And, as they all recognise, it presupposes a system of property rights. — Virgo Avalytikh

We've come back to the same issue we started with. You disavow the State, which gives a system of property rights, but at the same time you presuppose a system of property rights. Unless you produce an acceptable statement of property rights, you have no system of property rights, and therefore your presupposition is void, false. You've shown me two, very distinct and incompatibles systems of property rights, claimed by libertarians, the left and the right. Clearly the incompatibility between these two indicates that there is no such thing as the libertarian system of property rights, and your presupposition is void, false.

Your initial assertion was that the NAP is incompatible with private property. — Virgo Avalytikh

To be more precise, I said that the NAP is incompatible with the right to private property. You have shown me the fundamental disagreement between right and left on this issue of property rights, such that you have demonstrated that there is no such thing as convention on property rights. Therefore there is no "system of property rights". The NAP presupposes the existence of something which does not exist, a system of property rights. The convention required for there to be a system of property rights does not exist, yet the NAP presupposes such. That is why the right to private property (something recognized as non-existent, by lack of convention) is incompatible with the NAP which presupposes the existence of that right.

To be more precise, I said that the NAP is incompatible with the right to private property. You have shown me the fundamental disagreement between right and left on this issue of property rights, such that you have demonstrated that there is no such thing as convention on property rights. Therefore there is no "system of property rights". The NAP presupposes the existence of something which does not exist, a system of property rights. The convention required for there to be a system of property rights does not exist, yet the NAP presupposes such. That is why the right to private property (something recognized as non-existent, by lack of convention) is incompatible with the NAP which presupposes the existence of that right. — Metaphysician Undercover

You’re going to shatter her reason for living.

I introduced two major streams of thought in contemporary political philosophy concerning how property rights are generated, so that you can see what kinds of views are prevalent in the literature. There's no secret about the fact that they are mutually incompatible; that is why there is a distinction between them. Within the larger thoughtworld of libertarianism, there are certain varieties of opinion, as there are with all political philosophies. It doesn't follow in the least that therefore libertarians 'don't have' a system of property rights. They are there to read, if only you take the time to do so. I would say that a major task of political philosophy is to determine in a reasoned way what kinds of conventions in relations to property are worth recognising and which are not. The fact that there are differences of opinion on this question is not to say that there are not or could not be such conventions; it simply requires us to do the hard work that political philosophers do. Moreover, to say that, because one is a Statist, one simply doesn't have any basis on which to conduct such a discussion, is completely unwarranted and not convincing.

A lot of Native American tribes had communal property, and they were successful for millennia before the white man. I have no desire to read ad hoc arguments justifying the need for or the justification for private property.

as though my only options are choosing between endorsing this or that form of aggression — Virgo Avalytikh

Welcome to the real world.

Since I am sceptical of the State tout court, it is little comfort that there may be ways of keeping the power of this coercive monopoly ‘reined in’. — Virgo Avalytikh

Not reining it in, is even a worse approach.

I don't feel the need to choose between aggressive States or aggressive soon-to-be States. — Virgo Avalytikh

In all practical terms, what is a Libyan supposed to do now that he has been "liberated" from Khadaffi?

There is not even an aggressive soon-to-be State. The desire to lower aggression and violence within the Libyan perimeter has been unattainable for more than five years now. Trade and commerce have come to a standstill. There are shortages of everything.

Since the fighter jets who took out Khadaffi took off from France, I guess that the Libyans will soon have to jump into life rafts, cross the Mediterranean, and apply for welfare benefits on arrival in Marseille.

Are you sure that you want to replicate that scenario -- dismantling the perimeter -- elsewhere? Is there really a need to generalize this?

There's more to life than private property. I have a lot of possessions, and they mean a lot to me. Some I bought, some given to me, some I found, and there's probably a few that I borrowed and forgot to return. Each one is in my possession and is mine. But if I said I have the right to claim any of these things as my private property I'd be referring to the legal status given by the State.

It doesn't follow in the least that therefore libertarians 'don't have' a system of property rights — Virgo Avalytikh

A multitude of different, incompatible philosophies of property rights does not constitute a system of rights. We've agreed already that rights follow from conventions. So when people do not agree there is no convention, therefore no rights. What you describe is incompatible philosophies, not conventions.

