what you take out of q you have to take out of q throughout, obviously. So if you take the word 'necessary' out of the firstime premise it has to come out of the second too.

Anyway, let us indeed take a step back, as you recommend. Do you accept that this argument is valid:

1. If superman is Bartricks, then if superman is in the grocery necessarily Bartricks is in the grocery.
2. If superman is in the grocery Bartricks is not necessarily in the grocery.
3. Therefore superman is not Bartricks?

yes, the argument is valid so the conclusion must be true if the premises are. Therefore a competent critic will take issue with a premise. And it has to be premise 2 because 1 is a conceptual truth.

The problem is that premise 2 is self evidently true.

@Bartricks
My objection to your initial statement would be to premise two. In that premise you state that only a subject can value something. I believe someone attempted to make a similar objection earlier in this thread but just tried to say you were wrong, without actually addressing a premise, so hopefully this will be more direct. I would say that, things can have inherent value without a subject valuing them. This highlights the argument between the objectivity and subjectivity of morality. I believe that people have values that are subject to them. I don’t believe that all things only obtain their value from a subject. Finding one instance where this is the case would disprove the basic form of your argument.

I would say that murder is objectively morally wrong. I think that any person in their right mind will admit that human life is inherently good. If something is inherently good then it must have some inherent value. A person could attribute no extra value to it themselves as a subject and yet life still has value. Therefore, if they were to take life away from someone they would be going against something of inherent value. And that would be immoral.

Put in to a simple argument form, this would read:

1. Human life is inherently good
2. If something is inherently good, then that thing has inherent value
3. If something has inherent value, then destroying that thing, while in your right mind, is objectively immoral.
4. Therefore, ending a human life (aka murder), while in your right mind, is objectively immoral.


I believe this serves as a solid counterargument for what you are saying. The only way I could really see you raising an objection to this would be by objecting to premise 3, but it seems to me that if anyone disagreed with that statement, they themselves would be deemed immoral. I want to make clear that when I say good, I don’t mean good in the subjective sense like "Man that was some good pizza," but instead similar to a platonic view of something being part of THE Good.

Thoughts?

The problem is that premise 2 is self evidently true. — Bartricks

In that case, the entire argument seems unnecessary. Everyone presumably knows that you and I are not Superman, and I doubt that there are very many people who seriously think that their particular values are moral values binding on all, merely because they happen to hold them.

As for the argument in the OP, it is similarly question-begging by stipulating in #1 that being morally valuable (adjective) requires being valued (verb), which already implies a subject that does the valuing per #2. The OP even acknowledges that objectivists instead hold that being morally valuable is a quality that is external to any subject--for example, inherent in things themselves as just suggested--regardless of whether anyone properly recognizes it. They reject #1 accordingly.

Are you aware that there are different systems of formal logic, and not all operations are permissible in all systems? Do you know what the term "modal" means?

Well, I am aware that some people here seem to be working with different systems of logic.

Yes, I have been collecting modal cars for years. Joke. No, I am not sure exactly what it means, which is why I don't use it. I've getting from its use here that it means something like "I am about to confidently start talking nonsense". Is that right? That's how I interpret it. You, for instance, are about to talk nonsense, I think.

Anyway, do you think the argument is valid? The superman one. Is it, or is it not, valid?

I think it is just as evident that my values are not moral values as it is that I am not superman.

Do you think my values are moral values? Do you think yours are? Just asking.

And yes, you're quite right that any objectivist worth their salt had better deny premise 1 of the OP argument. That is, they have to deny that being morally valuable involves being the object of a valuing relation.

But I think you're operating with too broad a notion of what it is to beg the question. It is not question begging to refute a view with a deductively valid argument all the premises of which are extremely plausible. To deem arguments of that kind question begging simply because they have some premises that the proponent of a certain view is logically committed to deny is to render all refutations of all views question begging - which is to have stopped being 'question begging' from being any kind of vice.

The credibility of objectivism, then, rests on just how plausible that opening premise is.

