1. if bag of turnips is wife, then if wife go market, necessarily bag of turnips go market
2. If wife go market, bag of turnips not necessarily go market — Bartricks

If the bag or turnips and your wife are one and the same, then if your wife went to market necessarily the bag of turnips did. — Bartricks

:roll:

Equivocation. Equivocating the phrase "bag of turnips". In the same argument it references two different things. Your wife, and a bag of vegetables called "turnips".

Not all bags of turnips go to the market simply because your wife does. If your wife is equivalent to a bag of turnips, then it is a specific bag of turnips. That specific bag of turnips is necessarily at the market each and every time your wife goes to the market.


If A is B is what you want.

If all A's are B is what you need.

I think the problem with you lot is that you in your minds - but not in my posts - you are confusing moral values with things such as moral judgements, or moral evaluations. But, like I say, that's what you're doing, not what I'm doing. — Bartricks

You think so at least.

Reason doesn’t give a hoot how old you are; the day you die you’ve got the same brain you were born with....albeit more developed and rather more well-organized, I should think.

As to first cognitions....just because a subject doesn’t recognize a particular terminology for his conscious mental machinations, isn’t sufficient reason to suppose he isn’t doing the same thing he’d be doing if he did.

All of which is quite irrelevant. I, at least, because I exist in the present, must always think in the present.

As to first cognitions....just because a subject doesn’t recognize a particular terminology for his conscious mental machinations, isn’t sufficient reason to suppose he isn’t doing the same thing he’d be doing if he did. — Mww

This conflicts what you said earlier.

How so?

1. If Bartricks Potter is Superman, then if Superman went to the grocery, necessarily Bartricks Potter went to the grocery — Bartricks

This may seem like a minor point, but I'd like to clear it up before moving on. Why do we need the word necessarily in here? To me, the implication is that if we were to take out the word "necessarily", then there could be some hypothetical situation in which Barticks Potter did not go to the grocery. Clearly that is not the case. If A = B, then A & B identify the same entity/object, and by the basic rules of logic they must have the same properties.

I.e, removing the word necessarily does not alter the meaning of the proposition, the word is redundant and unnecessary.

1. If Bartricks Potter is Superman, then if Superman went to the grocery, Bartricks Potter went to the grocery

Are you OK with removing necessarily? If not, would you please explain.

No, absolutely not - the word necessary is, well, necessary. If I am superman, then if superman goes to the grocery necessarily I go, because I am he. That is, there is no possibility of superman being in the grocery and me not, for superman and I are the same person. (It is not that superman is necessarily in the grocery - no, it is contingent that he is in the grocery - the point is that 'if' superman is in the grocery, and 'if' I am superman, then necessarily I am in the grocery).

Of course, in reality if superman is in the grocery it does not follow of necessity that I am in the grocery - I may be, I may not be. And thus we can conclude that I am not superman.

Likewise for moral values. If moral values and my values are the same - that is, if moral valuings and my valuings are synonymous - then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable. It won't just happen to be, it 'must' be if I am valuing it, precisely because my values and moral values are the same.

But clearly if I value something it does not follow of necessity that what I am valuing is morally valuable. It may be, it may not be. And thus we can conclude that my values and moral values are not one and the same.

...to be defined is to be conceived, which is always the primary ground for some immediate and subsequent mediate cognizant ability... — Mww

And being defined/conceived...

What does that take? — creativesoul

...self-consciousness and a rational methodology. — Mww

So prior to our first cognition... we need definitions, self-awareness, and a rational methodology.

Does that sound right to you?

Seems quite evidently wrong to me. — creativesoul

As to first cognitions....just because a subject doesn’t recognize a particular terminology for his conscious mental machinations, isn’t sufficient reason to suppose he isn’t doing the same thing he’d be doing if he did. — Mww

If definitions are required for cognizant ability... He couldn't possibly be doing the same thing.

To help underscore how important the word 'necessary' is in the argument and how utterly indispensable it is, could you explain to me why you want it removed? I mean, if it really is doing no work, then its presence is irrelevant and removing it shouldn't affect the argument in the least.

