In such a situation both 1) and 2) will be true (assuming that the cup is blue, of course; if it isn't then both will be false). — Michael
You might as well say that the following is false:
She kicked the bucket iff she kicked the bucket
Because, after all, in some counterfactual situation the first part of the sentence might mean that she died and the second part of the sentence might mean that she struck a bucket with her foot. It's a strawman interpretation of what is being said. — Michael
You miss the point. Both of the following are true:
1. 1 + 1 = 2
2. 1 + 1 = 10 — Michael
The first is true using decimal numbers (among others) and the second is true using binary numbers. — Michael
Your claim that the T-schema is false because in some counterfactual situation a sentence with that same syntax would be false is akin to saying that 1) fails because in some counterfactual situation (e.g. binary mathematics) an equation with that same syntax would be false (or, rather, nonsense). — Michael
You seem to be confusing judgement of the truth with truth itself, which is a category error — Sapientia
1) is true, 2) is not; 1 and 1 make 2, not 10. — The Great Whatever
Not at all. In order for the biconditional here to say anything, we must first resolve whether you are using the phrase on the left idiomatically or not. If you are, then everything is fixed; she kicked the bucket iff she died, regardless of what the words mean in a counterfactual situation. You are confusing resolution of ambiguity in your use of the words now with possible counterfactual differences in word meaning.
Not at all. 1) will be true just in case the cup is red in that situation; 2) will be true just in case the cup is blue in that situation. Now, an utterance of 1) in that situation would be true in that situation just in case the cup is blue in that situation; but that is not what's at stake. What's at stake is whether 1), as uttered here, is true evaluated relative to that situation.
Not at all. 1 + 1 would still be 2 in that situation, but the equation, i.e. the sentence, "1 + 1 = 2" would be false, precisely because in such a situation that sentence would not mean that 1 + 1 = 2.
1 and 1 make 2 in decimal notation. — Michael
And in order for the T-schema to say anything, we must first resolve whether the sentence mentioned on the one side means the same thing as the sentence used on the other side. — Michael
If it is then everything is fixed; the cup is red iff "the cup is red" is true. — Michael
The truth of both sentences must be evaluated as uttered in the same situation. — Michael
In situation X (where "the cup is red" means that the cup is blue), the sentence "the cup is red" as uttered in that situation is true iff the cup is blue, and the sentence "the previous sentence is true" (referring to the sentence "the cup is red" as uttered in that situation) as uttered in that situation is true iff the cup is blue. — Michael
Again, you're being inconsistent. You say that 1 + 1 = 2 even if "1 + 1 = 2" is false when uttered in that situation because the former claim must be evaluated according to what it means to us now (in decimal notation) rather than what it means in this hypothetical situation, — Michael
but then don't apply the same reasoning to the T-schema. Even if "p iff 'p' is true" is false when uttered in that situation, it is still the case that p iff "p" is true, because this latter claim must be evaluated according to what it means to us now rather than what it means in this hypothetical situation.
1 and 1 make 2, period. — The Great Whatever
No. A biconditional is a biconditional and states whatever it states.
Again, you're confusing resolving ambiguity during the use of a sentence with evaluating the proposition a sentence expresses, whose value is already set after ambiguity is resolved, against a counterfactual situation in which different linguistic facts obtain.
This is not how it works,. though. It doesn't matter what the sentence would mean as uttered in that situation, because this is not where it was uttered. It was uttered by you, in the actual world, just now, and so expresses the proposition that the cup is red. It would have expressed the proposition that the cup is blue if it had been uttered in the alternate situation, but it was not, it was uttered here.
So the sentence expresses a proposition, that the cup is red, which evaluated relative to an alternate situation in which it's blue, is false. And relative to this situation of utterance as well, the other sentence expresses the proposition that a certain sentence, viz. "the cup is red" is true, which evaluated relative to that same alternate situation is false, since in that situation, the proposition expressed by this sentence is false, since in that situation the sentence means the cup is blue, which it is not.
So 1 + 1 is always 2, period, regardless of what's up with the language.
You say, in the top section:
It just doesn't make sense to me, and seems unbelievable, that all of these facts, all of these events, which can be - and can have been - stated, would not, as statements, have a corresponding truth-value for that reason alone, but would instead require a mind there judging them to be true or false.
But then you say, further down:
I think that a realist can straightforwardly acknowledge that any rational proposition, whether mathematical or otherwise, can only be grasped by a rational mind, and is not independent in that sense.