I would say that a major task of political philosophy is to determine in a reasoned way what kinds of conventions in relations to property are worth recognising and which are not. — Virgo Avalytikh

OK, if we can pick and choose which philosophies of property rights we would like to recognize, and call these "conventions", doesn't that mean we can choose our rights? What good is the NAP if it presupposes a system of property rights, and is built on property rights as its foundation, but each individual is allowed to choose one's own system of property rights, depending on their preferred philosophy?

The fact that there are differences of opinion on this question is not to say that there are not or could not be such conventions; it simply requires us to do the hard work that political philosophers do. — Virgo Avalytikh

The problem though, is with the NAP. As you aptly demonstrated, it presupposes property rights, it requires them, and is meaningless, useless without them. Now you admit that such conventions (which establish property rights) don't even exist, and require philosophers to do the hard work of producing them. Therefore the NAP is meaningless, useless. So, let's dump the NAP as not worth the paper it is written on. Agree? Or, would you keep pushing the NAP creating the illusion that people who presently own property protected under rights given by the State, would maintain such property rights if the State were dissolved? I think that's deception.

There's more to life than private property. I have a lot of possessions, and they mean a lot to me. Some I bought, some given to me, some I found, and there's probably a few that I borrowed and forgot to return. Each one is in my possession and is mine. But if I said I have the right to claim any of these things as my private property I'd be referring to the legal status given by the State. — Metaphysician Undercover

I value my property, too. To call it a right that isn’t given by a State set up through a social contract would require some kind of ad hoc argument, I think.

I would think this would be a huge problem for anarchists. With anarchy there would be no single convention on property ownership, so to propose a form of anarchism which pretends to be based in a system of property rights requires that those property rights be explicitly expressed. If these principles of property rights were adhered to, then I think we would just end up with a State, and not a form of anarchy.

The idea of right-wing anarchism strikes me as rather ridiculous. Since the poor outnumber the rich by a vast majority, how could these people reach a consensus which would allow the rich property owners to maintain their wealth? Who puts forth such crazy ideas ... Virgo?

But I never said that this was the definition of the NAP. — Virgo Avalytikh

Obviously, because then the circularity would have been obvious. You didn't offer a specific definition either, and the form of your argument implied such a broad definition.

If I aggress against you, perhaps by killing, assaulting, or stealing from you, I win and you lose. If you and I trade peacefully, we both enter into such arrangements with the expectation of individual benefit. The NAP prohibits aggression, and allows for peaceful trade. So it prohibits the former and permits the latter. There is nothing circular about any of this. The NAP is simply a just and worthy principle. — Virgo Avalytikh

Sure, but then trade and aggression are not the sum total of human interaction. Of course you can go ahead and define trade as "every interaction which allows for mutual benefit" and aggression as everything else, but then again your argument ends up circular.

They provide services, such as rights-enforcement. There might be criminal service-providers too, such as assassins or whatever else. But that doesn’t mean that the market will not or could not provide those services for which the State is usually considered necessary. All I am pointing out is that, just because the State does x, it does not follow that x would not get done in the absence of the State. — Virgo Avalytikh

Sure, individuals could provide similar services to what the state provides, but individuals cannot provide "rights", because a "right" needs a higher order, that is something that supersedes the self-interest of individuals, to exist. That doesn't need to be a modern nation state, but it needs to be something with authority above and beyond that of individuals.

It is then conceivable that individuals could enforce those rights, but they'd need to do this explicitly not as a service to other individuals, or else it wouldn't be enforcement. They'd need to be bound to the right itself, and the authority it derives from, not to the self-interest of whoever hired them.

This is certainly true, but only one part of the argument. The vindication of libertarianism for which I have argued also involves the fact that there is good reason to presume in favour of liberty (in other words, that aggression is something to be resorted to rather than a starting point), and that, while liberty is imperfect, the alternatives are much more imperfect. This is the entire point of the argument I presented initially. — Virgo Avalytikh

The problem is (and I am starting to repeat myself here) that as far as I can see, you haven't provided justification for the other steps in the argument.

