It's one a major interpration of Kant, though significantly different than might Wayfarer suggest.

Under this account of Kant, noumena is just an empty notion of our critical metaphysical thought. We posit it to demonstrate the shortcomings accounts of things independent of how they appear and conceptually relate to us.

Kant was responding to accounts speaking of forces of our world, yet which would never appear to us, but would somehow affect us. In Kant's sights are the theists, the mystics, etc., who would try to suppose a transcendent force which explained us, but was inexplicable in our concepts.

In this respect, Kant has no problem with objects existing before or without us, he's only making the point things must be explicable in our concepts. Kant, as an emprical realist, has no problem with My Everest existing at a particular height before any humans measure it.

It's like saying: "in order to know that I can't see the back of this screen, I must know that I'm not looking at the back of this screen. But I can only know that if I know what it looks like. Therefore, I must be able to see the back of this screen in order to say that I can't see it." — StreetlightX

I don’t think your argument is synonymous with the original argument I present. I’ll put your argument in premise form:

P1) In order to know whether or not I can see the back of this screen, I must know that I'm not looking at the back of this screen.
P2) I can only know whether or not I’m looking at the back of this screen” if I know what the back of the screen looks like.
C) Therefore, I must be able to see the back of this screen in order to say that I can't see it.

I think this can be refuted in a way that my first argument cannot be (Or at least I don't think this particular refutation would apply to the argument I have given. I could very well be wrong; however, the only counterargument I've seen is simply to assign the realist position as a self-evident axiom). Let me know if I have created a straw man out of your argument:

P1) The phone is a three-dimensional object.
P2) The side of a phone that has a screen is the “front.”
P3) If an object has a “front,” it is entailed that the object also has a “back.”
P4) “Front” and “back” are meaningless concepts if they are isolated from one another; this is evidenced by the fact that the terms are correlatives. We also see this with terms like “up” and “down,” “near” and “far,” and “left” and “right.” (The former term is meaningless without reference to the latter term, and the latter term is meaningless without reference to the former term).
P5) If I identify an object as having a “front,” I simultaneously assign a “back” to that object.
P6) I know that I am seeing the “front” of the phone because (i) I have identified the “front” of the phone as being the side of the phone with the screen and (ii) I am currently perceiving a screen, so I must be perceiving the“front” of the phone.”
P7) I know that I am not looking at the“back” of the phone, because I am looking at a screen.
P8) The side of a phone with a screen is the“front” of the phone.
C) Therefore, I know that I am looking at the “front” of the phone and not the “back” of the phone.

Right, and that axiom must be taken as a “given.” However, I wouldn’t say that giving the realist position the status of axiom renders it “off limits” to the skeptic who is unconvinced of its supposed “self-evidence.” — PessimisticIdealism

Agreed. The relevant issues to my mind would be about what logical consequences follow from it (e.g., is it coherent or does it lead to inconsistency or absurdity?), what it is useful for (e.g., science, everyday communication), and also how alternative definitions fare (e.g., idealism).

I found an interesting statement by Einstein related to this:

"The physical world is real." That is supposed to be the fundamental hypothesis. What does "hypothesis" mean here? For me, a hypothesis is a statement, whose truth must be assumed for the moment, but whose meaning must be raised above all ambiguity. The above statement appears to me, however, to be, in itself, meaningless, as if one said: "The physical world is cock-a-doodle-do." It appears to me that the "real" is an intrinsically empty, meaningless category (pigeon hole), whose monstrous importance lies only in the fact that I can do certain things in it and not certain others. — Einstein, 1918

I basically agree. Practicality and efficiency render skepticism unhelpful in terms of getting on with our daily lives; however, this wouldn't by any means render the initial argument null and void.

How do we know that Mt. Everest existed before we knew about it? — Marchesk

Glad I saw this. Last I looked it read differently.

"Mt. Everest" picks out a particular mountain. That mountain existed in it's entirety prior to being named.

I don’t even know what any of this means and why I should try to understand what appears to be unfounded speculation using terminology that hasn’t been defined clearly (there isn’t even an attempt to state what is meant by ‘being’, ‘independent’ and/or ‘known’, let alone how they are relatable in the context they are set out in).

"Mt. Everest" picks out a particular mountain. That mountain existed in it's entirety prior to being named. — creativesoul

That doesn't really answer @Marchesky's question. How do we know that that mountain existed before we knew about it?

My own take on philosophical realism is to start by assuming scientific realism, which presumably most philosophical realists will accept. But by what objective/independent measure does this collection of atoms count as a single object (e.g. the chair). By what objective/independent measure is the ship that Theseus leaves in the same ship he returns in? In both cases I don't think there is one. Accepting that there are things that exist independently of us (e.g the fundamentals of the Standard Model) doesn't entail being a philosophical realist about the everyday macroscopic objects we talk about. I'm not a reductionist, and so I can say that the ship that Theseus leaves in is the same ship he returns in, even though it has been rebuilt piecemeal throughout the journey. If it's the same ship, but not the same matter, then the ship is more than just the independently existing matter.