So let's assess it then - first, do you value anything? And if you do - and you surely do - is it not true to say that whatever you value is valuable to you? And doesn't something's being valuable to you just consist in it being the object of a positive attitude of yours, whatever else it may involve in addition?

Well, if all of that is true of 'values' when we use that word in relation to ourselves, what reason is there to think that the word 'value' in 'moral value' denotes something quite different?

I cannot see any reason to think that, apart from that our own values are clearly not moral values. But that's beside the point, for that is not evidence that our values are different in kind to moral values, anymore than the fact it is clear I am not you is evidence that you and I are different kinds of thing.

OF course, an objectivist might reject premise 1 because accepting it would mean their theory will turn out to be false. But that - that - is question begging.

Thanks for the vote of confidence but I think I've made a couple of mistakes. I've misread premise 1). I read 'If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily[,] it is morally valuable' where I think Bartricks meant, 'If moral values are my values, then if I value something[,] necessarily it is morally valuable'. Also when quantifying at least one thing, I've treated it like an implication rather than a connective so instead I think it should read as:

1. (Vx&Mx→Vy)]→ ( Vyz&¬∆(Vx&Mx)))]
2. Vyz&¬∆(Vx&Mx)
3.Vx&Mx→¬Vy

But the argument is still invalid because it should read as:

1. (Vx&Mx→Vy)→( Vyz&¬∆(Vx&Mx))
2. ¬( Vyz&∆(Vx&Mx))= ¬Vyz or ¬∆(Vx&Mx) (via DeMorgan's Theorem, which is not the same as: Vyz&¬∆(Vx&Mx))
3. ¬(Vx&Mx→Vy) = (Vx&Mx)&¬Vy (via truth tables, which is not the same as: Vx&Mx→¬Vy).

In English the argument should read something like:

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable
2. I don't value something nor it is necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore it is not the case that moral values are my values

Which is something different regarding truth values.

1. If superman is Bartricks, then if superman is in the grocery necessarily Bartricks is in the grocery.
2. If superman is in the grocery Bartricks is not necessarily in the grocery.
3. Therefore superman is not Bartricks? — Bartricks

When quantifying a singular such as superman we treat predicates as a connectives rather than implications because by saying superman is barticks, we are really saying: there is a subject that is predicated superman and bartricks. So with this in mind:

P = S&B, Q = [(S&G)&necessarily(B&G)]

1. (S&B)→[(S&G)&necessarily(B&G)]
2. not[(S&G)&necessarily(B&G))]= [not(S&B) nor necessarily(B&G)] (DeMorgan's Theorem)
3. Therefore not (S&B) = not S nor B (again DeMorgan's Theorem)

This is modus tollens and should read in English as:

1. If superman is Bartricks, then superman is in the grocery [and] necessarily Bartricks is in the grocery.
2. Superman is in not in the grocery nor is Bartricks necessarily in the grocery.
3. Therefore not superman nor Bartricks

Which is something totally different than what I quoted from you which is not modus tollens nor is it valid. Basically, You've made the connection in line 1 so regardless of the word necessarily, you cannot say superman is in the grocery while Bartricks is not. It's as simple as.

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable
2. I don't value something nor it is necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore it is not the case that moral values are my values"

I am afraid I do not know how to express things symbolically, so I must sick with English.
But I don't see how the above can possibly be my argument.

Surely the argument is this:

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore, moral values are not my values.

I don't see why that's not valid. Q says 'if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable". Q is false if, were I to value something it would not necessarily be morally valuable. And that's what 2 says.

So how does the argument fail to have this form:

1. If P, then Q
2. Not Q
3. Therefore not P?

I am not seeing it. It seems to have exactly that form, and thus to be valid.

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore, moral values are not my values. — Bartricks

Like I mentioned before, I valuing something are singular subjects(I and something) being predicated(value), so you've made a connection between I valuing something and morally valuable rather than an implication. Therefore you cannot just say I don't find something morally valuable and ignore the I value something. You may say for line 2: I don't value something nor necessarily [find a subject] morally valuable, whether you think this subject Reason, objective, subjective, god, whatever you call your subject.