Sure, that was the upper range of the numbers that I saw. I saw numbers as low as $10,000. I thought I would be a little less biased by putting up a number in mid-range. You also ignored the fact that most of that money is tied up in commodities and property. So, using your number, people would get around $10,000 cash, and then they would own a fraction of a beach house on the California coast. They would have a place to stay for two weeks out of the year, but then what would they be able to own with just $10,000? — Harry Hindu

Your claim was that, if all assets were divided equally among people, everyone would live in poverty. That is demonstrably false using any one of these numbers. That equally distributing assets is nevertheless impractical to the point of being essentially impossible is obvious. The vast majority of the population today owns way less than 10.000$ in assets. And as to where people live, there is rent.

I could enforce my view by physically defending what I own. Sure, there could be a larger group of people (ie a government, because that is all a government is - a group of people with a social contract and the resources to defend it) that come and take what I own, but then does that make it "right" or "wrong"? Is there such a thing as an objective "right" and "wrong" way to live and be governed? — Harry Hindu

Physically enforcing your assets is problematic, as you yourself are aware. That's why having a system where your assets are protected regardless of your ability to physically defend them is desirable. As to whether there is a "right" system, I do think so. Though it's not "objectively" right since there is no "object" to refer to. There is a system that is right between human subjects, so it's intersubjectively right.

That there is a plurivocity of opinions doesn’t mean that we should throw away the whole enterprise. People who disagree about the precise substance of rights may still agree that there ought to be a system of rights, just as two people may have completely different ontologies while still agreeing that ontology is meaningful and worthy. Moreover, the fact that there may be diverse conventions with regards to rights does not imply that all conventions are created equal. Some systems of rights are good and worthy, and some are not. This is where political philosophy has a role to play. By the same token, the fact that one system of rights might be recognised as ‘conventional’ does not imply that there is not a better system of rights that we might choose to employ.

‘Rights’ are nothing more than a set of principles which decide in favour of either you or me, where we would otherwise be engaged in conflict such that we cannot both achieve our own separate ends. If it were possible for all of us to achieve our own ends all of the time, there would never be any conflict, and no system of rights would be necessary. The ‘right’ allocates the scare resources over which we are in conflict either to serve your ends or mine. Coming at it from a slightly different angle (though it amounts to the same thing), rights determine the acceptable use of force.

The alternative to a system of rights is for there to be no principled system of resource-allocation, and no principled system determining the acceptable use of force. A system of rights is that which distinguishes us from a state of nature, in which all such conflicts are determined, not in a principled way, but by the arbitrary use of force. Statism is not a serious solution to this; indeed, Statism is simply an extension of the Hobbesian starting point, since the State’s use of force is no less arbitrary than anyone else’s. All that really distinguishes a State is that its use of force is successfully monopolistic.

What you have presented does not pose a particular threat to the worthiness of the NAP. Your argument seems to be that, since the NAP presupposes a system of rights, and since rights are conventions, and since there is no single, definitive convention regarding rights, the NAP should be abandoned. I don’t see how this follows. The world we live in is not a libertarian world. The NAP does not ‘obtain’ in the sense that the world is populated by States, and States are agencies of aggression on a dizzying scale. But all of this is quite independent of its worthiness. The NAP is a normative claim.

Sure, but then trade and aggression are not the sum total of human interaction. Of course you can go ahead and define trade as "every interaction which allows for mutual benefit" and aggression as everything else, but then again your argument ends up circular. — Echarmion

Either we interact in such a way that involves the initiatory use of force, or we interact in such a way that does not involve the initiatory use of force. These possibilities are jointly exhaustive, it seems to me. The distinction is also meaningful, and precisely the one which the NAP seeks to make. To be sure, not all interactions of the latter kind constitute ‘trade’ in the sense we ordinarily use this term, it is just an example of it (though, many social interactions such as friendships or marriages can certainly be analysed economically as kinds of ‘trades’; look at the stable marriage problem for example).

You keep making this charge of circularity, but I still don’t see exactly what it is that is supposed to be circular. ‘Circularity’ is a property of arguments, and it is that property by which the conclusion is assumed as a premise, implicitly or explicitly. What is the conclusion I am taking for granted, and where do I take it for granted?

