In that case, the entire argument seems unnecessary. Everyone presumably knows that you and I are not Superman, and I doubt that there are very many people who seriously think that their particular values are moral values binding on all, merely because they happen to hold them.The problem is that premise 2 is self evidently true. — Bartricks
1. If superman is Bartricks, then if superman is in the grocery necessarily Bartricks is in the grocery.
2. If superman is in the grocery Bartricks is not necessarily in the grocery.
3. Therefore superman is not Bartricks? — Bartricks
1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore, moral values are not my values. — Bartricks
So how does the argument fail to have this form:
1. If P, then Q
2. Not Q
3. Therefore not P? — Bartricks
1. If Superman's love is Bartrick's love, then if Superman loves something, necessarily Bartricks loves something.
2. If Superman loves something, Bartricks does not necessarily love something
3. Therefore Superman's love is not Bartrick's love. — Bartricks
It depends on how we define "moral values." If we mean values that have a moral aspect, then certainly some of your values and my values are moral values, because everyone has moral values in that sense. If we mean values that are morally binding on everyone, then there is still a good chance that some of your values and my values are moral values--but not because they are your values or my values. Your argument seems to be--please correct me if I am wrong--that certain values are moral values only because some mind (a god?) holds them. Objectivists would argue that certain values are moral values for a different reason, such as them being inherent in things as suggested.Do you think my values are moral values? Do you think yours are? Just asking. — Bartricks
It is question-begging to assume what you are trying to prove, which your argument does by presupposing that having value requires being valued (#1), which then requires a subject to do the valuing (#2). In fact, you just admitted as much, apparently without realizing it.It is not question begging to refute a view with a deductively valid argument all the premises of which are extremely plausible. — Bartricks
Since being the object of a valuing relation requires a subject to do the valuing, your argument begs the question. An objectivist would counter that there is a relevant sense in which something can be valuable without being the object of a valuing relation; i.e., regardless of whether any subject actually values it.My argument assumes that for something to be valuable in any sense is for it to be the object of a valuing relation. — Bartricks
This comes back to the same distinction between having value and being valued. My sense is that the alleged plausibility of premiss #1 in both the OP and your later argument relies heavily on the repetition of the same root word. With that in mind, it might helpfully clarify the issues to use different terminology; for example, replace "moral values" with "moral principles."Well, if all of that is true of 'values' when we use that word in relation to ourselves, what reason is there to think that the word 'value' in 'moral value' denotes something quite different? — Bartricks
Anything that one premiss entails by itself, without the addition of a second premiss, is effectively asserted by it. With that in mind, consider the OP argument again.Again, I am not begging the question. If you say otherwise then show me which premise asserts the truth of my thesis (not entails it - asserts it). — Bartricks
The only difference between #1 (premiss) and #3 (conclusion) is the addition of "by a subject," which is already implied; #2 is superfluous. To me, that is begging the question.1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued.
2. Only a subject can value something
3. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject. — Bartricks
Not at all. As I said, what begs the question is a premiss that already entails the conclusion by itself. A proper syllogism requires both premisses in order to entail the conclusion.No, now you've made all syllogisms question begging just by dint of their nature, which is absurd. — Bartricks
The nature of every relation is that it requires at least two correlates. An objectivist would claim instead that to be valuable is a quality that an object possesses in itself, thus requiring no valuing subject.The first premise says only that to be valuable is to be featuring as the object of a valuing relation. It says nothing about the nature of that relation. — Bartricks
No, for the reasons that I have already provided. Again, in my view these debates almost always come down to the premisses, not the reasoning. No objectivist would accept your #1, because actually being valued (by a subject) is not necessary for something to be morally valuable.I mean, if moral objectivism is false, how would you find out? What do you think a refutation of it would look like? The above? — Bartricks
Not at all. As I said, what begs the question is a premiss that already entails the conclusion by itself. A proper syllogism requires both premisses in order to entail the conclusion. — aletheist
Nonsense, that is not what it means to be an objectivist. Rather, as I have stated repeatedly, an objectivist rejects #1 because "being valuable" does not entail "being valued." On the other hand, "being valued" does entail "being valued by something," and what we call that something--subject, object, Reason, God, whatever--has no bearing on the argument itself.An objectivist can, in principle, accept premise 1 and reject 2. They can identify the valuer with an object. — Bartricks
How should I know? If I were aware of any such argument, then I already would have been persuaded by it! Again, in my experience it always comes down to the premisses, rather than the arguments.Is there nothing - no form of argument whatever - that you would accept has demonstrated objectivism to be false? — Bartricks
Put in to a simple argument form, this would read:
1. Human life is inherently good
2. If something is inherently good, then that thing has inherent value
3. If something has inherent value, then destroying that thing, while in your right mind, is objectively immoral.
4. Therefore, ending a human life (aka murder), while in your right mind, is objectively immoral. — username
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