So how does the argument fail to have this form:

1. If P, then Q
2. Not Q
3. Therefore not P? — Bartricks

P=(M&V implies V), Q = [(S&V)&(M&V)].

1. if (M&V implies V) then [(S&V)&(M&V)].
2. not [(S&V)&(M&V)] = [not (S&V) nor(M&V)] (notice how the connective(&) changes to a disjunction (nor) via DeMorgan's Theorem. This means that you have to consider both in the negative, not just one. So you cannot write: If I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable if indeed modus tollens is what you're after for justification for validity. Rather it should be: If I don't value something, nor necessarily morally valuable, which is something totally different.

Still not seeing it.

valuings are relations, so let's take an example that involves valuing relations, just not of the contentious moral kind.

1. If Superman's love for Lois Lane is Bartrick's love for Lois Lane, then if Superman loves Lois Lane, necessarily Bartricks loves Lois Lane.
2. If Superman loves Lois Lane, Bartricks does not necessarily love Lois Lane
3. Therefore, Superman's love for Lois Lane is not Bartrick's love for Lois Lane.

That's valid, yes?

or, perhaps better,

1. If Superman's love is Bartrick's love, then if Superman loves something, necessarily Bartricks loves something.
2. If Superman loves something, Bartricks does not necessarily love something
3. Therefore Superman's love is not Bartrick's love.

I don't know about all this DeMorgan stuff. But what you've said seems plainly false.

Q says "if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable"

The negation of Q is not "if I don't value something, necessarily it is not morally valuable". That's not the opposite of Q at all, but Q again.

The negation of Q is "If I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable"

So, I still don't see why you think my argument does not instantiate this valid argument form

If P, then Q
Not Q
Therefore not P.

Can you give an example of an argument like mine, in which it is clear that the conclusion is not entailed. I mean, in those examples of Superman's love it seemed to me that the conclusion clearly did follow from those premises. It seemed no less clear than if we were talking about water and gold, for in all of these cases we are exploring the possibility of two things being identical, be it either water and gold. Superman and me, or moral values and my values.

If Superman and I are one and the same person, then wherever Superman is, I am. And if being morally valuable and being valued by me are one and the same property, then if I value something it will be morally valuable. I mean, that strikes me as obviously true. Can you explain in English why, if being morally valuable is one and the same as being valued by me, it would not be true that, were I to value something, it would not necessarily be morally valuable?

My point is about quantification of subjects being predicated. if a universal statement about all supermen or all Lois Lanes or all Bartricks then we can only make an implication due to the generality of the statement but if talking about specific subjects predicated, such as one superman, one Lois Lane or one Bartricks then we can connect the predicates rather than imply them due to being specific so your above argument would be:

There is are singular subjects with the predicates superman, Lois Lane and Bartricks:
P= (S&L)&(B&L), Q = (S&L)&necessarily(B&L).

1. if (S&L)&(B&L) then (S&L)&necessarily(B&L) .
2. (S&L)&not necessarily(B&L) this isn't not Q, not Q = not[(S&L)&necessarily(B&L)] = (by DeMorgan's theorem) not [(S&L) nor necessarily(B&L).

You have made your predicates(S and B) in Q connectives by virtue of being singular subjects rather than universals/generalities so due to this connection, you need to negative S or B, not just B.

Does this make anymore sense?

It doesn't matter about DeMorgan. Via truth tables, not[(S&L)&necessarily(B&L)] as the same veracity as not [(S&L) nor necessarily(B&L) regardless whether true or false. Your version of . (S&L)&not necessarily(B&L) does not, therefore not modus tollens, that is , it isn't not Q, it's some other truth value.

You and I can agree that some things are morally valuable.

And I take it by 'inherent' moral value, we mean moral value that does not derive from the thing's usefulness as a means to securing some other end, but moral value that it seems to have in its own right. That is, when we say that something is inherently morally valuable, we mean that it is morally valuable for its own sake, or something like that.

Well, we can agree that some things are morally valuable in that way too. And nothing in the argument I gave implies otherwise. Something will be inherently morally valuable when the subject values it for its own sake rather than for some other sake.