Sure, individuals could provide similar services to what the state provides, but individuals cannot provide "rights", because a "right" needs a higher order, that is something that supersedes the self-interest of individuals, to exist. That doesn't need to be a modern nation state, but it needs to be something with authority above and beyond that of individuals. — Echarmion

Certainly, individuals do not ‘provide’ rights (though they can defend them). Rights are ‘higher order’ in the sense that they are principles, and therefore they are abstractions. You correctly observe that this does not have to be a State, but I would go further: it cannot be a State. There is nothing magical about ‘States’. A State, like any collective entity, is just a construct, composed of individuals like you and me. There is nothing ‘higher order’ about a State beyond the monopolistic status people tend to recognise in it, quite arbitrarily.

The problem is (and I am starting to repeat myself here) that as far as I can see, you haven't provided justification for the other steps in the argument. — Echarmion

Yes, you keep saying this, but I can do no more than direct you to my opening argument and subsequent comments. I’m not sure what step of the argument you’re taking issue with, exactly. What is it you object to?

These kinds of discussions really aren't worth having unless we have a clear distinction in place between 'private' property and 'communal' property. Private property is characterised, fundamentally, by de-privation; that is to say, exclusion. Private ownership is essentially exclusionary ownership. Consider a community of persons, in which there exists a wealthy property-owner. Suppose the other members of the community forcibly deprive him of his property, and distribute it according to some principle of egalitarian justice across all the members of this community. On the face of it, this looks like a straightforward case of 'communal' ownership.

Suppose, however, that there is a second community across the river, one which does not have a wealthy property-owner of its own to ransack. It may say to the newly enriched community that it, too, is entitled to its fair share of this wealth. But the first company refuses; 'It it ours', they say. What has really happened, then, is not so much the transferal of private property to communal property. The community is still practising private ownership rights. There is no difference in principle between the state of affairs before the ransacking and that which obtains after the ransacking. All that has changed is the scale.

The point is simply this: left-liberal egalitarians since Rousseau have recognised that the only consistent way to oppose private property is to endorse a system of global communal ownership. Either exclusion is per se objectionable or it is not. If it is, then a particular people with a patch of land to call their own is not really 'communal'; or, if it is communal, then communal ownership is simply a sub-species of private ownership.

Either we interact in such a way that involves the initiatory use of force, or we interact in such a way that does not involve the initiatory use of force. These possibilities are jointly exhaustive, it seems to me. The distinction is also meaningful, and precisely the one which the NAP seeks to make. To be sure, not all interactions of the latter kind constitute ‘trade’ in the sense we ordinarily use this term, it is just an example of it (though, many social interactions such as friendships or marriages can certainly be analysed economically as kinds of ‘trades’; look at the stable marriage problem for example). — Virgo Avalytikh

Yes, they are jointly exhaustive if formulated that way. But this doesn't tell me how the NAP ensures that burdens and benefits are distributed according to responsibility.

You keep making this charge of circularity, but I still don’t see exactly what it is that is supposed to be circular. ‘Circularity’ is a property of arguments, and it is that property by which the conclusion is assumed as a premise, implicitly or explicitly. What is the conclusion I am taking for granted, and where do I take it for granted? — Virgo Avalytikh

I started this particular line of argument by questioning your assertion that, in the absence of outside coercive forces, burdens and benefits of an act would - generally - fall on the person(s) responsible. You responded by pointing out that the NAP would be violated if burdens and benefits fall apart.

You have positioned the NAP as the principle that ensures, for lack of a better word, fairness. But the NAP, in it's general formulation, is vague and does not reference distribution of burdens and benefits at all. It's details are also debated, and you have offered no definition of your own. From this I conclude that you're taking for granted that the NAP will ensure a "fair" distribution of burdens without actually defining a specific NAP and showing how it works.

Certainly, individuals do not ‘provide’ rights (though they can defend them). Rights are ‘higher order’ in the sense that they are principles, and therefore they are abstractions. You correctly observe that this does not have to be a State, but I would go further: it cannot be a State. There is nothing magical about ‘States’. A State, like any collective entity, is just a construct, composed of individuals like you and me. There is nothing ‘higher order’ about a State beyond the monopolistic status people tend to recognise in it, quite arbitrarily. — Virgo Avalytikh

There is also no difference between a human being and any other configuration of matter beyond the special status people tend to recognise in it. It also doesn't follow that because a state is a construct, it cannot provide rights.