Being the same ship, and even being a ship, depends in part on us; on our perception/conception of the (independent) material world. And that's an antirealist view.

This is fine as far as it goes but it doesn't address my main objection: that it's not something about X which we must know ("know X when X is not being known"), but something about knowledge. So a realist - on my reading anyway - wouldn't say that

"In order to know whether or not "the being of X is independent of its being known," one must “know X when X is not being known.”

They would instead say something like:

"In order to know whether or not "the being of X is independent of its being known," one must "know the limits and scope of knowledge".

The problem is the assumption that it is something about X that must be known in order to secure its being-independant. But this is not the case. 'What one must know' lies on the side of knowledge, not on the side of the thing.

Would it also be fair to say that a ‘realist’ isn’t dogmatic and therefore a ‘realist’ is more or less someone who leans more towards a ‘realist’ take on the world?

I still find it strange that people think either this or that philosophical perspective is some in unbreakable unity of truth when it’s little more than a perspective tool. A so-called ‘realist’ must necessarily hold some inkling of opposing perspectives as functional, to some extent, or they wouldn’t lean toward ‘realism’ they’d just simply state their position without the inclination to name it.

Any profession toward ‘-ism’ means you hold the opposite perspective in view as a worthwhile perspective does it not?

I don't have much to say about this.

a realist - on my reading anyway - wouldn't say that. — StreetlightX

I don't think you're defending what the OP is criticizing.

I'm challenging the idea that a realist would agree with the OP's presentation of their position. So yeah, you're right, but only to the degree that what the OP is criticising is something of a strawman.

It a round abouts way that was what I was inferring. There are flavours of realism rather than a church of realism.

In the general view realism is just saying ‘When I walk out of a room I don’t believe the room ceases to exist, although in my immediate sensible experiencing it does - in some sense of the word - cease to be ‘appreciated’ as concretely there.

The OP had framed some extreme form of realism I doubt many would align to unless they were only using that definition within a specific context.

In the general view realism is just saying ‘When I walk out of a room I don’t believe the room ceases to exist, although in my immediate sensible experiencing it does - in some sense of the word - cease to be ‘appreciated’ as concretely there. — I like sushi

I think the idea the OP is making is that to believe that something continues to exist when it's not being seen we must have some idea of what it would mean for it to exist when it's not being seen. When we imagine a chair still existing when it's not being seen, what are we imagining? Presumably not nothing. Do we picture a chair in the room (and no person present)? But then that's just a counterfactual (disembodied) experience.

Do we picture a chair in the room (and no person present)? But then that's just a counterfactual (disembodied) experience. — Michael

That would be naive realism. The chair exists pretty much as we perceive it when we're not around to perceive it. But that obviously has problems, which were noted a long time ago.

We could instead say the lump of matter we consider a chair continues to exist. That's more defensible. But what makes it a chair? Are chairs real? Not the matter itself but the object we call a chair? That's harder to defend, since chairs are a cultural artifact. If humans didn't exist, there would be no chairs to sit in.

But what about mountains? Here it gets murky, because humans don't make mountains. They're already there. But how do we categorize a mountain, single it out, and measure it? Was Everest the tallest mountain before anyone measured its height? What gives tallest its meaning in this case, since the measurement depends on the criteria for being tallest mountain?

We see this problem with whether Pluto should be considered a planet. Nature doesn't care. But we try to be precise with whatever classification scheme works best for orbiting bodies. But then again that implies there are joints to nature science tries to carve at. And on it goes.

"Mt. Everest" picks out a particular mountain. That mountain existed in it's entirety prior to being named. — creativesoul

I agree, but where does nature draw the line on what is Mt. Everest and what isn't?

As for the OP, how do we know it existed before we were around? I think there are good scientific realist reasons for saying so, but regardless a realist needs to defend the assertion that things can exist without us knowing and not just state it.

If another person told you about Mt. Everest, then you'd have to first believe that that person and their observations exist independently of you for you to then understand that that there is something else that you don't know that they are referring to. If I use their descriptions and go to where their observations lead me, then I will find Mt. Everest. How can that be in a world other than a realist world?

How would a solipsist mind come to imagine a realist world in which I need information from others to experience what they experienced?

In this respect, Kant has no problem with objects existing before or without us, he's only making the point things must be explicable in our concepts. Kant, as an emprical realist, has no problem with My Everest existing at a particular height before any humans measure it. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Right, but then this leads to the Meillassoux critique that dinosaurs existed (not really). So we can empirically say humans evolved from earlier life forms, but since we weren't around, we can't assert this to be true. It only appears that way to us, because that's how human minds carve up the world. And thus we can't say anything true outside of ourselves. Science is only concerned with how the world correlates to us, and not how it is.

I find that hugely problematic. Anyway, it's certainly not a realist position.

I basically agree. Practicality and efficiency render skepticism unhelpful in terms of getting on with our daily lives; however, this wouldn't by any means render the initial argument null and void. — PessimisticIdealism

Right, the argument shows that one can't know that realism is true (via contradiction).