Yet clearly that's false. I mean, let's remove it from the argument and see what it becomes:

1. If superman is me, then if superman is in the grocery I am in the grocery
2. If superman is in the grocery I am not in the grocery
3. Therefore, superman is not me.

That argument is not sound. Premise 2 is obviously false.

This argument is sound:

1. If superman is me, then if superman is in the grocery, necessarily I am in the grocery
2. If superman is in the grocery then I am not necessarily in the grocery
3. Therefore, superman is not me.

Your replacement is not.

So I am at a loss to understand why you think the word 'necessary' is dispensable, given that taking it away would render a sound argument unsound.

So again, here is my argument - an argument that is fine as written, and that is valid and sound.

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore moral values are not my values.

Er, no. What I need is what I've got.

If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable.

If turnip is wife, then if wife at market necessarily turnip at market

If bag of turnips is wife, then if wife at market necessarily bag of turnips at market

If turnip is wives, then if wives at market necessarily turnip at market

If bag of turnips is wives, then if wives ta market necessarily bag of turnips at market.

And on and on and on.

No equivocation. Nothing but a straightforward deductively valid argument that has a conclusion you, and others, wish were false.

You're an idiot.

You think it is idiotic to think this argument is valid:

1. If turnip is wife, then if wife at market necessarily turnip at market
2. If wife at market, not necessarily turnip at market
3. Therefore turnip not wife?

Because it seems to me that it would be idiotic to think that it was invalid.

And if that argument is valid - and it is - it would be idiotic to think that this argument was invalid at the same time as acknowledging that the above is valid:

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore, my values are not moral values.

That would be spectacularly idiotic. That would be idiotic by idiot standards. Yet that seems to describe you down to a T. Do you have a secretary who types your replies for you, and cleans your food and excrement off the walls at the end of the day?

If definitions are required for cognizant ability... He couldn't possibly be doing the same thing. — creativesoul

I didn’t say definitions were required, you did:

Me: to define is to conceive
You: What does that take?
Me: self-consciousness and a rational methodology
You: we need definitions, self-awareness, and a rational methodology.

I said to define is to conceive, which makes explicit conception is the presupposition for definition. Conception enables the cognition; definition is the transition from thought to expression of thought. We don’t define to ourselves as a matter of mere cognition, we image or we synthesize images. We manufacture the expression which represents the synthesis of images in pure thought when we wish to communicate, or, when we think as if we are to communicate.

Besides, if he isn’t, as you suggest, doing the same thing, by means of self-consciousness and a rational methodology alone, we are left with the absurdity of requiring of two separate and distinct res cogitans in otherwise congruent agencies, predicated solely on the existence or non-existence of mere word play between them. Nahhhh.....it is the more parsimonious to grant any two separate agencies are doing exactly the same thing in the exercise of a singular rational methodology, but one may very well be doing a better job of it than another.

Disclaimer: non-Cartesian, i.e., representational, dualism being understood as given. Right? I mean....all the cool kids are doing it.

Another one would be

If Bartricks isn't a moron, then if Bartricks says P is self-evident, P is self-evident
If Bartricks says P is self-evident, not necessarily P is self-evident
Therefore, Bartricks is a moron


You'd agree that's valid, right?

No, second premise is gibberish. But well done for trying. Should say "If Bartricks says P is self-evident, P is not necessarily self-evident", not "If Bartricks says P is self-evident, not necessarily P is self-evident". Then it would be valid, yes. Do you agree?

No, second premise is gibberish. — Bartricks

So an argument isn't valid if the premise is semantic gibberish?

Answer my question and I'll answer yours.

Sure. No I don't agree. It's valid as it stands. Okay, your turn.

You're always chastising folks for their logic. You understand the differences between:

[]P
~[]P
x[]F
x~[]F

right?

It isn't valid as it stands, as you'd know if you knew anything about how to argue.

My answer to your question: depends. For instance, this argument is valid and gibberish: If squirt, then flimsy, not flimsy, therefore not squirt.

But your one was gibberish and invalid.

Nope. Not a clue.

My answer to your question: depends. — Bartricks

What does it depend on?

Nope. Not a clue. — Bartricks

Haha. Okay. Not surprising, unfortunately.

Yet I recognise that your argument was invalid and you don't. You know, the one that went if P, then Q; not R, therefore not P. Hmm. What does that tell us?

