Don't see how this follows from your first paragraph. — Banno
Yes, I know what you mean. But humanity operates from within the so-called "hermeneutic circle" of its present knowledge and understanding, and does not need any ultimate premise to ground all subsequent ones. It is as though reasonableness is cumulative as understanding grows, but never absolute, or based on any absolute foundation. — Janus
Think of science: there are certain things it is reasonable to believe in light of science and others things that are not. The premise here would be the totality of scientific understanding as it is now known, or rather attempted to be known. — Janus
So it would be unreasonable per se, and not merely on some premise or other, to claim that the earth is flat, for example. — Janus
Here, for your convenience, is the argument thus far:
1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued.
2. Only a subject can value something
3. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject.
4. If moral values are my valuings, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable
5. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable.
6. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject who is not me. — Bartricks
you think the Euthyphro is not the main basis upon which contemporary moral philosophers reject divine command theories??? It is. If you don't believe me, e-mail one — Bartricks
I accept that they are going to be sceptical about that, but not because it is not plausible in itself, but because accepting it would then entail a subjectivist position in ethics - a position they think is incompatible with the previous premise! — Bartricks
, even then, we must each decide whether to follow the divine command or no. — Banno
Here, for your convenience, is the argument thus far:
1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued.
2. Only a subject can value something
3. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject.
4. If moral values are my valuings, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable
5. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable.
6. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject who is not me. — Bartricks
Not all value is moral value. On that ground I reject 4. So, 5 and 4 contradict one another and/or are otherwise incompatible/mutually exclusive. — creativesoul
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