So, the existence of things possessing inherent moral value does not constitute a counterexample to any premise in the argument, so far as I can see.

But perhaps you mean by 'inherent moral value' something more than I said above. Perhaps when you say that something is 'inherently morally valuable' you mean, in addition to being valuable for its own sake, that it is 'objectively' morally valuable.

Okay, but now you have begged the question. Whether inherent moral value is subjective or objective is the issue under discussion, so one cannot just assume it is objective at the get go.

Note, my argument does not assume that moral value is subjective. It's subjectivity is asserted in a conclusion, not a premise.

My argument assumes that for something to be valuable in any sense is for it to be the object of a valuing relation. And my argument assumes that only subjects of experience - minds - are capable of adopting attitudes towards things.

An objectivist must either deny the first premise or the second. Note, to deny the second what is needed is an example of a genuine valuing attitude that is not being borne by a subject of experience. You cannot use moral values as your example, as that's question begging - it is to assume moral objectivism is true, not show it to be. We need an example in which a) it is clear we have real valuing going on, and b) the valuer is not a subject of experience.

Now, I don't believe there are any such examples. But perhaps there are, I am just unaware of them. Plus it does seem that my reason, anyway, represents anything that is not a subject of experience to be positively incapable of having any real attitude towards anything.

No, it does not make any more sense to me.

Perhaps you can just say if you consider this argument to be valid:

1. If Superman's love is Bartrick's love, then if Superman loves something, necessarily Bartricks loves something.
2. If Superman loves something, Bartricks does not necessarily love something
3. Therefore Superman's love is not Bartrick's love. — Bartricks

I'm off to bed now so I attempt an answer with more explanatory scope if possible in regards to your last question. Good chat though!

Do you think my values are moral values? Do you think yours are? Just asking. — Bartricks

It depends on how we define "moral values." If we mean values that have a moral aspect, then certainly some of your values and my values are moral values, because everyone has moral values in that sense. If we mean values that are morally binding on everyone, then there is still a good chance that some of your values and my values are moral values--but not because they are your values or my values. Your argument seems to be--please correct me if I am wrong--that certain values are moral values only because some mind (a god?) holds them. Objectivists would argue that certain values are moral values for a different reason, such as them being inherent in things as suggested.

It is not question begging to refute a view with a deductively valid argument all the premises of which are extremely plausible. — Bartricks

It is question-begging to assume what you are trying to prove, which your argument does by presupposing that having value requires being valued (#1), which then requires a subject to do the valuing (#2). In fact, you just admitted as much, apparently without realizing it.

My argument assumes that for something to be valuable in any sense is for it to be the object of a valuing relation. — Bartricks

Since being the object of a valuing relation requires a subject to do the valuing, your argument begs the question. An objectivist would counter that there is a relevant sense in which something can be valuable without being the object of a valuing relation; i.e., regardless of whether any subject actually values it.

Well, if all of that is true of 'values' when we use that word in relation to ourselves, what reason is there to think that the word 'value' in 'moral value' denotes something quite different? — Bartricks

This comes back to the same distinction between having value and being valued. My sense is that the alleged plausibility of premiss #1 in both the OP and your later argument relies heavily on the repetition of the same root word. With that in mind, it might helpfully clarify the issues to use different terminology; for example, replace "moral values" with "moral principles."

Why don't you just answer the question? If you value raping someone, is it necessarily morally good for you to do so?

Yes, it is question begging to assume the truth of the thesis you are trying to prove. I haven't done that. No premise asserts the thesis. The thesis is expressed in the conclusion, not the premises.

What is question begging is to reject a premise on no better grounds that it conflicts with your thesis, whatever that thesis may be.

So, if you reject a premise because your thesis - rather than any self-evident representation of reason - is inconsistent with it, then you are begging the question.

Again, I am not begging the question. If you say otherwise then show me which premise asserts the truth of my thesis (not entails it - asserts it).

Why on earth would I replace moral values with moral principles??? that makes no sense at all.

the issue is what are moral values. that is, what are they made of. Now, if you think moral values are not 'values', then you have the burden of proof. Discharge it. I think moral values are 'values'. Why? Because that's what they're called.

