er, what? — Bartricks

Not all beliefs are subjective, because some beliefs are deemed objectively justified. Furthermore, once a belief is expressed in language it is no longer a state of mind, and does no longer require that a person be involved. Machines can also manipulate language expressions.

Not all beliefs are subjective, because some beliefs are deemed objectively justified. Furthermore, once a belief is expressed in language it is no longer a state of mind, and does no longer require that a person be involved. Machines can also manipulate language expressions. — alcontali

If we use "subjective" to refer to mental phenomena, then beliefs would be subjective unless we're claiming that beliefs can obtain outside of minds somehow. It wouldn't hinge on justification if we're using "subjective" to simply denote that something is a mental phenomenon. (Not that I'd agree that a justification can be objective anyway.)

Re language, I'd say that you're conflating things like sounds, pixels on computer screens, ink marks on paper--however language is expressed, with beliefs. The sounds, etc. are correlated to beliefs, but they're not literally beliefs.

If we use "subjective" to refer to mental phenomena, then beliefs would be subjective unless we're claiming that beliefs can obtain outside of minds somehow. — Terrapin Station

Re language, I'd say that you're conflating things like sounds, pixels on computer screens, ink marks on paper--however language is expressed, with beliefs. The sounds, etc. are correlated to beliefs, but they're not literally beliefs. — Terrapin Station

I am convinced that some beliefs can be expressed in language -- and copied outside the mind -- and communicated to others. I have not said that I believe that about all beliefs; but that is not necessary anyway.

I am convinced that some beliefs can be expressed in language — alcontali

How do you think that sound waves or ink on a page or whatever can literally be a belief?

How do you think that sound waves or ink on a page or whatever can literally be a belief? — Terrapin Station

It is a language expression that is at best "isomorphic" with the corresponding belief, meaning that operations on the language expressions will still correspond to operations on the belief. For example, if you negate the language expression, it will somehow correspond to the negated belief.

We never really know what the belief is, because we only ever deal with the corresponding language expression.

In the justified (true) belief (JtB) doctrine, the term "belief" requires a corresponding language expression, without which it is not possible to communicate it, or from there, to verify its justification.

That does not mean that all beliefs can be expressed in language. It just means that formal knowledge only deals with beliefs that are expressed in language.

I'm coming rather late into this conversation, but please help this bear of little brain. I'm trying to follow this and I can't make sense of it.

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable (if P, then Q)
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable (not Q)
3. Therefore moral values are not my values (therefore not P)

That argument is valid and sound. You can run it again with yourself mentioned in premise 1 and 2 rather than me and it will remain valid and sound. — Bartricks

Staring with #1, I value eating ice cream (in moderation) - but I think we would all agree that eating ice cream is not morally valuable. What am I missing here?

You're not missing anything. The argument just conflates whole sets with members of a set, thereby appearing to show a contradiction. I've corrected it below.

1. If moral values are {a subset of the group} 'my values', then if I value something {it is not} necessarily [that] it is morally valuable (the subset P does not necessarily have only the properties of its containing set)
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable (P being a subset of Q does not imply that all members of Q must also be members of P)
3. Therefore moral values (subset P) do not have the same properties as the containing set (premise 1).

Its just a tautology.

Moral values are a subset of your values. Some of your values you are not inclined to universalise, the subset of moral values are generally those you are inclined to universalise. It's one of the properties which defines that subset.

That's what I was thinking, but I'd like to hear what @Bartricks has to say. I will keep an open mind on this.

We never really know what the belief is, because we only ever deal with the corresponding language expression. — alcontali

??

Don't you deal with your own beliefs?

It is a language expression that is at best "isomorphic" with the corresponding belief, meaning that operations on the language expressions will still correspond to operations on the belief. For example, if you negate the language expression, it will somehow correspond to the negated belief. — alcontali

I don't think I understand this.

So, let's say that I believe I stopped at the public library to use the restroom. I can write "I stopped at the public library to use the restroom." Now, I negate that, "I didn't stop at the public library to use the restroom," how does that correspond to a negated belief?

(Which is not to mention that what was at dispute isn't whether a linguistic expression can be correlated with a belief, but whether linguistic expressions literally are beliefs.)

You hit one of the nails squarely.

Staring with #1, I value eating ice cream (in moderation) - but I think we would all agree that eating ice cream is not morally valuable. What am I missing here? — EricH

That's not the first premise. The first premise expresses the thesis of individual subjectivism.

