In such a situation both 1) and 2) will be true (assuming that the cup is blue, of course; if it isn't then both will be false). — Michael

Not at all. 1) will be true just in case the cup is red in that situation; 2) will be true just in case the cup is blue in that situation. Now, an utterance of 1) in that situation would be true in that situation just in case the cup is blue in that situation; but that is not what's at stake. What's at stake is whether 1), as uttered here, is true evaluated relative to that situation.

You might as well say that the following is false:

She kicked the bucket iff she kicked the bucket

Because, after all, in some counterfactual situation the first part of the sentence might mean that she died and the second part of the sentence might mean that she struck a bucket with her foot. It's a strawman interpretation of what is being said. — Michael

Not at all. In order for the biconditional here to say anything, we must first resolve whether you are using the phrase on the left idiomatically or not. If you are, then everything is fixed; she kicked the bucket iff she died, regardless of what the words mean in a counterfactual situation. You are confusing resolution of ambiguity in your use of the words now with possible counterfactual differences in word meaning.

You miss the point. Both of the following are true:

1. 1 + 1 = 2
2. 1 + 1 = 10 — Michael

1) is true, 2) is not; 1 and 1 make 2, not 10.

The first is true using decimal numbers (among others) and the second is true using binary numbers. — Michael

Not at all. 1 + 1 is 2, regardless of what symbols are used to represent the numbers.

Your claim that the T-schema is false because in some counterfactual situation a sentence with that same syntax would be false is akin to saying that 1) fails because in some counterfactual situation (e.g. binary mathematics) an equation with that same syntax would be false (or, rather, nonsense). — Michael

Not at all. 1 + 1 would still be 2 in that situation, but the equation, i.e. the sentence, "1 + 1 = 2" would be false, precisely because in such a situation that sentence would not mean that 1 + 1 = 2.

You seem to be confusing judgement of the truth with truth itself, which is a category error — Sapientia

It's not a 'category error'. How do you separate truth from judgement? Can you point out anything which you hold to be true, whilst not judging it? Can you stand outside of judgement, and see things as they are without making it a matter of judgement?

The 'absurd logical consequences' that concern you, are on account of my argument undermining your innate notion of realism. And that notion is, as I explained, 'there anyway' realism - that the Universe is 'there anyway', while people, and minds, come into it and go out of it. So what I'm arguing turns that kind of realism on its head, but it does so on the basis of a reasoned analysis. That form of realism is what is bred into us nowadays as 'scientific realism' - that there's the big wide world, and we come into it, our minds are the consequence of the processes in it, those processes are what is real, what is 'there anyway', but the mind is just a product of that, and only has a kind of secondary reality.

That attitude is a consequence of Locke's representative realism and the native scientific empiricism of Western secular culture. My view of philosophy is that it ought to subvert this sense of reality; my philosophy is, in that sense, counter-cultural. Philosophy, as I understand it, causes you to question your sense of the solidity of the so-called 'external world', by making you aware of the sense in which the world is a mental construction, or, the way in which the mind contributes to what we generally regard as an 'independent reality'.

In what way is the state of affairs any different to the proposition which expresses it?

State of affairs: the cup is red
Proposition: "the cup is red"

What makes the proposition true or not is whether it expresses the state of affairs correctly (or you could say, corresponds correctly to the state of affairs).

The proposition is mind dependent, right. So, what makes the state of affairs any different when all it is is the proposition absent quotes?

It seems to me that the state of affairs is just a particular kind of language use/way of speaking. We 'say the world' and also say propositions.

Ok let's say the state of affairs that the propositions expresses is not mind-dependent. "The cup is red" is true or not independent of mind.