Interestingly, we can see what is going on here via the earlier hypothetical of the apple. We can posit that no-one in Bob's world, including Bob, knows that the apple is there. That demonstrates the realist premise since, in the hypothetical, the apple exists independently of being known to exist. But it is also impossible for any actor in that world to know that the apple independently exists at precisely those times that they don't know it exists.

So my only disagreement is with your final conclusion. I think realism is the operating assumption for everyday communication and the growth of knowledge (and is therefore tenable) but is not, itself, something that is known to be true.

So my only disagreement is with your final conclusion. I think realism is the operating assumption for everyday communication and the growth of knowledge (and is therefore tenable) but is not, itself, something that is known to be true. — Andrew M

I should probably alter the conclusion to say something along the lines of: “The realist position is not self-evident because it is a synthetic proposition that requires experiential evidence that the realist cannot hope to provide without contradicting himself. Therefore, the realist must base this “axiom” on his faith in the continuity of nature alone.”

I basically agree. Practicality and efficiency render skepticism unhelpful in terms of getting on with our daily lives; however, this wouldn't by any means render the initial argument null and void. — PessimisticIdealism

The initial argument is null and void because, as others have pointed out, the realist does not have to accept your burden of proof. All you did was formulate a basic skeptical argument, and most people, realists included, already accept that skepticism cannot be rigorously eliminated. But that doesn't make it the default position. Why should it be the default position?

P1) That which lies within my consciousness is what I have immediate certainty of. (i.e. I am certain that what is presented in my consciousness is present in my consciousness—a tautology, but nevertheless certain).
P2) The foundation of a philosophical system should be based on that which is self-evident or most certain, in order to ensure the stability of the system as it grows in size. If we start from uncertain premises, we cannot be certain as to the system’s structural soundness.
C1) Therefore, that which lies within consciousness is an appropriate starting point for philosophical inquiry.
P3) It is neither self-evident nor certain that “the being of X is independent of its being known.”
C2) Therefore, philosophy should not begin with the assumption that “the being of X is independent of its being known.”

What kind of realist are you then?

Science is only concerned with how the world correlates to us, and not how it is. — Marchesk

Is there a correlation between us and the world? If so, then isn't science getting at what is?

What are the viable alternatives? Are there only two - solipsism and realism?

If so, then we've narrowed it down to just possibilities.

If solipsism were the case, then why does it seem like realism is the case, and not solipsism? How can a solipsist mind arrive at the idea of there being a world outside of my experience of it? It seems to me that only if there really is a world that my experiences are about, would my solipsist, infant mind come to the realization that realism is the case.

We see just that occurring naturally. We are born solipsists and only through our trying to make some sense of our experiences do we come to realize object permanence - the idea that your mother still exists when she leaves the room.

So it seems that for solipsism to be the case, one would have to explain why it seems like there is an external world.

Is there a correlation between us and the world? If so, then isn't science getting at what is? — Harry Hindu

Yes, I'm a scientific realist. I was just repeating the correlationist argument Meillassoux critiques.

What are the viable alternatives? Are there only two - solipsism and realism? — Harry Hindu

Add transcendental and Berkeley's idealism to the list. Skepticism is that we simply can't know, so that would be fifth one.

But I agree about solipsism, why does it appear as if a world and other people exist?

Add transcendental and Berkeley's idealism to the list. Skepticism is that we simply can't know, so that would be fifth one. — Marchesk

Do either of the first two that you mentioned hold a view other than there are things outside of our experiences, or that there aren't? For a transcendental or Berkeley idealist, are there things that exist independent of their mind, whether it be other minds, or other bodies? The point is that it doesn't matter whether the external stuff is other ideas, or material, or whatever - only that there is stuff that exists independent of your experience, or not at all - what that stuff is made of is irrelevant at this point.

As for the skeptical alternative, that would require a clear definition of what it means to know anything.

I'm saying it doesn't lead to that, at least under this account of Kant.

Kant isn't rejecting existence of things before humans here, just the existence of things which are beyond human concepts. All Kant is saying is the world before our existence must reflect our concepts, since it is in conceptual relationship with us. In this Kant agrees with what is thought of as a realist in this thread, out in the world, before humans exist, there is a dinosaur or mountain which we may be known, one reflected in our concepts when we are aware of it.

Meillassoux is right, but has placed the problem in the wrong spot. The correlationist problem is really in Kent's metaphysical account of how objects are themselves.

Kamt doesn't make the suggestion nothing exists before our experiences, but forms a correlate supposition it is concepts which make something so. Kant is missing the metaphysical account of self-identity. He tries to deny noumena, rather than recognise there is something independent of any phenomenal form which constitutes the being of objects. Kant is missing understanding of how there is a thing (noumena), the existence is not phenomenal concepts we experience, which defines the forms and object takes. His problem is not denying emprical objects exist before humans, but rather failing to understanding how things exist and take the form they do. (i.e. not by conceptual form, but by the independent being of an object, which we may be aware of).