We are already familiar with values - we value things. Is there some other kind of valuing - a kind that does not require a subject? Provide an example, and don't make it 'moral' values, for that's question begging.

I totally hear what you are saying and I think we do agree to some extent. I think where we differ is in this; if I understand you correctly you are asserting that in order to be a moral value it has to be valued by someone (a subject) or conversely that if something isn't valued by someone then it can't be a moral value (at the very least in that specific instance). My argument is that even in spite of someone not valuing something, that thing can still have moral value because of the effect that it has on an intrinsic good (such as human life).

For instance, Peter Singer believes that killing infants and individuals with mental disabilities is morally acceptable because they don't possess a certain level of intelligence. I am saying that regardless of his subjective views on the matter, morally speaking, life still has value and the killing of an mentally disabled adult or infant would be objectively morally wrong, since in this instance it is outside of the subjective moral view of Singer. The preservation of life has intrinsic moral value outside of what any subject thinks about it ever.

Even if you don't care for that particular example, it seems to me that if you are to claim that things can only be of value if they are valued by a subject, then you are denying the value of things like the virtues or a platonic sense of the Good like I mentioned earlier. This concept revolves around the idea that there is a perfect good and that as humans we should be striving towards it and if we were ever to find it in its fullness, that we would be compelled to act in alignment with it. It is made up of many elements and I am of the opinion that we will never be able to fully grasp the entirety of the Good but just the fact that it exists presupposes that there are things that are morally good without a subject necessarily valuing them at that moment.

I fear my statements may have become a little incoherent but the point is that I do as a subject believe that murder is immoral but I also assert that there is such a thing as the Good and since we agree that life has intrinsic value, it seems to me that preserving it would be part of the Good. This would be an example of something objective creating moral value, since the Good is not a subject.

As a side note my Platonic philosophy is a little sloppy sometimes so if you object to something in that particular section of this response, I would love to hear your thoughts.

Again, I am not begging the question. If you say otherwise then show me which premise asserts the truth of my thesis (not entails it - asserts it). — Bartricks

Anything that one premiss entails by itself, without the addition of a second premiss, is effectively asserted by it. With that in mind, consider the OP argument again.

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued.
2. Only a subject can value something
3. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject. — Bartricks

The only difference between #1 (premiss) and #3 (conclusion) is the addition of "by a subject," which is already implied; #2 is superfluous. To me, that is begging the question.

In any case, again, the objectivist denies #1 because actually being valued (by a subject) is not necessary for something to be morally valuable. Note that we could substitute just about any other verb here, and the same would be true--actually being "Xed" (by a subject) is not necessary for something to be "Xable."

I have a lot in common with those who believe in the Platonic form of the good - far more than I have in common with individual and collectivist subjectivists (so although I am a subjectivist, I retain all the spirit of an objectivist, just without the insanity of supposing objective things can value and prescribe).

Really the only difference between my view and that of a Platonist is that on my view the Form of the Good is a person: Reason. She's a single person whose values constitute moral values, and whose prescriptions constitute the prescriptions of reason, among which feature moral prescriptions.

So there is still one source of all goodness - Reason. And moral value is no more in our gift than before.
What's morally valuable is what Reason values, not what you, I, or Peter Singer does.

But yes, I admit that if this person - Reason - does not exist, then nothing has any moral value. But you'd surely have to admit that too, albeit about the form of the Good - you'd have to admit that if that thing did not exist, then nothing would have any moral value.

You might reply that the Form of the Good cannot not exist - that it exists of necessity, or exists more certainly than anything.

But I think by whatever licence you say those things about the Form of the Good, I can say them about Reason, for Reason is simply the Form of the Good made personal.

No, now you've made all syllogisms question begging just by dint of their nature, which is absurd.

The first premise says only that to be valuable is to be featuring as the object of a valuing relation. It says nothing about the nature of that relation. And thus this premise does not beg the question against the objectivist about value,

the second premise says that only subjects of experience - minds - can bear attitudes towards things.