You have also completely skipped my point about self-interested contractors not "enforcing rights".

Yes, you keep saying this, but I can do no more than direct you to my opening argument and subsequent comments. I’m not sure what step of the argument you’re taking issue with, exactly. What is it you object to? — Virgo Avalytikh

I would like you to justify your premises beyond the first one. A libertarian system can suffer from "market failure", but other systems can suffer similar defects - fine. Your next premise was that market failure is less severe in libertarian systems than for other systems, especially any form of statism. Please provide an argument for this premise.

Aggressive marketing campaigns would not be considered as 'aggression' in the libertarian system. — Virgo Avalytikh

Well actually, of course they would. The overall definition of 'aggression' does not change just because libertarians have claimed one specific meaning. Even if we concede the libertarian meaning, the old definitions still apply when they are applicable.

And in world foreign policy, what counts as "initiatory use of violence"? If your grandpa killed my grandpa is my use of violence against you justified?

How about domestically? If I see a police officer tackle a peaceful protester (who refused to move off private property), and I beat up the police officer? I know you will count the refusal to move from private property as an act of aggression (but careful, because there is no violence in this example - unless you redefine violence as well), but what if I don't? Then the police are initiating violence.

Is there ANY chance that the phrase "initiatory use of violence" means the same thing to everyone?

I would like you to justify your premises beyond the first one. A libertarian system can suffer from "market failure", but other systems can suffer similar defects - fine. Your next premise was that market failure is less severe in libertarian systems than for other systems, especially any form of statism. Please provide an argument for this premise. — Echarmion

For the purposes of my argument, I have defined market failure as a situation wherein each individual acts correctly in his/her own interests, and the net result is to make (almost or absolutely) everybody worse off. One element of my argument is that such a phenomenon is a relative rarity in a system of private property and non-aggression. Both of the conditions are important: the NAP is senseless without a system of property (because, in the absence of ownership rights, ‘aggression’ cannot be recognised definitively as such), and private property is also important for avoiding the problems of market failure which plague a collective system of ownership. I understand ‘right-libertarianism’ to be the conjunction of these two principles (in distinction from, say, ‘left-libertarianism’, which upholds the latter but rejects the former).

If market failure is as I have defined it, then a system will successfully avoid market failure if, generally, individuals acting correctly in their own interests serves to improve their own situations as well as other peoples’, and does not make people substantially worse off than they would have been under some alternative system. I have provided a number of reasons for thinking that right-libertarianism satisfies these criteria.

I have argued that, since individuals tend to be best acquainted with their own situations, it is reasonable to expect people to do what is best for themselves if left to their own devices, rather than being forcibly coerced into living in a particular way, or being co-owned by everybody else. I know what is best for myself better than I do for any other person in this world, and I also know what is best for myself better than anybody else does, whether individually or collectively. I think that this principle is reasonable, and it stands in support of both private property and the NAP: private property, because ownership rights begin with the right to own one’s self, and the NAP, because I am more likely to know what is best for myself than someone who wishes to coerce me into living in a certain way.

I have also drawn attention to the nature of voluntary trade. Voluntary trade is win-win; the only way in which a trade can occur is if we each value what the other person has more than what we each presently have. Notice that this applies, not only in commercial ‘market-place’ situations, but for non-aggressive interactions in general. If you and I become friends, it is because you and I would each rather be friends than non-friends. This principle can be pushed very far, I think. Again, this serves as a vindication of both of our right-libertarian principles. ‘Trade’ cannot occur in a system of collective ownership, and therefore requires private ownership, and the NAP is that which secures the mutually beneficial result of the interaction (contrast this with an aggressive act, such as theft or murder).

Third, I drew attention to the way in which private property rights tend to eliminate the market failure problems inherent in a collective system of ownership. Collective ownership tends towards market failure for numerous reasons, but one reason is that no individual is personally responsible for that which is owned. In a system of collective ownership, an individual who puts that which is owned collectively to profitable use may not receive the profits him/herself, instead losing most of it to the central pot. An individual who does not put that which is owned collectively to profitable use is negligibly worse off than he would have been otherwise, and enjoys far more leisure. This becomes more and more the case as the scale of collective ownership increases.