But then what's even the point of positing this mind independence? Whether the proposition is true or not, isn't contained within the proposition. So by that I mean, "the cup is red" doesn't seem to posesses some sort of invisible truth value. How is it that we ourselves come to know the truh value? Well we actually have to find out whether the cup is red or not. This process of finding out is mind dependent, and if you're an idealist so is the cup. So here we have an entire mind-dependent analyses of how it is that we come to know a propositions truth value. But you'd have to then hold that there's a separate mind-independent matching of the proposition to the state of affairs going on, for truth to be mind independent. The proposition, independent of mind would either match the state of affairs true or false, and it would have this truth value. But the truth value would be invisible to us, likewise the way in which the proposition matches itself to the state of affairs. We don't know how this happens. And both of these are entirely irrelevant to how it is that we ourselves actually find the truh value of a proposition, which is we do our own matching.

So what's then the point of saying "but also the proposition was true or not independent of us looking at the cup and deciding whether it's true." Isn't that just totally irrelevant to us? We could never acces this mind independent truth value, it's not present to us in the proposition itself. It really has no bearing on how it is that we ourselves find out the truth value of a proposition. So why posit it? Does it have any explanatory value?

It seems totally unnecessary.

You might say the cup is red independent of mind. But don't we then get into an argument over theories of perception? You'd be arguing for direct realism, the 'redness' of the cup existing out in the world. How would we even know that the state of affairs is mind-independent?

1) is true, 2) is not; 1 and 1 make 2, not 10. — The Great Whatever

1 and 1 make 2 in decimal notation. 1 and 1 make 10 in binary notion. Given that 1) is written in decimal and 2) is written in binary, both 1) and 2) are true.

Compare with:

1. Snow is white
2. Schnee ist weiß

Two different sentences in two different languages.

Not at all. In order for the biconditional here to say anything, we must first resolve whether you are using the phrase on the left idiomatically or not. If you are, then everything is fixed; she kicked the bucket iff she died, regardless of what the words mean in a counterfactual situation. You are confusing resolution of ambiguity in your use of the words now with possible counterfactual differences in word meaning.

And in order for the T-schema to say anything, we must first resolve whether the sentence mentioned on the one side means the same thing as the sentence used on the other side. If it is then everything is fixed; the cup is red iff "the cup is red" is true.

You're being inconsistent.

Not at all. 1) will be true just in case the cup is red in that situation; 2) will be true just in case the cup is blue in that situation. Now, an utterance of 1) in that situation would be true in that situation just in case the cup is blue in that situation; but that is not what's at stake. What's at stake is whether 1), as uttered here, is true evaluated relative to that situation.

The truth of both sentences must be evaluated as uttered in the same situation. Iff 1) is true when uttered in situation X then 2) is true when uttered in situation X. In situation X (where "the cup is red" means that the cup is blue), the sentence "the cup is red" as uttered in that situation is true iff the cup is blue, and the sentence "the previous sentence is true" (referring to the sentence "the cup is red" as uttered in that situation) as uttered in that situation is true iff the cup is blue.

Not at all. 1 + 1 would still be 2 in that situation, but the equation, i.e. the sentence, "1 + 1 = 2" would be false, precisely because in such a situation that sentence would not mean that 1 + 1 = 2.

Again, you're being inconsistent. You say that 1 + 1 = 2 even if "1 + 1 = 2" is false when uttered in that situation because the former claim must be evaluated according to what it means to us now (in decimal notation) rather than what it means in this hypothetical situation, but then don't apply the same reasoning to the T-schema. Even if "p iff 'p' is true" is false when uttered in that situation, it is still the case that p iff "p" is true, because this latter claim must be evaluated according to what it means to us now rather than what it means in this hypothetical situation.

1 and 1 make 2 in decimal notation. — Michael

1 and 1 do not make 2 'in a notation.' 1 and 1 make 2, period. The equation or sentence '1 + 1 = 2' might be true or false, depending on how you disambiguate it relative to a notation, or depending on linguistic facts about the meaning of the symbols contained in it.

And in order for the T-schema to say anything, we must first resolve whether the sentence mentioned on the one side means the same thing as the sentence used on the other side. — Michael

No. A biconditional is a biconditional and states whatever it states.