Minds do things like hope, desire, sense, intend, value. And it seems that they have a monopoly on doing those things.

That's what the second premise asserts. Now, does that beg the question against the objectivist? No, because it says nothing about moral value. The first premise does, the second just says something about the nature of valuing attitudes.

Now, of course in combination those premises entail that objectivism about moral value is false. Well, so much the worse for objectivism about moral value. That's what its being demonstrably false looks like.

I mean, if moral objectivism is false, how would you find out? What do you think a refutation of it would look like? The above?? If not, what do you think a refutation would look like - or is moral objectivism an unfalsifiable thesis?

No, now you've made all syllogisms question begging just by dint of their nature, which is absurd. — Bartricks

Not at all. As I said, what begs the question is a premiss that already entails the conclusion by itself. A proper syllogism requires both premisses in order to entail the conclusion.

The first premise says only that to be valuable is to be featuring as the object of a valuing relation. It says nothing about the nature of that relation. — Bartricks

The nature of every relation is that it requires at least two correlates. An objectivist would claim instead that to be valuable is a quality that an object possesses in itself, thus requiring no valuing subject.

I mean, if moral objectivism is false, how would you find out? What do you think a refutation of it would look like? The above? — Bartricks

No, for the reasons that I have already provided. Again, in my view these debates almost always come down to the premisses, not the reasoning. No objectivist would accept your #1, because actually being valued (by a subject) is not necessary for something to be morally valuable.

Not at all. As I said, what begs the question is a premiss that already entails the conclusion by itself. A proper syllogism requires both premisses in order to entail the conclusion. — aletheist

No premise does that. Wishful thinking on your part. Indeed, you've explained why it does not. An objectivist can, in principle, accept premise 1 and reject 2. They can identify the valuer with an object. I mean, it's utterly insane to do that. But that's, you know, the problem. That's why, if you're reasonable, you'll conclude - with me - that moral values are not objective.

But again, neither premise by itself entails the conclusion.

And I ask you again, what do you think a refutation of moral objectivism would look like? Or can't there be one? Is there nothing - no form of argument whatever - that you would accept has demonstrated objectivism to be false?

An objectivist can, in principle, accept premise 1 and reject 2. They can identify the valuer with an object. — Bartricks

Nonsense, that is not what it means to be an objectivist. Rather, as I have stated repeatedly, an objectivist rejects #1 because "being valuable" does not entail "being valued." On the other hand, "being valued" does entail "being valued by something," and what we call that something--subject, object, Reason, God, whatever--has no bearing on the argument itself.

Is there nothing - no form of argument whatever - that you would accept has demonstrated objectivism to be false? — Bartricks

How should I know? If I were aware of any such argument, then I already would have been persuaded by it! Again, in my experience it always comes down to the premisses, rather than the arguments.

Put in to a simple argument form, this would read:

1. Human life is inherently good
2. If something is inherently good, then that thing has inherent value
3. If something has inherent value, then destroying that thing, while in your right mind, is objectively immoral.
4. Therefore, ending a human life (aka murder), while in your right mind, is objectively immoral. — username

When considering the terms that you use in your argument: "good", "inherently", "value", "objectively", "immoral", the very first question that springs to mind is: How do you even define these terms? If you do not define these terms first, then how do you know that you know what you are talking about?

In my opinion, it is simply not allowed to arbitrarily connect these terms with logical connectors without extensively and unambiguously defining them first.

All of this is a throwback to that Platonic dialogue between Socrates and Meno, in which Meno went on and on about "virtue". When Socrates asked him to explain what exactly he meant by "virtue", Meno ended up having to admit that he did not know what he was talking about.

Therefore, your simplistic argument form is very, very pre-Socratic. Your simplistic argument ignores almost 2500 years of learning why it does not make sense to do that.

no, there's more than one way to be an objectivist. They could reject premise 1, or they could reject 2. Sheesh!! Not sanely - that's why the argument is sound. But it shows it is not question begging.

Now, if you are an objectivist which option do you go for? Either explain why being morally valuable does not involve being the object of a valusing relation or explain how something objective can value something.

look up 'Socratic fallacy'