Not so under private ownership. A private owner who puts his property to profitable use receives that profit, and bears the cost (e.g. forgone profit) if he does not. Moreover, unlike collectivist situations, markets have an astonishing capacity to function on a scale that is simply dizzying (I strongly recommend Leonard Read’s short essay, ‘I, Pencil’, which illustrates this point marvellously). Not only is private property important, but of course the NAP is a vital ingredient here, too. That I bear the profits and costs of doing what I want with what I own presupposes that I am not subject to predatory aggression.

Contrast all of this with Friedman’s observation in my opening argument, that virtually everybody in the political realm take decisions whose costs and benefits go to others. The differences are striking and, to me at least, impressive (which is why I am an anarcho-capitalist).

You have positioned the NAP as the principle that ensures, for lack of a better word, fairness. But the NAP, in it's general formulation, is vague and does not reference distribution of burdens and benefits at all. It's details are also debated, and you have offered no definition of your own. From this I conclude that you're taking for granted that the NAP will ensure a "fair" distribution of burdens without actually defining a specific NAP and showing how it works. — Echarmion

The NAP is that principle which prohibits the initiatory use or threat of force against (persons or) property. I don’t believe I have invoked the concept of ‘fairness’ in defending the NAP, and I am not convinced that there is a perfectly coincidental connection between them (if I give a gift to all of my cousins bar one, this strikes me as unfair, but not a violation of the NAP). The NAP has many virtues, however, and I think that most people hold to it quite intuitively in all cases except the State (a quite arbitrary exception).

There is also no difference between a human being and any other configuration of matter beyond the special status people tend to recognise in it. It also doesn't follow that because a state is a construct, it cannot provide rights. — Echarmion

If a right is something of ‘higher order’ than individual persons, and if collective entities (like States) are, ontologically speaking, nothing above and beyond the individuals which comprise them, then States are no more capable of creating or bestowing rights than anyone else.

You have also completely skipped my point about self-interested contractors not "enforcing rights". — Echarmion

I am not sure what this means. I can enforce my own rights (by defending myself against an aggressor), a friend can help me to do so, and a private service-provider can help me do so as well. Why can't I pay someone to enforce my rights, or help me to do so?

Well actually, of course they would. The overall definition of 'aggression' does not change just because libertarians have claimed one specific meaning. Even if we concede the libertarian meaning, the old definitions still apply when they are applicable. — ZhouBoTong

It may be 'aggressive' in some sense, but not in the sense that is relevant to our purposes. Libertarians aren't interested in altering the definition of 'aggression' tout court, erasing all other possible meanings from history. The word is simply chosen to express a particular idea: the initiatory use of force.

And in world foreign policy, what counts as "initiatory use of violence"? If your grandpa killed my grandpa is my use of violence against you justified? — ZhouBoTong

No, it is not justified. I have not used force against you, so when you use force against me, it is initiatory. Our grandparents are a red herring.

How about domestically? If I see a police officer tackle a peaceful protester (who refused to move off private property), and I beat up the police officer? I know you will count the refusal to move from private property as an act of aggression (but careful, because there is no violence in this example - unless you redefine violence as well), but what if I don't? Then the police are initiating violence. — ZhouBoTong

Is the protester an aggressor, or not? You describe him as 'peaceful', but if he is a trespasser then he is violating someone's rights and stands in violation of the NAP. The police officer may simply be protecting the rights of whoever owns the property on which the protester is trespassing.

That there is a plurivocity of opinions doesn’t mean that we should throw away the whole enterprise. People who disagree about the precise substance of rights may still agree that there ought to be a system of rights, just as two people may have completely different ontologies while still agreeing that ontology is meaningful and worthy. Moreover, the fact that there may be diverse conventions with regards to rights does not imply that all conventions are created equal. Some systems of rights are good and worthy, and some are not. This is where political philosophy has a role to play. By the same token, the fact that one system of rights might be recognised as ‘conventional’ does not imply that there is not a better system of rights that we might choose to employ. — Virgo Avalytikh

OK, we can probably all agree that there ought to be a system of property rights, but this doesn't make such a convention magically appear. But the NAP, as described by you, presupposes the existence of such a system. So it is the NAP which ought to be thrown away, because its principal prerequisite does not exist. Once convention on property rights is established, then we might decide whether something like the NAP is called-for.