If it is then everything is fixed; the cup is red iff "the cup is red" is true. — Michael

Again, you're confusing resolving ambiguity during the use of a sentence with evaluating the proposition a sentence expresses, whose value is already set after ambiguity is resolved, against a counterfactual situation in which different linguistic facts obtain.

The truth of both sentences must be evaluated as uttered in the same situation. — Michael

There is some confusion here over situation of utterance and situation of evaluation. The situation of utterance determines which proposition a sentence expresses; that situation is this one, since you're actually uttering these sentences here. Once that proposition is fixed, it is a further question whether that proposition is true as evaluated relative to some situation or not. So it can be that a certain sentence, as uttered in this situation, is false as evaluated relative to another.

So, for instance, 'I am hungry,' as uttered by me, expresses the proposition that TGW is hungry; we can then evaluate whether that proposition is true in some situation or not.

In situation X (where "the cup is red" means that the cup is blue), the sentence "the cup is red" as uttered in that situation is true iff the cup is blue, and the sentence "the previous sentence is true" (referring to the sentence "the cup is red" as uttered in that situation) as uttered in that situation is true iff the cup is blue. — Michael

This is not how it works,. though. It doesn't matter what the sentence would mean as uttered in that situation, because this is not where it was uttered. It was uttered by you, in the actual world, just now, and so expresses the proposition that the cup is red. It would have expressed the proposition that the cup is blue if it had been uttered in the alternate situation, but it was not, it was uttered here.

So the sentence expresses a proposition, that the cup is red, which evaluated relative to an alternate situation in which it's blue, is false. And relative to this situation of utterance as well, the other sentence expresses the proposition that a certain sentence, viz. "the cup is red" is true, which evaluated relative to that same alternate situation is false, since in that situation, the proposition expressed by this sentence is false, since in that situation the sentence means the cup is blue, which it is not.

Again, you're being inconsistent. You say that 1 + 1 = 2 even if "1 + 1 = 2" is false when uttered in that situation because the former claim must be evaluated according to what it means to us now (in decimal notation) rather than what it means in this hypothetical situation, — Michael

No, the proposition which it expresses is tied to its use now, because now is when you actually used it. It's another question whether that proposition is true or false relative to some counterfactual situation.

So 1 + 1 is always 2, period, regardless of what's up with the language. But in a counterfactual situation, '1 + 1 = 2' might very well be false, because the symbol '1' might mean 5, for example.

but then don't apply the same reasoning to the T-schema. Even if "p iff 'p' is true" is false when uttered in that situation, it is still the case that p iff "p" is true, because this latter claim must be evaluated according to what it means to us now rather than what it means in this hypothetical situation.

The biconditional is something you're using now, so what it expresses it tied to the meaning of the words as they are now. Whether what it expresses is true relative to another situation is a different story. And relative to a situation which the sentence "the cup is red" means something else, the material equivalence doesn't hold, and so the biconditional as you use it now is false.

1 and 1 make 2, period. — The Great Whatever

Only if you're not using the base-2 number system.

No. A biconditional is a biconditional and states whatever it states.

Yes, and it states what it states in the English language as we currently understand it. To then try to interpret it by switching in a different language is to misinterpret it. I'm not using some hypothetical English where the words mean something other than what they do now. Every word I'm using (and mentioning) is everyday English. And using everyday English, the statements "it is true that the cup is red" and "'the cup is red' is true" have the same truth conditions.

Again, you're confusing resolving ambiguity during the use of a sentence with evaluating the proposition a sentence expresses, whose value is already set after ambiguity is resolved, against a counterfactual situation in which different linguistic facts obtain.

I'm not confusing it. I'm pointing out that just as the sentence must be understood as not being ambiguous, it must also be understood as not having some counterfactual meaning. Using the actual non-ambiguous meaning of everyday English words, the statements "it is true that the cup is red" and "'the cup is red' is true" have the same truth conditions.

This is not how it works,. though. It doesn't matter what the sentence would mean as uttered in that situation, because this is not where it was uttered. It was uttered by you, in the actual world, just now, and so expresses the proposition that the cup is red. It would have expressed the proposition that the cup is blue if it had been uttered in the alternate situation, but it was not, it was uttered here.