So, using your ice cream example, the first premise would say

1. If I value eating ice cream, then necessarily eating ice cream is morally valuable

the second premise then asserts something that is self-evidently true to the reason of most people:

2. If I value eating ice cream, then eating ice cream is not necessarily morally valuable

It might be morally valuable - we can no doubt dream up circumstances under which it would be - but it is not 'necessarily' morally valuable (yet it would be if moral value was made of your valuings).

the conclusion then follows as a matter of logic. Just as most people can see, with their reason, that 2 is true, they can see as well that this argument form is valid:

1. if P then Q
2. Not Q
3. Therefore not P

the argument therefore establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that moral value is not composed of your valuings.

Perhaps that is already obvious to you - it is to me - but it is not to some people and they need to be shown it in no uncertain terms (normally, in my experience, about 7 times before it sinks in).

Er, no I haven't. The original argument refers to any of your valuings. If it works with any of your valuings, then it is also going to work with a subset of them - yes?

How on earth can you think that?? Missed completely. I mean, hurled the hammer through the window.

You haven't read Joyce. Or you read him in Albanian or something.

Joyce believes that it is the mark of a moral imperative that it is categorical. Like Kant. And like, you know, the vast bulk of moral philosophers, now and throughout history. And like, well, most who have a moral sensibility.

I agree. But Joyce is not a moral realist becusae he thinks that categorical reasons - that is, categorical imperatives of reason - either don't, or can't exist (it isn't clear which of those views he holds).

I am a moral realist.

Anyway, this is tedious as the issue is not what this or that philosopher thinks about this or that, the issue is whether moral imperatives actually are categorical. And they are. And if they are, then that demonstrates that they are not imperatives that we are issuing to ourselves and others. And likewise for moral values.

I mean, that's by no means the only way to show this, it is just the way I have been adopting given there is such widespread agreement on the categoricity of moral values and norms.

Read my definition - the one operative here. Beliefs are subjective, becusae beliefs are mental states and mental states are states of a subject.

Again, you're not addressing anything I've argued. I don't deny the existence of beliefs, or that knowledge involves having justified ones (though, like I say, I think I would deny that). Indeed, 'justifications' are what you have if - and only if - Reason, the subject whose values constitute moral values, endorses what you believe.

But, like I say, I don't see how what you're saying is connecting with anything I am saying.

You're confusing the expression of a belief with the belief itself.

If I write on a piece of paper that "I believe it is Sunday" I have not created a belief made of paper.

Joyce believes that it is the mark of a moral imperative that it is categorical. Like Kant. And like, you know, the vast bulk of moral philosophers, now and throughout history. And like, well, most who have a moral sensibility. — Bartricks

Firstly, I've asked you twice now for some empirical evidence to support this claim and you've provided none. Secondly, I've already explained that categoricity and moral realism are not mutually exclusive so referring to your claim as categorical is not a rebuttal to my assertion that it is moral realism. Your argument hinges on the plausibility of a premise which relies on moral realism (and then places that reified entity outside of human biology). You claim this premise is delivered by reason. You therefore need to provide a plausible explanation of why the majority of ethicists disagree with you on the matter. Has their reason failed them? If so, how can you demonstrate that it is not your reason which has failed you?

And finally, quit the condescending insults. This is a philosophy forum, not a schoolyard. Such an attitude may play well with students, but it just makes you sound like a child. No one will take you seriously if you maintain this delusion that anyone who doesn't share your personal understanding of a concept or author must be an idiot. If it is possible for someone to read these authors and yet still have such a poor understanding of them, then how do you know that someone isn't you?

You: who - I have no idea what a 'someone' this killer could be is. — Bartricks

You keep insisting, using your bad analogy, that I am demanding to know who the subject is, when I have told you repeatedly that all I want to know is what kind of subject you are talking about, and then you continue with this strawman even though you have already said the subject is Reason.

You insist on reverting to this bad analogy instead of addressing the problems or unclarities of your actual argument.

You present an interpretation of the Euthyphro that substitutes the "virtue" or "piety" of the usual translations of the dialogue for 'morality' which is fine since that is in accordance with the use of the Dialogue in modern ethics.

You say the import of the argument is to show that something is not moral on account of its being valued by a subject, and then go on to claim that moral values are such on account of being valued by a subject: namely Reason.

You cannot explain how Reason can be considered to be a subject, but then instead of explaining it, you attack others claiming that they misunderstand your argument. misunderstand the Euthyphro and so on.

Are you serious? Are you a troll? Who knows, but why should you be taken seriously unless you pay attention to, and try to address, the fair criticisms of your so-called argument that others having been presenting? I have not seen you give one response in good faith to any criticism; all you seem to be able to offer is ad hominems and insults, straw men and red herrings; in short, it seems, anything to avoid having to face the ambiguities, incoherences, inconsistencies and gaps in what you are presenting.

I agree with you that new theories cannot come about via rationality; if by rationality you simply mean deductive reasoning.

Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of pragmati(ci)sm, drew distinctions between deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning.