Coming at it from a slightly different angle (though it amounts to the same thing), rights determine the acceptable use of force. — Virgo Avalytikh

But you have been proposing a completely different angle, one in which the State has been abolished. At this point, there are no rights, that's the important point which you do not seem to be grasping. At this point we cannot say "rights determine the acceptable use of force" because there are no rights, the revolt is against the State which is the support of the existing rights. At this point, the use of force will be inevitable, it will be required to abolish the State. Furthermore, the use of force will play a role in determining which rights are acceptable, not vise versa.

The alternative to a system of rights is for there to be no principled system of resource-allocation, and no principled system determining the acceptable use of force. — Virgo Avalytikh

That situation follows inevitably from the anarchist induced abolition of the State. It is inevitable because of disagreement. There will be disagreement concerning the need to abolish the State, therefore disagreement as to whether such force is "acceptable use of force". The NAP which might be touted by those who abolish the State will not be respected because the Statists will declare wrongful use of force. And, as I pointed out, if the State is abolished, the NAP would then have no system of property rights to support it, so it becomes completely meaningless anyway.

What you have presented does not pose a particular threat to the worthiness of the NAP. Your argument seems to be that, since the NAP presupposes a system of rights, and since rights are conventions, and since there is no single, definitive convention regarding rights, the NAP should be abandoned. I don’t see how this follows. — Virgo Avalytikh

Try looking at it this way. Suppose we have a principle which states "if we are good, we will not act aggressively". Notice that "we will not act aggressively" requires "we are good", just like the NAP requires a system of property rights. Trying to get people to not act aggressively is impossible and a useless exercise if the people are not good. What is required is to make the people good. Likewise, trying to get people to respect and obey the NAP is impossible, and a useless exercise without an agreed upon system of property rights, because the NAP requires that. So what is required to work on is an acceptable system of property rights. That's how normative principles work, it's pointless to push a principle without the necessary conditions for application of the principle.

No, it is not justified. I have not used force against you, so when you use force against me, it is initiatory. Our grandparents are a red herring. — Virgo Avalytikh

I disagree. Your family/country/ancestors potentially make you culpable. I will try a libertarian perspective:

If my grandpa steals all your land then leaves it to me in his will, would you and the courts be the aggressors when you try to get your land back? I didn't do anything wrong?

Any chance we can take this beyond our opinions? I don't see how?

Is the protester an aggressor, or not? You describe him as 'peaceful', but if he is a trespasser then he is violating someone's rights and stands in violation of the NAP. The police officer may simply be protecting the rights of whoever owns the property on which the protester is trespassing. — Virgo Avalytikh

I disagree (how is the trespassing MORE aggressive than the ownership?).

Is there ANY chance that the phrase "initiatory use of violence" means the same thing to everyone? — ZhouBoTong

I am still leaning toward 'no'.

If my grandpa steals all your land then leaves it to me in his will, would you and the courts be the aggressors when you try to get your land back? I didn't do anything wrong? — ZhouBoTong

There's a salient difference between theft and murder. In the case of the former, some form of compensation, or even restitution, is possible. In the case of the latter, it's plainly not. If my grandfather was a thief, I may justifiably lose property I possess that originated in his acts of thievery, provided solid evidence of such acts. If my grandfather was a murderer, I may not justifiably lose my own life.

Regarding "aggressive marketing campaigns", I have to confess that I am having a hard time grasping just what in the world the argument is supposed to be. Yes, things can be colloquially described as "aggressive". No, that doesn't mean that they are aggressive in the philosophically relevant sense. One might as well accuse libertarians of illicitly "changing the language!" because the libertarian principle doesn't prohibit "passive-aggressive behavior" and doesn't compel us to be particularly kind to our fellows.

