Here’s mine again: “There can be a possible world where this planet doesn’t exist [belief] because the possibility doesn’t depend on the material world from which we would not be able to derive that possibility [justification].”
My justification gives an explanation for how the possible world obtains on my terms, i.e. I reason that it’s being an abstract object which allows it to exist because on other terms it would not be able to.
It seems to me you can condense yours down to this: “There can be possible worlds because there are possible worlds.” — AJJ
My justification gives an explantion for how the possible world obtains on my terms, i.e. I reason that being a consequence of a metaphysics that's not strongly(/causally) deterministic allows it to exist because on other terms it would not be able to. — Terrapin Station
It seems to me you can condense yours down to this: “There can be possible worlds because there are possible worlds.” — Terrapin Station
I’m explaining how possible worlds exist (as abstract objects) and not simply asserting that they do without any enabling reason why they do/can. — AJJ
But that's what I did. The world could be strongly deterministic. It's not. That's how (non-actual) possible worlds exist. — Terrapin Station
I’m saying there are possibilities/possible worlds (ways things could have been) — AJJ
and that these are abstract objects (something additional about how they obtain). — AJJ
So when I say that possibilities are concrete facts, I'm not saying something additional about how they obtain? — Terrapin Station
Possibilities are real--they're the fact(s) that the world isn't strongly/causally deterministic. That doesn't hinge on thought, but it's not abstract, either. — Terrapin Station
How on your terms do those possibilities obtain? — AJJ
since they can’t depend on the present world for that — AJJ
If the explanation concludes "being concrete objects is what allows possible worlds to exist, since they CAN depend on the present world for that," why wouldn't that be an explanation just like yours, simply with a different conclusion? — Terrapin Station
You wouldn't think that an explanation has to conclude that something can't depend on the present world, would you? — Terrapin Station
The reason my explanation doesn’t wind up being circular is that abstract objects can be said to obtain within the divine intellect, which (if abstract objects exist) must exist necessarily unless abstract objects can be said to exist otherwise. — AJJ
If abstract objects exist aside from "the divine intellect," and that's what we're talking about re possibilities being abstract objects, is that circular? — Terrapin Station
You’ll have to clearer yourself, I don’t know exactly what you’re saying there. — AJJ
It seems to me the circularity is avoided by the abstract objects existing necessarily within a Platonic third realm or the divine intellect. — AJJ
But that's what I did. The world could be strongly deterministic. It's not. That's how (non-actual) possible worlds exist. — Terrapin Station
So when I say that possibilities are concrete facts, I'm not saying something additional about how they obtain? — Terrapin Station
So possibilities are both "non-actual" and "concrete facts"? Can you explain how that could be a coherent assertion? — Janus
I cannot see how physicalism can be coherently separated from determinism. — Janus
Of course, then we're just disagreeing on whether different things are logical necessities. You'd say your explanation is; I'd say my explanation is. — Terrapin Station
So the reason yours is circular and mine isn’t is our justifications for 2 in each case. I justify my 2 by showing that you seemingly can’t describe the way possibilities are grounded in the physical world, or that you do so simply by arguing in a circle. — AJJ
I’ve demonstrated mine is. — AJJ
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