If I remember correctly, Popper denies there is any inductive reasoning (as it is merely expectation that the future will be as the past), but Peirce's abductive reasoning is what Popper would call conjecture.

No, you just don't know what you think you know.

You can be a moral realist and deny the categoricity of moral norms and values.

You can be a moral nihilist and affirm the categoricity of moral norms (most do, in fact)

You can be a moral realist and affirm the categoricity of moral norms.

You're just ignorant and don't understand the difference between moral realism and the claim that moral norms are categorical.

And as for empirical data - go and read some moral philosophers writing about morality.

IN other words, I refer you to moral philosophy.

Okay for the umpteenth time - the subject is....wait for it......a subject. A subject of experiences. You know, what you are. What I am. Like, the most familiar thing in the world.

One of those. A person. A someone. A subject of consciousness. Someone it is something like to be. And so on.

And what's interesting about them - the one described in the conclusion of my argument - what marks them out as distinct from you and I, is not their subjectivity, but the fact their values constitute moral values and their prescriptions constitute moral prescriptions.

I don't think you're going to get this at this point if you haven't already. You're locked into your own view and unless I express your incoherent view you're not going to understand mine.

And don't start talking to me about the Euthyphro dialogue. You haven't read it, have you? I think I'm the only one here who actually has.

What you've done is done some googling on it and read some bonkers Wikipedia page or whatever - something written either by you or someone else on here.

Here's a quote from Bertrand Russell that I quite like - it's about why we shouldn't trust Xenephon's version of Socrates' Apology.

"“A stupid man's report of what a clever man says can never be accurate, because he unconsciously translates what he hears into something he can understand.”

I have told you what a subject is. But you insist you don't know and that I haven't told you.

I have told you that the arguments I have made are deductively valid. But you don't seem to realise this and don't seem to realize that this means you have to deny a premise.

I have told you that my argument does not conclude with 'God'. Yet you insist that the subject has to be God.

And so on and so on.

I have told you that the arguments I have made are deductively valid. — Bartricks

Which is irrelevant to whether the argument is semantically coherent. You're stating the argument in natural language. If it's not semantically coherent, that's a problem.

Okay for the umpteenth time - the subject is....wait for it......a subject. A subject of experiences. You know, what you are. What I am. Like, the most familiar thing in the world. — Bartricks

So, you are saying that Reason is a subject and hence in light of the above we can conclude that for you Reason must be a subject that experiences?

And don't start talking to me about the Euthyphro dialogue. You haven't read it, have you? I think I'm the only one here who actually has. — Bartricks

Of course I've read it. My interpretation of it is no different than yours, really. I agree that it shows that piety, virtue, morality, beauty or whatever cannot be merely the valuings of a subject. But you say they are the valuings of a subject: namely Reason.

I studied this Dialogue in a course on ethics as an undergraduate. The lecturer used the dilemma in this form: 'Is something pious because God loves it, or does God love it because it is pious.' I pointed out to her that in the original form it was not "God" but "the gods", and since the gods might disagree with one another about what they loved that could indeed be a problem.

I also pointed out that in the context of Christian theology, one could reasonably say that it is both the case that something is pious because God loves it and that God loves it because it is pious. There seems to be no contradiction or inconsistency in this because God is understood to be the divine lawgiver. IT is no good saying that God could love something evil, because God is understood to be goodness itself.

Are you claiming that something is both morally good because it is in accordance with Reason and that it is in accordance with Reason because it is morally good?

"“A stupid man's report of what a clever man says can never be accurate, because he unconsciously translates what he hears into something he can understand.” — Bartricks

A stupid man quotes those he sees as authorities out of context to convince himself he is smarter than others instead of presenting arguments and then trying to see if there are any flaws in them.

I have told you what a subject is. But you insist you don't know and that I haven't told you. — Bartricks

You have said a subject is an experiencer, you have said Reason is a subject, and yet you refuse to answer the question as to whether Reason is therefore an experiencer. I wonder why! :roll:

OK, you are just a troll. Keep going this way and you will likely be banned.

yes, the subject - the one whose values are moral values - is an experiencer. A subject of experiences. Like me. Like you. And what - what - is your objection?

And what problem is the euthyphro raising for me? The original does not address my view. So you have to tailor it to address my view. And then all I am going to say is "something is valuable because reason values it" and wait to hear why that's something I shouldn't say.

So on your view, if you're stating an argument in terms of a natural language, natural language semantics doesn't matter because ____?

well you're not coping well are you. Go write my name on a pillow or something and hit it a few times and then see if you can raise a reasonable objection to my argument rather than swear and stomp.

I assume your working definition of a troll is 'someone I don't agree with or understand yet who argues in accordance with the canons of reason and who does mean but very accurate parodies of my questions so as to reveal their confused and tortorous nature'