What happened to "What does it depend on?"

...therefore flying spaghetti monster.

That part was cool.

Are you claiming I am wrong?

Are you claiming I am wrong? — Bartricks

What in the world? I'm asking you a question. You said that in your view, the answer to whether semantic gibberish is relevant to validity is (that it) "depends."

So I'm asking for more details about your view: what does it depend on?

Let’s take a step back here and review the big picture

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore moral values are not my values. — Bartricks

You have been stating that this is logically sound because the sentences map to this logic:

1. if P then Q
2. Not Q
3. Therefore not P — Bartricks

However, as many people have demonstrated, this mapping is clearly incomplete since both P & Q have embedded logic. E.g., at an absolute bare minimum we need to start by splitting out P into A = B. In fact it’s a lot more complicated than that.

On top of that, you are using the word necessarily. Now 6 or 7 days ago,@Happenstance explained that if you are using the word necessarily then you need to use modal logic to represent your sentences in some proper logical form. Here is how @Happenstance converted your sentences into modal logic:

∀ = for all, ∃ = there exists a least one.
Predicate V = value, M = moral.
Variables x = not y nor z, y = person(implied by I or my), z = something,
Necessarily = ∆.

∀x∃y∃z[
1. (Vx&Mx→Vy)→ ( ∆(Vyz)→Vx&Mx)
2. Vyz→¬∆(Vx&Mx)
3. Vx&Mx→¬Vy
] — Happenstance

I did a quick run through of this, and while I am far from an expert in these things, it looks sound to me. @Happenstance then demonstrated that this is invalid for various reasons. He then asked you to map your sentences into first order predicate logic.

Your response was that you were

not sophisticated enough to do that — Bartricks

What I am attempting to do here is to do what @Happenstance asked you to do, the only difference is that I am trying to use second order logic. The reason I am using second order logic is because it makes more sense to me to represent your term Moral Values as a set of individual moral values.

But this still means that we must eliminate the word necessarily - and now we are back to this point. Here is your #1, along with some alternatives:

A. If I am superman, then if superman goes to the grocery necessarily I go, because I am he.
B. If I am superman, then if superman goes to the grocery obviously I go, because I am he.
C. If I am superman, then if superman goes to the grocery then of course I go, because I am he.
D. If I am superman, then there are no occurrences of superman to go to the grocery but not me, because I am he.
E. If I am superman, then if superman goes to the grocery I go

As far as I can tell, these sentences all have the exact same semantics and the same truth value - the word necessarily serves no purpose except to add additional emphasis.

However, you seem be saying is that you need necessarily, otherwise your #2 is false. I have not even gotten to formulating #2; removing the necessarily from that is a separate task. But there’s no point in doing that if we cannot convert #1 into some formal representation.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

SO - all that said, you now have a decision to make. Do you want to convince me (and many others) that your logic is valid & sound? If yes, then you need to demonstrate that your sentences can be converted/mapped into some recognized system of formal logic.

1. You can continue to work with me and see if we can convert your sentences into second order propositional logic. I cannot do this on my own, since some of your terms are not well defined and I need to figure out exactly what you mean.
2. If you insist that the word necessarily is necessary, then you need to demonstrate that @Happenstance’s reasoning is flawed - of course you would also have to demonstrate a logically sound representation in modal logic.
3. You can use some other generally recognized system of formal logic.

As usual, the debate is not about the validity of the reasoning, but rather the truth of the premisses.

1. If superman is me, then if superman is in the grocery, necessarily I am in the grocery
2. If superman is in the grocery then I am not necessarily in the grocery
3. Therefore, superman is not me. — Bartricks

The truth of #2, and thus the soundness of the entire argument, depends upon the (unstated) assumption that Superman's identity is contingent. Someone who insists that I am Superman can simply deny #2, since it then follows from #1 that if Superman is in the grocery, necessarily I am in the grocery.

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore moral values are not my values. — Bartricks

Likewise, the truth of #2, and thus the soundness of the entire argument, depends upon the (unstated) assumption that moral values are contingent. Someone who insists that moral values are my values can simply deny #2, since it then follows from #1 that if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable.