the one being tortured. There's nothing to worry about.

Is this fair? If not, why not?

If Alex has brain state one at one time and brain state 2 at another time, there's two different Alexs. — csalisbury

You don't need the brain state part. Just simply, any x at T1 isn't identical to "x" at T2. That's what it means to not buy identity through time.

Thus if nervous Alex (brain state 1) is nervous because he is about to be tortured (the pain of brain state 2) (I'm abstracting here! of course there are multiple brain states throughout!) then he is confused. He won't be the one being tortured. There's nothing to worry about. — csalisbury

That something is non-identical through time doesn't imply that there's no connection through time. But sure, if one ONLY cared about identity through time, then that person wouldn't care in that situation.

You don't need the brain state part. Just simply, any x at T1 isn't identical to "x" at T2. That's what it means to not buy identity through time.

Clearly you don't need the brain-state part to talk about identity-over-time in general, but we're talking about identity apropos of brain states and consciousness.

That something is non-identical through time doesn't imply that there's no connection through time.

Can you elaborate on what you mean by a connection which isn't related to identity? Alex 1 and Alex 2 aren't the same person, they're just connected, is that right? Can you explain how that works? I hope you won't say that I know quite well what you're talking about. People tend to do that same thing with Qualia or the sense of having a soul. It just won't do!

I am not sure if I would stay dead. <3

First, you need to make sure that you're not conflating "personal identity" with the more general, logical notion of identity. I'm not sure that you're not conflating the two. They're two different ideas.

Anyway, sure, Alex at T1 is causally connected to Alex at T2, they're contiguous, memory is involved, there's a sense of a continuous self involved, and so on. Those are some examples, although by no means is it an exhaustive list, of the connections.

First, you need to make sure that you're not conflating "personal identity" with the more general, logical notion of identity. I'm not sure that you're not conflating the two. They're two different ideas.

Fair enough. One might think that 'personal identity' is a subclass of the much broader class of 'identity' but if there is no identity over time, then personal identity is just a way of talking. The 'identity' part of 'personal identity' is far too loose. Yes? Personal identity literally can have nothing to do with identity if identity doesn't persist across time. Do you agree?

Let's look at each of your connections with reference to this central question. Why should nervous alex (Alex1) be nervous about becoming tortured Alex (Alex2)?

1. Causal connection. The executioner's feeling of duty is causally connected to Alex's anguish. Does that mean that the executioner should be nervous about the torture he himself is to soon feel, being causally connected it? Clearly not. So causal connection does not get at the matter.

2.Contiguity. The executioner's blade is contiguous with alex's flesh, both in space and in time. Does that mean the blade should be nervous about the torture it is to soon feel. Clearly not. So contiguity does not get at the matter.

3. memory. If nervous Alex is aware he'll be knocked unconscious prior to execution and given a drug that'll prevent recollection, would he be right not to be nervous about the impending torture (since, at that time, he won't remember earlier states?) Clearly not. So memory does not get at the matter.

4. Sense of self. Well what is this? Is the sense of self a physical thing? Is it a brain state? But if it's a brain state the only way it can extend across multiple brain states is to be connected. Through what? Through a sense of self! But what is a sense of self. Is it a brain state? But if it's a brain state...

The executioner's feeling of duty is causally connected to Alex's anguish. — csalisbury

???

I don't think you're using causal connection I the sense that I'm using it. I'm talking about causality in what we could call a (direct) "physics sense."

How is the executioner's "feeling of duty" causally connected to Alex in that sense?

(Also, just btw, I'm going to need to split soon, but I can continue this silliness tomorrow)