Pretty unbelievable that anyone can defend free market Capitalism in the year two thousand nineteen

Pretty unbelievable that anyone can defend free market Capitalism in the year two thousand nineteen — Maw

I wonder if Virgo isn’t actually an older white male billionaire? She’s certainly a cheerleader for their cause.

Capitalism is such an obviously desirable thing that, barring having been woefully misled by a plethora of bad arguments popular within academic circles, it's quite difficult to see just why anyone would oppose it, let alone vehemently oppose it. Those who devise unreasonable conceptions of 'justice' and bark orders at their fellows from their academic ivory tower would do well to at least not have the audacity to accuse anyone else of being far removed from the "common man" or of supporting the cause of "the few".

Capitalism is such an obviously desirable thing that, barring having been woefully misled by a plethora of bad arguments popular within academic circles, it's quite difficult to see just why anyone would oppose it, let alone vehemently oppose it. Those who devise unreasonable conceptions of 'justice' and bark orders at their fellows from their academic ivory tower would do well to at least not have the audacity to accuse anyone else of being far removed from the "common man" or of supporting the cause of "the few". — Constrained Maximizer

Conflating laissez faire capitalism with regulated capitalism is the problem, and, no, I don’t live in an ivory tower. I’m from the ghetto. Go back to your white men cigar and Scotch parlor.

Capitalism is such an obviously desirable thing that, barring having been woefully misled by a plethora of bad arguments popular within academic circles, it's quite difficult to see just why anyone would oppose it, let alone vehemently oppose it. Those who devise unreasonable conceptions of 'justice' and bark orders at their fellows from their academic ivory tower would do well to at least not have the audacity to accuse anyone else of being far removed from the "common man" or of supporting the cause of "the few". — Constrained Maximizer

Weird you say that since Socialism is viewed more positively and Capitalism more negatively by adults with family income less than $30K than Adults with a family income of more than $30K. So much for being removed from the "common man". Also weird how Bernie Sanders has the largest number of individual donors who live all across the United States.

Conflating laissez faire capitalism with regulated capitalism is the problem, and, no, I don’t live in an ivory tower. I’m from the ghetto. Go back to your white men cigar and Scotch parlor. — Noah Te Stroete

Ah, yes, the ghetto, where they usually develop theories about "regulated capitalism" or "laissez faire capitalism". I think that that's where John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin are originally from. As for "white men", just who do you think is coming up with communitarian/egalitarian/socialist thought? People from the Congo?

Your accusations are both rude and intellectually vapid, but the delicious irony is arguably the best part of it all.

Weird you say that since Socialism is viewed more positively and Capitalism more negatively by adults with family income less than $30K than Adults with a family income of more than $30K. So much for being removed from the "common man". Also weird how Bernie Sanders has the largest number of individual donors who live all across the United States. — Maw

That respondents don't view capitalism and socialism in "either-or terms", despite the fact that these are clearly incompatible economic models, might tell you something about the validity of such results.

Your accusations are both rude and intellectually vapid, but the delicious irony is arguably the best part of it all. — Constrained Maximizer

Just giving it back!

People from the Congo? — Constrained Maximizer

Interesting. I will just let that stand as an insight into your sensibilities.

Ah, yes, the ghetto, where they usually develop theories about "regulated capitalism" or "laissez faire capitalism". I think that that's where John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin are originally from. As for "white men", just who do you think is coming up with communitarian/egalitarian/socialist thought? People from the Congo? — Constrained Maximizer

I’ve read arguments for laissez faire capitalism and for socialism. BOTH come from the ivory tower. I do not. BOTH are wrong-headed, except laissez faire capitalism philosophy is driven by selfishness of the capitalists, while socialist philosophy is driven by altruistic impulses. Like I said, both are wrong.

That respondents don't view capitalism and socialism in "either-or terms", despite the fact that these are clearly incompatible economic models, might tell you something about the validity of such results. — Constrained Maximizer

That fact isn't relevant to your original claim. You claimed that Capitalism is an "obviously desirable thing", and that those who oppose or "vehemently oppose" it are exclusively out-of-touch academics perched within their ivory towers. As I've shown, that's simply not true. There is sustained criticism and skepticism of Capitalism that exists across incomes and demographics.