Those two statements seem in conflict to me. — Wayfarer
In some cases, Person A might be factually mistaken, and Person B not, which is pretty straightforward. — Wayfarer
But in other cases, it can be very hard to adjudicate. — Wayfarer
That doesn't rule against the fact that judgements are still undertaken by intelligent subjects. — Wayfarer
It also doesn't rule against the fact that people can be wrong - often large numbers of people, about very important matters of fact, as I think we have seen in the news at least a couple of times recently. — Wayfarer
I know, or rather fear, that there are things I'm likely to be wrong about, and that there are many other things I don't know. I have had to change my view, in fact I've often changed it after discussions such as these. — Wayfarer
But if that realist wanted to understand what was being talked about, they would have to grasp it. — Wayfarer
There are any number of propositions that may or may not be true, that you or I will never know about. — Wayfarer
I think 'the realism you're talking about' is what I call 'there anyway' realism - that the big wide world is 'there anyway', regardless of whether anyone's in it, regardless whether you're thinking about it or not. — Wayfarer
Pragmatically that is true, but on another level, the world you think is 'there anyway' still relies on a perspective, namely yours. — Wayfarer
That is because the mind organises perceptions, judgements, sensations, and so on, so as to form the very concept of 'there anyway'; that is a volitional act, or, in some sense, a mental construction, in the Kantian sense. But again, it's not something in your mind or my mind alone, it is an inter-subjective reality, very similar to what Husserl called an 'umwelt' or 'lebenswelt', namely, a world that is imbued with judgement and meaning. That is what the ''there anyway' realist actually believes in, whilst at the same time pretending that they have no part in it. — Wayfarer
Let me phrase that another way then. You can use "the world" all you want, but I do not know what this refers to — Metaphysician Undercover
It depended on a mind or minds, but now that the rules have been set, they don't depend on any mind. — Sapientia
I believe, for instance, that the Pythagorean theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of man.
Are you denying objective reality?
Only if you're not using the base-2 number system. — Michael
Yes, and it states what it states in the English language as we currently understand it. To then try to interpret it by switching in a different language is to misinterpret it. — Michael
And using everyday English, the statements "it is true that the cup is red" and "'the cup is red' is true" have the same truth conditions. — Michael
This is just nonsense. If we have the two sentences 1) the cup is red and 2) the previous sentence is true then 2) is true iff 1) is true. It's that simple. — Michael
The question, then, is whether or not propositions are sentence-dependent. If so, and if sentences are mind-dependent, then propositions are mind-dependent. And if truth is proposition-dependent then truth is mind-dependent. — Michael
Why would sentences be mind-dependent in any sense relevant to the debate? If I write a sentence on a piece of paper, then there is a sentence which doesn't depend on my mind or anyone else's. We (minds, that is) could all suddenly cease to exist, and the sentence would still be there. — Sapientia
But I think it's a bit of a leap to go from "we talk about truth as if it's mind-independent" to "truth is mind-independent". — Michael
Maybe something akin to fictionalism or quasi realism is correct. — Michael
Well, I might say that a sentence isn't simply a pattern of ink but a pattern of ink that expresses a proposition. And expressing a proposition isn't the sort of thing that ink can do when it isn't being read. — Michael
I might also say that a sentence isn't simply a pattern of ink but a pattern of ink that expresses a proposition. But reading it has nothing to do with it expressing a proposition. — Sapientia
Often when someone says something like that I just think that it's not worth bothering to even attempt communication with them. It always strikes me as akin to, say, if I owned a cab company, and someone were to approach me about a job, but then they say, "I don't even know what a car is." Sometimes it's just not worth bothering. — Terrapin Station
And I disagree. That a pattern of ink expresses a proposition just is that we have a particular kind of conceptual attitude towards that pattern of ink. — Michael
What is expressing a proposition to you? Is it a physical process that occurs in the absence of any kind of brain activity? — Michael
Even this statement which you make here, acts as evidence that there is no such thing as the world. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think that the "have", which denotes the present, is necessary. I think that it would be sufficient that we had a particular kind of conceptual attitude towards that pattern of ink, and that this can be used to answer the question of whether it expresses a proposition. If it is the case that it expressed a proposition, then why would it no longer be the case? For there to be propositions, it is required that they be produced, which requires producers. But once they have been produced, the producers are no longer needed. What has been produced is independent from that which produced it. We do not need to read them or maintain them in any way. What's done is done. We can pack our bags, go home, and die, and there will still be a sentence on a piece of paper that we turned into something mraningful. Something would have to change that for it to be otherwise, but what would - or could - that be? — Sapientia
If it is the case that it expressed a proposition, then why would it no longer be the case?
It is what a sentence does when it has meaning. And a sentence can have meaning if it has been given meaning.
This is wrong because determining what proposition is expressed by the utterance of a sentence requires knowing something about the context of utterance. — Mongrel
Say you walk in a library and you see a poster pinned to the wall that reads "Physicists are imported." As you contemplate the meaning, a host of fascinating insights open up for you. You subsequently find that the poster is part of an art installation in which the artist is having posters made from computer generated sentences. This is one of them.
You think to yourself: "See! The sentence expressed a proposition all on its own... without any help from a human mind."
No. It didn't. You derived a proposition from it by projecting a context of utterance. — Mongrel
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