So the sentence expresses a proposition, that the cup is red, which evaluated relative to an alternate situation in which it's blue, is false. And relative to this situation of utterance as well, the other sentence expresses the proposition that a certain sentence, viz. "the cup is red" is true, which evaluated relative to that same alternate situation is false, since in that situation, the proposition expressed by this sentence is false, since in that situation the sentence means the cup is blue, which it is not.

This is just nonsense. If we have the two sentences 1) the cup is red and 2) the previous sentence is true then 2) is true iff 1) is true. It's that simple.

So 1 + 1 is always 2, period, regardless of what's up with the language.

1 + 1 is always 10, period.

Part II

You say, in the top section:

It just doesn't make sense to me, and seems unbelievable, that all of these facts, all of these events, which can be - and can have been - stated, would not, as statements, have a corresponding truth-value for that reason alone, but would instead require a mind there judging them to be true or false.

But then you say, further down:

I think that a realist can straightforwardly acknowledge that any rational proposition, whether mathematical or otherwise, can only be grasped by a rational mind, and is not independent in that sense.

Those two statements seem in conflict to me. — Wayfarer

There isn't much I have to say about that. You haven't even stated what you think the conflict seems to be. They don't seem in conflict to me.

In some cases, Person A might be factually mistaken, and Person B not, which is pretty straightforward. — Wayfarer

That's what I think. But how can that be what you think? Your earlier comment seems to imply subjective relativism. You said that whether a proposition is true or false is a matter of judgement. How do you square that with your above comment? Would you like to qualify your original comment? Because it seems to follow from your original comment that if Person A judges the proposition to be true, then the proposition is true, and anything else, including whether or not he is factually mistaken, is irrelevant. And likewise with regards to Person B.

Is that what you meant when you said that whether a proposition is true or false is a matter of judgement? If not, then what did you mean? You didn't directly address this the last time, so can you please do so this time?

But in other cases, it can be very hard to adjudicate. — Wayfarer

And how is that relevant?

We're not talking about epistemology. I can see how that would be relevant in epistemology, where the focus would be:

Do we know who is right and who is wrong? If so, how? How do we adjudicate between them? What do we need to take into account? How should we go about deciding?

But I don't see how that is relevant in the context of this discussion.

That doesn't rule against the fact that judgements are still undertaken by intelligent subjects. — Wayfarer

Yes, judgements are undertaken by intelligent subjects. Relevance?

It also doesn't rule against the fact that people can be wrong - often large numbers of people, about very important matters of fact, as I think we have seen in the news at least a couple of times recently. — Wayfarer

Yes, people can be wrong. But how do you account for that, given what you've said? That's the reason I brought it up.

I know, or rather fear, that there are things I'm likely to be wrong about, and that there are many other things I don't know. I have had to change my view, in fact I've often changed it after discussions such as these. — Wayfarer

Right, so we both judge that we are fallible. But my argument attempted to show that given what you've already claimed, that results in contradiction. Do you have anything to say about that? With all due respect, I'm not just bringing these topics up as talking points.

But if that realist wanted to understand what was being talked about, they would have to grasp it. — Wayfarer

Yes, of course they would. So what? That's a red herring. You can't just change the subject like that, jeeprs.

There are any number of propositions that may or may not be true, that you or I will never know about. — Wayfarer

That we will never know about them is not relevant, because this isn't an epistemological discussion.

What is relevant is whether there are - or can be - truths which do not depend on any mind to be truths.

I think 'the realism you're talking about' is what I call 'there anyway' realism - that the big wide world is 'there anyway', regardless of whether anyone's in it, regardless whether you're thinking about it or not. — Wayfarer

I am indeed a realist of that kind. Although the realism in this discussion is more specific, and has focused on truth and meaning.

Pragmatically that is true, but on another level, the world you think is 'there anyway' still relies on a perspective, namely yours. — Wayfarer

You seem to be changing the subject again, whether you mean to or not.

I don't care about what is "pragmatically true" if that is anything other than what is true. And I don't agree that the world depends on any perspective, whether mine or someone else's.

That is because the mind organises perceptions, judgements, sensations, and so on, so as to form the very concept of 'there anyway'; that is a volitional act, or, in some sense, a mental construction, in the Kantian sense. But again, it's not something in your mind or my mind alone, it is an inter-subjective reality, very similar to what Husserl called an 'umwelt' or 'lebenswelt', namely, a world that is imbued with judgement and meaning. That is what the ''there anyway' realist actually believes in, whilst at the same time pretending that they have no part in it. — Wayfarer

As interesting as that may be, can you bring it back to truth and mind-dependence? If you're leading up to something that pertains to that, can you get there sometime soon? You might need to spell it out. I would like to avoid digression.

Are you denying objective reality? Or are you just denying the knowledge of it or perceptual access to it? The former may well be relevant, whereas I'm not so sure about the latter. It's the difference between metaphysics and epistemology again.

Let me phrase that another way then. You can use "the world" all you want, but I do not know what this refers to — Metaphysician Undercover

Often when someone says something like that I just think that it's not worth bothering to even attempt communication with them. It always strikes me as akin to, say, if I owned a cab company, and someone were to approach me about a job, but then they say, "I don't even know what a car is." Sometimes it's just not worth bothering.

It depended on a mind or minds, but now that the rules have been set, they don't depend on any mind. — Sapientia

How would they not still depend on minds? At best, sans minds, we're talking about something like a set of marks on a piece of paper or a computer screen, or a set of recorded sounds or something like that.

If rules apply, they apply regardless of whether anyone is around to observe. The tree that falls in the middle of the forest makes a sound even if no one is around to hear it.

In other words, how could something even be a rule without someone thinking about it as such? How do rules apply without mentality involved? Explain how that would work.

Gravity works, its always worked, even though it was not conceptualized until 1687. A rule describes what we experience in the world, and it works regardless of whether or not anyone is available to witness it.

So you're not making any distinction between linguistic rules and physical laws?

I am not talking about linguistic rules...?

But that's what the conversation was about. That's what Sapentia was responding about, and what I responded to him about.

Gota ya, my bad.

I didn't change the subject, it's more that I am 'joining the dots' in a way you're not expecting.

Regarding the two statements which I said were in conflict: the first says 'I can't believe all of these facts ... require a mind there judging them to be true or false' but the next paragraph acknowledges that 'a realist can straightforwardly acknowledge that any rational proposition, whether mathematical or otherwise, can only be grasped by a rational mind, and is not independent in that sense.'

So first you say, you can't believe that there needs to be a mind to judge facts, but then in the second, you acknowledge that a rational proposition can only be grasped by a mind. That is what I said 'appeared to be a contradiction'.

At any rate, this point is very close to the nub of the argument. I will try and illustrate it with the example below:

There is a passage in an interesting account of the encounter between Tagore (Indian mystic) and Einstein (Western scientist). Einstein says, at one point:

I believe, for instance, that the Pythagorean theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of man.

So what I'm arguing is that, even though this is true in one sense, the Pythagorean theorem can nevertheless only be grasped by a rational intelligence. And the same can be said for much of the 'furniture of reason' - logical laws, natural numbers, and the like, which are only perceptible to a rational mind. So whatever we know is underpinned by the rational (intuitive, symbolic, and other) aspects of mind, and is not truly 'mind-independent' in the sense that Einstein's scientific realism depicts it.

Now my view is that modern philosophy, since Descartes, Newton, etc, has lost sight of the fundamental role of mind in the apprehension of reality. This is because the way mind was construed as 'res cogitans', the 'invisible thinking substance', then negated by philosophical materialism, and subsequently 'explained' in terms of molecular and evolutionary biology. In all of this, 'mind' was relegated to a secondary degree of reality - relegated to the subjective. But it is only by virtue of the mind that we have any knowledge of the world at all.

Through scientific measurements and conventions, regularities are identified and exploited which provide the great powers that science possesses. Those are quantifiable and objective in a relative sense, but the idea that such knowledge is or can be absolute is the error of scientism.

So when you ask:

Are you denying objective reality?

What I'm denying is that 'objective reality' exists in its own right, separately to any subjective knowledge, experience and perception of it. But I'm not arguing that the world exists 'in the mind'. The objective and subjective are poles within experience - they are not absolutes, but are mutually dependent (much as anticipated by Kant's Critique of Pure Reason).

Only if you're not using the base-2 number system. — Michael

No. Base is just a matter of notation.

Yes, and it states what it states in the English language as we currently understand it. To then try to interpret it by switching in a different language is to misinterpret it. — Michael

I'm doing no such thing. The sentences as you express them now in English are not equivalent, because they do not express equivalent propositions. This is shown by the fact that their truth conditions come apart in different worlds of evaluation.

And using everyday English, the statements "it is true that the cup is red" and "'the cup is red' is true" have the same truth conditions. — Michael

They do not, as I have repeatedly demonstrated.

This is just nonsense. If we have the two sentences 1) the cup is red and 2) the previous sentence is true then 2) is true iff 1) is true. It's that simple. — Michael

I can't help you if you're going to hold onto this. I have explained, patiently and in depth and detail, why this is not so. You are free to review the arguments again, since they are catalogued here. You are also free to continue to believe 'it's that simple,' but you are wrong.

The question, then, is whether or not propositions are sentence-dependent. If so, and if sentences are mind-dependent, then propositions are mind-dependent. And if truth is proposition-dependent then truth is mind-dependent. — Michael

Why would sentences be mind-dependent in any sense relevant to the debate? If I write a sentence on a piece of paper, then there is a sentence which doesn't depend on my mind or anyone else's. We (minds, that is) could all suddenly cease to exist, and the sentence would still be there.

Why would sentences be mind-dependent in any sense relevant to the debate? If I write a sentence on a piece of paper, then there is a sentence which doesn't depend on my mind or anyone else's. We (minds, that is) could all suddenly cease to exist, and the sentence would still be there. — Sapientia

Well, I might say that a sentence isn't simply a pattern of ink but a pattern of ink that expresses a proposition. And expressing a proposition isn't the sort of thing that ink can do when it isn't being read.

But I think it's a bit of a leap to go from "we talk about truth as if it's mind-independent" to "truth is mind-independent". — Michael

Yes, it would be. That wasn't my intention. It's just that what is meant by "truth" is important, since it can determine the logical consequences.

Maybe something akin to fictionalism or quasi realism is correct. — Michael

Maybe.

Well, I might say that a sentence isn't simply a pattern of ink but a pattern of ink that expresses a proposition. And expressing a proposition isn't the sort of thing that ink can do when it isn't being read. — Michael

I might also say that a sentence isn't simply a pattern of ink but a pattern of ink that expresses a proposition. But reading it and it expressing a proposition are not necessarily connected such that only by reading it, does it express a proposition.

I might also say that a sentence isn't simply a pattern of ink but a pattern of ink that expresses a proposition. But reading it has nothing to do with it expressing a proposition. — Sapientia

And I disagree. That a pattern of ink expresses a proposition just is that we have a particular kind of conceptual attitude towards that pattern of ink.

What is expressing a proposition to you? Is it a physical process that can occur in the absence of any kind of mental activity? What particles are involved, and in what way do they behave?

Or is it some non-physical (and non-mental) process? Then what is its ontology, and where's the evidence of such a thing?

Often when someone says something like that I just think that it's not worth bothering to even attempt communication with them. It always strikes me as akin to, say, if I owned a cab company, and someone were to approach me about a job, but then they say, "I don't even know what a car is." Sometimes it's just not worth bothering. — Terrapin Station

This is philosophy, and it's customary ask others to explain and justify the concepts they use. That's how we learn what the others are talking about, and what the others believe. If you're not interested ...

And I disagree. That a pattern of ink expresses a proposition just is that we have a particular kind of conceptual attitude towards that pattern of ink. — Michael

I don't think that the "have", which denotes the present, is necessary. I think that it would be sufficient that we had a particular kind of conceptual attitude towards that pattern of ink, and I think that this can be used to answer the question of whether it expresses a proposition. If it is the case that it expressed a proposition, then why would it no longer do so? For there to be propositions, it is required that they be produced, which requires producers. But once they have been produced, the producers are no longer needed. What has been produced is independent from that which produced it. We do not need to read them or maintain them in any way. What's done is done. We can pack our bags, go home, and die, and there will still be a sentence on a piece of paper that we turned into something meaningful. Something would have to change that for it to be otherwise, but what would - or could - that be?

What is expressing a proposition to you? Is it a physical process that occurs in the absence of any kind of brain activity? — Michael

It is what a sentence does when it has meaning. And a sentence can have meaning if it has been given meaning.

Unfortunately, a lot of people think that philosophy amounts to "playing stupid." (I can explain why a lot of people misinterpret it that way.) Philosophy really isn't playing stupid though. This is a case where either you're playing stupid or you effectively really are.

Even this statement which you make here, acts as evidence that there is no such thing as the world. — Metaphysician Undercover

No such thing as the world! That's a good one. >:O

I don't think that the "have", which denotes the present, is necessary. I think that it would be sufficient that we had a particular kind of conceptual attitude towards that pattern of ink, and that this can be used to answer the question of whether it expresses a proposition. If it is the case that it expressed a proposition, then why would it no longer be the case? For there to be propositions, it is required that they be produced, which requires producers. But once they have been produced, the producers are no longer needed. What has been produced is independent from that which produced it. We do not need to read them or maintain them in any way. What's done is done. We can pack our bags, go home, and die, and there will still be a sentence on a piece of paper that we turned into something mraningful. Something would have to change that for it to be otherwise, but what would - or could - that be? — Sapientia

But what is the ontology of expressing a proposition? Is it a physical process that occurs in the absence of mental activity? It seems to me that your position requires that it is (unless you want to argue for mind-independent non-physical processes, but again, what is the nature of such a thing, and where's the evidence?).

If it is the case that it expressed a proposition, then why would it no longer be the case?

You wouldn't say that because the ball fell then it's still falling even after it lands. So why would you say that because the ink expressed a proposition then it's still expressing a proposition even after it's no longer being read?

It is what a sentence does when it has meaning. And a sentence can have meaning if it has been given meaning.

And what does it mean for ink to have meaning? What is the ontology of having meaning? Is it a physical process that occurs even in the absence of mental activity?

I say it isn't. That ink has meaning just is that we have a particular cognitive attitude towards that ink. Meaning isn't some mind-independent physical (or mystical) substance that attaches itself to carbon (or whatever it is that ink is made of), and nor is it a kind of physical (or mystical) behaviour that carbon engages in.

This is wrong because determining what proposition is expressed by the utterance of a sentence requires knowing something about the context of utterance. — Mongrel

What do you mean here? Do you mean that knowing what proposition is expressed by the utterance of a sentence requires knowing something about the context of utterance? Or do you mean something else? Perhaps something more than just that.

You seem to either be 1) thinking about this from the perspective of someone else, and assuming that it is they who determine what proposition is expressed; or 2) using "determining" as a synonym for "knowing".

Say you walk in a library and you see a poster pinned to the wall that reads "Physicists are imported." As you contemplate the meaning, a host of fascinating insights open up for you. You subsequently find that the poster is part of an art installation in which the artist is having posters made from computer generated sentences. This is one of them.

You think to yourself: "See! The sentence expressed a proposition all on its own... without any help from a human mind."

No. It didn't. You derived a proposition from it by projecting a context of utterance. — Mongrel

So it was meaningless, in the sense that it was never given a meaning. It can mean something to someone, but that wouldn't be it's meaning. Although that would be a meaning, and it would be it's meaning for that someone.